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i 
ABSTRACT 
This original, reflective practitioner study researched whether professionalising 
IA could be successfully achieved, in line with the UK Cyber Security Strategy 
expectations.  The context was an observed changing dominant narrative from 
IA to cybersecurity.  The research provides a dialectical relationship with the 
past to improve IA understanding.   
The Academic contribution: Using archival and survey data, the research 
traced the origins of the term IA and its practitioner usage, in the context of the 
increasing use of the neologism of cybersecurity, contributing to knowledge 
through historical research.  Discourse analysis of predominantly UK 
government reports, policy direction, legislative and regulatory changes, 
reviewing texts to explore the functions served by specific constructions, mainly 
Information Security (Infosec) vs IA.  The Researcher studied how accounts 
were linguistically constructed in terms of the descriptive, referential and 
rhetorical language used, and the function that serves.  The results were 
captured in a chronological review of IA ontology. 
The Practitioner contribution: Through an initial Participatory Action 
Research (PAR) public sector case study, the researcher sought to make sense 
of how the IA profession operates and how it was maturing.  Data collection 
from self-professed IA practitioners provided empirical evidence. The 
researcher undertook evolutionary work analysing survey responses and 
developed theories from the analysis to answer the research questions.  The 
researcher observed a need to implement a unified approach to Information 
Governance (IG) on a large organisation-wide scale.  Using a constructivist 
grounded theory the researcher developed a new theoretical framework - 
i3GRC™ (Integrated and Informed Information Governance, Risk, and 
Compliance) - based on what people actually say and do within the IA 
profession.  i3GRC™ supports the required Information Protection (IP) through 
maturation from IA to holistic IG.  Again, using PAR, the theoretical framework 
was tested through a private sector case study, the resultant experience 
strengthening the bridge between academia and practitioners. 
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The person who speaks and writes precisely in a professional context is not 
being pedantic: she is being respectful of her interlocutors.  She’s being a 
professional by thinking clearly about exactly what she means and then 
expressing herself as exactly as language will allow (Kabay, undated).  
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Part 1 – IA: Introduction, Literature Review, and Methodology 
 
The Introduction provides context for the research area. 
 
In the Literature Review, the fundamental principles of, and elements pertaining 
to, IA ontology is discussed in order to frame the professionalism discussion.  
The available different models for IA are evaluated. 
 
The research strategy is discussed, the research paradigms are examined and 
the underlying ontological, epistemological, ethics and methodologies for IS 
research are selected.  The aims, objectives and general assumptions are 
explained. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Context 
 
1.1.1 In 2009, the UK government set about an agenda to professionalise 
Information Assurance (IA) as observed in objective 4 from the UK 
Cyber Security Strategy: “building the cross -cutting knowledge, skills 
and capability to underpin all cybersecurity objectives” (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2011d).  At the same time, UK Government policy shifted from 
reference to IA to reference to cybersecurity, in line with the prevailing 
dominant narrative (NAO, 2013, p.12).  It is interesting to note that 
Russian narrative focuses on information space rather than 
cyberspace (Kingova, 2013).  The UK vision was:  “… for the UK in 
2015 to derive huge economic and social value from a vibrant, resilient 
and secure cyberspace, where our actions, guided by our core values 
for liberty, fairness, transparency and the rule of law, enhance 
prosperity, national security and a strong society” (UK Cabinet Office, 
2011d).  In support of this endeavour, the UK Government released 
£650 million worth of funding to support the National Cyber Security 
Programme (ISM, 2010). 
1.1.2 However, by March 2016, Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) provided commentary advising that despite spending nearly 
£1 billion on cybersecurity, the expected benefits had not been 
“There is nothing new under the sun, but there is something old we do not know.” 
Ecclesiastes 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
2 | P a g e  
realised (Gothard, 2016).  A senior public sector IT chief was quoted in 
Computer Weekly as stating that: 
Security is an area of very significant challenge for government 
officials.  We don’t do security assurance in proportion to risk.  
There will be a rebellion soon because we can’t get anything 
done (Hall, 2011a). 
1.1.3 From the quote, it could be interpreted that industry overdoes security 
and that this hampers business progress.  McClurg identified this 
phenomenon when he stated: “The norm for the 21st century security 
executive is protecting all the business assets all the time” (McClurg, 
2005 cited in Dunkel, 2010).  This situation often arises out of a lack of 
understanding of the application of effective risk management. 
1.1.4 Year on year, through the Verizon findings (Verizon, 2006 - 2016), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) surveys (running since 2000), 
Ponemon Institute research (Ponemon Institute LLC 2007, 2011-2014) 
and other research (Gillon et al., 2011), the findings fluctuate between 
identifying that either those responsible are largely outsiders (hackers 
coming through networks or social engineering of employees) or 
insiders (disenfranchised employees).  The latter correlates with social 
behaviour in recessionary times (op.cit.). 
1.1.5 In 2016, Verizon conducted their tenth annual Data Breach 
Investigation Report (DBIR) (Verizon, 2017). In 2010, the DBIR 
(Verizon, 2011) showed that data loss through cyber-attacks had 
decreased sharply.  However, by the end of 2014, the total number of 
breaches was higher than ever, where the losses of information were 
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experienced both electronically and physically, largely through human 
error (Verizon, 2015).  In 2016, the greatest volume of breaches was 
perpetrated by outsiders (75 per cent).  As a sector, whilst they were 
managing Capital Risk, the ramifications of the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007-2008 continued to be experienced alongside ongoing data 
breaches.  Research showed that the UK’s major banks and lenders – 
including Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, NatWest, 
Nationwide, and Santander –reported multiple incidents to the ICO 
(Ashford, 2015; Vijayan, 2015). 
1.1.6 These reports continually emphasised the need to remain vigilant in 
implementing and maintaining good IA practices.  To do so, however, 
they need to understand the who, what, why and when of the required 
actions – which necessitates deeper understanding than sound bites 
from the news media.  Stevens (2009) addressed this: 
We need to challenge our assumptions about what is expected of 
public authorities; about how we procure IT and from whom; 
about whether we should be collecting or sharing personal 
information at all.  We need bold thinking, and those who do it 
need to know they will be supported if there are failures, not 
pilloried by the media and left out in the cold by their managers.  
It’s innovation that will put an end to our data loss problems, and 
build a platform for 21st century information management. 
1.1.7 2014 was a significant year for breach activity; 2015 was an equally 
active year with several companies suffering as a result of ethical 
standards failures.  2016 and 2017 saw increased ransomware 
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causing avoidable system harm.  The belief that the private sector 
would “spontaneously generate the solutions needed for cybersecurity 
and minimize the need for government action” is proving to be 
misguided and lacking in evidence of success.  Cyber insecurity (or 
lack of integrity and assurance) reflects what has been allowed, not 
just by omission, to grow. (Schneier, 2017). 
1.1.8 Previously, a commonplace audit and post-breach or incident finding 
had been that employees (90 per cent) were a far greater threat to IA 
than outsiders (Kabay, 2002).  However, most individuals are 
experiencing some form of information overload.  The ongoing 
increase in breaches and the volume of data being extracted from 
organisations should not be occurring given the available mechanisms 
to protect the information.  This reality has resulted in a significant 
increase in lawsuits which are targeting directors for their lack of 
application of duty of care by employing the available technological 
measures to adequately protect information (Mooney, 2015; Edwards, 
2015; Schwartz, 2015). 
1.1.9 None of this represents a new phenomenon.  The first significant data 
breach publicly disclosed was in 1984 when the global credit 
information corporation known as TRW Inc. (now called Experian) was 
hacked and ninety million records were stolen.  In 1986, sixteen million 
records were stolen from Revenue Canada.  In a disappointing 
manifestation of the risk of being destined to repeat the same 
mistakes, in October 2015, there was another Experian related breach 
(Cunningham, 2015). 
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1.1.10 In June 2011, Microsoft published a paper regarding the difficulty of 
using the available statistics given that, in particular, “for rare 
phenomenon we are measuring a signal weaker than the noise in 
which it is embedded”.  Self-reported numbers may be used without 
screening for embellishment or exaggeration and this produces 
“estimates that cannot be relied upon” (Florencio and Herley, 2011, 
p.2).  This is less of a phenomenon in the field of IA as those 
responsible for ensuring the protection of information assets are rarely 
likely to contribute to surveys honestly or accurately, irrespective of 
their purported anonymous nature.  To do so, in and of itself, could 
result in an admission of a weakness that should never be exposed.  
Such conundrums are manifold in the area of focus for this research. 
1.1.11 A key phrase, harnessed by the InfoSec practitioner and academic 
communities (Sasse, Lacey) during the preceding decade, particularly 
following on from the slew of data breaches in 2008 and 2009, was 
“human factors”.  “Human factors” have been an area of Information 
Systems (IS) research for many years, crossing the disciplines of 
economics, psychiatry, psychology, public policy, sociology, and 
anthropology and has been the subject of much academic research 
(Checkland, 1991).  The Tavistock Institute made reference to the 
socio-technical inter-relationship in system design in 1949. Mumford 
and Beekman (1994, p.32) stressed that: “If a technical system is 
created at the expense of a social system, the results obtained will be 
sub-optimal”.  However, “human factors” had not been embedded in 
the practitioner realm of InfoSec nor IA until the early 21st century. 
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1.1.12 It is important to reflect on human na ture as “this is a solid foundation 
for any practice of business management” of which InfoSec 
management is one.  Thus, by default, so is IA (Stein, 2010, p.139).  In 
the majority of the referenced material, IA specialists concur that 
security depends on people more than on technology (Ashenden, 
2007; Blyth and Kovacich, 2001 and 2006; Collins, 1997; Glass, 1998; 
Virgo 2011). 
1.1.13 The speed at which business, government, and citizens operate within 
the 21st century can result in context not always being understood by 
all participants and the resulting confusion can hamper the success of 
the required outcomes.  Equally, the growth of IT, and the global and 
largely instant availability of information, as a result, has not 
necessarily made for a more intelligent, nor secure, human race 
(Stamper, 1973, p.1; Williams, 2014). 
1.1.14 Both Lacey (2013a) and Schneier (2013b) held a discourse with 
regard to the long standing people, process and technology (PPT) 
triangle of operational expectation.  Both believed that a rebalancing 
was required.  Lacey argued that the IT security (ITSEC) world had 
become so complicated that we needed less in the way of people and 
process, and more technology.  Schneier concurred that more 
technology was now required in order to address the volume of data 
created. 
1.1.15 With regard to IP related roles, the task is invariably to provide 
reassurance as to the measures taken in order to apply known best 
practice for securing the information and for not reusing it beyond the 
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boundaries set by available legislation.  However, reality dictates that 
there can be no such thing as 100 per cent security, nor can there be 
a 100 per cent risk-free situation (in any event).  Thus it is unlikely that 
anyone can provide a 100 per cent degree of assurance with regard to 
their IP measures.  Similarly, there are, no “free” internet products and 
services.  The companies involved are seeking to turn a profit, to raise 
more funds, to please shareholders.  They are generating revenue, 
usually at the expense of personal data, which can be seen to be a 
prized and valuable commodity (Best, 1996; Ashenden, 2007).  For 
example, in April 2015 with the release of an age-guessing tool by 
Microsoft which went viral, the clear intention of the uptake was to 
gather geospatial data as well as personal metadata on each 
individual being deceived by the vanity of the appealing application 
(Vaas, 2015). 
1.1.16 This context requires significant skill from the IA practitioners.  IA must 
be maintained throughout the lifecycle of a system, as threats change 
with the shifting political or business environment, vulnerabilities 
appear and disappear.  Thus, the configuration of the system changes 
and new weaknesses are discovered, and the impact of systems 
failure changes as dependency on a system develops. 
1.1.17 The researcher contends that there has not been a compelling enough 
event to encourage sufficient adoption of the required practices, 
despite the increasing volumes of significant breaches.  It is vital to 
appreciate the breadth of meaning for the term IA.  As InfoSec is the 
forerunner for IA, without a depth of understanding of this terminology, 
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there is no foundation upon which to base communication and 
successful IA implementation, in neither the present nor the future.  As 
Hutton (2008, p.17) wrote: 
IA is as much a problem of culture and human behaviour as it is 
a technical one.  Without formal processes, procedures, audit 
and an overview of the situation, your information is vulnerable to 
organised crime, casual loss, and well-meaning staff who do not 
understand the risks associated with some of their current 
working practices. 
1.2 Motivating Scenario and Problem Statement 
 
1.2.1 As a longstanding practitioner in the field, the researcher had been 
observing a lack of IA understanding that was inhibiting the collective 
ability of professionals across the public, private and third sectors and 
academia to adequately protect the information assets entrusted to 
them in order to ensure that they maintained the UK (and beyond) as 
a safe place in which to operate.   
1.2.2 An article in the winter of 2008 highlighted research in the UK that 
claimed that 40 per cent of senior management respondents had little 
or no understanding of what the term IA actually meant (Hutton, 2008).  
This was after a number of years of work by various industry bodies to 
provide advice and guidance including the creation of a national 
strategy for IA.  Senior management lack of understanding with regard 
to the constituent terminology has continued to be identified as an 
“The enemy of knowledge is the illusion of knowledge.” Stephen Hawking 
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issue of concern (Cornish et al., 2011; Holtham, 2015).  Thus, despite 
the launch of the first UK National IA Strategy (UK CSIA, 2003), 
revised in 2007 (UK Cabinet Office, 2007a), accompanied by clear 
direction to government departments from the Cabinet Secretary, 
there have been security breaches in all sectors, including significant 
breaches of the UK Data Protection Act during 2007 and 2008 
(Burton, 2011). 
1.2.3 Central government repeatedly articulated intentions for the UK to be 
the safest place to transact online (UK Cabinet Office, 2009b; UK 
Cabinet Office, 2011d; UK HMG, 2016b).  However, the underlying 
implications are of flaws in the approach.  This was further evidenced 
in subsequent research identifying that over 52 per cent of UK 
businesses were subject to a data breach in 2016 (Beaming, 2017).  
1.2.4 This resonated with the researcher’s own experience and motivated 
the commencement of research to investigate possible causes of the 
lack of IA understanding that appeared to be at the core of an inability 
to improve InfoSec and deliver the required Information Protection 
(IP), the ultimate outcome of IA activities.  Note: IP is a term that will 
be used throughout this thesis to denote the overarching theme.  IA 
and Information Governance (IG) are outcomes of successful 
achievement of IP.  This level of abstraction, linguistic interpretation, 
and translation, is central to the research. 
1.2.5 This research also analysed the likely success of the IA 
professionalism agenda in the context of the seven dimensions of 
professionalism (Brock, 2006), Lord Benson’s nine obligations (1992) 
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and the work of  Evans (2002, 2008) and Evetts (2003), but also in the 
context of an observed increasing shift in the dominant narrative to the 
perceived all-embracing term of cybersecurity, being adopted across 
all sectors at the sacrifice of IA..  In particular, the researcher was 
concerned that the term IA was at risk of being subsumed by the 
neologism of cybersecurity. 
1.2.6 The research kept pace with the current government, its impact and 
progress as they pertain to IA.  In May 2009, a change of UK 
government created an unstable and chaotic operational state, for the 
subsequent six months.  There was a consequent change of political 
direction on the collection, processing, use, and sharing of personal 
data in ways that had been previously agreed upon.  The result was a  
cessation of a number of cross-government IT related projects 
(Shanes, 2011).  This was not wholly down to cost.  The political 
dynamics had an impact on the direction of information management 
(IM) within the context of public sector governance. With the high 
volume outsourced usage of private sector companies for delivery of 
UK government public sector services, they were equally impacted. 
1.2.7 There is an available body of literature regarding IA implementation, 
from both practitioners and academics.  However, there appeared to 
be a collective amnesia regarding previous research, publications, 
available material relating to IA forming the basis of a successful 
cybersecurity protection framework (Cornish et al., 2011, p.viii and 
p.30).  The research sought to carry out a historical analysis reviewing 
the constituent parts, influences, and changes over time; then 
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undertaking synthesis evaluating whether IA remains fit for purpose; 
and finally providing a framework for future IA implementation. 
1.2.8 As is often the case with longitudinal research, the objectives changed 
as a result of reflection on the findings and the available IA research; 
ongoing review of key publications and reports, shift in the dominant 
narrative, as well as a change in personal circumstances arising from 
undertaking a full-time global security policy and risk governance 
executive role in a large IT services provider between November 2011 
and July 2015. 
1.2.9 In the researchers’ experience, for as much as the volume of available 
information has increased, the level of IA understanding has been 
decreasing.  This has had a critical impact on the effectiveness of 
implementation of the specific and necessary requirements.  The lack 
of IA understanding is potentially central to the cause of the skills crisis 
(Shah, 2013; ISACA, 2014; Millman, 2016).  In February 2017, Sir 
Vince Cable discussed related history identifying low adoption of 
apprenticeships in the context of poor decisions taken with regard to 
educational standards, confirming that had been discussion about a 
skills crisis since shortly after the second world war (Cable, 2017). 
1.2.10 The level of public confidence in the capacity and capability of all 
sectors (public, private, third) to protect their information remains 
diminished, reputations are tarnished and levels of trust remain low 
(Seldon, 2009).  The researcher contended that lack of IA 
understanding was putting at risk the successful maturation of the UK 
information society (InfoSoc).  If ignorance continues to prevail, IP will 
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not succeed which will damage not only the UK economy but risks the 
safety and security of many citizens worldwide. 
1.2.11 The problem statement is thus: IA practitioners do not understand 
what the term IA means.  This represents a barrier to effective IA 
implementation, inhibiting all sectors to adequately protect information 
assets in order to ensure maintenance of the UK (and beyond) as a 
safe place in which to transact online, in alignment with the UK Cyber 
Security Strategy. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
1.3.1 In implementation terms, IA theory has been largely based on the 
independent and individual views of practitioners, often channelled by 
the speech acts of either military or governmental channels but with no 
reference to source definitions in order to maintain consistency across 
organisational boundaries.  The author sought to research whether 
professionalising IA could be successfully achieved, in line with the UK 
Cyber Security Strategy expectations, providing a dialectical 
relationship with the past to improve IA understanding.   
1.3.2 The research aimed to tackle this wicked problem from a multiple of 
different angles, providing a solution from the IG space, rather than 
adding to the existing IA space.  Key characteristics of wicked 
problems are that they straddle a number of disciplines, are difficult to 
define, are socially complex, involve changing behaviour, are often 
multi-causal and hardly ever sit conveniently within the responsibility of 
any one organisation (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p.161). 
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1.3.3 The purpose of this research was to evidence IA understanding, to 
provide a contribution to both the existing ontology and to the 
enhancement of practice in an attempt to identify improvements for the 
future (Remenyi, 2014, p.xii) and to improve policy making and 
professional practice, rather than to pursue political goals, per se 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.17).  A guiding principle applied 
was that in order to comprehend the future, we must understand the 
past.  [Note: This work is a study of the ontology of IA and its effective 
implementation, rather than InfoSec.] 
1.3.4 The objectives were fourfold: i) to improve professional practice in IA 
and enhance the understanding of the subject area; ii) to evidence an 
extensive body of available material, much of which appeared to be 
unknown to many who claimed to be “security professionals” which did 
a great disservice to the professionalism agenda spearheaded by the 
UK’s Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG), and to the 
ability of the discipline to mature; iii) to provide empirical evidence as to 
the next stage of IP focus for security professionals, within the roadmap 
progression from IT Security, through InfoSec through IA to IG as 
portrayed in Figure 1 below, and therefore; and iv) to produce a 
framework for organisations to follow to achieve appropriate levels of 
holistic IG (i3GRC™). 
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Figure 1:  IT to IG Progression 
 
1.4 Design and Structure of the Thesis 
1.4.1 The thesis follows the research structure as outlined by Galliers and 
Land (1988) and is described Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2:  Thesis Structure  
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1.4.2 Chapter 1: Introduction addresses the context for this research. 
1.4.3 Chapter 2: Literature Review sets out the main literature study of 
academic literature that underlies the rigour of the research and the 
political and business literature that confirms the relevance of the 
research topic.  Relevant literature was brought into the discussions in 
the subsequent chapters as it related to the ongoing development of 
the Grounded Theory. 
1.4.4 Chapter 3: Research Strategy provides a description of the 
methodology used to accomplish the research in this study, covering 
the research assumptions, paradigm and questions, discussing the 
purpose, methodology, and application of the respective 
methodologies. 
1.4.5 Chapter 4: Research Findings and Discussion presents the 
findings and the supporting results analysis, providing outputs from the 
surveys, interviews and case studies.  This chapter looks at the level 
of success of the research in demonstrating that IA has not been well 
understood to date.  Discourse analysis identified the propagation of 
terminology utilised; the drivers and obligations experienced; the 
standards and measurements that drive compliance with regulation 
and legislation within the IA field; the impact of culture and politics on 
IA adoption and implementation, IA professionalism and aspects of the 
InfoSoc and how this has changed the breadth of IA requirements. 
1.4.6 Chapter 5: Developing a Grounded Theory discusses the 
Participatory Action Research (PAR) case study findings which were 
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utilised to form a comparative, interpretative analysis to reach resulted 
in the formulation of a new Grounded Theory. 
1.4.7 Chapter 6: i3GRC™ Integrated and Informed Information 
Governance, Risk, and Compliance presents a new framework 
following explanatory background as to the research progression that 
led to its creation.  The findings from the previous Chapter contribute 
to the development of the framework. 
1.4.8 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work provides the research 
conclusions, reflecting on the research process and presents a 
number of areas of possible future work. 
1.5 Summary of Research Approach and Methodology 
1.5.1 The researcher used an iterative socially constructivist, inductive, 
design science research approach, in a critical realist ontology, with an 
interpretive epistemological paradigm.  The research sought to answer 
the following questions: 1) can IA professional practice be improved 
through enhanced IA understanding?; 2) How has the extensive body 
of knowledge influenced professionals?; 3) Is there a next area of 
focus for security professionals within the roadmap progression from 
IT Security, through InfoSec, through to IA?; and finally, 4) Is it 
possible to produce a framework suitable to support the route from IA 
to IG? 
1.5.2 The methodology was mixed methods using interviews, surveys and 
PAR case studies, supported by historical research with a final output 
using Grounded Theory. 
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1.5.3 Choosing the appropriate research methodology is itself an area of 
constant academic debate, particularly when carried out in the context 
of business (Remenyi, 2014).  The methodology used for the PAR 
case studies was ethnography by participant-observation in order to 
better understand both the public and private sector culture and 
dynamics and the impact of the various themes identified herein, the 
most important of which was the area of IA professionalisation. 
1.5.4 Contextual and discourse analysis was undertaken, producing a set of 
non-hierarchical flat open codes around the themes of terminology, 
standards and measurements, culture and politics, and 
professionalism.  The impact of the InfoSoc and the barriers to 
adoption were dealt with as secondary codes.  Memos were 
continually recorded for each of these themes throughout the study 
and this write up is the collation and distillation of the work. 
1.5.5 As the core topic was information based, the IS domain was a suitable 
multi-disciplinary base from which to provide a contribution to the 
study of IA; more particularly, in this case, within the context of the 
behavioural science and linguistics.  A general structure for research 
in the field of IS in a business context involves: finding a suitable 
problem or research question; understanding what data is required to 
comprehend the issues involved; producing a data acquisition plan; 
accessing and managing the data; processing it appropriately; seeking 
more data if required; and finally interpreting the results.  This 
approach has been confirmed as a valid methodology within the field 
of IS (Galliers, 1985; 1997). 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
18 | P a g e  
1.5.6 The research was influenced by Critical Theory – how things should 
be, as distinct from Descriptive Theory – how things are; or Analytic 
Theory – why things are the way things are.  This aspect of how things 
should be was fundamental to the outcomes of the Grounded Theory 
created through iterative and reflexive interpretation of the findings - 
those involved in delivering IA, largely IT professionals by background, 
do not understand the scope of it and that leads to the need for the 
improvement framework – Integrated and Informed Information 
Governance, Risk, and Compliance (i3GRC™).  It was important for 
the researcher to produce a theory that fitted the real world, grounded 
in the empirical data (Gregory, 2011) that adds value to the role of the 
IA practitioner.  In so doing, an appreciation of Design Science 
Research was realised. 
1.6 Research Contribution 
1.6.1 This practitioner research contributes to the learning of the discipline 
of IA, addressing a gap in knowledge through reviewing the available 
Body of Knowledge (BoK) addressing existing IA frameworks, but also 
extant literature, adding a detailed chronology of IA references through 
related reports, publications, government policy, regulation, legislation 
and industry contributions, showing growth and depth across a lengthy 
time span. 
1.6.2 Through peer review and testing, the scale of this historical BoK has 
been confirmed to be new to many and should aid practitioner 
understanding, addressing multiple confusing mixtures of the concepts 
of IT security, InfoSec, cybersecurity, IA , and IG.  Furthermore, 
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contextual analysis regarding the prevailing level of understanding and 
implementation of IA practices provides empirical evidence that whilst 
there are multiple definitions for IA, there are equally as many error 
prone interpretations utilisation of which are resulting in insecure 
system design and risk of data breach. 
1.6.3 The research contributes to the literature on the ontology of IA by 
providing empirical evidence of the codification of its understanding.  
At the time of commencement of the study (2009), no such equivalent 
work existed.  However, as is the risk with longitudinal research, a not 
dissimilar study has been undertaken by Cherdantseva and Hilton 
(2013a) into the specific distinctions between the two terms – InfoSec 
and IA.  Richardson (2012) also carried out parallel research, to an 
extent, though it was more specifically focussed in the military and 
national security domains of the UK, with an emphasis on addressing 
the ability to assure air-gapped systems in the cyberspace domain. 
1.6.4 Cherdantseva and Hilton (2013b) called for the creation of an up-to-
date conceptual model of InfoSec and IA to reflect the current era.  
Whilst they followed up with the creation of their own Reference Model 
for IA and Security (RMIAS), the findings of this research took a 
different direction, showing that a framework incorporating the more 
broad space of IG is required, in order to embrace the growth and 
complexity of organisational demands. 
1.6.5 Scott (2004, p.70) elucidated IA history through the US military lens: 
It is clear that significant events of past military warfare have 
shaped the current structure of military and civilian IA 
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programs ... the entire evolutionary model demonstrates that 
the concept currently known as IA did, in fact, evolve from 
earlier forms of information and information systems security 
concepts during warfare. 
1.6.6 Scott (Ibid. p.69) suggested areas of future research:  “It would be 
beneficial to explore these later events to discover what specific 
changes have occurred. …..Further research could also focus on a 
closer analysis of the various government policies implemented over 
the period covered by the evolutionary process.” 
1.6.7 This research provides a coherent academic structure upon which to 
base IA practice.  The impact of the contributions available will largely 
be experienced across the practitioner community through conference 
presentations, industry journal articles seeking to share the outcomes 
and consultancy engagements. 
1.6.8 The InfoSec industry largely operates in vertical silos which do not 
integrate with the existing interdisciplinary areas of information 
science.  IA remains a separate endeavour, not sufficiently embedded 
across organisational domains.  As identified by Keen (1980, p.9): 
“Unless we build on each other’s work, a field can never emerge, 
however good individual fragments may be”.  The findings contribute 
to other IP related models, bringing together a number of multi-
disciplinary groups who at present risk talking over each other rather 
than being heard coherently – InfoSec, IA, Information Risk 
Management (IRM), Records and Information Management (RIM) and 
IG.  These are different groups of learned colleagues with agendas 
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that are operated as if entirely separate and yet, an understanding of 
the depth and breadth of IP indicates that the goals are the same. 
1.6.9 Using the reflections from the Literature Review, combined with the 
input from IA academics and practitioners, this research sought to 
address the boundary breaking aspect.  Coalescence can be found 
under the IG discipline, and not solely from the perspective of 
technology, but with the three elements of PPT in balance.  However, 
the evidence suggests a need to add a fourth leg, that of politics, both 
internal (organisational) and external. 
1.6.10 This research presents a unique comparison of membership bodies as 
part of the analysis of the IA professionalism agenda – work that has 
not been undertaken elsewhere.  The findings also extend IA research 
by introducing a graphical representation of a proposed future 
ontology for the achievement of robust IP - the i3GRC™ framework.  
This new meta framework within which to articulate IA – in the context 
of IG – provides a unique contribution to industry and academia as 
part of the maturation of IP for all sectors; to broaden, deepen and 
mature the BoK, supporting system design, development, 
enhancement and improvement, taking forward the discipline in an 
appropriate direction. 
1.6.11 Twenty-three presentations of the material have been given during the 
course of this research [see Appendix I, Section 10.2] in addition to 
the publication of two books: one providing reference to best practice 
in InfoSec (December 2008) Achieving Best Practice in Public Sector 
Information Security, Ark Group Publishing, and a second entitled 
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Once more unto the Breach – Managing Information Security in an 
Uncertain World, ITGI Publishing, (2012).  This was revised and 
republished in 2014. 
1.6.12 This research proposes connections and patterns between sets of 
data and evidence within the constraints of both personal prejudices 
and experience.  Pragmatically, using this interpretivist approach has 
allowed for a “significant contribution to both theory and improvement 
of practice” (Remenyi, 2014. p.xii). 
1.6.13 A further aspect of the uniqueness of this research is that it is not 
technology led – a requirement identified by Sherwood et al. (2005, 
p.xviii) - although the researcher disagrees with reference to there 
being “few” books: 
…there is a growing concern that the technology that attracts so 
much investment from businesses is not delivering what it 
promises, and it is clear that the reason is that developments are 
led from a technical standpoint, not a business one.  There are 
few books that address this issue, either for ICT generally or 
information systems security specifically. 
1.7 Summary Research Conclusions 
1.7.1 This research has addressed a gap in the extent of understanding of 
the full meaning of IA in the context of professionalising it.  The gap 
between IS research and practice has been widely recognized and 
observed (Guangco, 2007, p.4).  Enhancement of understanding can 
be facilitated through mechanisms such as industry publications, 
education, and attending conferences.  IS researchers and 
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practitioners hold separate conferences with little cross participation 
and representation (Straub et al., 2005).  As Guangco (2007, p.7) 
observed, “networking activities have been limited within the 
boundaries of each community, instead of facilitating an exchange”.  
Success can only be measured if practitioners have time and interest 
to avail of these; combined with awareness of their existence 
alongside funding for professional membership bodies in order to have 
access to journals. 
1.7.2 Critical to addressing the “skills crisis” is the requirement to ensure 
that there is an “informed” skill base.  Reliance on seasoned 
practitioners has a limited lifespan.  Search, recruitment and talent 
companies all need to be engaged in this upskilling, as do regulators 
and policy makers.  Teaching fundamentals and principles so that 
cross-organisational individuals can tackle any presented problems.  
The Literature Review chronologically records the history of available 
ontology from InfoSec through to what has been published on IA, 
linking back to the UK Government Sector (and beyond) [See 
Appendix III: IA Chronology] in order to align professionalism of IA to 
address the skills crisis. 
1.7.3 Adopting the i3GRC™ framework will assist in reducing the crisis, as 
will situational awareness across the UK and beyond.  Other research 
has identified a rise in anti-intellectualism: “the dismissal of science, 
the arts, and humanities and their replacement by entertainment, self-
righteousness, ignorance, and deliberate gullibility” (Williams, 2014).  
This needs to be tackled. 
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1.7.4 This research was designed to signpost the depth of the BoK in order 
to reduce claims of a lack of available mechanisms with which to 
tackle any aspect of IA (now continually, often erroneously, referred to 
as cybersecurity) and ensure that these can be relied upon to guide 
and shape the discipline and successful future of the IA profession. 
1.7.5 The research identified a plethora of confusing descriptions, 
explanations, and terminology.  The available literature has 
consistently outlined the steps to follow to secure information assets, 
from gaining executive level buy in to implementing policies and 
procedures and embarking on culture change programmes.  Why the 
activities are repeated is a cultural phenomenon that should be 
addressed by social scientists, though Dekker (2011) discusses some 
of the reasons for the behaviour. 
1.7.6 For the sake of future IP, stronger collaboration between academia 
and industry must address that there appears to be more that should 
be known than unknown.  Reduction in expenditure on further 
research is required, rather policy makers and implementers need to 
support embedding identified IA best practices. 
1.7.7 In 2011, the UK Government brought together a large group of 
participants with the intention of “Fighting Fraud Together” (UK HMG 
2011b).  Given how much fraud occurs through the compromise of 
existing systems and electronic infrastructures, the researcher 
believes that there are more participants required to join the group.  
Having a different organisation for each type of threat is difficult to 
manage in the long term.  The same challenge faces the private 
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sector; more silos are created to address different threat vectors 
(Fisher, 2010).  In 2011, further research undertaken by Cornish et al. 
(2011, p.28) in this area agreed: 
....despite the perceived fragmentation it is to government that 
industry tends to turn for intelligence and information, particularly 
on high-level cybersecurity threats. This proposed architecture 
involves the government, but cannot be led by it. The nature of 
the problem is ingrained and systemic to the extent that a central 
authority can merely provide incentives to encourage a societal 
remedy but cannot mandate it.  In simple terms, the £650 million 
allocated to cybersecurity (over four years) by the SDSR cannot 
‘fix’ or ‘secure’ the critical national infrastructure, though it can 
help to catalyse greater attention to these issues within 
government. 
1.7.8 As Simms (2011, p.26) wrote: 
The haste and brevity of the communications media du jour - 
texts and tweets – are no excuse for poor writing although they 
help to explain it.  People have lost the habit of thinking about 
what they want to say before they write it down.  So they 
shouldn’t be surprised if their audience doesn’t pay much 
attention to what they’ve said either. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 The first chapter highlighted the context within which this research was 
positioned – global experience of increasing information losses (data 
breaches) despite a myriad of available reports, frameworks, 
standards, legislation, regulation, and guidance.  This Literature 
Review identifies key foundation blocks for IA in order to provide clarity 
to both its definition and meaning within the context of the prevailing 
BoK.  It is supported by an extensive chronological compilation of 
research and analysis of accessible primary and secondary sources – 
published books, newspaper, magazine content, government reports, 
industry whitepapers, public and private sector reports and survey 
results - combined with a review of availab le relevant industry and 
popular literature, provided in Appendix III: IA Chronology. 
2.1.2 Towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the rhetoric 
was dominated by the prefix cyber, as if it were a new concept.  This 
Literature Review has found many resources dating further back, 
which reinforced the need for good IA to be embedded on an ongoing 
basis (IAAC, 2000a-d).  The global IT industry referred to “hi-tech 
crime”, before that e-crime, at a time when every initiative was 
afforded the opportunity of putting an “e” for electronic in front of it - 
prior to the adoption of the “cyber” label – but did not re-brand all 
related activities as “hi-tech crime prevention”. 
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2.1.3 In 2013, the UK National Audit Office (NAO, 2013) represented this 
situation visually with a timeline showing how the UK Government had 
issued IA strategy documents from 2001 through to 2008 and then in 
2009 changed the focus to issue the first UK Cyber Security Strategy.  
Davies (2010) wrote that what people appear to be hearing is 
“something, something, security, something, something, cyber, 
something, something, advanced persistent threat, something, 
something”. 
2.1.4 Tibbs et al. (2013) articulated the scope of the cyber challenge as an 
academic exercise appearing to repeat, though updating the work 
undertaken by the Foresight project (UK HMG (2003a) a decade 
previously.  It is an international and boundary-less issue.  In Tibbs et 
al. (op.cit.), there is no reference to IA whereas its place is recognised 
within the Cyber Primer produced for the UK Ministry of Defence 
(2013).  Tibbs et al. (op.cit.) expanded on the depth of the challenge 
the UK Cyber Security Strategy was written to address. 
2.1.5 In 2010, the UK Government changed from Labour to a Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat Coalition and, in so doing, renamed a great 
many departments.  The links for many of the identified historical 
references were not, in all cases, transferred to the National Archives 
and thus, whilst a high volume of resources have been previously 
published, a number of them may be lost forever, squandering 
valuable history and risking the ability to reap the rewards of learning 
lessons. 
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2.1.6 This aspect of IRM is a challenge for many organisations in all sectors.  
It is for these reasons that a number of pertinent historical articles are 
referenced in the Bibliography. 
2.1.7 The history of IA in the UK is embedded in the defence world.  The 
work of Richardson (2012) was undertaken in the military domain 
focussing on national security, which is outside the scope of this more 
operational, business focussed research.  However, the models 
created within his research are valuable and portable and will be 
referenced in the Findings discussion in Chapter 4.  For context, the 
scope of IA presented in Figure 3 below provides a reference point, 
visualising the multiple layers of complexity. 
 
Figure 3:  Assurance, Threat and Risk landscape, Source: Richardson (2012, p.100) 
 
2.1.8 Dimopoulos (2007) thesis has IA in the title. However, its contents 
were almost exclusively focused on InfoSec and Risk Management, 
with nothing that explicitly embraced the terminology of IA.  As an IA 
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resource, it is therefore thin and indicative of the continual evidence of 
authors using the term IA when InfoSec was what was being 
addressed.  Cherdantseva and Hilton (2013a) took the decision to join 
the two together to form their Reference Model of IA and Security 
(RMIAS) discussed in more detail below.  As identified by 
Cherdantseva and Hilton (2013b, p.9) “IAS means different things to 
different experts depending on their education and experience”.  
Indeed, for some in the UK, IAS already stands for “ IA Standard” as 
produced by CESG (UK CESG, 2009 e/f/g/h, 2010a). 
2.1.9 Despite there being more information easily accessible and available 
than in any previous generation, Cooper articulated that people are 
not reading enough; “books offer a great opportunity for managers to 
step away from the ‘paced assembly line of managing’ (Cooper, 2011, 
p.78).  Blogging is an example of this too, where participants feel they 
have a voice but the results become noise in the maelstrom (Virgo, 
2010; Room, 2009).  This is not a new phenomenon (Toffler, 1970; 
Stewart, 2015) but one that will be visited throughout the Literature 
Review. 
2.1.10 This Chapter defines IA and constrains the thinking and discourse to 
IA.  Historically, sources have been largely focussed on InfoSec.  In 
parallel with the timeline of this research study, a number of relevant 
IA focussed theses have been published (Cherdantseva and Hilton, 
2014; Richardson, 2012) – which corroborated the need for attention 
to this discipline. 
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2.2 IA Origins 
 
2.2.1 The next section provides a chronological historical terminology 
review, in order to return to analyse IA adoption barriers.  A full list of 
identified definitions is consolidated in Appendix I, Section 10.20, 
Table 29: IA Definitions. 
2.2.2 From the United States (US), there is a history of iterations and 
development from Physical Security to Operational Security (OPSEC), 
Computer Security (COMPUSEC) and Communications Security 
(COMSEC).  COMPUSEC tends to include database security; 
COMSEC tends to include network security and cryptography and is 
referred to by some as ITSEC.  COMPUSEC and COMSEC were 
merged into InfoSec. 
2.2.3 Kovacich (1998, p.2) stated that for his purposes, in writing about the 
role of the IS Security Officer, “the term InfoSec” incorporates the 
terms information system security, information systems protection, 
information security, technology security, computer security, 
telecommunications security and technology protection” – making this 
a comprehensive view.  He added: 
The terms are all meant to describe the security and protection 
of the computers and telecommunication systems and the 
information that they store, process and transmit... [and 
...That the further one looks back -- the further forward one can see... 
Winston Churchill, Quebec Conference, 1943  
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InfoSec]... in any language, in any culture, in any country ...[is 
relative to the protection of those IS]. 
2.2.4 In 1999, InfoSec was defined in ISO/IEC 15408 as being “the 
protection of information against unauthorised disclosure, transfer or 
destruction, whether accidental or intentional” (IOS, 2009; Herrmann, 
2003).  Caplan and Sanders (1999) addressed the element of 
functionality within requirements as it related to InfoSec stating that 
functional requirements represent a statement of the security 
functionality or features a product is intended to provide. 
2.2.5 In 2000, InfoSec came to be defined as: 
Protection of information systems against unauthorised access 
to or modification of information, whether in storage, 
processing or transit and against the denial of service to 
authorised users, including those measures necessary to 
detect, document and counter such threats (US NSTISSI 
4009, 2000). 
2.2.6 This was a natural progression from the earliest form of definition 
encompassing confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) as the 
core elements of InfoSec.  The model embraced the need to embed 
PPT as an overlay on the three main goals of security, that of 
achieving the CIA of the information you are seeking to protect.  He 
articulated these in the manner of “Education, Training & Awareness 
(people); Policy and Practices (process) and Technology” (Ibid. p.4). 
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2.2.7 Parker (1981) explained the origins of the CIA triad, as represented in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4:  InfoSec Triad, Source: Gashi et al. (2015) 
 
2.2.8 McCumber presented an original pedagogic framework for InfoSec, 
highlighting the constituent parts, including the need for a “common 
language/terminology in order to communicate effectively” (1991, p.4), 
shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5:  Original InfoSec Model, Source: McCumber (1991, p.4) 
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2.2.9 The most fulsome and concise definition of IA can be found in the US 
Department of Defence (DoD) (1998) Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations (IO) (Joint Publication 3-13).  It provided a broad focus of 
the information environment in which the Forces found themselves as 
a result of the continued scope of network communications, 
introducing two further terms to the CIA triad, those of authentication 
and non-repudiation. 
Information Assurance. Information operations that protect 
and defend information and information systems by ensuring 
their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and 
reaction capabilities.  Also called IA. 
2.2.10 Confidentiality covers protection against disclosure of information.  
Integrity is designed to ensure no unauthorised medication of data 
takes place.  Availability is about the timely, reliable access to 
required data.  Non-repudiation covers IP and identity through the 
delivery channels.  Authentication is part of that proof of identity 
chain.  These five key attributes are referred to more globally as the 
Five Pillars of IA (IWS, 2011).  These pillars are supported by five 
common aims (Schou and Shoemaker, 2007, p.62): i) prevention; ii) 
detection; iii) containment; iv) deterrence and v) recovery.  Mitigation, 
transference, and avoidance are often added to the list, as strategies 
for protecting information and reducing vulnerabilities. 
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2.2.11 Figure 6 below represents this scope definition. 
 
Figure 6:  Joint Publication 3-13, Source: US DoD (1998, p.51) 
 
2.2.12 The US Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) on behalf of 
the US DoD produced a Position Paper on IA in April 1999 and 
referred to this definition.  IA was articulated as taking a 
comprehensive view of the assurance responsibility “beyond 
establishing a top-level architecture, the IA concept does little more 
than integrate the conventional assurance activities of {COMPSEC} 
COMSEC, NETSEC, INFOSEC and security of operations into a 
single system” (Schou and Shoemaker, 2007, p.xxi and p.395). 
2.2.13 Most other US DoD publications refer to the same definition (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), CNSS, CNSSI etc.) .  A 
later Air Force Instruction bulletin (US DoD, 2001) identified that this 
definition could originally be found in U.S. DoD 3600-1 dated 1996 
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(source no longer available).   McKnight (2002) also referred to this 
definition. 
2.2.14 Research into the effective implementation of IA in the US DoD has 
been extensive – including, NDIA (1998) which identified best 
practices and Powell, Holmes and Pie (2010) who posited the IA 
Range.  There have been a number of attempts to align IA with 
corporate strategy, thus elevating it above the domain of IT. 
2.2.15 McCumber (Ibid.) showed how precluding other aspects of a full IA 
model (critical information characteristics, states, etc.) in security 
measures (policy) effectively restricts responses when it comes to 
dealing with threats that exist outside of the legal spectrum.  The onus 
is on those involved in the implementation of policy to understand the 
environment within which they are operating and the likely factors that 
will impact on their success (Liles, 2011). 
2.2.16 A decade later, there was an update to the McCumber InfoSec Model, 
positioning IA definition and direction for the future.  The Maconachy 
IA Model, presented in a seminal conference paper, added the already 
defined information characteristics, authentication, and non-
repudiation.  Maconachy et al. (2001), working at the US National 
Security Agency at the time, saw IA as embracing the InfoSec CIA 
triad but needing to be articulated in terms of four dimensions: i) 
Information States; ii) Security Services (known as the Five Pillars); iii) 
Security Countermeasures (also known as controls or safeguards - 
embracing PPT aspects); and iv) Time (aligning with the Security 
Development Life Cycle (SDLC) as information is in constant flux 
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dependent upon time.  Information can have a greater sensitivity 
depending on when it is produced or released).  The model is 
represented in Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7:  Maconachy IA Model, Source: Maconachy et al. (2001) 
 
2.2.17 At the time of presentation, it was acknowledged that this was both a 
complex system description and a difficult concept to understand for 
non-professionals.  This work sought to provide a scientific approach 
to explaining the development of IA, something that Shostack and 
Stewart (2008) missed in their understanding of what is already known 
and available within the BoK for IA when they called for definition 
expansion. 
2.2.18 IA was born as system integration increased and, correspondingly, the 
need for security increased.  Thus IA was intended to address 
proactive and reactive network defence; to encompass InfoSec and to 
broaden and deepen the profession.  The integrated model was 
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designed to provide “a framework for questioning as well as teaching 
information assurance topics” (Ibid. p.309).  The scope is represented 
in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8:  IA and InfoSec relationship, Source: Maconachy et al. (2001, p.307) 
 
2.2.19 The Maconachy information states, previously articulated in the US 
National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Committee publication NSTISSI No. 4011 (US NSTISSI, 
1994), can be aligned with two specific UK Government approaches: i) 
Protective marking classifications in line with the Manual of Protective 
Security (MPS); and ii) Creating Profiles that correspond to levels of 
protection required for information (UK CESG, undated), which 
correspond with the likely countermeasures to be implemented in the 
solution space - (Being) Aware (medium), Deter (medium high), Detect 
and Resist (high) and Defend (very high).  This was more recently 
updated to Prevent, Protect, Prepare and Pursue – a commonly 
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understood doctrine requiring a combination of Policies, Plans, 
Processes, and Doctrine. 
2.2.20 Whilst the initial progression was from CompuSec to InfoSec, Parker 
(2011, per comms) disagreed with the ISO, NIST and the US DoD 
treatment of the elements, claiming that they are inconsistent.  Parker 
saw that confidentiality and integrity referred to the secure state of 
information, whereas authentication and non-repudiation referred to 
controls to achieve CIA applied to people not information.  He 
contended that the US DoD omitted availability from their list, leaving 
security defined incompletely. 
2.2.21 Parker believed that “IA goes too far” given that it is an attempt to 
declare the intentions of an organisation to provide confidence, a 
pledge or a promise beyond protection from crime, abuse, misuse, 
errors and omissions “and doesn’t seem appropriate”.  Parker 
considered the six elements described above (confidentiality, 
possession or control, integrity, authenticity, availability and , utility) to 
be attributes of information that are atomic in that they cannot be 
broken down any further; they are non-overlapping, referring to unique 
aspects of information.  Information may have integrity but not be 
authentic and may be authentic (what the owner or custodian 
intended) but not have integrity (complete, whole and in good 
condition).  Encrypted information may be available but without the 
key would not be useful. 
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2.2.22 Since 1998, the Parkerian Hexad (Figure 9 below) had been used as a 
model to explain his thinking. 
 
Figure 9:  Parkerian Hexad, Source: Parker (1998) 
 
2.2.23 It can be argued that this is a contentious premise in the context of 
modern day business, where reputation is hard to gain and easy to 
lose if information is compromised as a result of a lack of 
implementation of available controls (op.cit.).  Parker stressed that an 
important security element is protecting the possession of information 
whether it is confidential, or just proprietary and not confidential.  
Incorrectly defining integrity to include the authenticity of information is 
in conflict with most dictionaries.  Parker used authenticity to refer to a 
state of information as opposed to how the US DoD referred to it – 
relating to people and access control. 
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2.2.24 Parker remained concerned that none of the available definitions 
include deception (op.cit.).  Parker (2010) sought to express a more 
robust model for InfoSec, moving from the traditional (current) model 
(Figure 10) to a more modern view (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 10:  Current InfoSec Model, Source: Parker (2010) 
 
 
Figure 11:  New Conceptual InfoSec Model, Source: Parker (2010) 
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2.2.25 This was inconsistent with the prevailing models with no correlation to 
either the McCumber Model or its Maconachy maturation in the 
suggested CIA improvement.  The researcher questioned Parker 
directly on this and he went on to state that “Confidentiality and 
Integrity refer to the secure state of information, and Authentication 
and Non-Repudiation refer to controls to achieve CIA applied to 
people, not information” (op.cit.).  Parker’s views on definition 
appeared to be as prone to issues of subjectivity, confirmatory bias, 
and confusion around terminology, despite thirty years of writing about 
InfoSec and working in the industry, as any other contributor. 
2.2.26 Herrmann (2002, p.8) proposed a broader definition of IA, whilst still 
using both terms (InfoSec and IA) relatively interchangeably: 
...an engineering discipline that provides a comprehensive and 
systematic approach to ensuring that individual automated 
systems and dynamic combinations of automated systems and 
dynamic combinations of automated systems interact and 
provide their specified functionality, no more and no less, safely, 
reliably and securely in the intended operational environments. 
2.2.27 Herrmann’s contention was that using the term “automated systems” 
allowed for a broader scope than the use of the term “information 
systems”.  Herrmann (Ibid. p.9) saw IA as a three-dimensional 
challenge – encompassing “safety, reliability and security” - 
contending that a “safe, reliable and secure system by definition has 
proactively built-in error/fault/failure (whether accidental or intentional) 
prevention, detection, containment, and recovery mechanisms”.  This 
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book provides the basis for a clear understanding of IA for all 
practitioners, given the clarity it brings to the subject area. 
2.2.28 Herrmann (loc.cit.) stated that “IA affects nearly all aspects of the 
everyday life of individuals and organisations. … IA has a pervasive 
role in today’s technological society.  This role can be divided into 
seven categories: i) human safety; ii) environmental safety; iii) property 
safety; iv) economic stability and security; v) social stability; vi) privacy, 
both individual and corporate; and vii) National security.”  
2.2.29 Schou and Trimmer (2004, p.i) identified that these dimensions also 
have states applicable to them – those of processing, storage, and 
transmission.  These are the exact states that are a central focus of 
the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), 
seeking to ensure that organisations focus on where their possession, 
usage, and exchange of credit card data is taking place. 
2.2.30 Desman (2002, p.xvi) spoke of holding a particular philosophy with 
regard to InfoSec, that: 
...it is not a technical issue, but a people issue.  We simply use 
technical tools to resolve the problems we encounter.  If we 
cannot speak and be understood, we will never reach our desired 
goals.  As with the philosophy of democracy, if we do not gain 
the right to govern from those being governed, we will not.  If we 
do not gain the cooperation of the rest of the company, nothing 
we do will come to fruition. 
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2.2.31 Effective InfoSec and IP is about supporting business processes “that 
provide[s] management with the processes needed to perform the 
fiduciary responsibility” rather than meeting security needs or audit 
requirements, per se.  Barman (2002) also agreed with this within the 
context of security policy formulation, stating that the need is to identify 
what is to be protected in order to design appropriate security policies. 
2.2.32 This was the discourse of the time, as Wylder (2004, p.21) pointed out: 
The effect of decentralization on the securing of corporate 
information assets is to force a change in viewpoint.  The job of 
security, once regarded as a matter of data security, is now 
considered one of InfoSec, as the sum of the data elements is 
worth more than the individual parts.  Databases now feed 
information to midrange machines and personal computers 
where there is additional processing performed.  The job of the 
data security manager broadens to encompass all the data 
elements as they flow through the organization. 
2.2.33 Wylder’s writing was comprehensive with regard to the breadth and 
depth of InfoSec and what a professional should be doing in terms of 
their role.  In contrast, the definitions provided by Schou and Trimmer 
(op.cit., p.i) were inconsistent with the findings of the Literature 
Review: 
IA contains all the elements of InfoSec (confidentiality) but also 
includes elements of availability, and integrity…. IA provides a 
view of protection that includes defensive measures in all three 
states -- processing, storage, and transmission.  To defend 
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information and data there are three fundamental 
countermeasure categories: 1. Technology, 2. Operations, 3. 
Awareness, training and education.  
2.2.34 IA contains all the elements of InfoSec – and yet Schou and Trimmer 
(Ibid.) presented only one – the C; and then say that it includes the A 
and the I as extras to make up the IA.  The whole paragraph is 
linguistically challenging, confusing and unhelpful.  A reader could 
absorb this and believe that InfoSec relies only on one attribute of CIA, 
and equally leave without understanding that IA has five core 
elements to it.  This is another example of the importance of the need 
for accurate sentence construction to ensure clarity of meaning. 
2.2.35 Dimitriadis (2011) contends that what we have ended up experiencing, 
in implementation terms, is a lack of consistency as each sector, 
industry, and organisation has appeared to implement security on the 
basis of their specific business needs and created a unique security 
definition to suit them.  However, it could be seen that “InfoSec is no 
longer merely an emerging field of risk – it is well established as a 
critical and highly active field of risk that must be high on the agenda 
for every organisation’s governing body” (Toomey, 2011, p.2). 
2.2.36 Whilst there are many US NIST publications available, SP800-12 
provides a robust discourse on the subject of assurance specifically in 
relation to IA, in particular, given that “assurance is not an absolute 
guarantee that the measures work as intended” (US NIST, 1995, 
p.103).  This can undermine management and communication, 
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particularly when it comes to reassuring the public, whose personal 
information an organisation may be charged with protecting.  
2.2.37 Figure 12 provides a visual representation of the distinction between 
InfoSec and IA: 
 
Figure 12:  IA versus InfoSec, Source: Grec (2011) 
2.2.38 Krause and Tipton (2004) only mention IA relative to software products 
(commercial or government “off the shelf”)  in relation to technical 
policy assurance, constraining the terminology rather than opening it 
up to the breadth of meaning it should have been afforded.  
2.2.39 Numerous definitions of software assurance can be found.  It is the 
level of confidence that software is free from vulnerabilities, either 
intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at any 
time during its life cycle, and that the software functions as intended 
(US CNSS, 2003).  The goal of software assurance is the ability to 
provide to software acquirers and users the justifiable confidence that 
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software will consistently exhibit its required properties, producing 
assurance as to the integrity, accuracy, and timeliness of the available 
information being produced.  Security is what enables software to 
exhibit those properties even when the software comes under attack 
(IATAC, 2007).  A high level of concern at the number of software 
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures was highlighted in the US 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, addressing the point that 
known vulnerabilities were going uncorrected and causing significant 
risk to the nation (US DHS, 2003). 
2.2.40 It is essential to assure that the software within an asset base 
incorporates the required IA functionality.  Schou and Shoemaker 
(2007, p.250) articulated that: “IA is linked to software because 
security functionality is enabled by it and software processes 
organizational information”.  Accreditation is a process a llowing for 
formal acceptance of a system’s security.  There are frameworks 
available for achieving this, for example, Common Criteria for 
Information Technology Security Evaluation, with detailed 
explanations of assurance evaluation levels (Herrmann, 2003).  CESG 
provides various accreditation schemes (UK CESG, undated, 
Certification).  However, gaining assurance also highlights to an 
organisation the risks that must be accepted as part of business 
operations, either because it is not possible to address those risks or it 
is not economically feasible to do so.  That focus enables the 
organisation to ensure that the risks remain, and will continue to 
remain within acceptable limits (Dowdall, Mattinson and Fagan, 2011).  
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Lack of commercial incentive for companies and lack of liability against 
software developers makes for more risky outcome – and a less 
professional one. 
2.2.41 In order to be approved at any of the Assurance levels shown in 
Figure 13 below, platforms must be tested, such as Microsoft 
Windows, and a protection profile against which those tests are to be 
performed has to be agreed.  For each level passed, Certification is 
received. 
 
Figure 13:  Software Assurance Evaluation Levels, Source: IT Compliance Institute (2010)  
 
2.2.42 The State of the Art report provides a chronology of US focussed 
reports and research relating to software assurance (IATAC, 2007, 
p.3-5).  The report references the genus of software security 
assurance work as far back as the 1970s.  Evidence suggests that 
software development should be more secure.  In 2013, research 
identified that “the average software developer, for example, doesn’t 
own a single book on the subject of his or her work, and hasn’t ever 
read one.  That fact is horrifying for anyone concerned about the 
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quality of work in the field; for folks like us who write books, it is 
positively tragic” (DeMarco and Lister, 2013, p.11). 
2.2.43 Bott (2005, p.19) takes the approach that “most software is not critical” 
and therefore, given the volume and propagation, it is too difficult to 
regulate software engineering for anything other than the most critical 
of systems – e.g. air traffic control.  This argument seems weak.  The 
basics of software engineering are not necessarily being learned by 
“script kiddies”.  This is overlaid with the complexity of having multiple 
vendor or product specific qualifications and certifications to be 
undertaken and maintained. 
2.2.44 The inclusion of IA from a technical software perspective is depicted in 
Figure 14 below. 
 
Figure 14:  Software Assurance Universe, Source: US DHS (2010)  
 
2.2.45 A description of the alignment between assurance and security can be 
found in an independent review of the security measures surrounding 
the UK Census 2011 (Dowdall, Mattinson and Fagan, 2011, p.29): 
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The term “assurance” has a specific meaning within the security 
environment.  Assurance is gained through activities confirming 
that the security measures that have been set in place are both 
effective and appropriate.  It is not sufficient simply to set in place 
an assembly of technical and procedural controls; they must 
work, they must be seen to work, and they must be aligned to the 
underlying security problem. ... Assurance confirms that the 
security measures that have been put in place are aligned to the 
problems that they are intended to address, and that they can be 
relied upon to operate as expected. 
2.2.46 There are different types of assurance – product, cryptographic, 
implementation, standards, operational and disposal. “The level of 
assurance required will depend on the security function that the 
system is performing” (Clarke, 2009).  Satisfying assurance 
requirements provides confidence that the functional requirements 
have been met.  The focus was more usually on product security, 
rather than overall organisational security. 
2.2.47 There are multiple dimensions to the A in IA: i) Assurance that the 
processes and controls relied upon to manage risk and deliver 
performance are up to the task; ii) Assurance that the information 
relied upon to manage the business, set strategies, etc. are reliable; 
iii) Assurance on risk management provides the confidence to take 
risk; iv) Assurance that new projects, especially technology projects, 
will perform as desired; v) Assurance that IP and other assets are 
protected; vi) advisory services that contribute to the improvement of 
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governance, the management of risk, and controls; vii) Avoiding 
compliance disasters; viii) Reputation protection; ix) Improving sales 
and revenue performance through effective controls; and x) Direct 
cost-savings opportunities, such as from contract audits. 
2.2.48 Delivering security per se does not increase profits; ergo it does not 
add value.  However, there are growing instances where the ability to 
evidence assurance may add to profit margins, shareholder value and 
regulatory performance for year-end audits.  The benefits can include 
the ability for businesses with audited accounts to borrow at lower 
interest rates, on the basis of the ability to evidence assurance that a 
product or industry standard is met and thus may increase sales, or 
may reduce insurance premiums (ACCA, 2010a/b/c). 
2.2.49 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guidance states that the use of IS and networks should respect the 
legitimate rights and interests of others and “should be consistent with 
the values of a democratic society” particularly reflecting “the need for 
an open and free flow of information and basic concerns for personal 
privacy” (OECD, 1992, p.9). 
2.2.50 In the UK, IA includes Data Protection and Privacy as a result of the 
close confidentiality links and OECD guidance requirements as 
implemented by IM and Quality, Records Management professionals 
and much more (Stahl, 2004).  Rather than diminishing over time, this 
requirement has increased in importance in the passing two decades 
with the adoption of internet usage.  The assurance function cannot be 
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successfully deployed until the risks are fully understood (Schou and 
Shoemaker, 2007, p.13). 
2.2.51 Within industry, it is possible to choose from InfoSec, “information 
risk”, Information Risk Management (IRM), IP or IA and also the US 
centric umbrella term of governance, risk and compliance (GRC) 
(TAAT, 2010c).  GRC itself is prone to as many as twenty-two different 
definitions (Marks, 2011), although the most favoured is that provided 
by the Open Compliance and Ethics Group (OCEG, 2011). 
2.2.52 Following research work at Forrester in 2002 (Rasmussen, 2015), 
OCEG was formed at the end of 2002 and began to discuss publicly, 
in various forums, the need for taking an integrated approach to GRC 
and internal controls (with consideration of culture) in 2003.  OCEG 
used the acronym with the “C” representing Compliance because this 
was a siloed area of operations (each subject of compliance separate 
from the other) that needed great attention and harmonisation. 
2.2.53 PwC had first used the term to represent a practice area of the firm.  
Others sometimes used the “C” to refer to Controls and some still do.  
In many ways, the C represents a C cubed, representing Compliance, 
Culture and Controls and GRC itself involves even more corporate 
systems (Quality, IT, Legal, Human Resources (HR) and others) but 
thirteen letter acronyms do not catch on (Racz et al., 2010). 
2.2.54 The Information Technology (IT) industry is awash with duplicative 
acronym usage.  For some, IA means Internal Audit, not Information 
Assurance.  For others, IA stands for Identity Assurance or 
Information Architecture. IRM can mean Information Risk 
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Management or it could mean Information and Records Management.  
Team to team, department to department, in different organisations, 
the same acronyms can be used to mean different things.  CI can 
mean Configuration Item, or Continuous Improvement, depending on 
team role in an organisation.  There are many for whom the acronym 
CIA will signify the American Central Intelligence Agency, rather than 
the fundamental tenets of Information Security (InfoSec) – 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.  The word “vulnerabilities” is 
another example of a speech act with multiple implications.  There are 
technical vulnerabilities within code writing; there are system design 
vulnerabilities; there are process and people vulnerabilities.  They 
each require different treatment responses: all are prone to 
vulnerabilities, but the context dictates the meaning and the 
understanding.  These usage duplications add to confusion, 
misinterpretation and poor outcomes. 
2.2.55 By 2004, GRC was well established based on the consultancy and 
audit work of PwC and OCEG use and was adopted across the 
advisory firms and key solution providers (Switzer, 2011).   GRC is a 
lens through which an organisation can understand their business and 
appreciate why these elements need to work together in harmony (risk 
management and strategy), addressing fragmented processes, 
removing silos and working pan-organisationally.  The international 
standard for risk management, ISO 31000 – articulated a framework 
requiring executive mandate and commitment, embedded risk 
management.  The terminology in ISO Guide 73 - where risk is defined 
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as the effect of uncertainty on objectives - combines with ISO 31000 to 
provide a rounded understanding of the risk context (AIRMIC, Alarm 
and IRM, 2010, p.4). 
2.2.56 Figure 15 below shows the confluence of areas. 
 
Figure 15:  Overall Assurance View 
 
2.2.57 GRC is not about technology but about improved business processes.  
The difference experienced in an organisation without GRC (Figure 
16) and with GRC (Figure 17) is depicted below. 
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Figure 16:  An Organisation without GRC, Source: OCEG (2009a) 
 
Figure 17:  An Organisation with GRC, Source: OCEG (2009a) 
 
2.2.58 Lacey (2009, p.198) was unimpressed with the use of the US term IA 
in the public sector.  Lacey’s reticence is from a position of not 
believing that it was possible for a security professional to encompass 
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the breadth of skills implied by the more wide ranging terminology – 
and an interesting perception that “the word ‘assurance’ also lacks the 
authority of ‘security’” ( loc.cit.).  The public sector context remains 
slightly different: “Governments have different motivations for why they 
might spend on security.  Sometimes the data is involved in national 
security ...other times, the obligation has to do with the mandatory 
nature of the data collection and the social contract that surrounds it” 
(Shostack and Stewart, 2008, p.108). 
2.2.59 In the researcher’s experience, this continues to miss the point and 
shows a lack of appreciation for the history of the development and 
growth of IT Security, through InfoSec to IA.  In discussion, Tyrrell and 
Seddon (2014, p.31) addressed the sectoral differences in drivers 
asserting that “fear is pervasive in the public sector”; whereas in the 
private sector, the driving issue is profit.  Further: 
...the private sector (is) more amenable to improvement because 
effectiveness, eliminating waste and fulfilling the business’s 
purposes are quickly measurable in the bottom line.  But in the 
public sector fulfilling the purpose of the service effectively is way 
down the list of priorities – way below meeting targets and 
everyone keeping their jobs, even if their jobs are unnecessary. 
2.2.60 Taylor et al. (2008, p.vii) – in the InfoSec Management Principles 
syllabus description document - begins by stating that “InfoSec ...is 
more accurately called IA” and then carry on throughout to use the 
terms inter changeably, which creates confusion and does a 
disservice to both strands of the profession.  The definition does not 
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extend beyond the well-known CIA triad to include what this research 
has confirmed as being the already included IA elements of 
authentication and non-repudiation.  Similar to the manual for the 
Certificate in InfoSec Management Principles, if the terms were so 
interchangeable then it should have been the Certificate in IA 
Principles in order to ameliorate future proofing as it would have 
reflected a more accurate understanding of the difference between the 
terms. 
2.2.61 The evidence continued to show that IA is often used as a synonym 
for InfoSec (Boyce and Jennings, 2002).  The issue of terminological 
difficulties within the security industry is not new (Schneier, 2003).  
Whilst it may be that “Attempts to create strictly defined vocabulary 
within InfoSec are likely doomed to failure as long as English remains 
a living language” (Shostack and Stewart, 2008, p.143); it is important 
to appreciate that practical responses flow from definitions.  There is a 
natural cause and effect as a result of the speech acts and dominant 
narrative used. 
2.2.62 In the late 1990s, the term IA was known only by small groups of 
InfoSec experts, often considered to be ‘paranoid’ or ‘rigid’ (Lacey, 
2013b).  Today, IA is well-known by a wider audience involved with 
UK public sector projects and private sector contracts ranging from 
high-level executives to engineers of many disciplines.  Many have 
sought insight on IA processes through reading papers and attending 
briefings.  Research undertaken by Tawileh and McIntosh (2007, p.6) 
appeared to use both InfoSec and IA interchangeably, causing 
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confusion to the outcomes; although the work did identify the need to 
embed the requirements across the whole business environment and 
the historical evidence that exists reflecting this need. 
2.2.63 In the late 2000s, the status quo was similar, with only a small number 
of professionals truly understanding the breadth of meaning and the 
scale of available material upon from which to draw experience and 
wisdom (Hutton, 2008).  In 2009, UK Government policy shifted to 
reference cybersecurity in line with the dominant narrative (NAO, 
2013, p.12). 
2.2.64 In the context of cybersecurity, there is a lack of evidence of any new 
principles.  Tibbs (2013, p.112) identified this need: 
[in order] to understand and tame the Global Cyber Game ...[it 
will be necessary]...to establish a set of principles grounded in 
the root characteristics of information and power.  These 
principles can then form design criteria for the development of 
cyber policy and strategy. 
2.2.65 Excessive use of computer jargon and acronyms was identified as an 
issue with particular regard to user interface and system design 
(Galitz, 2007) and, separately, as an issue with regard to delivering 
InfoSec user awareness programmes (Peltier, 2005).  As referenced 
in Goodell (1996, p.14), “How do you know when something new is 
coming?  You know it when the language...is ugly.  You cannot tell 
what these things are....”.  There have been different examples of the 
progression of language, not all of which have merit.  2015 saw the 
entrance of ESRM – Enterprise Security and Risk Management - and 
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the term “phigital” – where the physical and the digital collide.  
Acronyms are often used within the written word in order to reduce 
repetition of cumbersome word strings.  However, verbal abbreviation 
of common terms – where they are not so common; use of vernacular, 
industry speak, speed, shorthand, Twitter – are all creating 
misunderstandings between teams where extensive periods of time 
are required in explanation, building up animosity between 
departments because nobody appreciates being corrected (Simms, 
2011, p.26).  If an acronym has not been spelt out, a new term 
explained and the parameters from which the dialogue is to take place 
outlined, it will not matter how many times they are repeated, there wil l 
be different interpretation. 
2.3 The Importance of Definition 
2.3.1 In 2008, a survey highlighted that “40 per cent of senior management 
respondents had little or no understanding of what the term 
information assurance actually meant”.  The article reporting the 
survey went on to state that: 
Most organisations lack clear accountability for information 
assurance.  With no single owner and usually so many well-
meaning stakeholders, IA remains someone else’s problem as 
a data-loss scandal, a collapse in customer confidence or 
negative press washes over your company (Hutton, 2008). 
2.3.2 The researcher found this to still be the case, given the lack of 
understanding of the terminology and the expectation that the 
solutions remain the responsibility of IT professionals to address 
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(Holtham, 2015, p.13).  Richardson (2012, p.18) identified that “the 
current structure of Assurance is both restrictive and intolerant to the 
problems it needs to define, explore and resolve”.  Richardson (Ibid. 
p.195) went on to provide his own definition of IA specific for the area 
of research – the military and national security theatre: 
IA is the assumed responsibility (Corporate Governance) and 
accreditation of a socio-technical Enterprise across the 5-layers 
of the Cyber Domain (Geographical, Physical, Logical, Persona  
and Cyber Persona), inclusive of their Business Processes, 
Information Operations, Information Exploitation, Management, 
Services, Technologies and Infrastructures.  The socio-technical 
Enterprise is assured by appropriate levels of maturity and 
awareness within the 8-Dimensions of IA (Structure, Resi lience, 
Dependability, Safety, Security, Protection, Trust and Risk 
Management). 
2.3.3 These are eight different elements to those selected by Cherdantseva 
and Hilton (2013a) for their concept of the IAS-octave: Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability, Accountability, Non-repudiation, Auditability, 
Authenticity, and Trustworthiness and Privacy within their Reference 
Model for IA and Security (RMIAS).  The IAS-octave seeks to 
replace the CIA-triad, the McCumber Cube, and the Maconachy IA 
Model, detailing a comprehensive set of security goals (Cherdantseva 
and Hilton, 2013b).  This is referenced as evidence of multiple 
overlapping models.  The researcher contends that this academic 
duplication adds layers of complexity, rather than simplifying the 
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challenge of achieving IP in all domains.  Risk management is an 
inherent element of InfoSec.  Physical security has long been an 
understood requirement; convergence in these overlapping industries 
has been actively sought for some time.  The issues are interwoven, 
not separately dependent.  Since 1998, Purdue University has had 
CERIAS – the Centre for Education and Research in IA and Security 
(IAS) - so the concepts are not new. 
2.3.4 There is an existing model - the Open Group (2011) InfoSec 
Management Maturity Model (O-ISM3) - that does not appear to have 
been considered within the work of Cherdantseva and Hilton (2013b, 
2014).  This model already identified CIA as an insufficient model for 
the security needs of the 21st century.  The model mapped ISO 9001 
quality management principles to InfoSec management systems.  The 
latest version, dated 2013, also mapped to ISO 27001.  The whole 
model focuses on common processes rather than on controls, 
processes which are shared across many organisations.  
Cherdantseva (2014) also reviewed the work of Von Solms (2001) and 
sought to enhance the multi-dimensional view of the InfoSec domain, 
to which the researcher has added italicised commentary: i) the 
Strategic/Corporate Governance Dimension; all subsequent standards 
and frameworks have sought to address this, COBiT, BMIS, ISO 
27001 etc and yet still there is a need to explain to leadership the 
importance of the domain and the need for inclusion; ii) the 
Governance/Organisational Dimension; this would have, by default, 
included the Physical Security dimension and the Business Continuity 
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Dimension – by creating multiple vertical silos, the industry continues 
to create duplication of effort and complexity; iii) the Policy Dimension; 
iv) the Best Practice Dimension; v) the Ethical Dimension; vi) the 
Certification Dimension; vii) the Legal Dimension; - by default this must 
contain the Privacy Dimension, given the requirement to comply with 
relevant legislation with regard to the protection of personally 
identifiable information (PII); viii) the Insurance Dimension; - this 
should be part of the Governance/Organisational Dimension – it is a 
part of doing business, a management decision; ix) the 
Personnel/Human Dimension; ix) the Awareness Dimension; the 
researcher wonders why this is not part of the Personnel/Human 
Dimension – who else is going to be being made aware?; xi) the 
Technical Dimension - this must, by default, contain both the System 
Development Dimension which ensures that the security is built into 
the development process; and the Security Architecture Dimension; it 
appears to be a constant failing of the collective IT industry that 
“Security” has been treated as a separate vertical organisational 
activity rather than an intrinsically horizontal one; xii) the 
Measurement/Metrics (Compliance monitoring/Real time IT audit) 
Dimension; and xii) the Audit Dimension.  This list is consistent with 
the regular industry approach of separating out activities, rather than 
bringing them together and ensuring a broader understanding of more 
issues with less duplication of effort.  The researcher believes this 
adds misunderstanding to an already confused domain.  Significant 
difference in focus in the last twenty years can be seen in the 
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Compliance space.  Regulation, standards, policies and contracts are 
variations of the compliance requirement which could create a new 
Dimension:  xiv) the Compliance Dimension – to combine: iii) the 
Policy Dimension; iv) the Best Practice Dimension; vi) the Certification 
Dimension and vii) the Legal Dimension. 
2.3.5 Figure 18 below synthesises two ontologies together. 
 
Figure 18:  A Reference Model of IA and Security (RMIAS), Source: Cherdantseva and Hilton 
(2013b) 
2.3.6 The researcher recommends a different direction, not seeking to join 
two disciplines that can be seen to be one (InfoSec) as a subset of the 
other (IA), but rather showing the roadmap progression leading from 
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IT Security through InfoSec, through IA to IG (see Figure 24).  Security 
may historically have been an IT issue.  However, assurance raises 
the requirement to a more organisational one, given the importance of 
valuing information as an asset and the need to protect both 
reputation and personal privacy. 
2.3.7 The researcher contends that the plethora of definitions and 
terminology has led to confusion for those in a position of having to 
implement the requirements of IA sufficient to warrant clarification, 
agreement and streamlining.  The confusion can often manifest itself 
in paralysis in implementing the available guidance or the repeated 
themes evidenced in many of the government and industry reports that 
follow after a significant event, breach or incident. 
2.3.8 It behoves IA professionals to take stock and ensure that they 
understand the background and theory before continuing to progress 
with both professionalisation and with the future consumerisation in 
the context of the IoT, where interconnectivity is the norm, making 
personal information even more of a commodity (Howard and Prince, 
2011). 
2.4 Identification of IA Best/Common Practice 
2.4.1 Good and best practices have existed for a long time and need to be 
used (Nanton, 2004).  “Best practices” are designed to be vague 
enough to apply in the general case.  They are dictated by 
consultants, vendors and the security industry as a whole.  “Best 
practices” are activities that are supposed to represent collective 
wisdom within a field (Shostack and Stewart, 2008, p.36-37).  Best 
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practice is considered to be a business buzzword, used to describe 
the process of developing and following a standard way of doing 
things that multiple organisations can use.  A best practice is a method 
or technique that has consistently shown results superior to those 
achieved with other means and is used as a benchmark. 
2.4.2 As improvements are discovered a “best” practice can evolve to 
ameliorate operational outcomes.  Unfortunately, however, what is 
evident is often not even standard practice, but rather a lack of 
common sense.  The Ashley Madison breach highlighted how far 
education still has to reach, how deeply it needs to be embedded, in 
order to improve one of the most standard of requirements - password 
management practices (Whittaker, 2015). 
2.4.3 In order to effectively embed IA – in government, in industry and 
beyond - the goal must be to transform InfoSec into a multidisciplinary 
field in which technologists work closely with experts in “soft issues” 
such as public policy, economics, and sociology (Shostack and 
Stewart, 2008, p.103). 
2.4.4 The work of Piatek and Newkirk (2009) addressed many of the 
questions concerning what is involved in embedding IA into US 
Department of Defense (DoD) systems being developed, though with 
the emphasis being on technology enhancements through the system 
development lifecycle (SDLC), rather than securing business 
improvements overall.  The work of Pappas (2008) reviewed the US 
DoD approach to IA awareness training in detail, collating a wealth of 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
65 | P a g e  
resources and articulating the IA challenge in the context of 
information superiority. 
2.4.5 A continual theme throughout the first decade of the 21st century has 
been that “IA is both art and science”; it needs to be tackled through 
multidisciplinary efforts (Petersen et al., 2004; Bishop, 2003, p.xxxii-iii). 
2.4.6 From a UK perspective, the starting point is a premise of 
understanding InfoSec.  On the passing of the thirtieth anniversary of 
the creation of BS7799, Lacey (2013b) wrote the following: 
Donn Parker of SRI International, and several security audit 
companies were also experimenting with a set of IT controls 
which eventually become COBIT prior to the late 1980s when 
David Lacey joined Shell and by the late 1980s had assembled a 
collection of around a hundred baseline controls which were 
published privately for the I4 InfoSec circle which he conceived 
and founded. 
2.4.7 This was an early reference to the longstanding existence of common 
practice.  As referenced by NIST (US NIST, 2001b):  
IA is achieved – and must be maintained – through a process that 
includes the assessment of threats to an IS, an analysis of the 
vulnerabilities in the system, an understanding of the impact of a 
system failure, and the application of technical and non-technical 
countermeasures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level for the 
business. 
2.4.8 Core to understanding IA is appreciating to what the “information” is 
referring.  The function and responsibility of security personnel is to 
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protect corporate information assets.  Kovacich (1998) addressed the 
issue of “the value of information”, in particular, that it is time 
dependent. 
2.4.9 Barman (2002) pointed out the important concept of information as an 
asset.  Peltier (2002) referenced the term “information protection”.  
Two years later, Peltier (2004, p.3) contended that “Information is an 
asset and is the property of the organization” and also added that an 
IP “program should be part of any organization’s overall asset 
protection program”.  This requirement has taken on increasing 
importance with the ongoing maturation of the InfoSoc.  Blyth and 
Kovacich (2006, p.121) showed this progression over time in Figure 
19, showing examples of assets requiring protection, though the 
researcher contends that the Information rather than the Knowledge 
age remain the area of greater concern. 
 
Figure 19:  Evolution of the Human Ages, Source: Blyth and Kovacich (2006, p.121 ) 
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2.4.10 IA includes those actions that protect and defend information and IS.  
IA is both a business enabler and a business protector; ensuring users 
of IS are not unwittingly exposing themselves to unacceptable risk.  
This has equally been expressed as IA representing a migration from 
a preventative to an enabling approach (McFadzean, 2005).  
McFadzean (2005) contributed to the BoK by producing a brief history 
of the early part of the 21st century and the progression of IA, 
particularly with regard to the need to make a business case to senior 
management for their “buy-in”. 
2.4.11 The stated benefits of creating a corporate IA culture and corporate IA 
programme are expected to include (UK Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2010): i) more assured continuity of business processes 
and services and of the business itself; ii) greater efficiency and higher 
levels of performance of internal operations; iii) improved security, 
integrity, reliability, and utility of IS and data (higher levels of 
maintenance of the corporate information infrastructure); and iv) more 
reliable and greater leveraging of the goodwill, trading and support 
relationships established with partners, stakeholders, customers, 
investors, government and the public at large. 
2.4.12 ISACA brought these concepts together in their Business Model for 
InfoSec (BMIS), shown in Figure 20 below, seeking to provide an “in-
depth explanation to a holistic business model which examines 
security issues from a systems perspective” (ISACA, 2009; ISACA, 
2010a).  In the researcher’s experience, this is the most holistic and 
useful, practitioner based operational framework. 
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Figure 20:  BMIS - the Business Model for InfoSec, Source: ISACA (2009) 
 
2.4.13 There are a number of basic steps found sequentially in most InfoSec 
standards (ISO 27001, ISACA BMIS et al.), which build towards the 
identification and implementation of an InfoSec management system 
(ISMS) (Dimitriadis, 2011).  These are: i) Business Impact Analysis  
– looking at the impact to the business following the realisation of a 
threat, usually in terms of the monetary, reputational or legal impact; ii) 
Risk Analysis – the possibility of the occurrence of a security incident 
is calculated based on a database of security weaknesses.  This step 
needs to take into account technical measures that are already in 
place to reduce risk and any other complementary controls already 
available; iii) Risk Management – once identified, risks are prioritised 
in relation to the impact level and business appetite for risk; and iv) 
ISMS implementation* – management framework implementation 
including consideration of human, cultural, technical, business and 
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external factors and requires metrics, measurement, and continuous 
improvements.  * The work of Coles-Kemp (2008) provided an 
extensive review of the understanding and effectiveness of ISMS 
implementation. 
2.4.14 InfoSec requires controls to be selected and implemented, the best of 
which are preventive (in the most obvious sense of preventing any 
breach of security from taking place in the first instance), such as 
firewalls, user access control mechanisms, encryption of data and 
communications, digital signatures, data backup systems and 
detective controls such as intrusion detection systems or security 
monitoring platforms form the basic components of security 
architecture.  Palmer (2011) provided helpful explanation for the types 
of controls: i) “Preventive controls (“before the fact”) – The most 
important control type since, if 100 per cent effective (which it never 
is), none of the others would be necessary – physical barriers, 
passwords, etc.; ii) Detective controls (“after the fact”) - If a preventive 
mechanism fails, this is the first type of control necessary to identify 
the facts prior to correction – audit trails, monitoring, etc.; iii) Corrective 
controls (“before or after the fact”) - This type of control is designed to 
correct a problem once identified – change control, overrides, etc.; iv) 
Compliance controls (“enforcing the fact”) - Compliance controls are 
designed to keep an organisation inside the law and its Chief 
Executive Officer out of jail – observing data protection laws, avoiding 
libel, etc.; and v) Deterrent controls (“instead of the fact”) - Designed to 
advise against certain forms of action - security policy, logon warning, 
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etc.”  The various technical controls are usually complemented by a 
framework of security policies, procedures, and guidelines aimed at 
controlling the actions of the users to whom they apply (Kesar, 2011). 
2.4.15 As an example of further duplication and replication, in 2014, the 
European Banking Authority (EBA, 2014) proposed new regulations 
aimed at payment service providers (Hancock, 2015).  The security 
recommendations included: i) segregation of duties in information 
technology; ii) hardening servers with secure configurations; iii) 
applying “least privi lege” principles to access control; iv) limiting login 
attempts; v) end-to-end encryption; vi) logging and vii) change 
management.  These elements were already addressed in the PCI 
DSS (PCI SSC, undated).  They were also covered in other financial 
sector guidance and regulations, as well as in ISO 27001; in the US 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA); in NIST; in 
SANS Top 20 Critical Controls; in the UK Governments 10 Steps to 
Cyber Security; the list goes on. 
2.4.16 Ezingeard et al. (2003) described IA as having been “developed by 
IAAC” which was not untrue.  In 2000, the IA Advisory Council (IAAC) 
was formed in order to further IA research and discussion across the 
public and private sector and academia.  IAAC is a unique partnership 
between government, industry and academia and its members include 
some key government policy makers and the research community.   
Collectively, they developed the subject area and worked with notable 
bodies such as the Institute of Directors (IoD) to improve 
organisational adoption. 
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2.4.17 The Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 1999) and BS7799 (now ISO 270001) 
were also identified as important influences on the maturation of IA in 
the UK, although BS7799 was inaccurately described by the authors 
(op.cit.) as the “Code of Practice for IA Management”.  It has only ever 
been an “InfoSec Management” code.  In 2007, they updated their 
earlier InfoSec best practice identification work, represented in Table 1 
below, as a comparator of the two particular fields. 
 InfoSec IA 
Confidentiality Need-to-know only 
and protection from 
unauthorised access 
How can ongoing compliance be ensured 
against regulatory changes or regional 
variations?  
What would be the impact on reputation 
of a breach of confidentiality? 
Integrity Preventing 
accidental or 
malicious alteration, 
corruption or 
deletion 
Can users compare relative levels of 
reliability if data are conflicting? 
How does the organisation reduce costs 
incurred through errors? 
Availability Disaster recovery 
and business 
continuity to ensure 
ongoing operation of 
existing systems 
How can we develop systems that will 
not be restrictive as the organisation 
grows, enters new alliances or develops 
new business? 
Identification 
and 
authentication 
Password access 
control 
Do users keep their passwords secret 
and regularly changed because they are 
told to or because they understand the 
importance of password safety? 
How can we develop better identification 
and authentication methods for our 
stakeholders? 
Non-
repudiation 
Fraud prevention How can security reduce the 
organisation’s transaction costs? 
Can transactions be simplified for our 
customers to increase their value gained 
from dealing with us, without 
compromising security? 
Table 1:  Comparing InfoSec to IA, Adapted from Ezingeard, McFadzean, Birchall (2007), pp.96-
118 
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2.4.18 IAAC (2003m) defined IA as “the certainty that the information within 
an organisation is reliable, secure and private.  IA encompassed both 
the accuracy of the information and its protection, and included 
disciplines such as InfoSec Management, Risk Management and 
Business Continuity Management”.  This definition focused attention 
on the centrality of information to holistic business assurance.  The 
endeavour was to alter perceptions such that IA would be seen not as 
an optional, additional activity but rather as something to be 
embedded throughout an organisation. 
2.4.19 The terminology used was deliberately different from the standard CIA 
triad, using the terms reliable, secure and private on the premise that 
these would mean more at director level (McFadzean, 2005).  Further 
IAAC publications refined the definition: 
IA is a holistic approach towards protecting information and 
information systems by ensuring availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiali ty, and non-repudiation.  Although 
building on the discipline of InfoSec, the concept of IA raises the 
profile of security as a business critical operational function 
rather than as a technical support function (Anhal et al., 2002). 
The long term goal was to achieve a good level of IA throughout the 
Digital Society (IAAC, 2002), for the systems and data that people rely 
upon in their daily lives to be reliable and trustworthy.  This meant that 
IS would protect the data they process, store, and communicate; they 
would function as they need to; they would function when they need 
to; and they would function under control. 
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2.4.20 Another entrant into the IA domain is “Cyber-Physical Systems” (CPS), 
a 2015 three letter acronym (TLA) from a working group sponsored by 
NIST in the US, seeking to address the pressing requirements of 
ensuring assurance across “smart” systems.  The te rm was chosen to 
denote the interconnectedness between the physical (e.g. kettle, 
fridge, car) domain and the cyber (the ether) domain and the intended 
framework is represented in Figure 21 below. 
 
 
Figure 21:  CPS PWG Draft CPS Framework, Source: NIST (2015) 
 
2.4.21 Existing terminology covered these – Operational Technology (OT) 
and Information Technology (IT) - and in other areas of the industry, 
convergence of these two vertical areas of focus had already been 
taking place.  Whilst the work undertaken by the CPS Public Working 
Group (PWG) provides a worthy framework for operations , and is 
intended to provide an appropriate reference architecture moving 
forward, the researcher would contend that without acknowledgement 
of the existing constructs within which IO are already taking place, this 
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will appear as a new activity, will drain precious resources and will 
therefore dilute existing efforts. 
2.4.22 This ongoing entrance of new players and new terminology, new 
standards and new frameworks, to address existing work done shows 
a closed system at work, lacking proper interaction continually moving 
toward greater disorganisation (Koenig, 2012, p.19). 
2.4.23 The IA process is cyclical; the risk assessment and risk management 
plan are continuously revised and improved based on data gleaned 
from evaluation (reviews) (Walters, 2011).  This cyclical work 
addresses some of the challenges of the complexity and the 
anticipated unknown unknowns.  Reviews provide both causes and 
effects that can be addressed by the implementation of available 
standards (safeguards, countermeasures, controls). 
2.4.24 The work undertaken by Cornish et al. (2011, p.viii) in Building a Cyber 
Security Culture identified clear examples of best practice in action.  
However, it did not appear to identify the existence of resources such 
as GetSafeOnline nor CESG as signposts for available resources and 
for awareness raising efforts.  All UK Government departments were 
encouraged to foster a culture that values, protects and uses 
information for the public good (UK Cabinet Office, 2010a).  Clear 
principles exist and the UK public sector is well served.  CESG and 
GCHQ only provide advice in many areas, advice that can be and is 
often ignored.  These are the distilled best and common practice 
required to achieve both InfoSec and then IA, which should be 
standard practice in all organisations irrespective of sector.  This has 
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been used to assess how well IA activities were being implemented.  
These Assurance Activities, if adequately implemented, would address 
the findings of the regular Ponemon Data Breach reports - that the 
cost of a data breach can be reduced (Prince, 2015) by having i) an 
incident response plan and team; ii) extensive use of encryption; iii) 
business continuity management (BCM) involvement; iv) Chief 
Information Security Officer (CISO) leadership; v) employee training; 
vi) board-level involvement; and vii) insurance protection. 
2.4.25 CESG produced ten Assurance Activities - the “10 Steps to Cyber 
Security” (UK GCHQ, 2015) shown in Table 2. 
1 
Secure 
configuration 
Apply security patches and ensure that the secure configuration of all ICT 
systems is maintained. Create a system inventory and define a baseline 
build for all ICT devices. 
2 
Removable 
media controls 
Produce a policy to control all access to removable media. Limit media 
types and use. Scan all media for malware before importing on to a 
corporate system. 
3 
Network 
security 
Protect your networks against external and internal attack. Manage the 
network perimeter. Filter out unauthorised access and malicious content. 
Monitor and test security controls. 
4 
User and 
educational 
awareness 
Produce user security policies covering acceptable and secure use of the 
organisation's systems. Establish a staff training programme. Maintain 
user awareness of the cyber risks  
5 IRM regime  
Establish an effective governance structure and determine your risk 
appetite – just like you would for any other risk. Maintain the Board’s 
engagement with the cyber risk.  
6 Home working 
Develop a mobile working policy and train staff to adhere to it. Apply the 
secure baseline build to all devices. Protect data both in transit and at 
rest.  
7 
Managing user 
privileges 
Establish account management processes and limit the number of 
privileged accounts. Limit user privileges and monitor user activity. 
Control access to activity and audit logs.  
8 
Malware 
protection 
Produce relevant policy and establish anti-malware defences that are 
applicable and relevant to all business areas. Scan for malware across 
the organisation.  
9 Monitoring 
Establish a monitoring strategy and produce supporting policies. 
Continuously monitor all ICT systems and networks. Analyse logs for 
unusual activity that could indicate an attack.  
10 
Incident 
management 
Establish an incident response and disaster recovery capability. Produce 
and test incident management plans. Provide specialist training to the 
incident management team. Report criminal incidents to law enforcement.  
Table 2:  Assurance Survey (UK GCHQ, 2015) 
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2.4.26 However, standards do not establish security, people do.  Therefore, 
similarly, standards will not deliver IA, people will (Ross, 2013, p.4).  
Good security practice supported by robust systems design remains 
absent, despite available information, resources, courses and 
guidance, as well as legislative, regulation and industry changes.  
However, historical research shows the existence of awareness of 
many aspects of management, strategy, and leadership. 
2.4.27 For example, Aberdeen Group research (2005 cited in ITGI, 2012, 
p.33) identified that “losses due to ineffective security can be reduced 
by up to 90 per cent by implementing known, commonly used security 
practices.  This alone should be sufficient to motivate action by 
responsible management”.  There are many organisations purchasing 
equipment and solutions that may not be necessary if more 
understanding of the available best or common practices, regulation, 
legislation and available standards existed amongst the involved 
professionals.  “This lack of intellectual honesty has led the entire 
industry a long way off course” (Howard and Prince, 2011, p.259). 
2.4.28 Finally, the impact of organisational politics on the ability to deliver IA 
is not to be discounted (Pott, 2015 and Valsmith, 2015).  This was 
identified by the work of Peter Drucker (in Stein, 2010, p.60): 
The modern corporation is thus a political institution; its purpose is 
the creation of legitimate power in the industrial sphere. [...] The 
political purpose of the corporation is the creation of a legitimate 
social government on the basis of the original power of the 
individual property rights of its shareholders. 
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2.4.29 Information Age infrastructure is founded upon the Open Source 
Interconnection (OSI) Seven Layer model, shown in Figure 22 below.   
 
Figure 22:  OSI Model, Source: Korah (2006) 
 
2.4.29 However, there are people and psychological layers that need to be 
considered on top, where politics is occurring between the margins of 
layers 9 to 11: i) Layer 8 can be considered the business process 
layer; ii) Layer 9, the human contact layer – also the cognitive layer; iii) 
Layer 10, the context layer; and iv) Layer 11, the ecosystem layer. 
2.5 The Growth and Usage of IA in the UK 
2.5.1 Through the review of IA definitions, it has been observed that the UK 
development has been influenced by its ongoing maturation in the US.  
IA covers the defensive realm of IO, based on concepts and models 
that have migrated from the field of IS security (Blyth and Kovacich, 
2006). 
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2.5.2 From 2002, the UK Government’s key source of guidance on IA was 
the UK Central Sponsor for IA (UK CSIA, as was) and it defined IA as: 
“the confidence that information systems will protect the information 
they carry and will function as they need to, when they need to, under 
the control of legitimate users” (UK CSIA, 2002).  This is the definition 
that is consistently used in most central government related 
publications. 
2.5.3 Shanes (2011) identified that assurance is fundamentally about 
reassurance in the context of operating government systems.  Table 3 
presents existing UK Government initiatives designed to assist 
organisations in addressing IA, though without a timeline. 
 
 
Table 3:  Public Sector IA initiatives, Source: Shanes (2011, p.34) 
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2.5.4 Corporate Governance was brought to the fore following the Enron 
scandal where the organisation involved was found to have been 
remiss in its financial reporting and its auditors were embroiled in the 
subsequent debacle on the basis of having signed off on accounts that 
were not a true reflection of the internal reality or risk levels (Turnbull, 
2002).  Subsequent reporting in the UK included references borne 
from these events including the Higgs Review (Higgs, 2003), the 
Smith Guidance (FRC, 2005) and the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA, 2008). 
2.5.5 Vendors such as Microsoft, Oracle and IBM have sought to contribute 
to increased board awareness of risk management as a result of a 
breach, an incident, a media report or an event that has brought focus 
onto the requirements of IA in the context of protecting organisational 
information and embedding information risk management in order to 
achieve this.  The UK had already been reporting on these issues 
earlier than the Enron scandal mentioned above – through the 
Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992) and the Turnbull Report (ICAEW, 
1999).  The latter was successful in bringing the issue of internal 
control and risk management to the attention of the board; its 
principles remain the building blocks on which good Corporate 
Governance is based.  Thus it can be evidenced that the need for 
greater leadership and governance has been a strong theme for a 
considerable length of time, with regard to information awareness, 
management, and risk reporting. 
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2.5.6 Boyce and Jennings (2002, p.170) articulated the stages of the 
security life cycle thus: 
Often security is thought of as an event rather than a process, as 
a stitch in time rather than a thread that runs throughout each 
phase of a system’s life cycle.  Security is often not considered 
during the initial planning, design, and development of the 
system.  Attempts to retrofit security into the system after it is 
developed are typically more expensive and less effective than if 
it is incorporated from inception.  Likewise, security does not end 
once the system has been accredited and approved to operate 
under certain conditions. Throughout the system’s operational 
and maintenance phase, the system’s compliance with the terms 
of its accreditation must be verified.  Even when the system’s li fe 
cycle is over, security policies and procedures must govern the 
secure destruction and disposal of the system. 
2.5.7 CESG (2012b), the National Technical Authority for IA, used the US 
DoD “Five Pillars” to communicate IA as being “essential for safe 
electronic transactions”: i) Confidentiality – keeping information 
private; ii) Integrity – ensuring information has not been tampered with; 
iii) Availability – ensuring information is available when required; iv) 
Authentication – confirming the identity of the individual who undertook 
the transaction; and v) Non-repudiation – the individual who undertook 
the transaction cannot subsequently deny it. 
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2.5.8 The CESG definition constrained IA in terms of “electronic 
transactions”, missing the human factor(s) of physical security as has 
been witnessed with the many and varied data losses and security 
breaches, the majority of which have been as a result of an error on 
the part of a well-meaning member of staff, not necessarily directly as 
a result of “electronic transactions”.  CESG’s core role was the delivery 
of a UK technical capability for IA - addressing IA issues at a software 
and technology level - and to ensure the supply of appropriate 
technical solutions, which may explain their more narrow focus. 
2.5.9 By 2007, the UK National IA Strategy (NIAS) (op.cit.) (first issued in 
2003 (UK CSIA, 2003)), aligned with the Hermann scope of IA 
definition (paragraph 2.2.36).  By 2011, the NIAS aimed, to create “A 
UK environment where citizens, businesses and government use and 
enjoy the full benefits of information systems with confidence”.  The 
Strategy had several intended outcomes: Government would be better 
able to deliver public services through the appropriate use of ICT; the 
UK’s national security would be strengthened by protecting information 
and IS at risk of compromise; and the UK’s economic and social well-
being would be enhanced as government, businesses and citizens 
realise the full benefits of ICT. 
2.5.10 The aim of the NIAS was to embed IA as a part of everyday business 
processes, ensuring that there was clear and effective IRM by 
organisations, and agreement upon and compliance with approved 
and appropriate IA standards.  The objectives of the Strategy were the 
development and availability of appropriate IA capabilities through the 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
82 | P a g e  
development and availability of the right products and services; 
coordinated and appropriate efforts on innovation and research; 
improved professionalism across all areas of the IA sector and 
improved awareness and outreach across the UK.  However, reaching 
back twenty years, more than sixty per cent of new computer projects 
at the time failed in the US and the UK alone, with £58 billion lost 
through technology related ‘teething troubles’ (Collins, 1997).  
Returning to the present day, the breach reporting in 2017, showed 
that only 37 per cent of UK businesses were taking data protection 
seriously in the context of the implementation of security best practice 
(Forbes, 2017). 
2.5.11 IA in the UK public sector came of age in 2008 as a result of the 
government response following the HMRC loss of 25 million records 
(IPCC, 2008).  This event proved to be embarrassing to the UK 
Government and damaging to the trust of the public in the capability of 
the government to protect their personal data and provide appropriate 
assurance as to its ongoing safety and security.  In order to improve 
public perception, 11 reports were issued in 2008 alone, which all 
highlighted the need for, and the importance of, IA [see Appendix I, 
Section 10.21].  Following on from the reporting, which had identified 
lack of leadership as a cause for bad IA implementation, the 
requirement was to embark upon an appreciable cross-governmental 
culture change, addressing data handling procedures, accountability, 
and InfoSec awareness. 
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2.5.12 The prevailing rhetoric had been that Government preferred self-
regulation whilst wishing to endorse strong ecommerce as vital for the 
UK in terms of position and development.  However, in response to the 
breach, Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) embarked on a programme 
of implementing cross governmental mandatory minimum measures 
for data handling which were to be in place by certain dates and thus 
target setting and measurements became a part of the lexicon and 
portfolio of IA operations (Cabinet Office, 2008d). 
2.5.13 This led to the development of the IA Maturity Model (IAMM) as a 
mechanism for measuring the implementation of best practice 
requirements across six categories (UK Cabinet Office, 2009d; UK 
CESG, 2010a): i) Leadership and Governance; ii) Training, Education, 
and Awareness; iii) IRM; iv) Through-life IA Measures; v) Assured 
Information Sharing; and vi) Compliance. 
2.5.14 The researcher created and delivered the internal InfoSec and risk 
awareness training module delivered across the whole of HMRC in 
response to the second requirement above and published a book as a 
result of the experiences.  This was referenced in Case Study 2.1 in 
the Cabinet Office report Protecting Information (Simmons, 2009; 
Cabinet Office, 2010a). 
2.5.15 Using the IAMM was intended to enable the required organisational 
culture change towards viewing information as an important asset 
requiring protection.  The IAMM is linked with the need to “establish a 
culture of continuous improvement in IA practice” (Schou and 
Shoemaker, 2007, p.410).  Given the wealth of available, historical 
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material, entering new “government speak” phrases such as “Through-
life IA Measures” clouded the already full vocabulary.  This is an 
example of the UK public sector introducing terminology that is 
inconsistent with the BoK available to the industry professionals likely 
to be involved in assisting with the implementation of the required 
controls, safeguards, improvements etc.  As Shostack and Stewart 
(2008, p.xi) stated: “The classics are classic for a reason – they work!”. 
2.5.16 Adoption of the IAMM is believed to be essential for successful 
implementation of IA; it is also mandatory for central government 
departments.  The lack of mandate beyond central government, to 
local government and other public sector organisations, means that IA 
is not as embedded as it could be.  It is often harder to secure senior 
buy-in, as there are other priorities that have to be met. 
2.5.17 The IA Chronology, Appendix III signposts an extensive repository of 
good practice and available resources of advice, all published long in 
advance of the 2008 data breach.  It was this tipping point that led to 
the researcher being asked to produce a publication to address the 
identified challenges (Simmons, 2009), which began the analysis as to 
why it was that such a volume of available material can be at the 
disposal of those who require it but that it can appear to be continually 
ignored in the pursuit of progress. 
2.5.18 This behaviour has been at the expense of embedding best practice 
that would have ultimately helped to reduce the risk of such losses 
and breaches being experienced, not only in the UK public sector but 
subsequently in the global private sector too.  “Best practices are 
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simply activities that are supposed to represent collective wisdom 
within a field” (Shostack and Stewart, 2008, p.36). 
2.5.19 The difficulty is often that understanding of how badly a security 
measure can fail is only realised after a failure occurs: “Success is 
often silent, invisible or boring.  It doesn’t make for a good story” (Ibid. 
p.44).  The preparations required for the Year 2000 (Y2K) were 
experienced by many, yet the end result for some was one of no 
impact whatsoever, so the effort appeared to be wasted (Nolan and 
McFarlan, 2005, p.1).  However, there is no way to evidence this.  
There was an extra second (a leap second) in 2015.  Again, a number 
of systems had to be prepared for this event, but there was no 
material impact.  Software is always being improved and citizens, 
customers, and clients can become inured to the need for and value of 
constant updates. 
2.5.20 Heller (2015) identified the difficulties of always doing the right thing 
and saying the right thing, but there is a groundswell of concern as to 
where the lines need to be drawn and where the responsibilities lie.  
There is a need for people who will challenge the status quo, though 
to do so can increase risk for both the individual and for the 
organisation they are employed by. 
2.5.21 Information is continually confirmed as being fundamental to the 
business of government.  Effective IA is acknowledged as being core 
to ensuring the appropriate safeguarding of information assets .  Yet 
there have been many public sector IT projects that have been the 
subject of delays and excessive costs. 
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2.5.22 The issue of IT project failures has been being widely researched, 
reported and written about for decades.  Both the Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee (UK Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2010) and the NAO (op.cit.) have reviewed government 
progress into the effective implementation of systems and the security 
applied to them.  The lack of real improvement on the basis of lessons 
that should be learnt from the available materials continues to be of 
concern (Collins and Bicknell, 1997; Glass, 1998; Virgo 2011). 
2.5.23 On the subject of mandatory measures, the National Health Service 
(NHS) was ahead of central government in terms of implementing IG 
in 2002/03, with the NHS IG Toolkit which had already been in 
operation for a number of years prior to the roll out across central 
government and beyond as a result of the Data Handling reviews of 
2008 (UK NHS, 2015).  The NHS was clear that IG was necessary to 
support the provision of high-quality care by promoting the effective 
and appropriate use of information (YAS, 2011).  Therefore, good 
practice already existed in parts of the UK public sector – parts that 
had embraced the breadth of the task and matured to IG beyond IA. 
2.5.24 In 2009, the UK Government was defining IA as: 
the practice of managing information-related risks.  IA is the 
confidence that information and communication systems will, 
through their life cycle, protect the information they handle (i.e. 
ensure the information’s Confidentiality and Integrity), and will 
function as and when they need to (i.e. information is Available as 
required), under the control of legitimate users.  This confidence is 
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vital, as UK government and business all depend on such 
information systems (Translink, 2009). 
2.5.25 Thus it protects information and IS by ensuring CIA, authentication, 
and non-repudiation.  IA is a business function providing confidence in 
Pragmatic, Appropriate and Cost Effective (PACE) Risk Management 
of the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of Information and 
IS (UK CESG, 2009f).  The NIAS was linked to the Government ICT 
Strategy with three principles underpinning and enabling the delivery 
of the IA element of the Strategy: i) Partnership: It was acknowledged 
that public sector organisations would need to work together to deliver 
the right IA outcomes.  In particular, Cabinet Office was to work closely 
with its key partner CESG and the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI), to drive implementation as well as to engage 
with the IA Industry in order to ensure vital success of the strategy; ii) 
Professionalism: There was to be recognised and widespread 
professionalism in IA encompassing those in risk ownership roles in 
the public sector, industry partners, and government IA specialists;  
and iii) Pace and agility: were anticipated to become the dominant 
characteristics of design-to-market delivery of IA capability, evaluation 
of products and services, response to incidents and management of 
risk impact (UK Cabinet Office, 2009e). 
2.5.26 In 2009, two years after the UK Government formation of a single 
National IA Framework (op.cit.), the first UK Cyber Security Strategy 
was produced (op.cit.).  This followed after the multiple Data Handling 
Review (DHR) related reports after the HMRC breach (Child Benefit 
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data loss in 2007).  By 2011, the UK Cyber Security Strategy was 
launched and supported by a £650 million central government 
investment programme. 
2.5.27 Parker and others have been, for over forty-five years, trying to aid 
understanding of risk, probability and the incentives required to 
encourage people to do the right thing (more recently referred to as 
“human factors”).  Therefore, it is disconcerting that industry and 
business continue to experience breaches and incidents.  A 
correlation has been analysed between breach activity and revenue 
growth (Jaffray, 2016).  The security industry profits from insecurity in 
computing devices sufficient to lack incentives to fix what is known to 
be broken.  This means that principles of professionalism are 
forgotten.  Ongoing data breach and loss volumes can be traced back 
to bad system design (Hulme, 2012, referencing the work of Koppel).  
So the more software problems there are, the more continual 
employment there will be for software engineers. 
2.5.28 The implication is that there is deficiency in the approach, the 
implementation or the understanding (Lacey, 2013b).  It is clear that 
“somebody must pay for broken security and somebody must reward 
good security (only then will things start to improve).  Determining who 
is who, which is which, and how best to apply these concepts is a 
matter for government.” (McGraw and Arce, 2010)  However, Room 
(2009, p.186) posed the thorny question “does the publication of 
official reports actually make any difference on the ground?”.  
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2.5.29 These core elements are supported by human needs, as represented 
by Maslow’s Hierarchy in Figure 23 below: 
 
Figure 23:  Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs applied to the online world, Source: Kim (2000)  
 
2.5.30 Unless these human aspects are acknowledged and addressed, 
achieving Objective 4 of the UK Cyber Security Strategy is unlikely.  
As a result of the dominant narrative, there is a contingent impact on 
the culture of an organisation in terms of its willingness to adopt the 
messages provided and embed the best practice advice, which will be 
explored in further detail in future work. 
2.5.31 The researcher contends that the change in dominant narrative from 
IA to cyber has had a dilution effect on adoption and understanding of 
existing dogma.  Cyber space is often referred to as the area of focus 
for policy development in the 21st century and yet for the criminals, 
their focus is not limited to the Internet.  It can involve many 
technological systems that may or may not be connected to the World  
Wide Web.  Criminals are more than content to use “threat vectors” 
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that exist outside of government agencies’ jurisdictions due to near-
sighted policies that have not kept pace with those technological 
developments. 
2.6 Conclusions 
2.6.1 It can be seen from this review that practitioner literature has made an 
important contribution to IA understanding.  InfoSec was not the focus 
of searches as this would have rendered the scale of the task all but 
insurmountable.  Corresponding resources are available, particularly in 
the work of Cherdantseva and Hilton (2014).  Whilst considerable 
continuity of approach has been evidenced, differences in 
pronouncements by advisors, regulators and other bodies have also 
been identified.  The Literature Review has shown incremental 
definition maturation over time.  Definitions are temporally dependent, 
given that each concept is subject to a process of evolution on the 
basis of educational progression and experiential learning. 
2.6.2 IA definitions have been compiled in Appendix I: Table 29; however, 
the following definition formed the corner stone of the research: 
Information operations that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This 
includes providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities 
(US DoD 3600-1, 1996 cited in Herrmann, 2002). 
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2.6.3 The language of IA starts with the language of InfoSec.  The majority 
of the literature reviewed described the development and 
implementation of InfoSec; even that which was entitled IA, in the 
main, referenced InfoSec at its core.  There was a school of thought 
that the terms remain interchangeable and that the distinction is 
between the sectors, even at some points reflecting that, in the UK, IA 
is to the public sector as InfoSec is to the private sector (Blyth and 
Kovacich, 2006; Lacey, 2010; Virgo, 2011). 
2.6.4 Blyth and Kovacich (2006) were in accord with the UK CSIA definition 
but stated that they are content for the reader to make their own mind 
up once they have completed reading the work.  The work of Ilies and 
Boaru (2011) contains an interesting view of the terminology interplay 
between InfoSec and IA, from an IS standpoint, in the context of 
NATO.  The statement that IA “determines all information flows” is 
challenging, though the identification of the significance of information 
classification is important.  In the experience of the researcher, this is 
unhelpful from the perspective of a practitioner. 
2.6.5 Any lack of clarity creates risk as it devalues the existing definitions.  
Identified IA theory discusses the five pillars upon which a successful 
IA programme is grounded: availability, integrity, identification, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation of information assets.  
Fundamentally, IA is understood to be the confidence that information 
assets within an organisation are maintained reliable, accurate, secure 
and available when required.  This was a reference object 
constellation from InfoSec enhanced to IA through the five pillars.  The 
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adoption of cyber securitization has had no equivalent explanation of 
any distinction as to the description of relevant cyber security best 
practices. 
2.6.6 Palermo (2011) referenced the difficulties raised through the use of 
“loose terminology”.  A Wikipedia search for cybersecurity during the 
timeline of this research continually pointed to “computer security”, 
implying interchangeability.  Practice literature reflects that different 
assumptions and situations evoke different responses based on the 
provided definitions.  This has led to both dilution of understanding 
and impedance of successful implementation.  Future locus of 
attention needs to be on the integration of multiple complex systems in 
order to reduce confusion.  Awareness of this challenge will assist 
both academia and practitioners to reach a better understanding as 
well as developing more appropriate analytical language. 
2.6.7 Similarly, in the opinion of the researcher, formulation of new models, 
deliberately joining InfoSec and IA together, does not adequately 
address the identified gaps in understanding; rather it perpetuates the 
prevailing confusion by adding more “communication noise”.  The 
researcher would contend that this does a disservice to the depth that 
can be found in the available IA history and practice, as documented 
herein, and the benefits that can be gained from understanding this 
and thus implementing it properly and comprehensively. 
2.6.8 The Literature Review initially intended to focus on the area of IA in 
the UK Public Sector, providing a thorough review of 2000 to 2010, 
years which were the most volatile in terms of information growth and 
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expansion and thus simultaneously increased information risk.  
However, what was most illuminating was the identification of so many 
relevant and important resources spanning previous decades, 
addressing the information sciences and beyond.  These added to the 
BoK and depth of understanding of the IA domain, creating an 
extensive and wide ranging Bibliography.  Part of the work included a 
review of the outputs from IAAC from their inception in 2000 through to 
the present day (2017).  The impact of their output has been vital to 
the understanding and maturation of IA in the UK.  The researcher has 
interwoven this review into the IA Chronology, Appendix III. 
2.6.9 As Collins and Bicknell (1997, Author’s Note) pointed out, “it is 
possible to avoid disasters by reading a book”.  There is plenty of 
valuable resource material available.  However, it appears that 
practitioners in vital roles and professional positions are lacking in the 
skills to identify and benefit from them. 
2.6.10 There is much that has been written about IM outside of the security 
arena and it is being missed by those involved in maintaining the BoK 
for InfoSec and IA.  This can be evidenced in the various BoK 
repositories available.  The contents do not include nor allude to IM as 
being a core subject area of value in the context of InfoSec.  As 
neither InfoSec nor IA is considered to be fully fledged scientific 
disciplines in their own right, there is a paucity of academic resources 
upon which to draw. 
2.6.11 In order to position IA effectively, there needs to be appreciation of 
other related disciplines.  In the 1970s, the US Government 
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commissioned a report into information usage – both paper and 
electronic - which popularised the concept of IM (Kahn and Blair, 
2009).  Kahn and Blair (Ibid. p.14) provide a history of the IM realm as 
far back as 1943 and reference a definition of InfoSec which shows 
how narrowly it was viewed, understood, nay required at the time: 
“ensuring that the valuable information is accessible only to those 
authorised to see it; and ensuring its trustworthiness”.  Information has 
to be safely stored in order to be of use for future generations. 
2.6.12 IA is part of the cross-disciplinary domain that is IM.  In the publication 
by Best (1996, p.136) there was acknowledgement that “Probably the 
greatest technological problem affecting IM is that there is so much 
technology about and it keeps changing very rapidly”.  The same could 
be said of InfoSec and IA.  This is not something that is widely 
understood by those responsible for delivery of InfoSec solutions.  It is 
important for any organisation to know its processes and its 
information needs.  Best (1996, p.137) articulated that “IM is NOT just 
another name for information technology”.  Without knowing this 
context, it is difficult to overlay security and assurance needs. 
2.6.13 The Literature Review led to the identification of themes that were the 
focus of the research questions, detailed historical contextual and 
discourse analysis following surveys, interviews, and case study 
research.  In order to constrain the scope of the research, the themes 
were prioritised (high, medium and low priority) and subsequent 
sections of Chapter 4 reflect the findings in these areas: i) 
Terminology (understanding of IA); ii) Drivers and Obligations (to 
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implement or achieve IA); iii) Standards and Measurements (covering 
best practice); iv) Impact of Culture and Politics (addressing 
organisational change) – on the management of information risk – 
both internal to an organisation as well as external (Low priority at the 
outset, but grew higher through the Grounded Theory process) – 
addressed by the work undertaken by Shanes (2011) in reviewing IA 
in the MOD.  This area included elements of Management theory (to 
help understand the first two) (Medium priority); v) Professionalism of 
ICT and IA (High priority) – note: the focus is on IA, not on ICT; vi) 
InfoSoc (reflecting the present context and the impact of the IoT; and 
vii) Barriers (to achieve successful IA implementation). 
2.6.14 For ongoing reference, the researcher has viewed the continuum from 
IT Security, through InfoSec, through IA to IG, represented in Figure 
24 below: 
 
Figure 24:  IP Continuum 
  
IT Security
Information Security
Information Assurance
Information Governance
• Principles, CIA
• Standards, Frameworks
• Specialisms
• Membership groups etc
• Informationcentric
• Principles, CIA+
• Frameworks (HMG SPF)
• Professionalism
• Entitycentric assurance
• Frameworks 
• Toolkits (UK & US IG)
• MSc
• i3GRC
• Point solut ions
• Technologycentric
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3 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 In this chapter, the reasons for the research strategy, the chosen 
methodology and the identification of the research questions are 
addressed. 
3.1.2 The underlying theories that supported this research are: Critical 
Theory, Design Science Research Theory and Chaos Theory, but the 
most important and predominant was Systems Theory – through the 
lens of management, organisation and integration. 
3.2 Research Questions 
3.2.1 The research questions are listed in Table 4 below alongside the 
methods utilised to answer these: 
Q# Question Methods Utilised 
1 Can IA professional practice be 
improved through enhanced IA 
understanding? 
Historical Research 
Survey and Interviews 
Contextual and Discourse 
Analysis 
2 How has the extensive body of 
knowledge influenced professionals? 
Survey and Interviews 
Contextual and Discourse 
Analysis 
3 Is there a next area of focus for 
security professionals within the 
roadmap progression from IT 
Security, through InfoSec through to 
IA?  
Contextual and Discourse 
Analysis 
PAR/Case Study 
4 Is it possible to produce a framework 
suitable to support the route from IA to 
IG? 
Grounded Theory 
PAR/Case Study 
Table 4:  Research Questions 
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3.3.2 Further questions arose from the literature review and the ongoing 
iterative content and discourse analysis, as follows: i) What are the 
origins and original definitions of IA?; ii) Are these definitions 
understood at appropriate organisational levels in order to effectively 
implement IA requirements, both now and as they develop over time? 
iii) How does the ability to apply learned intelligence, or not, support 
the advancement of the InfoSoc?; iv) What impact has change of 
political leadership in government had on the direction of IA across the 
UK public sector – in the context of policy making and professional 
practice? v) What other barriers (constraints) to successful 
implementation of IA can be identified through historical review and 
research of available materials, interviews, surveys and observation of 
human interactions?; vi) How do the answers from the previous 
questions support the development of the IA profession?; and vii) 
What should the ethical requirements be for IA professionals?.  These 
subsequent research questions represented the structure for the 
development of the survey questionnaire. 
3.3 Approach 
3.3.1 This was a mixed method research study, utilising a range of 
qualitative approaches, including: i) Extensive content/textual 
analysis to extract the critical success factors from available 
secondary sources including journals, books and reports;  Desktop 
Research, Desktop Analysis [Historical Research, Grounded Theory]; 
ii) Survey research was undertaken in order to identify primary source 
data, using the free association narrative discourse analysis of survey 
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questionnaires and interview notes with a view to supporting a new 
grounded theory (Hollway and Jefferson, 2008). and analysis; iii) 
Interviews (unstructured, informal, freeform, conversational and 
discursive) were undertaken with key practitioners in both private and 
public sector organisations in order to provide depth to the survey 
results; iv) Unstructured observation, capturing “insider” knowledge 
through PAR, observing and detailing illustrative incidents.  Qualitative 
researchers study people by observing them in their natural settings, 
or by analysing the cultural symbols they use.  This brings together a 
variety of empirical materials (case study, personal experience, 
interview, participant observation, historical analysis of available texts) 
that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings. 
3.3.2 There are a number of data collection tools that could have been used 
to collect primary data, of which the first two were chosen for this 
research: i) Semi-structured person to person interviews; ii) 
Telephone/Skype interviews; iii) Postal questionnaire; and iv) 
Electronic survey. 
3.3.3 Two case studies are presented for analytical purposes – one public 
sector [CS1] and one private sector [CS2].  The PAR was field 
research, conducted in natural settings in order to collect substantial 
situation information; utilising inductive reasoning from observations 
through to formulation of a grounded theory to explain the 
phenomena identified in the field of exploration. [PAR/Case Study] 
3.3.4 For the first phase of the research, a Literature Review was 
undertaken utilising historical research methodology, as a systematic 
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process designed to collect and “objectively evaluate data related to 
past occurrences to arrive at conclusions about the causes, effects, or 
trends of past events that may be helpful in explaining the present” 
(Nel, 1983, in Scott, 2004).  This historical analysis of identified IA BoK 
drew inspiration from ethno-methodological critique of official statistics 
and relevant documentary sources.  The literature search was focused 
on both academic and practitioner published research spanning 
decades, explicitly related to IA as opposed to InfoSec (see Appendix 
I, Section 10.18 for a list of resources uti lised, including Table 9).  The 
Literature Review was deliberately broad ranging in order to evidence 
the available volume of material from a number of different sources,  
across a historical timeline.  Historical research was conducted to 
produce a chronology of IA. 
3.3.5 Secondly, the findings of the Literature Review were utilised to define 
the themes which guided the investigation, leading to the creation of 
the questions that were posed to respondents during the interviews.  
This approach was in line with that described by Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007, p.3): “The analysis of data involves interpretation of 
the meanings, functions and consequences of human actions and 
institutional practices, and how these are implicated in local, and 
perhaps also wider, contexts.”, providing greater depth of 
understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon under review. 
3.3.6 The contextual analysis of existing definitions found in the Literature 
Review, the results of two related surveys and interviews, alongside 
PAR in two case studies collectively led to the derivation of a single 
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graphical representation of a proposed new framework - Integrated 
and Informed Information Governance, Risk, and Compliance – 
i3GRC™ using Grounded Theory. 
3.3.7 Ongoing literature searches, reviews, and analysis were undertaken in 
parallel with the ethnographic PAR.  As the research gained 
momentum, and some research questions proved difficult to answer, 
often a change of direction or an additional type of literature was 
included in order to try and gain a different perspective on the 
problem(s). 
3.3.8 The research framework applicable is outlined in Figure 25 below.  
Whilst the steps are numbered in the diagram, the approach need not 
be consecutive in order to achieve the desired outcome (Johnson and 
Christensen, 2005). 
 
Figure 25:  Mixed Research Study Steps, Source: Johnson and Christensen (2005) 
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3.3.9 The researcher has been part of what is observed; spent considerable 
time focussed on meanings; sought to understand what was 
happening; analysed the totality of each situation, and developed 
ideas through induction from evidence.  This has resonance with the 
Design Science Research Method, represented in Figure 26 below. 
 
Figure 26:  A Design Science Research Methodology for IS, Source: Peffers (2007) 
 
3.3.11 An IA framework starts with a focus on PPT, as represented in the 
Environment column on the left of the model.  The research used the 
available Knowledge Base (right column) to influence the analysis and 
stimulation for change within this IS research (middle column). 
3.4 Review of Chosen Methods 
3.4.1 PAR was chosen for the case study particularly because it is an 
exploratory and flexible method of research.  A case study method is 
an “appropriate way to research an area in which few previous studies 
have been carried out”, (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987, p.370). 
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3.4.2 Participant observation, ethnography, and fieldwork were used 
interchangeably (Silverman, 2009) in order to understand the public 
and private sector cultures and the impact of the various research 
themes identified.  This was a reflective process with the ability to 
impact on wider teams available to the researcher.  Reflective 
practitioners are professionals who systematically improve their 
understanding of their worlds through reflection on their activities, with 
the support of their peers (Schon, 1983 in Fisher, 2007). 
3.4.3 In analytic ethnography the researcher attempts to provide answers 
to questions about life and organisation, striving to pursue the study in 
an unfettered or naturalistic manner.  The researcher utilised data 
based on a deep familiarity with the setting that was gained by 
personal participation and developed a propositional analysis over the 
course of the research period (Miles and Huberman, 2002, p.137). 
3.4.4 PAR methods are applied where the researcher attempts to “obtain 
practical results of value to groups with whom the researcher has 
allied him/herself while at the same time adding to the body of 
theoretical knowledge” (Galliers, 1985, p.282).  PAR aims to contribute 
to practical knowledge of participants as well as scientific knowledge, 
due to a “joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical 
framework” (Rapoport, 1970, p.499).  In addition, there should be a 
mutually satisfactory outcome between the researcher’s interests of 
theory and the organisation.  The researcher carries out the research 
as a participant and not as an observer.  This method is characteristic 
of anti-positivism and interpretative or critical research. 
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3.4.5 According to Susman and Evered (1978), PAR follows a five phase 
cyclical process: diagnosing, action planning, action taking, evaluating 
and specifying learning.  The researcher’s task is to identify the 
problem area and aim to develop a working hypothesis or predictions 
that imply a goal and a procedure for achieving it (Baskerville, 1999 
and Brewer, 2007).  The evaluation phase refers to the assessment of 
the instructional strategy or technique.  The activity “specifying 
learning” is formally undertaken as an ongoing process to acquire new 
knowledge.  This was encapsulated in a publication by the researcher 
(Simmons, (2012a) highlighting information loss and data breach 
incidents and lessons learnt. 
3.4.6 The whole process is iterative, like the hermeneutic circle (Brewer, 
2007), deconstructing prior conceptions of the phenomenon (of IA), 
critically analysing how it (IA) has been studied and how it is presented 
and analysed in the existing research and available literature. 
3.4.7 The underlying problem of the PAR method is that “it cannot be wholly 
planned and directed down a particular path” (Checkland, 1991, 
p.153).  Checkland concludes that the researcher might express his 
own aims, but is not able to implement them with certainty in the 
experiment.  However, PAR develops the researcher’s competency 
and the testing of findings through critical professional discussion 
helps to provide holistic and inclusive reflection of the subject (Fisher, 
2007). 
3.4.8 The researcher agrees with Wadsworth’s description of PAR as being 
“like the discovery phase of any science” in that it “knows it is coming 
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from somewhere and going to somewhere, even though it does not 
know in advance where precisely (sic) it is going to end up or what the 
new state will look like” (Wadsworth, 1998). 
3.4.9 Lewin expanded on PAR as being appropriate for organisational 
development, believing that the motivation to change was strongly 
related to action and thus if people were actively involved in decisions 
affecting them, they were more likely to adopt new ways of thinking, 
behaving and acting (Lewin, 1946 in O’Brien, 2001).  This is a central 
tenet for IA practitioners with regard to InfoSec awareness 
programmes and so the synergy is valuable in this research context.  
Through the use of PAR, the researcher was able to actively influence 
outcomes by implementing IA best practice to a mature level in a 
manner that moved it beyond reflective knowledge creation. 
3.4.10 The core reference group for this research has been key members of 
IAAC.  This was been a valuable synergy of interested parties in order 
to ensure that the researcher remained grounded and provided useful 
outputs.  The IA Chronology, Appendix III, was utilised as part of 
IAAC 10th anniversary collateral. 
3.4.11 Memo writing has been conducted in order to follow the lines of inquiry 
that have resulted from investigation of the subject.  Many existing 
frameworks were reviewed in order to progress through the lines of 
discovery and interrogate the relationships between concepts (Miles 
and Huberman, 2002). 
3.4.12 In the researcher’s opinion, the richness of the patterns identified was 
best described using a narrative rather than numerical analysis.  The 
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full thesis acts as a primary narrative; a lengthy document telling the 
story of the phenomenon researched in a comprehensive way.  It is 
from this story that the grounded theory was distilled, through the 
iterative process reaching a conclusion in January 2015 with the 
realisation of the need for i3GRC™ as being the next stage on the IP 
roadmap.  One of the core principles of Grounded Theory is that “all is 
data” (Glaser, 1998).  In other words, everything that has been learnt 
through the research process presents itself as data for further 
investigation, analysis, and study.  As a result, the researcher has 
been embedded within the IA industry for nearly two decades and has 
utilised a constructivist grounded theory approach. 
3.4.13 The process has involved constant review and presentation of the 
resulting themes seeking paradoxes or contradictions, studying both 
the absence as well as the presence of IA understanding, engaging in 
abstract concept discovery and categorisation of the evidence collated 
throughout the process.  Many who, why, what, where and when 
questions have been asked and, to some extent, answered.  However, 
in dealing with a wicked problem (Rittel and Webber, 1973), it is 
possible that more questions have been identified than answers found.  
These are extrapolated in the Research Findings (Chapter 4). 
3.4.14 Historical criticism is a branch of literary analysis of the nineteenth 
century that seeks to investigate the origins of a text.  The historical 
method of research applies to fields of study encompassing origins, 
growth, theories, crisis etc.: “History is our collective memory.  The 
ability to utilize history and extract useful generalizations and theories 
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is uniquely human.  Without a record of the past we are left to navigate 
life’s course without the aid of those who have gone before us” 
(Education Research, 2010). 
3.4.15 This methodological approach was utilised to show the links between 
reports, publications and texts found during the Literature Review and 
to analyse their impact on IA development.  By seeking historical 
understanding of IA, it should be possible to offer a valuable 
perspective with which to view present circumstances, perceptions, 
and uses of IA.  History helps understanding of the sources of 
contemporary problems, how they arose and how their characteristics 
unfolded through time.  It also identifies the solutions that worked in 
the past and those that did not (Mason, McKenney and Copeland, 
1997a).  Historical research offers perspectives on phenomena that 
are unavailable by any other methodological means.  The results 
reflect the cultural circumstances and ideological assumptions that 
underlie phenomena and the role played by key decision makers 
together with long-term economic, social and political forces in 
creating them (Ibid. 1997a). 
3.4.16 Of the key schemas of historical thinking (cyclical, providential and 
progressive) (Gilderhus, 2006), the cyclical school was the most 
appropriate for this study as it accepted that history repeats itself on 
the basis that essential forces of human nature are unchangeable and 
humans make mistakes over and over when confronted with similar or 
identical situations.  Placing the researcher and the subject at the 
centre of the research process, the phenomenon is captured, 
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bracketed (to interpret meaning), constructed and contextualised.  The 
intention was to bring the topic into a sharper focus as interpretation 
laid the groundwork for a deeper understanding (Miles and Huberman, 
2002, p.353-360).  Stanford (1986) articulated the historical cyclical 
approach used by the researcher, Figure 27 below. 
 
Figure 27:  Structure of History, Source: Stanford (1986) 
 
3.4.17 There are a number of steps to be followed which have consistently 
been referred to in literature: i) the recognition of a historical problem 
or the identification of a need for certain historical knowledge; ii) the 
gathering of as much relevant information about the problem or topic 
as possible; iii) if appropriate, the analysis of evidence and forming of 
hypothesis that tentatively explains relationships between historical 
factors and the drawing of conclusions (synthesis); and iv) the 
recording of conclusions in a meaningful narrative (exposition) (Busha 
and Harter, 1980). 
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3.4.18 The main stance this historical research has taken is didactic, seeking 
to be instructive, teaching a lesson.  There has also been a Socratic 
element, establishing the “why” of historical events that have impacted 
the development and maturation of IA to date through shared learning 
and clarification of the known unknowns.  The testimony of peers and 
industry experts from IAAC has been cross checked in order to filter 
for accuracy.  This involves heuristics - the rigorous collection and 
organisation of the most pertinent collected evidence, the verification 
of the authenticity and veracity of information and its sources in order 
to generate learning. 
3.4.19 Finding primary sources was relatively swift given the low volume of IA 
specific material available.  However, finding the secondary sources 
was more challenging, particularly as a result of the change in UK 
Government in May 2009.  A number of previously available web links 
for key useful and valuable resources on IA were removed rather than 
sent to The National Archives (TNA) repository. 
3.4.20 The scope is not as broad as many other historical reviews might 
necessarily be.  Experience and testimony are the grounds for 
historical certainty.  The researcher’s experience has already been 
identified as being fundamental and core to this process, with issues 
of subjectivity and reflexivity being recognised as influential to the 
research.  Historical research also uses inductive reasoning 
approaches to build theories that draw conclusions about events, 
interpreting and observing phenomena – thus the formulation of the 
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new model, i3GRC™, designed to embody all of the research analysis 
and findings. 
3.5 Research Assumptions 
3.5.1 The research questions were constructed upon a number of parallel 
assumptions: i) ontology (the nature of information, available shared 
understanding of common vocabulary); ii) epistemology (human 
knowledge and how it can be achieved); iii) research methodology (the 
preferred research methods); and ethics (the implied values of the 
research). 
3.5.2 The highest level assumptions were as follows: i) subjectivity is 
inherent, with the attendant threat of researcher bias: the researcher 
found evidence from the past that supports views expressed today; 
multiple sources of evidence and corroboration were continually 
sought in order to reduce this bias; ii) participant observer has affected 
the phenomenon being studied: changes have occurred; and iii) 
participant observer has lived in the setting and defers to the culture: 
this occurred in both Case Study examples. 
3.5.3 Under the epistemological assumption, the researcher interacted with 
the object of research and there can be a resultant effect on that 
object. Findings were created through interaction between the 
researcher and the researched. 
3.5.4 Under the axiological assumption, values have a role to play in 
influencing the outcomes.  The researcher was not reluctant to be 
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openly passionate about pursuing the project and this aspect is dealt 
with in the Reflexivity section. 
3.5.5 The methodological assumption requires close interaction between the 
researcher and respondents.  This was the case during the research 
phase itself, particularly the case studies.  Methods included long term 
observations, free association narrative and conversational interviews 
and content analysis of documents – analysing the speech acts used 
rather than the structure of the content. 
3.5.6 For a rhetorical assumption, the researcher was sufficiently embedded 
and involved within the object of research that the results were 
reflected back at regular points throughout, seeking peer review and 
agreement prior to proceeding. 
3.5.7 This research assumes that both the reader and the survey subject 
already have some appreciation for the background of both IT Security 
and InfoSec.  The work carried out by Cherdantseva and Hilton (2014) 
squarely addressed the InfoSec definitions space.  The researcher 
further assumed that it is understood and appreciated, or at least 
would be by the reader who completes the Literature Review, that IA 
is an important step along a roadmap towards IG and needs to be 
understood in this context, and within the wider scope of the InfoSoc. 
3.6 Research Paradigm 
3.6.1 The researcher used an iterative socially constructivist, inductive, 
design science research approach, in a critical realist ontology, with an 
interpretive epistemological paradigm.  Interpretivism acknowledges 
that the world is complex and dynamic and is being interpreted and 
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experienced by people in many differing ways and is impacted upon 
(both positively and negatively, as shown within the research body 
itself) by their social context and the wider social systems within which 
they are operating.  Knowledge was constructed based not only on 
observable phenomena but also on subjective beliefs and 
understanding of the background to IA and its industry usage and 
placement. 
3.6.2 Historical research requires interpretation of the information and the 
interpretivism aspect was linked with elements of linguistic study and 
cultural anthropology in the context of IA and its understanding, usage, 
and implementation in the UK public sector. 
3.7 Reflexivity 
3.7.1 Reflexivity means that the researcher remains in an asking or 
questioning stance throughout (Miles and Huberman, 1994) but also 
that an individual researcher can have difficulties, being “beset with 
self-delusions” (Miles and Huberman, 2002, p.119).  Analysis of data 
collected contained a subjective element and was not value-free 
(Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 2000, p.372).  Miles and Huberman 
(2002) stressed that subjectivity is a “natural and necessary element 
of evaluation, which calls for no apology” (Ibid. p.125). 
3.7.2 Due to the ethnographic nature of this research, it is important to 
acknowledge that the researcher’s own beliefs and objectives have 
influenced how the outputs are shaped (Gilbert, 2008: 512 [in Young, 
2008]).  The researcher cannot be disentangled from the research 
process, having been embedded within the InfoSec and IA industry for 
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almost two decades.  However, any assertions made have been 
guided by empirical survey evidence and PAR experience. 
3.7.3 The researcher strove to ensure that these risks were minimised by 
seeking peer review when appropriate, e.g. through the publication of 
books, papers, presentations etc.  The theory constructed is sensitive 
to the political, economic and geographical context within which the 
world is operating, particularly the UK. 
3.7.4 Reflexivity was borne in mind with regard to political opinion with 
changes of government.  From the outset, the political landscape was 
recognised as being of importance to the understanding of the 
terminology used and the implementation of government policy, both 
elements being fundamental to the research outcomes.  
3.8 Other Methodology Considerations 
3.8.1 Systems theory had a significant sphere of influence as a result of 
the interdependence and inter-relationship of many of the concepts 
that form part of this study (Boulding, 1956) particularly the integrated 
system theory as presented by Hong et al (2003). 
3.8.2 The approximate return of a system to its initial conditions – 
recurrence - was identified as an important element throughout the 
Literature Review, particularly as most of the publications reviewed 
returned to the core of the original InfoSec management standard 
(BS7799, now ISO 27001) as the frame of reference for discourse.  
Recurrence is an understood element of Chaos Theory.  This field of 
study is increasingly being used to analyse organisational 
development, as it relies on the concept of uncertainty as being central 
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to the influence of change (Spender, 1996).  Positively, this “enables a 
researcher to grasp meaning and respond intellectually (and 
emotionally) to what is being said in the data in order to be able to 
arrive at concepts that are grounded in data” (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008, p41).  The chaos paradigm has replaced the Newtonian 
reductionist paradigm and the researcher’s experience mirrors this.  
Review of complex systems requires new thinking in order to deal with 
the limitations reached (Dekker, 2011, p.188). 
3.8.3 Also of relevance was the theory of Complex Adaptive Systems 
(CAS) (Holland, 2006).  CAS are systems that are networks of 
interactions and relationships.  They are flexible and fluid, adaptive 
and changing as a result of individual and collective behaviour.  This is 
true of IA, given the global information space within which most 
organisations are interacting - be it where they work or where their 
data may reside and may thus need protecting (Holland, 2006). 
3.8.4 Cybernetics was used as a backdrop in tracing the links from the 
original usage of cyber through to IG, as part of the historical research 
to reinterpret the meaning and contribution of IA to the InfoSoc. 
3.8.5 Bifurcation had a relevance to this research (Luo, 1997) as many of 
the sources studied utilised definitions and constructs for InfoSec 
rather than IA.  The Grounded Theory and new framework formulation 
were intended to articulate implications for change and new directions 
as a result of revisiting definitions and ensuring that these are more 
widely understood and accepted. 
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3.8.6 Sensitivity was also of importance as IA has been affected by the 
political and economic climate.  There are three types of sensitivity 
identified in research – historical, political and contextual.  Historical 
sensitivity aids understanding of governance of structures and 
situations (Silverman, 2009).  Sensitivity to initial conditions is 
sometimes referred to as the “butterfly effect” and this is often how IA 
policy has been cascaded from central government outwards and 
downwards across the rest of the public sector and local government.  
Sensitivity is also raised with regard to the researcher being immersed 
in the subject area. 
3.8.7 Critical theory is a theoretical approach that is sensitive to 
application.  The speed of development of the InfoSoc and the 
technology that supports this, along with the shift in the political 
landscape in the UK in 2009, led to change in IS management 
radiating out from central government.  Cognisance of this was 
important to the outcome of the research. 
3.9 Ethics 
 
3.9.1 This research involved sending surveys to IA practitioners and thus 
humans were objects of analysis (Vinson and Singer, 2001).  
Confidentiality for individuals was guaranteed with all personal 
identifiers eliminated, the data being presented anonymously.  These 
“Ethics of research refers to assumptions about the responsibility of a 
researcher for the consequences of his/her research approach and its results” 
(Iivari, et al., 1998, p.175). 
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measures ensured that extracting individual identities was simply not 
possible.  Another ethical aspect of the research was the decisions 
made with regard to the implications of the value-drive and action-
effects of the inquiry identified by Wadsworth (1998) as the effects of: 
i) raising some questions and not others; ii) the effects of involving 
some people in the process and not others; iii) observing some 
phenomena and not others; iv) making this sense of it and not 
alternative senses; and deciding to take this action (or ‘no’ action) as a 
result of it rather than any other action etc. 
3.9.2 As required by the research study regulations, the University of 
Wolverhampton Ethics Board provided ethical approval for the Survey 
Questionnaire both in 2010 and again in 2012. 
3.10 Conclusions 
3.10.1 The research was grounded in a historical content analysis of primary 
and secondary documentary sources to contextualise available IA 
concepts, doctrine, policies, procedures, and education in order to 
review how IA understanding evolved. 
3.10.2 There are basic beliefs that define a particular research paradigm 
which must be supported by both an epistemological question – e.g. 
what is the basic belief about knowledge (in this instance, what can be 
known about IA) and a methodological question that describes how 
the researcher goes about finding out whatever can be known (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994).  This research used an exploratory (qualitative) 
survey method to obtain empirical evidence of both theoretical and 
practical IA understanding and to verify this against available 
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academic and practitioner outputs.  The purpose was to learn from the 
experience of the surveyed target group and to validate the findings 
from the Literature Review. 
3.10.3 Validation occurred through mixed method research utilising survey 
questionnaires, interviews and recording of observation through PAR 
case studies and reflexive ethnography to understand IA ontology and 
to interpret IA implementation in the context of the IA professionalism 
agenda.  Through the Hegelian process of dialectical reasoning and 
the subsequent constructivist, inductive Grounded Theory work, the 
new meta framework - i3GRC™ – was realised. 
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Part 2 - Research 
 
 
In this part, based on the research questions, the design of the questionnaire is 
developed and the appropriate target group is selected. 
 
The survey execution, responses and interview analysis and the resultant 
survey findings are critically discussed utilising the identified themes throughout 
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4 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Approach and Goals 
4.1.1 As discussed in the Methodology Chapter, the researcher used mixed 
methods including an exploratory (qualitative) survey, freeform 
interviews and conducted two PAR case studies.  The Questionnaires 
are represented in Appendix I, Section 10.14 and Section 10.15. 
4.1.2 The survey collection was supported by freeform interviews which 
were undertaken in person, face-to-face; by telephone; by Skype and 
via email leading to more consistent interpretation of the questions 
posed than standardized interviewing, particularly when respondents’ 
situations are atypical (Conrad and Schober, 1999a/b).  It was 
important to ensure that there was a shared doctrine attached to 
words so that the question asked was the one that was understood.  
No predetermined questions were asked, in order to remain as open 
and adaptable as possible to the interviewee’s nature and priorities.  
4.1.3 The researcher engaged in two extensive case studies, one in a large 
UK public sector local government environment from 2009 to 2011 and 
another in a global private sector services environment from 2011 to 
2015.  The description of the background of each Case Study 
environment and supporting materials have been placed in Appendix 
II in order to maintain the narrative style of this findings chapter.  In 
particular, see Section 11.1 and Table 30.  The Public Sector Case 
Study is signposted throughout as CS1 and the Private Sector Case 
Study is signposted as CS2. 
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4.1.4 The task of the survey, interview and case study research was to 
establish from practitioners the depth of IA understanding, having 
identified clear distinction in definitional terms between InfoSec and IA 
in the Literature Review.  The results of the interviews added to the 
richness of the findings.  In particular, a number of individuals took 
extra care in the provision of detail, which is captured in the detailed 
respondent memos produced in tabular format in Appendix I, Section 
10.17.  Together with the survey results, they contributed to the 
knowledge of IA understanding; implementation abilities of those 
actively engaged in the industry; helping to identify key themes to be 
incorporated into the future development of IA education and 
professionalisation.  These themes influenced the Grounded Theory 
formulation.  Subsequent sections of this chapter step through the 
responses and case study interactions, providing corresponding 
evidence, in a narrative style. 
4.1.5 The goal of the research was to obtain empirical data regarding the 
level of IA practitioner understanding in order to provide evidence of 
the likely ability to achieve the stated goals of the UK Cyber Security 
Strategy.  The intended outcomes were: i) to validate the findings of 
the Literature Review; ii) to provide IA practitioners with initiatives 
within which to frame the profession for the future, founded on 
historical underpinnings; and iii) to formulate a related Grounded 
Theory. 
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4.2 Target Groups and Research Execution 
4.2.1 The questions were designed based on an assumption that the 
meaning of them would be commonly shared, the terms understood – 
and, if not, that this in itself would be raised as a finding to be 
addressed in the research.  The survey question style followed 
University guidelines. 
4.2.2 The first group was made up of industry experts from IAAC, 
representing a cross-section of both InfoSec and IA professionals of 
varying lengths of service in public and private sectors, third sector 
and academia, with differing certifications, education and levels of 
understanding, as well as membership of several worldwide industry 
bodies (ISACA, (ISC)², ISSA, IAAC, BCS, IISP etc), largely all 
members of IAAC.  The second circulation group was made up of 
mainly operational Security Officers, across multiple geographies 
(spanning US, Europe, and Asia) and industry sectors – in order to 
understand the challenges of those in the role of day-to-day 
practitioner [CS2].  Further participant details are provided in Table 20, 
Appendix I at Section 10.16.  Studying a population by studying a 
presentative sample is a known best practice in statistical inference 
analysis.  The population was made up of several units from which the 
research could observe characteristics and draw samples for analysis.  
A sample size of greater than 30 is considered sufficient reference 
material for qualitative analysis.  This sample size is therefore 
considered to be sufficient. 
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4.2.3 Figure 28 shows the spread where I is the IAAC circulation, O is Other 
and P is the Private Sector Outsourcing circulation. 
 
Figure 28:  Total Survey Types 
 
4.2.4 Respondent Demographics are depicted in Figure 29 below: 
 
Figure 29:  Total Spread of Respondents 
 
51% 
20% 
29% 
I 
O 
P 
24% 
1% 
5% 
68% 
2% 
Total spread of survey respondents 
Consultant Lawyer Lecturer Practitioner Professional body 
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4.2.5 As different security and data protection legislation applies in each 
geographic region, the purpose of increasing the scope of the survey 
was to investigate to what extent, and how, operating in different 
environments affects cultural awareness and understanding amongst 
practitioners.  Figure 30 below identifies the geographical spread of 
respondents. 
 
Figure 30:  Geographical Spread of Respondents  
 
4.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
4.3.1 In order to obtain further knowledge, verify thinking and increase the 
validity of the research, a number of unstructured, informal, freeform, 
conversational and discursive interviews were conducted with subject 
matter experts, including senior IA practitioners. 
4.3.2 The researcher is a member of a number of UK industry groups which 
afforded easy access to IA practitioners and InfoSec professionals – 
many of whom cross over and are represented in each group.  
4% 
2% 1% 
73% 
20% 
Geographical spread of respondents 
Australia 
Ireland 
Singapore 
UK 
USA 
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Removal of duplication of responses was part of the data analysis 
process.  The results are reflected in these findings. 
4.3.3 Figure 31 identifies the activities undertaken in order to ensure 
participation within the chosen target groups and gather adequate 
data collection for analysis and validation purposes.  
 
Figure 31:  Collection Methods Utilisation 
 
4.3.4 Coding for the respondents is provided in Appendix I, before Table 
20 and is signposted throughout the rest of Chapters 4 and 5 by way 
of brackets, bold number and letter configurations based on the codes 
listed in Table 5 below.  Thus [11E] refers to a UK legal expert when 
cross referenced with Table 20. 
  
15% 
2% 
3% 
5% 
23% 
1% 2% 
41% 
5% 3% 
Collection methods 
Email Email and Skype Email and Survey 
Email and Telephone Face-to-face  Face-to-face and emails 
Face-to-face and Survey Survey Teleconference 
Telephone 
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Code Description of interaction / methodology 
E Email correspondence 
ES Survey respondent with extra email input and conversational 
follow-up 
ESk Emails and Skype semi-structured interview 
ET Email and telephone 
F Face-to-Face semi-structured interview 
FE Face-to-Face semi-structured interview and email follow-up 
FS Face-to-Face semi-structured interview and survey completion 
S Survey respondent 
T Telephone semi-structured interview 
Te Teleconference with global private sector clients, i3GRC™ 
explained 
Table 5:  Respondent Coding 
 
4.4 Validation Methods 
4.4.1 Triangulation methods were used to validate the observations and 
identify biases in the data gathered, as depicted in Figure 32 below. 
 
Figure 32:  Data Triangulation 
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4.4.2 Triangulation is the exercise of using more than one method to collect 
data on the same topic.  This ensures data correlation and validation 
occurs.  Triangulation has taken the following forms: i) comparison and 
correlation of the survey results, the interviews, and the public and 
private sector Case Studies [CS1 and CS2, see Table 6], one to 
another; ii) comparison with other theses including Richardson (2012) 
and Cherdantseva (2014), which has been vital; and iii) comparison 
with the available academic research and the outputs of various 
government bodies and resources available to the community of 
practitioners. 
4.4.3 The results of the questionnaires were used to both answer the 
research questions and to test and validate empirical generalisations 
which were formed throughout the theory building process, in order to 
identify common relationships across them and to provide statements 
about the object of study (Gable, 1994, p.114). 
4.4.4 The method provides only a “snapshot” of the actual situation and 
does not necessarily allow understanding of the underlying meaning of 
gathered data.  The benefits of the researcher’s own experience and 
the PAR carried out helped to enrich these findings. 
4.4.5 As the bulk of the data collection was gathered through the historical 
research phase, this became the pivotal point of the triangulation 
activities.  Consistently throughout the research, the views of known 
and available expert practitioners in the industry have been sought in 
order to ground the theory being developed.  These experts are part of 
the IAAC community originally surveyed.  The interview (key 
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informants) and survey data were combined in the memo writing for 
the Grounded Theory bui lding. 
4.4.6 Ongoing literature searches were carried out in parallel with the 
ethnographic study, alongside PAR observations which were made by 
interviewing multiple stakeholders at different levels in various 
organisations.  Iterative qualitative content analysis was then 
performed against the identified themes.  Reviews took place internally 
within each CS organisation, not externally, in order to prevent skew.  
All available and applicable Internal Audit and external resource 
reports were reviewed as part of the data gathering and triangulation 
in order to ensure the theory being built addressed the identified gaps.  
4.4.7 The process was a reflective one.  Further validation was achieved 
through reflexive discussion with each organisation; the findings have 
been fed back to various professional peer audiences.  A number of 
conferences, seminars, and workshops were also attended where the 
work was presented in a style conducive to discourse so that shared 
views and understanding could be captured.  Posters were also 
prepared and presented at several events.  See Appendix I, Section 
10.2. 
4.5 Case Studies 
4.5.1 During the span of the research study, two significant periods of time 
were spent; one in a large UK public sector local counci l [CS1] and 
one in a large global private sector outsourcing business [CS2], the 
names of neither are being explicitly disclosed in order to maintain 
confidentiality. 
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4.5.2 Table 6 below provides a comparison of CS1 and CS2 organisational 
approaches to IA implementation, highlighting both the similarities as 
well as the differences across the identified survey themes. 
Areas Public Sector [CS1] Private Sector [CS2 
Timeline 2008-2010 2011-2015 
Employees c.13,000  107,000 
Terminology InfoSec centric – no adoption of the UK IA 
language change(s) 
GRC  
Heavy emphasis on Compliance 
Drivers and 
Obligations 
GCSx Code of Connection (CoCo) – no 
connection = no system connectivity! 
UK Government obligation, resisted for as 
long as possible! 
PCI DSS for retail and commercial 
HIPAA for US Healthcare 
ISO 27001 global certif ication 
Cloud Security Alliance CSTAR for Cloud 
Services 
NIST, FISMA, SANS, ISAE 3402 
Standards and 
Measurements 
ISO 27001 accepted as a framework 
worthy of consideration but not vital 
HMG Security Policy Framew ork 
IAMM – considered through the PAR 
process 
ISO 27001 global certif ication being 
sought for all Data Centres – heavy 
requirement and expectation from 
worldw ide global customers 
Signif icant measurement from external 
audits imposed by client companies 
Impact of culture 
and politics 
Under Lib Dem control at the time of AR – 
this had a notable impact on budget and 
focus 
ICT very hands off in terms of people 
engagement across the organisation – “the 
department of no”.....No real skills with 
regard to speaking to leadership regarding 
InfoSec risks and the UK Government IA 
requirements. 
Different country by country impacts 
experienced but more particularly in the 
outsourcing dynamic, where the cultural 
impact of employees not adhering to 
security policy control implementation w as 
being increasingly felt as a result executive 
leadership decisions to focus on growing 
business in certain locations. 
Professionalism 
of ICT and IA 
No init ial focus but the researcher was 
able to positively influence those worked 
with to follow careers in the security 
industry, to take up membership of 
relevant professional bodies and to share 
know ledge and learning more positively. 
Delivered InfoSec Awareness sessions to 
thousands of Council employees and did 
outreach presentations to schools and 
other groups to ensure positive 
engagement and consistency of 
messaging. 
Stealth newsletter started in 2012 which by 
2015 had thousands of recipients 
worldw ide, 15th of every month, delivered 
to their Inbox highlighting w hy the controls 
were relevant, which news stories were of 
corresponding value to learn from and 
what the development focus for the GRC 
programme w as. 
The researcher mentored a number of 
individuals, ensuring their skills were 
improved and sustainable. 
Information 
Society 
Not applicable at the time – although 
medical monitoring devices in the homes 
of the elderly or bewildered were already 
being considered from a security and data 
protection perspective. 
Mult iple issues for multiple different clients 
globally but the GRC programme w as not 
specif ically impacted as the focus was on 
internal signal reporting. 
Barriers Austerity as a result of the f inancial crash. Ongoing business attrition, loss of key 
employees through ongoing job losses. 
Table 6:  Case Study Comparison 
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4.5.3 In CS1, the researcher was in the position of that of an external IA 
consultant.  There are many independent consultants in the industry, 
worldwide.  CS1 involved the roll-out of a government mandated 
organisation wide IA compliance management programme which 
included the delivery of InfoSec Awareness programme, in person, to 
hundreds of employees across a region of the UK.  The PAR resulted 
in the publication of an Information Security Manager’s guide book 
(Simmons, 2012a) representing a compilation of learning and sharing 
of practical lessons learnt. 
4.5.4 In CS2, the researcher had changed function to that of a permanent 
senior global focus for a large IT outsourcing company, initially with a 
specific security policy related improvement task.  CS2 resulted in the 
creation of a Unified Compliance Framework (UCF) through mature 
implementation of GRC technology across a multi-industry, all sector 
landscape.  The global organisational reach afforded the researcher 
the opportunity to engage with a wide selection of respondents, 
reflected in the survey and interview data, representing multiple 
disciplines.  The case studies provide explanation of the observed 
phenomena and demonstrate understanding of the subject of the 
investigation in its context and environment.  The results of the case 
studies have both corroborated and enhanced the survey results.  
Sector comparison has also assisted the formulation of the theoretical 
conjecture and confirmation of hypotheses. 
  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
129 | P a g e  
4.5.5 In CS2, the researcher had the opportunity to create observations of 
deliberate intervention, bringing about change through the delivery of 
dependent variables of global communication in a private sector 
setting.  In CS2 (see Appendix II, Section 11.2 and 11.3), HEART 
was uti lised as a communication tool to signify that what was designed 
for the benefit of all was a Holistic Enterprise Assurance Risk and 
Trust framework. 
4.5.6 In CS2, the GRC-related entity was buried organisationally within a 
sub-entity of the entity being assessed/audited, which did not provide 
the appropriate separation of duties nor afford the board the ability to 
benefit from accurate independent assurance.  As a technology 
company, and in keeping with its competitors, it had no incentive to 
consider the more strategic elements of GRC implementation, beyond 
the available technology solution – a solution to a problem largely 
exacerbated by technology.  The researcher provided an IG Strategy 
framework within which to manage information within the context of 
the most pressing legislative and compliance requirements.  Internal 
controls required rethinking, reprioritising and risk management in 
order to shift from the initial narrow focus on “tick box” assessments to 
a more multidisciplinary approach, with results sharing and 
improvement plans in place as continual audit evidence. 
4.5.7 Gillon et al. (2011) identified the need to do organisational focussed 
research and this case study embraced the requirement.  By the 
nature of the private sector case study, the researcher had to take an 
“outside in” view in order to ensure cognizance of and communication 
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with the client (customer) stakeholders on an ongoing basis.  This is 
represented in the pictorial at Figure 33 below. 
 
Figure 33:  IG Stakeholders, Source: Forrester (2015) 
 
4.6 Terminology 
4.6.1 The first section of the survey was designed to gauge depth of IA 
understanding of the respondents and to ascertain any temporal 
change.  See Memos at Appendix I, Section 10.17, Table 21.  
Together with the extensive Literature Review, this section answers 
the first research question: Can professional IA practice be improved 
through enhanced IA understanding? 
4.6.2 Senior practitioners had known about both the distinction (between 
InfoSec and IA) and the definitions for over 30 years. [16FS, 61FS] 
with 2010 being the most recent. [72S]  The terms were consistently 
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used interchangeably, as was found in the Literature Review. [31ES, 
45S, 49S, 50S, 54S, 66S, 69S, 71S, 75S, 76S, 78S] though one 
respondent stated IA was “undefined with multiple meanings”. [67S] 
4.6.3 In the PAR, there was evidence of the difference between what IA 
means and what people are actually doing – in terms of its constituent 
parts - to achieve it [CS1, CS2].  As identified in the Literature Review, 
individuals have professional identities.  A security person will 
describe IT Governance in InfoSec and ISO 27001 terms and frame of 
reference. [35F]  An Information and Records Management (IRM) 
person describes the IG space with a different emphasis on the locus 
of terminology. [25E]  An IT person will often describe their ontology in 
IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) terms. [59S]  There is a difference in 
terminology usage across the world.  The term IA is not widely used in 
South East Asia.  One respondent specifically stated that “Assurance 
has an interesting perception in many languages and cultures and in 
Australia it hasn’t really taken off because many people consider it to 
be a bit of a buzzword that has no real defined meaning – which is an 
important requirement when trying to win over important stakeholders 
in an ISP”. [48S, 57S] 
4.6.4 According to respondents, there is a lack of related legal oversight in 
Australia and in the Asia Pacific region, outside of specific government 
requirements and some weak privacy legislation. [57E, 58S] 
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4.6.5 The word cloud at Figure 34 represents the Terminology findings: 
 
Figure 34:  Word Cloud created 12 September 2015 
4.6.6 Many other terms were referenced, identified in the list below: 
Information Protection; 
Data Classification and Management; 
Data Protection; 
Cybersecurity; 
InfoSec; 
Accessibility; 
Corporate Security Governance; 
Global security policies; 
IRM; 
Minimalist compliant; 
Protection of IT assets; 
Level of trust; 
Lessen or eliminate related vulnerabilities; 
Corporate Security Governance; 
Security risk and compliance planning; 
Build the confidence in the stakeholders; 
Risk management programme (identification, evaluation, treatment of 
risks); 
IX = Information Exploitation. 
 
4.6.7 Information Exploitation was a term identified by UK MoD 
respondents. [10FS, 14F] 
4.6.8 When an audience of members of the BCS Information Risk 
Management and Assurance (IRMA) group were asked to come up 
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with words or phrases to describe IA the following terms were used 
[Appendix I, presentation reference 10.2.4]: Quality and accuracy; 
Reliability; Reputation; Compliance; Do it correctly; “I know it when I 
see it!”; CESG Standards. 
4.6.9 Whilst this used to be the IRM and Audit Group (IRMA), it was clear 
that despite the change to the IRM and Assurance labelling, there was 
little real IA understanding, where it comes from and what skills are 
needed to effectively implement it.  The group were, in 2010, 
considering changing to an IG label given the focus on Governance 
within the Corporate, Financial and Health sectors , though at the time 
of submission this change had still not taken place. 
4.6.10 In conversation, many practitioners believed that it was “just 
something that CESG threw into the mix in the mid noughties”. [69S, 
78S]  The responses were invariably subjective. 
4.6.11 As a term, IA was considered useful to industry specialists only as a 
term for discussion amongst each other, whereas, for example, the 
use of “cyber” as a label was believed to have gained better traction 
and garnered wider interest and adoption amongst business leaders, 
government and industry alike. [1F] 
4.6.12 Only one respondent [52S] identified the evolution previously 
presented in Figure 24 (page 98) - Security > IT Security > Information 
Security > Information Assurance > GRC - It is an evolution. [52S], 
(December 2012). 
4.6.13 Similarly, only one respondent [58S] highlighted that appropriate 
implementation of monitoring and reporting tools is a first major step.   
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However, several respondents did identify that IA is but one part of IG, 
requiring greater organisational governance. [15ES, 53S, 54S, 58S, 
60S, 68S, 71S, 77S, 81S]  Respondent 60S phrased it thus: “IA is 
about managing the quality and security of information.  It is one part 
of IG”. 
4.6.14 Respondent [65S] identified that the use of acronyms in the spoken 
word, as opposed to the written word, had led to confusion and 
misunderstanding. 
4.6.15 In both CS1 and CS2, the researcher observed many examples of 
misunderstood sets of terminology and the implications this is causing 
within the community.  Contracts were being signed up to on the 
premise that a service provider would “be compliant with PCI”, without 
all parties understanding the implications of what that meant.  When 
something goes wrong, unravelling responsibilities and actions to be 
taken becomes cumbersome and costly.  Respondents identified this 
need for IA professionals to be well versed in legal and contractual 
language in order to best serve their organisations in their roles. [46S, 
53S, 69S] 
4.6.16 There are cost implications which have to be understood, based on 
the services selected for contractual delivery, and those that are left 
out.  Financial understanding is another aspect to the skills and 
competency portfolio of an IA professional, an area that is not part of 
any current educational framework.  Errors of omission in contractual 
language can have discernible impact on both the operation of 
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services and the costs incurred by the business. [7ES, 10FS, 14F, 
56S, 57S, 59S, 65S, 67S, 50S, 78S, 79S] 
4.6.17 In the private sector case study [CS2], the researcher witnessed a 
global IT outsourcing company with lawyers still utilising contractual 
language referring to the backup of data to floppy disk.  Nobody had 
taken the time to update this content and address obvious gaps in 
terminology despite the contractual implications.   
4.6.18 Exception Management is another example of a misunderstood 
concept.  In the private sector case study, exceptions to security policy 
were being consistently treated as risks, which was not always the 
case. [CS2]  An exception against policy was raised for every instance 
of not adhering to policy, even if the lack of adherence was actually an 
instance of the provision of security greater than that required by the 
original baseline. 
4.6.19 Other examples include Governance, often too broad in its usage but 
intended to mean Control and Authority – largely in business terms.  
Demand in German is the word used to ask for something; there is no 
tone intended.  A common understanding of terminology is vital given 
that, with outsourcing and off shoring, the native language of those 
required to take action may not be English. [83F] 
4.6.20 Many programmes of work may take several years and then they are 
out of date for the next project.  Seeking to overlay IA requirements is 
always difficult, given that it ultimately needs to be built into the 
framework of operation from the outset. [7ES, 46S, 47S, 49S, 50S, 
58S] 
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4.6.21 There is frequent mixing of concepts and the confusion is leading to 
difficulty in selling IA to Board level or effectively implementing it. [62S, 
69S]  From the survey responses, Table 7 presents a list of words 
identified as ones that matter most and least to IA practitioners: 
Words that matter most  Words that matter least 
Trust Security 
Accountability Best Practice 
Dependence “we’ve always done it this 
way” 
Authentication Guarantee 
Non-repudiation Certainty 
Enabling  
Safety  
Protection  
Teaming  
Integration  
Concurrency  
Probability  
Risk  
Table 7:  Words Matter 
 
4.6.22 This presents challenges for future development of InfoSec 
Awareness materials, or cybersecurity related awareness campaigns, 
but also offers options for change in the prevailing dialogue and 
rhetoric usage.    Also, the researcher observed a distinction between 
the public and private sector understanding of the terminology in use. 
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4.7 Drivers and Obligations 
4.7.1 The second section of the survey was designed to elicit understanding 
with regard to drivers and obligations for implementing IA 
programmes.  See Memos at Appendix I, Section 10.17, Table 22. 
4.7.2 The findings bore out understanding of benefits and returns to be 
appreciated from creating a corporate IA culture and programme, also 
identified in the Literature Review.  Respondents identified benefits 
including improved IM; more effective use of ICT; resilient ICT; better 
business continuity planning and greater security to operations and to 
business, as well as for individuals. [10FS] 
4.7.3 Respondents [10FS, 14F, 45S, 46S, 47S, 48S, 50S, 56S, 59S, 65S, 
67S, 72S, 74S, 76S, 78S] concurred that the risks of neglecting this 
aspect of corporate governance might include: i) higher operating 
costs, including both daily costs due to inadequacies of the information 
infrastructure (e.g. from poor records management) and irregular costs 
due to major incidents or adverse events; ii) greater uncertainty in 
forecasting and planning future costs; and iii) more difficult and less 
beneficial relationships with partners etc. 
4.7.4 In the UK, the public sector focus has been on compliance as a result 
of government IA frameworks, data protection legislation requirements 
and the IAMM.  The latter was cited as the reference point for 
prioritisation, with many bodies required to achieve Level 3. [10FS, 
14F, 76S] 
4.7.5 Respondents concurred with the Literature Review findings that fear 
was driving compliance activities. [48S, 52S]  The private sector IA 
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focus has been on financial sector regulation, through “know your 
customer (KYC)” programmes. [46S, 52S, 53S, 60S]  Operational Risk 
has not been fully addressed. 
4.7.6 One respondent stated “Public sector organisations that I encounter 
take no constructive notice until hit by the ICO – even then they are 
not fully embracing the requirements.  Private sector tries much harder 
but is prepared to take risks.” [15ES] 
 
4.7.7 There were respondents who believed that the academic and third 
sectors are laggards in IA. [52S, 65S]  In particular, one respondent 
specifically fed back: “I don’t think academics know what any of these 
terms mean....  In general, academia seems pretty rubbish” [75S]  
Others believed that the public sector and academia were ahead. 
[58S] Still other respondents [46S, 63S, 75S] believed that the 
manufacturing sector were laggards. 
4.7.8 Respondent 73S identified that “Academics are not providing enough 
good research (but that’s because there is little funding available) and 
need to become more ‘business-centric’”.  However, respondent 58S  
believed that “public/academic sectors are well ahead of many private 
institutions”.  These divided opinions are not unusual across sectors 
on the premise of a belief that each sector is doing better or worse 
than the other – until an individual changes job or function within a 
different sector and sees the reality for themselves. 
Yesterday I heard a comment that the difference between "InfoSec" and "IA" is 
that between the private and public sectors. The more I think on it, the more 
interesting the comment becomes.  Anecdote provided by third party, 12 November 2010, 7ES 
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4.7.9 Research by the IISP showed the extent of the divided opinions with 
there being little gap between those who felt there was improvement in 
the ability to defend systems and those who were neutral on the 
subject (IISP, 2016). 
4.7.10 The insurance question was asked in order to assess maturity level in 
terms of adoption of this mitigation strategy.  The cost of implementing 
best practices in IA may well be more than any reduction in insurance 
premiums. [46S, 47S]  It comes down to return on investment of 
implementing best practices with the reduction in insurance premiums 
being an added benefit.  Another aspect identified was that of the 
problem of how best to arrange accreditation, to the extent that the 
insurance companies would accept evidence of compliance.  A regular 
audit was the normal approach, but the costs of undertaking this 
cannot be ignored.  A self-audit runs the risk of becoming a tick-in-the-
box exercise that will not benefit ‘the customer’ until the company has 
been found guilty of a violation. [7ES, 73S]  This does not address the 
public sector, which holds an appreciable amount of information and 
does not insure their services as, by their nature, they are government 
backed and do not need to do so.  The research continued to identify 
wicked problems without solutions. 
4.7.11 PAR [CS2] identified that elements of insurance require further 
consideration, represented in Table 8 below, with a view to changing 
the focus of the rhetoric from a budget model to a turnover model.  
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Required Impediments 
People Personalities 
Process Costs 
Technology Maturity 
Table 8:  Considerations for Insurance/Under writing industry rethink  
 
4.7.12 Professionals identified a need to have broader education in finance 
models in order to present risk effectively to management and 
leadership, in compelling business terms. [56S, 76S]  Practitioners 
cannot be in a position of raising the identification of risks to 
management without the ability to understand the financial implications 
of implementation of risk reduction strategies. 
4.8 Standards and Measurements 
4.8.1 IA has been making the transition from a technical activity to a senior 
management and board issue for several decades.  Following on from 
Section 4.7, this next section was designed to elicit mechanisms for 
measuring the effectiveness of IA implementation on the premise that 
for many senior managers, what gets measured, gets managed, and 
vice versa.  See Memos at Appendix I, Section 10.17, Table 23. 
4.8.2 PAR [CS2] identified that in the service provision sector had been told 
not to say “best practice” anymore as the implication of legal 
interpretation of the terminology could result in a law suit for not 
achieving perfection.  In fact, for some, the term “best practice” was 
deemed too emotive and context dependent.  However, as one 
respondent identified “The divergence between good practice and 
common practice is still far too wide”. [74S] 
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4.8.3 ISO 27001 was the most quoted standard by multiple respondents. 
[10FS, 46S, 48S, 68S, 71S]  Implementation of ISO 27001 is 
accepted as best practice.  However, it cannot be prescriptive 
because technology is changing so quickly.  ISO 27001 is not an IA 
standard; it is an InfoSec management standard.  There is no IA 
standard; nor is there a globally accepted cybersecurity standard.  A 
list of identified related standards and Best Practices available to 
address InfoSec and management, equally identified by other 
researchers, has been reproduced in Appendix I, Section 10.19. 
4.8.4 From the private sector point of view, whether IA is achieved or not is 
measured against the business attributes that are specified and 
agreed as a requirement by the customer/client.  The benefits are 
subsequently measured in terms of the degree to which the fulfilment 
of a customer/client requirement supports, lends support or advances 
the aims, goals, and mission of the customer/client, whether financially 
or otherwise. [47S] 
4.8.5 The same key issues continue to arise through audits and reviews, 
identified by many professionals ((ISC)², 2013a) and respondents alike 
[51S, 68S]: i) incorrect access rights (account); ii) no systematic 
responsibility for accesses (account); iii) who did what, when (also 
known as segregation of duty); iv) lacking corrective actions/follow-up 
(management); v) lacking documentation of decisions (management); 
and vi) faulty code, patching, or non-best practice (management). 
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4.8.6 One respondent [57S] articulated the following overall programme 
approach, consistently understood by the majority of respondents and 
experienced by the researcher in CS2.  Those elements in bold are 
intended to denote activities/processes to provide assurance to 
stakeholders. 
 Security Program Management 
o Planning ( Strategy and Security Requirements, continual 
improvement) 
o Program Assessment, Gap Analysis 
 Security Governance 
 Policies, Processes and Procedures 
 Legal and Regulatory  
 Risk Management 
 Review 
 Enforcement /Compliance 
o Audit 
o Penetration Testing 
 Security Technology and Architecture 
 Definitions, Design to comply with security 
requirements, Development and testing 
 Security Operations 
 Compliance to Procedures 
 Risk Assessment 
 Implementation 
 Vulnerability Management 
 Patch Management 
 Incident Management 
 Event Management 
 Reporting 
4.8.7 The public sector expects the supply chain to be mature in terms of IA 
practice.  However, contractual terms are inadequate and are not 
being policed.  Without sufficient oversight and ability to evidence the 
required level of IP, further breaches are inevitable. [50S]  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
143 | P a g e  
4.9 Impact of Culture and Politics 
4.9.1 This area of focus arose out of several themes from the Literature 
Review analysis, including organisational and geographical political 
context.  See Memos at Appendix I, Section 10.17, Table 24.  The 
UK Labour government went through an extensive transformational 
agenda during the first part of the new millennium.  In May 2009, the 
change from a Labour to a coalition led government created a shift in 
focus, following a significant period of activity implementing the Data 
Handling Review requirements.  This is highlighted in the IA 
Chronology, Appendix III.  The questions for consideration in this 
section therefore focussed on whether change in political landscape 
might change priorities and thus change resource allocation.  The 
findings bore out this reality in parts of the public sector , and also in 
the private sector servicing the public sector. 
4.9.2 The research was undertaken at a time when changes in culture were 
evident as a result of the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 
2001 and the actions of Wikileaks and Edward Snowden, aspects 
borne out specifically by survey respondents. [48S, 51S, 58S] 
4.9.3 The rhetoric is different in the ICT and Security trade press. [15ES]  
The IT industry is not as mature as other regulated industries.  Self-
regulation has not been universally adopted. [7ES, 15ES]  
Respondents noted that private sector organisations that provide 
outsourced services to the UK public sector were more closely 
monitored by business leaders, though the requests to meet standards 
came with cost implications. [7ES, 24T, 54S] 
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4.9.4 Promoting IA expertise was only going to make a difference if the 
whole of the target audience was alert to the benefits and the 
necessity of change, and if the organisation being served also had 
embedded within it a number of leaders able to take the rest of the 
teams along with them.  If an organisation’s management are unwilling 
to adapt, it was only ever going to be difficult to trigger the required 
cultural change. [15ES] 
4.9.5 2010 was a particularly active year in terms of the design of the UK 
Government’s IA professionalism agenda.  The UK Government had 
an active role in the landscape, as expressed by one respondent: “not 
just regulation, but monitoring and enforcing due process and 
providing the right incentives and disincentives”. [7ES, 11E] 
4.9.6 Respondents identified that the Public Sector had become more 
attuned to the need for InfoSec with more emphasis on this area 
which, at minimum, improves awareness. [1F, 7ES, 10FS, 15ES, 
31ES, 49S, 60S, 79S]  However, additional awareness or investment 
in resources into security measures does not automatically equate to 
better security or better IP (Kaplan, 2008). 
4.9.7 There is an ethical dimension to striking the balance between the 
effective implementation of operational security (across an 
organisational horizontal) against the Private Sector (team) need to 
see an ongoing increase in sales of Security Services (along the 
outsourcing vertical), whether relevant or required. [48S, 56S] 
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4.9.8 One respondent stated that IA was InfoSec but was changed to reflect 
the demands of the UK public sector. [49S]  The Literature Review 
identified how the usage of the terminology was borne out of 
government led initiatives.  In 2010, the complexity of the existing UK 
public sector landscape was clear given the number of different bodies 
with competing agendas – MoD, Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA at the time, now National Crime Agency [NCA]), MI5, MI6, 
GCHQ, eCrime Units, Criminal Asset Recovery Unit, Office of 
CyberSecurity, CyberSecurity Operations Centre, expanded Special 
Forces and more. [10FS, 14F] 
4.9.9 Historically, fraud prevention has been carried out as a separate 
activity from cybercrime, at a policing level, and the same can be said 
for organisational implementation.  This has been wasteful of 
resources and lacks a combination of available intelligence.  There are 
a number of industry, government and law enforcement fraud 
intelligence assessments which are not brought together to give one 
common, authoritative picture.  Given that the criminals are using 
cyberspace as the medium through which they are committing fraud, 
the correlation between fraud and cybercrime was only fully realised in 
2015 with the first release of co-ordinated crime statistics reporting. 
[5F]  It was also clear that improved coordination of the multiplicity of 
different organisations would be required.  For one respondent, it was 
hoped that perhaps by 2015 there would be a Department of 
Information and Infrastructure, though there is still no sign of this yet 
(2017). [5F] 
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4.9.10 Passionate leadership carries little physical cost to the organisation 
yet it can have huge impact.  This explains why organisations with 
limited resources can make appreciable improvements.  The 
overriding sense from respondents was that the task was not mission 
impossible, rather it was mission critical. [10FS, 15ES]  However, the 
power of one enthusiast may be insufficient depending on the size of 
organisation and the volume of information records requiring 
protection.  Quality, compliance and IP are an outcome of what is 
done; they are not in addition to what is done – by all employees. 
[60S, 75S] 
4.9.11 The historical anecdote below is shared as evidence of how long the 
repeated issues have been experienced and how important the “tone 
at the top” is to the success of any change management undertaking. 
Cement Ltd, 1967 
A new HR system was being implemented.  The staff were 
worried about IT having access to their personnel data, including 
their salaries as this would be the first time all of that information 
would be in the one, accessible place. 
The then MD took the bold step of putting his salary on an A4 
sheet of paper, poster style, on the main reception notice board 
stating what he was getting paid, on the premise of being 
confident that he was worth it.  The message to all of his 
employees was this – if you are paid too little, the company 
should be embarrassed; if you are paid too much, either you 
should be embarrassed or you need to work harder to justify the 
salary! 
Leadership made the significant difference to the ultimate 
success of the implementation of this new system as everyone 
got on with allowing their data to be input into it. 
(Anecdote provided by respondent 22F) 
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4.10 Professionalism of IA 
4.10.1 This area of study was designed to elicit understanding of the impact 
of the IA professionalism agenda at the time of the research.  See 
Memos at Appendix I, Section 10.17, Table 25.  Combined with the 
Literature Review, this section answers the second research 
question(s): How has the extensive body of knowledge influenced 
professionals? 
4.10.2 Overall, the belief amongst respondents is that IA has not achieved 
the status of a profession. [3F, 5F, 10FS, 14F]  The researcher 
contends that the ongoing confusion in terminology is not aiding 
progress, leading to question whether we seeking to professionalise 
“cyber professionals”, “InfoSec professionals” or “IA professionals”.  If 
the latter, then there is no representative IA membership body for 
them to belong to. 
4.10.3 The existence of a NIAS since 2003 helped to increase IA 
understanding but respondents felt that it lacked political momentum.  
In professionalising the industry, positively there is a greater presence 
of security experienced C-level executives at the top of organisations 
that are discussing and adding IA to their strategies.  Professionalising 
the industry has created a greater drive for minimum standards, 
baselines, benchmarks and levels of compliance that must be met, to 
ensure that any organisation is not impacted by a lack of adherence to 
local laws and regulatory requirements.  For many, there is clear 
budget and strategy for security risk and compliance planning, 
delivering IA.  There is greater awareness of the threat landscape and 
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improved appetite to understand the risk posture of organisations.  
Managed risk brings value to an organisation; poorly managed risks 
devalue an organisation. [54S] 
4.10.4 The ongoing “skills crisis” rhetoric and the identified gaps ((ISC)², 
2011d/2013a/2015g) were of concern to the researcher given the 
volume of available information, certification, standardisation, 
accreditation and professional membership bodies. 
4.10.5 Many respondents believed that professionalism was a key strategic 
enabler. [1F, 10FS, 15ES, 18E, 20F, 21E, 26F, 27E, 28T, 49S, 63S, 
66S, 79S]  IA is not a core discipline in its own right, it is not 
academically accepted. [20F]  There are IT bodies and InfoSec 
bodies.  There is no IA professional membership body.  Negatively, 
there is a belief that there is a large group of accredited professionals 
that appear to have achieved their qualifications without relevant 
experience, gaining senior level roles in organisations and damaging 
the credibility of IA as a result.  Part of the risk lies with the recruiters 
not checking experience as well as accreditation (perhaps being ill 
informed and/or time poor) but also with the professional industry 
bodies not making the experience measurement process sufficiently 
robust.  The gap is narrowing over time as the various membership 
bodies address it. [48S] 
4.10.6 As was found in Section 4.11, management leadership and direction is 
vital.  Many respondents identified concerns regarding a lack of 
leadership. [10FS, 14F, 48S, 53S, 65S, 84F]  In the UK public sector, 
the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO) was designed to take on 
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the function that would help to filter these issues up, through and to – 
and to help the decision making processes.  However, the nominated 
individuals, including the Heads of Profession, have historically not 
been from the InfoSec profession and thus lack grounding in the 
concepts and terminology.  This, in itself, perpetuates 
unprofessionalism. [10FS, 20F]  The Council for Professors and 
Heads of Computing (CPHC) help to advise the UK Government in 
managing this stream of professionals though there is a high turnover 
in Cabinet Office staff and there was no evidence that they had read 
the available reports. [84F] 
4.10.7 This difficulty was also articulated by a peer group the researcher 
presented to [Appendix I, 10.2.8].  The views expressed were that 
any organisations Board of Directors needs to understand the threat 
independently of the employed professional(s), particularly if they turn 
to a professional for advice.  However, if the professional is finding the 
subject area too complex to understand, the question then asked was 
– “who will they [the Board] trust to advise them on this complex 
subject?”. 
4.10.8 This situation is not specific to the public sector.  Speaking at an open 
conference in December 2011, the CSO of BP was a self-confessed 
unqualified individual but expected his staff to gain relevant 
qualifications.  One of the most senior figures in Security in BT has no 
discernible relevant qualifications or certifications, again self-
confessed.  This opens up the profession to direct challenge as to why 
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effort is applied to professionalising an industry when it does not 
employ accredited or certified individuals in senior roles. 
4.10.9 Whilst a multiplicity of choice was identified by respondents – IISP, UK 
CESG, IAAC, BCS, IET, ISACA, (ISC)², ISSA, the Big Four, SANS, 
SABSA, BCS IRMA, IBM, ISF, Oracle, Tripwire, HP - the majority 
stated that they would turn to people they knew, as opposed to 
specific professional membership bodies, for advice and guidance.  
With so many membership bodies, consideration needs to be given as 
to how many of their members overlap and to what extent the volume 
is creating a dilution effect.  However, this was not something the 
scope of research could encompass.  One survey respondent 
expressed these challenges, represented below. 
As long as each of these areas has societies where annual dues 
are payable, separate journals and, dare I say it, separate vested 
interests, the array of information/data/knowledge groups can 
never be viewed as a cohesive whole, no matter what academic 
studies may argue for it.  There are economic reasons why 
merging and cohesiveness are desirable - not only for the work 
done in the field, but also the research work which is 
duplicated/unseen/misunderstood... And then there are the 
international differences: the US will never see things the 
British/European/Asian way, and vice versa... (Email per comms, 
8 September 2015) 
4.10.10 The ethical dimension appeared regularly as a theme throughout this 
study. [50S]  All the widely known professional membership bodies in 
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the ICT industry, and those specifically addressing InfoSec and IA 
have Codes of Ethics, requirements for annual continuous 
professional development (CPD), levels of competencies, 
assessments, etc.  In spite of this, there was a call for a cybersecurity 
code of ethics or professional membership body (in conversation, 
IAAC PDM, 8 September 2015, IISP Congress 2016). [28T]  The 
researcher believes that to do so would risk the development of new 
avenues for addressing an already solved problem and the dilution of 
the existing BoK. [16FS, 45S, 47S]  This is not to say that the existing 
Codes of Ethics would not benefit from being updated. 
4.10.11 Enforcement is also an issue - without threat of sanction by a 
professional body, no code of conduct or ethics can be considered to 
be effective. [31ES, 57S].  This changes behaviour, with an increase 
in security spending as well as a delay in being able to fill vacant 
positions due to a lack of available talent.  The length of time to work 
through academia makes the process longer so more vocational 
training may be required. [71S] 
4.10.12 (ISC)2, ISSA and BCS all operate a CPD approach.  This supports the 
requirement to ensure that professional development processes exist 
in order to maintain the quality and relevance of professional services 
throughout a practitioner’s working life.  There are many IA 
practitioners who are dismissive of certifications provided by 
membership bodies.  This does a disservice to those who take the 
time to invest in their education.  College education authenticates 
knowledge.  Certification authorizes it. 
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4.10.13 Head-hunters were suggested as an option in terms of a source for 
qualified professionals who would know the subject area, from the 
premise of the head hunters knowing the industry. [7ES]  However, in 
contrast, respondents identified that recruitment agencies are seeking 
individuals with “cyber” skills and if longstanding InfoSec professionals 
and IA practitioners do not explicitly reference “cyber” in their CV, they 
are discounted. [15ES, 76S]  This lack of cohesion of purpose and 
messaging has not helped the collective industry. 
4.10.14 In 2005, a strategic partnership between ISACA, ISSA (the Information 
Systems Security Association) and ASIS International (the American 
Society for Industrial Security) was announced in response to the 
convergence pressures on IT audit, information security, and physical 
security professionals.  Unfortunately, there has not been much to 
show from the partnership to date, despite the potential for members 
sharing benefits and cross-skilling.  It is difficult to find mention of the 
partnership on the websites of the three partners.  However, the 
convergence pressures are still there, although audit independence 
obviously limits the extent to which IT auditors can sensibly merge with 
their colleagues in information, physical security, or other fields. 
4.10.15 In 2017, the IISP embarked on the Chartered status process to create 
a Chartered Information Security Professional.  However, the 
Worshipful Company of Security Professionals has already been 
awarding Chartered Security Professional status in conjunction with 
ASIS.  The future implications are that those with existing 
certifications, qualifications and chartered status awarded from other 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
153 | P a g e  
bodies, may have to duplicate the effort in order to maintain their 
perceived currency and credibility in the industry. 
4.10.16 Table 9 below provides an overview of the available spread of 
resources for practitioners.  Others have been identified in Appendix 
II. 
Sector Covered by 
Government USA (including NIST), UK (multiple outlets including 
CESG, CPNI, DWP, MOD, Home Office, Cabinet Office), 
Australia, Singapore, Germany 
Industry IBM, HP, Oracle, IBM, Tripwire, Microsoft, SANS 
Institute, CISCO 
Professional 
Services Networks 
Deloitte, PwC, Ernst & Young, KPMG 
Professional 
membership bodies 
IISP, BCS, IET, ISACA, (ISC)², ISSA, SABSA, BCS 
IRMA, ACS (Australian) 
Not for profit 
industry 
membership bodies 
IAAC, ISF, Cloud Security Alliance, SABSA, EC Council 
(International Council of Electronic Commerce 
Consultants) 
Other bodies  ARMA, ACCA, BCI, IRMS 
Table 9:  Spread of Information Resources Available 
 
4.10.17 NIST 800-100 was suggested as a good reference point, as was ISO 
27001 on multiple occasions.  The IAAC/IoD Directors Guides to 
Managing Information Risk were also mentioned as reference 
resources.  These have been in circulation since 2004. [20F] 
4.10.18 In 2016, this research inspired a series of workshops on the 
Profession led by IAAC.  The output from this (IAAC, 2017) coined the 
term GRADE A to cover the breadth of possible actors across 
Governors; Risk Managers; Auditors/Assessors; Defenders 
(incorporating testers, analysis and operators); Engineers and 
Architects.  The workshops and resultant paper corroborated these 
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findings – that there is an excess of industry duplication and confusion 
and that the profession does not present credibly as a result.  
4.10.19 During PAR in CS2, respondents identified that there is a risk that due 
to the inward looking support of the silos, service providers are selling 
what they want to sell, not what the customer needs to buy. [69S] 
4.10.20 The findings from respondents bore out that the risk of unprofessional, 
ill-informed decision makers was regularly witnessed. [20F]  Delivering 
IA “... is only noticeable if it is absent (like the washing up and the bed 
making) and you get no medals for it!” (senior UK Government official, 
IAAC Symposium, 8 September 2010).  Through the delivery of 
presentations addressing elements of this research, the hypotheses 
have continued to be tested and there is practitioner confirmation that 
there are those in the profession who already see that a) calling it 
cyber and b) not understanding the breadth of coverage are negatively 
impacting the ongoing skills crisis and reducing the success of the IA 
professionalism agenda. 
4.11 Information Society 
4.11.1 The research survey responses led to wider societal and industry 
related analysis and consideration, therefore the next two issues were 
not initially addressed in the Literature Review.  See Memos at 
Appendix I, Section 10.17, Table 26. 
4.11.2 The IoT is considered to be the next industrial revolution – the second 
digital revolution – and everyone needs to be prepared (UK 
Government Office for Science, 2014).  One respondent identified that 
the InfoSoc will “bring about participatory forms of government, quite 
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different, in different countries”. [15ES]  The IoT is an ego centric 
“internet of me” place to inhabit.  There is a “grand bargain” to be had 
between privacy and functionality.  However, there is still insufficient 
awareness by the citizen with regard to their role, responsibilities and 
liabilities.  GetSafeOnline has been around in the UK since 2006. 
4.11.3 In the US there is a Cyber Security Awareness month (October) which 
has been adopted globally.  There are other examples of efforts to 
raise awareness worldwide and yet citizens do not necessarily adopt 
the health warnings for their multiple connected devices: updating 
firewalls, anti-virus protection, avoiding clicking on unknown links and 
visiting non-secure sites. 
4.11.4 Timberg (2015) provided a valuable write up of the challenges faced 
by building the connected future on an insecure foundation which is 
not fit for purpose.  This signposted the 1998 appearance of a group of 
hackers from L0pht Industries before the US States Senate where 
they informed them that computers, were not safe — neither the 
software, the hardware, nor the networks that link them together.  “The 
companies that bui ld these things don’t care, and they have no reason 
to care because failure costs them nothing.  And the federal 
government has neither the skill nor the will to do anything about it” 
(Grand, 1998). 
4.11.5 In the US, Congress has been actively involved in cybersecurity 
issues, holding hearings every year since the nineties.  The UK NAO 
has provided similar reporting oversight.  There is no shortage of data 
on this topic: government agencies, academic institutions, think tanks, 
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security consultants, membership bodies and trade associations have 
issued hundreds of reports, studies, analyses and statistics.  The UK 
Government itself holds the statistical data to evidence that near 80% 
of the significant breaches experienced in the preceding three years 
were as a result of poorly patched systems where the vulnerability 
management was not kept up to date (Lucas, 2015, p.242).  This does 
not positively position the security professionals responsible (nor their 
leadership). 
4.11.6 The requirement to secure systems is based on perceptions of the 
value of the information those systems contain and the likelihood of 
any risk of exposure or loss.  There are different views as to what 
constitutes important information and how such information can be 
treated within different organisational environments and cultures.  The 
value of information and the need to adequately protect it have been 
important societal tenets for centuries.  There is enough history 
available and this research has served to draw together many 
resources. 
4.11.7 As an example of a situation made more complex by the InfoSoc, a 
known military installation had what was thought to be a good 
homepage on the Web.  It showed an aerial view of the facility with 
buildings labelled “Operations Center” and “Technical Support Center”.  
It was valuable public relations, but it also provided valuable targeting 
information for those who might wish them ill.  This situation was 
replicated in the private sector case study [CS2] where a Data Centre 
that served similarly sensitive clients had a video arranged for them by 
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Marketing, designed for advertising purposes.  It unwittingly created 
the same risks, not something that the Physical Security people 
involved had initially considered until the InfoSec team engaged. 
4.11.8 The InfoSoc has progressed apace, significantly enhanced as a result 
of the speed of technological developments and the reach of the 
internet to parts of the world previously unconnected.  The speed of 
development(s) in many industries, in and of itself, leads to ski lls 
crises.  Legislative, regulatory, industry standards and political 
changes can be shown to have had appreciable impact on the 
understanding of requirements for IP within the InfoSoc.  Industry 
experts have been articulating the subject of IA, the reasons and need 
for it for several decades and yet progress to successful adoption still 
lacks corresponding speed in alignment with the pace of the InfoSoc - 
as evidenced by the increased volume of data lost or stolen and the 
number of systems breached. [61S] 
4.11.9 The idiosyncrasies for each global sector have been creating fissures 
of broken understanding.  However, in real terms, the concepts are the 
same; the risk appetites may be different, thus the implementation of 
controls must be adapted.  Jacobson and Rursch (2013, p.12) 
captured the lack of mandate and the length of time for adoption of the 
IA frameworks in the following expression: 
.... Government, industry and higher education are to blame for 
letting security awareness campaigns serve in place of IT security 
literacy.  Until we treat IT security as everyone’s problem, and 
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employees and managers at all levels contribute to the company’s 
security; we will continue to lose the security battle. 
4.11.10 Each organisation owns its information, not the IT department.  IT 
manages data, at a bits and bytes level.  Information has been and 
can be used as a tool of war and indeed can be the theatre of war 
itself.  Information war is economic war, not territorial and 
understanding of this is changing the dynamics of the protection 
mechanisms required (Denning, 2000). 
4.11.11 IT vendors talk about Data Protection but, in reality, they do not mean 
this in the legal sense; they mean it in a technological sense.  There 
are vendors claiming that encrypting data will address the 
requirements of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (EU 
GDPR).  This presents a naïve understanding of the depth and 
breadth of IA required in order to deliver the full scope of IP, in the 
context of a regulatory landscape that is slowly adapting .  The ongoing 
skills crises will continue to deepen as it is difficult to find people with 
the level of interdisciplinary specialisms required to address the IP 
implementation gaps, both philosophically and practically. 
4.11.12 IA should be a central concern of business, government and citizens 
because: i) corporate value is derived from effective management of 
information risk; ii) society and government depends upon secure 
information infrastructures for the delivery of traditional critical services 
as well as for novel services; and iii) citizens need to take more 
responsibility for protecting the privacy and security of their information 
assets. 
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4.11.13 This will also be essential to the morale and confidence of the citizen 
in the InfoSoc, where information is the basis of all economic value.  
Though there are more questions than answers currently surrounding 
the future in the interconnected IoT InfoSoc, responsibility cannot be 
abrogated. 
4.11.14 It may be that IA practitioners are suffering from too great a degree of 
scepticism which is having an impact on the capability to progress 
maturely.  Sceptics tend not to believe in the requirement of basic 
foundations, of which there are many attributable to IA and, if properly 
implemented, would already be significantly reducing the current levels 
of risk to personal data, company reputation, trust in government and 
protection of systems and cyber space.  Equally, there could be 
validity in the sceptic stance on the exact same grounds – the 
consistency of failures could be taken to imply that nothing should be 
done to address them (Meer, 2013 / 2015). 
4.11.15 Information overload is often reported as being a deterrent to 
understanding and is recognised in science as being a concern as 
there can be “severe limitations on the amount of data able to be 
received, processed and remembered by the human mind” (Miles and 
Huberman, 2002, p.127).  People also tend to ignore information that 
conflicts with an already held belief so they then get stuck in the 
change dynamic, not being able to move forward (appearing to be 
intellectually frozen).  These inertia considerations will be taken into 
account during the analysis phase, ensuring consistency in judgement 
and evaluation is achieved. 
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4.11.16 Securely designed systems of systems are required from the outset.  
This will result in fewer system breaches; less loss of income, less 
impact to industry, individuals and society as a whole.  Given that the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) has a set of International Standards 
for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, this is something that 
the IA industry should be working to emulate in order to raise their 
profile (IIA, 2009). 
4.11.17 Alternatively, the security sector could cease to continue to try and 
force this change that has still not been effectively embedded after 
several decades and instead, given that security is everyone’s 
responsibility.  The “security market” could be restructured to ensure 
that the skills, experience, knowledge and ways of working necessary 
to embed the required IP techniques are available to every other 
industry. 
4.11.18 Social media has shown exponential adoption (Fox, 2015).  
Accessibility to social media means people expect immediacy; they no 
longer have to wait for the evening news broadcast.  The social norms 
of the internet are forming and storming on a daily basis.  For as much 
as technology is changing the norms, it is also creating new problems 
and it will take people to resolve them.  There have been other social 
anthropologists and scientists who have written about society and 
seen its adaptive changes over the era and decades. 
4.11.19 Brin (1998, pp.295-6), in a seminal work on the Transparent Society, 
captured a number of options, following the thinking of others, 
concluding that the latest wave would be a self-monitored society - 
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auto-surveillance (self-scrutiny) becomes useful, necessary and then a 
compulsive part of daily life: 
Such a society is transparent and porous.  Information leakage is 
rampant.  Barriers and boundaries – distance, darkness, time, 
walls, windows and even skin, which have been fundamental to 
our conceptions of privacy, liberty and individuality – give way.  
Actions as well as feelings, thoughts, past and even futures are 
increasingly visible.  The line between the public and the private 
is weakened; observations seem constant; more and more 
information goes on a permanent record, whether we will this or 
not, and even whether we know about it or not. 
4.11.20 This was prescient and is emblematic of present day society.  Brin 
also used the term “data smog”, noting that it would lead to “pollution” 
(Ibid. p.300).  This resonates with a shift in IT industry focus to “Big 
Data” and the need for the roles of Data Analyst and Data Scientist, 
particularly in the Security profession, in order to “mine” the data and 
provide “security intelligence” / “actionable intelligence” back to  
management and leadership.  These terms are in their infancy in 
socialisation across organisations. 
4.11.21 Thomson Reuters (2013a, p.4) suggested that “true behaviour change 
may best be achieved by more intelligent use of existing tools, such as 
work quality supervision and information flow, rather than by chasing 
an elusive “mind-set change”.  Schneier (2015a and 2015b, p.238) 
also addressed the theme of data pollution in 2015: 
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Data is the pollution problem of the information age, and 
protecting privacy is the environmental challenge.  Almost all 
computers produce personal information.  It stays around, 
festering.  How we deal with it -- how we contain it and how we 
dispose of it -- is central to the health of our information 
economy.  Just as we look back today at the early decades of the 
industrial age and wonder how our ancestors could have ignored 
pollution in their rush to build an industrial world, our 
grandchildren will look back at us during these early decades of 
the information age and judge us on how we addressed the 
challenge of data collection and misuse. 
4.11.22 In September 2015, the UK Knowledge Transfer Network (UK KTN 
2015) released their draft work programme for 2016-2017 which 
included a call for submissions for suggestions for ways to increase 
security adoption, with a focus on the InfoSoc under the banner “KTN 
2020”.  The researcher contends that this will be another exercise in 
the creation of new ways to solve known problems for which existing 
solutions were available.  KTN 2020 is not encouraging anything other 
than repeated patterns of bad behaviour.  Companies will have the 
opportunity to request new government money to address an old 
problem that remains unsolved due to lack of application of existing 
knowledge and coordinated effort.  There is a lack of evident industry 
accountability and corporate social responsibility. 
4.11.23 The scale of the challenge was previously identified: “IA demands that 
trustworthy systems be developed from untrustworthy components 
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within power-generation systems, banking, transportation, emergency 
services, and telecommunications” (Hamre, 1998).  Anderson’s 2015 
report for UK Government entitled A Question of Trust (Anderson, 
2015) provides a detailed exposition of the challenge of the scale of 
technological reach – and the impacts of that on society. 
4.11.24 Security industry dialogue is inward-facing; the membership groups 
talk to each other about subjects they already know about.  This 
creates an insular and parochial effect which needs a revamp in order 
for it to be effective for the 21st century information age.  Globalisation 
is prevalent, with large businesses having employees working 
worldwide.  Maintaining country specific bodies does not seem 
appropriate in this InfoSoc context. [CS2] 
4.11.25 The world continues to connect devices at an accelerating rate.  The 
known safeguards have been established, but are not being 
adequately installed, implemented and maintained and this is risking 
the fragility of the InfoSoc that can be easily shattered, particularly as 
the criminal fraternity continue to easily find vulnerabilities in the 
infrastructure.  This fragility was further evidenced in the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling on the legal basis for transfers of 
personal data to businesses under the US Safe Harbor agreement 
(UK ICO, 2015). 
4.11.26 In the context of the globalised IoT environment, the UK cannot stand 
alone.  No single country can, for example, issue anti-spam legislation, 
given that the perpetrators of cybercrime are worldwide and do not 
respect geographical nor legislative borders.  The same is true for 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
164 | P a g e  
challenges presented by operating in the cyber domain, already 
addressed in the Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention work undertaken 
in 2003 (UK HMG 2003a), though the risks and implications of the 
extent of the global connectivity may not have been appreciated.  
Further detail is provided in Appendix I, Section 10.18. 
4.11.27 There is no IA if not all participants (including citizens) are aware of, 
and take up, their responsibility. [16FS, 52S]  In the future, this will 
require cross discipline effort from psychology, sociology and 
behavioral scientists.  The protection of collective information 
resources – which requires IA – will be a defining challenge of national 
security, worldwide in the years to come. 
4.11.28 Whilst articulation of the real, persistent and growing threat has moved 
from the technical journal pages to the front pages of worldwide media 
newsprint (both on and offline), the people challenge being seen is 
that the greater threats may be from complacency, ignorance, 
obliviousness, politics and budgets (Curmudgeon, 2015, p.39).  The IA 
message has to be disseminated using the tools of the Information 
Age.  Once wide understanding is genuinely achieved, the InfoSoc will 
regulate through the planned legislative changes combined with the 
increased prosecutions for data breaches. 
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4.12 Barriers 
4.12.1 Barriers have been constantly identified throughout this thesis; for 
many respondents, the greatest concern was inaction. [14F, 24T, 54S, 
81F]  See Memos at Appendix I, Section 10.17, Table 27.  Given the 
plethora of available approaches, standards, regulation, legislation, 
industry bodies, multiple overlapping and competing government 
agencies – this inaction may, in fact, be caused by paralysis, with 
those involved not knowing which way to turn. 
4.12.2 A consistent theme reflected during the research study was that 
emphasis on ICT technology has had a negative impact on IA by 
providing a false sense of security.  Antivirus vendors, patching, 
firewalls, IDS/IPS, access control are all necessary but not sufficient to 
protect confidential information.  Change upsets and disrupts.  
Vendors do not want business professionals to look at other products 
nor to challenge their cost models.  Decision-makers who supported 
the purchase of existing systems may fear a change in direction could 
suggest the original decision-making was flawed.  Some respondents 
reflected that business practices stifle the realisation of good security 
through the attainment of a loss of security standards. [35F, 38E, 
38FE]  Other research undertaken resonates with the survey 
responses (Meer, 2015). 
4.12.3 However, the scale of the challenge was identified some time ago: 
“The progression of information science collectively and individually 
perhaps does not have sufficient will or motivation to advocate its own 
cause successfully against the much stronger commercially driven 
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pressures of the IT professions” (Best, 1996, p.53).  There is no group 
taking this forward.  Vendors are accused of self-interest.  Oltsik 
identified this when he stated: “if bad behaviour (such as confusion 
marketing or outright mis-selling) is regarded as normal by sufficient 
numbers of people in the industry, it becomes the norm” (Oltsik, 2014). 
4.12.4 The “customer" can sometimes be hard to identify as they may be 
internal more than external: 
Executive management, with all their formal training, really does 
not have a foundation in security, and often a limited exposure to 
risk.  They do not understand, or find benefit in learning our 
literary currency.  Therefore, we are forced to try and adapt our 
terminology, used by limited practitioners, into the language of 
our disengaged masters - business equivalents, and to a closer 
equivalent financial audiences.  In the process, in our attempt to 
be understood, we contribute to the fractured representations 
that we intend.  The net result is that the language ... is 
imprecise.  We bastardized it to be understood.  The audience 
rarely deserves or benefits from our effort.  There are a plethora 
of other causes, including the lazy and the well-intended but ill-
educated. [15ES]  This was also reference by respondent [82F] 
– “Don’t dumb down everything - train people up to the right level 
– we need to reverse engineer management” (21 February 
2014). 
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4.12.5 In all industries, there is a balance to be struck, none more so than in 
the IS realm.  Things should be made as complex as necessary but no 
more so.  Professionals cannot always be looking for a simple answer 
if it does not exist. [35F, 39FE] 
4.12.6 Since the global financial crisis of 2007 imposed unprecedented 
budgetary restrictions on both the public and private sectors, new 
security solutions must be more efficient and cost-effective than the 
ones currently available.  This has created a constant need to “do 
more with less” which has constrained the resources available to 
respond appropriately to a changing threat landscape. [46S, 50S, 
59S]  This is particularly relevant if the organisation has not historically 
invested appropriately in security controls and thus is starting from a 
weak security posture.  The level of investment needed to improve 
security is higher than what would otherwise be necessary. 
4.12.7 Senior management is continually incentivised to focus on revenue 
protection in order to strive and thrive: through status, recognition, end 
of year appraisals, marketing and sales techniques collectively 
displaying intellectual dishonesty.  These behaviours put a strain on 
the ability of the organisation to maintain a level of ethical resilience  
(Raval, 2016). 
4.12.8 When value protection is at odds with value creation, the dynamic 
changes, resulting in an inability to adequately risk assess the threat 
vectors.  Conventional compliance has consistently been shown to 
provide a tick-box mentality that does not provide for security to be 
embedded horizontally across an organisation as opposed to being 
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tackled as a vertical silo. [7ES, 73S]  The risk dynamic continues to 
confuse with evidence of risk aversion more likely than active risk 
management; with rewarded risk being at odds with unrewarded risk.   
Various resources for guidance on addressing these challenges are 
available (ACCA, 2010a/b/c). 
4.12.9 As another example of a further wave of change in 2015, the UK 
Prime Minister set out his vision for a smarter state which would 
require greater consolidation alongside devolution of power (Cameron, 
2015).  There are a plethora of examples scattered throughout 
multiple research endeavours [including CS1] and many government 
reports, identifying duplicative work being carried out.  A small UK 
Local Council intending to issue bus passes required data from 
colleagues within their own organisation.  Those colleagues, 
incentivised to ensure they covered their costs, wanted to charge the 
transportation related team £15,000 to get the data right, due to a lack 
of IG and management having been applied.  The data could not be 
relied upon not to contain reference to either dead people or people 
who could have moved away who were still showing on the relevant 
register.  Such housekeeping activities need to be embedded as part 
of the IG activities, but should already have been in place as part of 
the data protection, and therefore compliance, activities.  As Cameron 
(2015) stated – “It’s not just about resources: it’s about results”. 
4.12.10 Inappropriate controls coupled with the knowledge base increasing in 
the general public around privacy and security, brought on by 
publicised issues such as credit card numbers being published and/or 
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other private information being leaked, have changed the awareness 
of the cyber domain.  The findings and the Literature Review identified 
that governance is misunderstood.  The findings corroborate that 
enforcement is lacking; that policing compliance is difficult.  It is a 
misnomer to believe that the CISO is responsible  and accountable for 
the actions of business leaders. 
4.12.11 Collective executive liability exists, much of which cannot be written 
about due to commercial sensitivities and risk.  However, Home 
Depot, Target and the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
breaches resulted in both Class Action suits and resignations at 
director level, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in the case of Target.  
Respondents confirmed and concurred that there is evidence of 
plausible deniability being the leadership stance. [46S, 50S, 59S] 
4.12.12 Directors must, at all times, act in the best interests of the company 
and owe duties of good faith and trust.  If a director fails in this 
personal duty, then he/she may be liable to the company for any 
losses occasioned as a result of this failure.  This reality was well 
understood by a worldwide audience with the Volkswagen “deceit 
device” scandal in September 2015 (Hotten, 2015; Raval, 2016) and 
the subsequent identification of false data creation by both Mitsubishi 
and Nissan (TopGear, 2016).  Ignorance is no defence in the eyes of 
the law.  The lack of accountability and evidence of culpable 
deniability in action are creating barriers to successful risk reduction. 
[35F, 39FE] 
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4.12.13 The public expects that executives should be held accountable for not 
taking appropriate actions to protect their information processed, 
stored and transmitted through digital means.  A Data Breach 
Litigation Report provides a comprehensive analysis of class action 
lawsuits involving data security breaches filed in the United States 
District Courts (Cave, 2015).  A number of lawsuits were generated as 
a result of the Home Depot breach in 2014 and the Target breach in 
2013.  Prosecution of directors in the future is expected, which may 
change the incentives and behaviour. 
4.12.14 Equally, personal liability exists, if an individual fails to ensure that 
appropriate internal control procedures and security measures are in 
place to prevent theft or destruction of proprietary information by 
hackers.  Personal liability is linked to individual responsibility, the 
maintenance of which relies on high personal ethics (Stahl, 2004). 
4.12.15 The influence of corporate change initiatives and rebranding was 
identified as a barrier by respondents.  By way of an example, in the 
large private sector case study a new initiative was identified in the 
Asia Pacific and Japan (APJ) region, labelled as “Service Exposures”.  
The CISO Office undertook an investigation to identify to what this 
referred in order to ensure that there was no duplication of effort as all 
attempts were being made to standardise global processes for 
evidence collection, risk management and compliance reporting. 
4.12.16 It transpired that the “Service Exposure” process was a risk 
management process by any other name that the region called it 
Service Exposure to cut through any resistance from accounts 
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regarding existing risk processes – with no acknowledgement of the 
level of duplication this would cause.  It was being aggressively rolled 
out across APJ by management hungry for the visibility of risk and risk 
management.  They were using one SharePoint per account but with a 
consistent model for each and had requirements (but not resources) to 
develop dashboard reporting.  This was at the same time as the global 
CISO Office team were already working on the Account Risk 
Repository in which relevant information and evidence could be stored 
and which would be visible to the region (APJ) management. 
4.12.17 The net result of this entirely separate initiative, as a company, was 
that when in receipt of either an internal or external audit and asked 
for evidence of risk, the company would have a whole region missing 
because they would be talking about Service Exposures and a data  
trawl would not evidence like for like.  Renaming something does not 
help when the rest of the worldwide industry has no need to change its 
nomenclature.  Change can be seen as an enabler.  However, it is 
often a barrier in and of itself, but also as many are resistant to 
change.  Equally, if efforts have been tried to implement new 
improvement programmes before, then that resistance can be 
understandable if there is evidence of previous failures.  More 
information sharing can lead to more risk, which can create a barrier to 
adopting such initiatives. [18E, 76S] 
4.12.18 The ability to deduce is being lost as a result of gaps in knowledge 
and a lack of ability to apply deductive reasoning.  A number of 
respondents expressed concerns regarding this.  [22F, 35F, 39FE] 
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4.13 Conclusions 
 
4.13.1 This chapter has been presented as a narrative discourse analysis in 
order to tell the story of the research process and findings.  
Signposting of respondent interaction has been interwoven to  
reference corroboration with the identified themes from the Literature 
Review and the survey findings. 
4.13.2 The summation of the phenomena that emerge from the data analysis 
of the findings and the PAR are articulated below,: i) IA practitioners 
do not understand the ontology of InfoSec nor that of IA; ii) the shift in 
dominant narrative from IA to cybersecurity creates a schism that 
could have unforeseen consequences, diluting and narrowing 
practitioner and policy-maker understanding; iii) self-taught 
practitioners devalue the long term success of professionalizing IA ; iv) 
lack of IA understanding results in higher cost(s) in the short term due 
to over-reliance on suppliers and technology products selected to 
reduce risk; and v) IA practitioners do not understand the relationships 
between InfoSec, IA, and IG.  These empirically identified gaps are 
exacerbating progress of the UK government IA professionalism 
agenda. 
4.13.3 In answering the first question as to whether IA professional practice 
could be improved through enhanced IA understanding, the answer is 
in the affirmative.  The second question was designed to identify the 
By three methods we may learn wisdom: first, by reflection, which is noblest; 
second, by imitation, which is easiest; and third, by experience, which is the 
bitterest. Confucius, Chinese philosopher and reformer (551 BC - 479 BC) 
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BoK and its impact on IA practitioner.  The Literature Review identified 
core definitions that exist for IA.  Discourse and content analysis of 
survey responses, interview transcripts, PAR and the supporting 
research findings presented phenomena that evidenced that the 
majority of respondents did not understand the term IA; the 
terminology used by practitioners is inconsistent. [48S]  For many, 
InfoSec only incorporated the C of the CIA triad; the I and the A only, 
therefore, being applicable to IA. [46S,68S] 
4.13.4 The McCumber and Maconachy frameworks are known by few, yet 
there are many propagating false views industry-wide [9E, 31ES, 
63S], including to UK Government, which is exacerbating 
improvement and achievement of the UK Cybersecurity strategy 
goals.  The lack of detailed IA understanding should be of grave 
concern to policy makers, business leaders and government officials 
alike, given the importance of the subject area and how vital the 
effective implementation of IA is to the achievement of the stated 
objectives of the UK Cyber Security Strategy. 
4.13.5 Much of the IA understanding is subjective and perspective based.  
Many of the private sector respondents operate in vertical industry 
sectors within a global outsourcing business. [CS2, 45S, 50S, 66S]  
As a result, they have not been exposed to wider industry experience.  
IA practitioners require a fundamental understanding of a wide range 
of specialisations, including digital forensics, fraud examination, 
systems engineering, security risk management, privacy, and 
compliance.  The ability to interpret risks, review contractual language 
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and ensure that, in the event of a breach, their employer has adequate 
protection built into the contractual language is at risk.  Establishing 
this understanding and keeping it up to date requires resources, with 
coverage as diverse as the field itself.  These are broad areas of study 
for one single team to master and remain current in their 
understanding. 
4.13.6 A sub question of the research was “How can we professionalise an 
industry that is not understood?”.  The researcher contends that it is 
vital that there is acknowledgement of this reality in order to avoid 
continuing down an ill-formed route.  The evidence showed that 
volumes of standards and membership bodies have created barriers 
as paralysis can result due to the level of confusion caused.  This was 
expounded in the Professionalism section. 
4.13.7 The technological developments that have led to the current state of 
the InfoSoc have progressed through storage medium including 
microfilm, tape, disc etc.  Within the context of this research, IA sits as 
a subset within a family of IM activity, according to Kahn and Blair 
(Ibid. p.14): i) Records management; ii) document management; iii) 
knowledge management; iv) enterprise content management; v) 
information security; vi) information privacy; vii) disaster recovery; viii) 
customer/client relationship management; ix) storage management; 
and x) data mining. 
4.13.8 The UK Government approach has been largely department centric.  
As an example of duplicative wastage, the UK HMRC ran a different 
professionalism framework for contractors than that available from 
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either the Cabinet Office or CESG.  Role based assessments versus 
skill based assessments need to be reviewed (IISP board meeting, 20 
October 2015). 
4.13.9 By 2020, the intention is to have cybersecurity as part of the UK 
national curriculum, although by then the requirements may have 
changed significantly with the impact of the IoT, with generations who 
have only ever known an existence entirely and fully absorbed in the 
digital realm, in cyber space. 
4.13.10 The ontology of IG needs to be clearly understood by IA practitioners 
as IG was identified by respondents as the wider field within which IA 
needs to be placed [58S, 60S, 68S, 71S, 77S, 81F] – thus signifying 
the progression from IA, to IG, answering the third research question: 
Is there a next area of focus for security professionals within the 
roadmap progression from IT Security, through InfoSec through to IA.  
This key finding was fundamental to the grounded theory development 
described next in Chapter 5. 
  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
176 | P a g e  
 
 
Part 3 - Framework Refinement, Experiment and 
Discussion 
 
 
In this part, the Grounded Theory is developed and refined as the research 
questions have been critically examined and the theory developed throughout 
the research period. 
 
The case studies [CS1 and CS2], available in Appendix II, have contributed to 
the Grounded Theory development. 
 
This part closes with the research conclusions, shows the research contribution 
to knowledge and states areas for future research. 
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5 DEVELOPING A GROUNDED THEORY 
5.1 Introduction 
 
5.1.1 In order to synthesise the research findings, this Chapter describes 
the development of a Grounded Theory and the resultant holistic IG 
framework that comprises process, characteristics and best practices, 
answering the third research question: Is there a next area of focus for 
security professionals within the roadmap progression from IT 
Security, through InfoSec through to IA? 
5.1.2 Theories of professionalisation are brought together with a discussion 
of different types of professional identity and professional knowledge 
in order to show how the lens of professionalisation helps to make 
sense of the findings in Chapter 4. 
5.2 Why Ontology Review? 
5.2.1 Ontology - a lexicon of terminology and meaning - reflects the 
structure of the world and constrains the problem definition.  The 
purpose of ontology is to ensure that duplication of effort is reduced to 
a minimum.  Taxonomy and lexicon work have been well rounded in 
the InfoSec industry.  The work of Uschold and King (1995), Tsoumas 
and Gritzalis (2006), Abdullah, Sadiq and Indulska (2011), Raskin et 
al. (2001), Cherdantseva (2014) and Arara, Fgee and Bargelail (2015) 
The idea of the computer and its infrastructure as primary objects of protection 
was always an aberration.  It began that way because they were so expensive, 
large and difficult to replace. Today we throw them away. We are returning our 
attention to where protection, trust, and control should always have been – the 
processes and information that make up the landscape we manage.   Harry B. 
DeMaio (B2B and Beyond) 
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have reviewed components of IA Ontology.  Willetts (2008) created an 
IA Architecture (IA2) and provided an in depth end to end IA enterprise 
life cycle management (ELCM) approach. 
5.2.2 The goal of an IA Ontology is to provide a common vocabulary, reduce 
ambiguity, express needs, and facilitate action.  IA currently lacks a 
distinct professional identity as a result of having neither, given that all 
are “borrowed” from InfoSec and there is currently too much 
terminology blend.  Figure 35 shows the breadth of scope expected to 
be covered by various IA frameworks: 
 
Figure 35:  Mature IA, Source: Clarke (2015) and Tsoumas (2006) 
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5.2.3 The scope of involvement required for IA is depicted in Figure 36:  
 
Figure 36:  IA is a Shared Responsibility, Source: UNC Charlotte (2015)  
 
5.3 GRC Revisited 
5.3.1 As identified in the Literature Review, GRC is an acronym widely used 
in the Americas by large, multi-national corporate private sector 
businesses.  OCEG (2007) recognized that GRC had historically 
grown up from separate, largely fragmented organisational initiatives.  
In order to address this shortfall, the objective of the OCEG was to 
develop an integrated, standardized approach to implement a 
coordinated GRC programme with specific accountability and 
oversight seeded through to a designated individual of suitable 
organisational seniority – or a committee at a strategic level – and to 
ensure board level fiduciary oversight with accountable stakeholders. 
5.3.2 GRC is structured in that order for a reason, as an organisation needs 
to start with Governance (of its PPT), identify its Risks and manage 
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(reduce) them, then evidence Compliance.  OCEG (2009a) identified 
the benefits of operating this system of PPT: i) enables an 
organisation to understand and prioritise stakeholder expectations; ii) 
sets business objectives that are congruent with its values and risks; 
iii) achieves objectives while optimizing its risk profile, and protecting 
value;; iv) operates within legal, contractual, internal, social, and 
ethical boundaries;; v) provides relevant, reliable, and timely 
information to appropriate stakeholders; and vi) enables the 
measurement of the performance and effectiveness of the system. 
5.3.3 GRC is not about a single individual owning all the elements.  GRC is 
expected to be a federation of professional roles working together in 
collaboration to achieve sustainability, consistency, efficiency, 
accountability and transparency (Howard and Prince, 2011, p.44) 
namely: governance; strategy and business performance 
management; risk management; compliance; internal control’  
corporate security; legal; IT; business ethics; sustainability and 
corporate social responsibility; quality management; human capital 
and culture; audit and assurance; and finance.  GRC is also not about 
silos of risk and compliance operating independently of each other, 
nor is it another label for Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), 
although the R of GRC is intended to encompass ERM. 
5.3.4 ERM is defined in Table 10 below by two leading organisations: the 
Risk Management Society (RIMS) and the Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA): 
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Body Definition Source 
RIMS Enterprise risk management is a strategic 
business discipline that supports the 
achievement of an organisation’s 
objectives by addressing the full spectrum 
of its risks and managing the combined 
impact of those risks as an inter-related 
risk portfolio.  
www.rims.org/resources/ER
M/Pages/WhatisERM.aspx  
The IIA Enterprise risk management is a 
structured, consistent and continuous 
process across the whole organisation for 
identifying, assessing, deciding on 
responses to and reporting on 
opportunities and threats that affect the 
achievement of its objectives. 
https://na.theiia.org/standard
s-guidance/recommended-
guidance/Pages/Position-
Papers.aspx 
Table 10:  Risk Management and Internal Audit: Forging a Collaborative Alliance, Source: RIMS 
and IIA (2012) 
 
5.3.5 In particular, for the RIMS, the risk discussion is capital risk, financial 
risk – far beyond the technical and cyber risks the InfoSec sector 
discusses.  Much of the risk discussion takes place at crossed 
purposes and greater skills are required to join these various 
disciplines together for the greater good of the organisations being 
served.  Within the narrow sector of InfoSec, there is a continued lack 
of effectiveness at both understanding and capturing information risk.  
5.3.6 Internal Audit provides an opinion on the veracity of the management 
assurance.  To restate, Internal Audit does not provide the actual 
assurance – it provides an opinion.   By providing an independent, 
second opinion, the Board is provided with a greater level of 
assurance as to risk management and performance.  Governance 
provides Board level reassurance.  These are subtle differences for 
which day-to-day operational management has had little cognizance 
of.  Internal Audit looks at GRC as representing Governance, Risk 
Management (RM) and Internal Control (IC), (IIA, 2011).  Figure 37 
below represents the scope of Internal Audit review: 
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Figure 37:  The Internal Audit review, Source: Taylor Baines (2013)  
 
5.3.7 The COSO model provided the following pictorial representation of the 
scope of IA functions in Figure 38 below: 
 
Figure 38:  Internal Audit’s Role in ERM, Source: IIA (2004, p.4) 
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5.3.8 Under the executive scope of Internal Audit, there are several 
disciplines that need to be conjoined in order to address the IoT, also 
referred to as the Internet of Everything (IoE). These have been 
depicted below in Figure 39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39:  Disciplines to be Brought Together 
 
5.3.9 Within the IT industry, GRC has been largely seen as a label for yet 
more technology or services consultants provide.  The researcher 
contends that it needs to grow beyond the technology market rhetoric 
and focus.  Technology plays a part, as evidence is required: i) to 
provide the assurance of achieving compliance to standards, 
regulation and legislation; ii) to show risk assessments having taken 
place and that controls are being implemented to effectively reduce 
identified risk; and iii) to show the breadth of governance an 
organisation has in place.  KPMG (2010) encapsulated the breadth of 
GRC scope in the Holistic Model represented in Figure 40 below: 
Information 
Governance 
Information Security 
Privacy 
Data Protection 
Information & 
Records 
Management 
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Figure 40:  GRC Guiding Principles Holistic Model, Source: KPMG (2010) 
 
5.3.10 The four components of Strategy, Values, Business Model and Value 
Drivers need to work effectively together in order to achieve 
compliance and evidence continuously improving performance.  The 
ultimate goal for any organisation is resilience: the ability to deal with 
(or flex against) ongoing change, be it internally or externally driven, 
however seen or unforeseen the circumstances.  This requires a well-
formed governance structure and broad interpretation of assurance 
activities, for which IA is a constituent active part. 
5.3.11 There is also the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) - - covering ERM, since 2004.  There 
is clear evidence of the intentions to absorb the internal controls 
framework into the risk management framework to provide an 
integrated business operational management framework, as depicted 
in Figure 41 below. 
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Figure 41:  COSO IC to COSO ERM, Source: IIA (2010) and IMA (2014) 
 
5.3.12 Depicted in Figure 42 is the COSO anticipated future goal state of 
ERM.  The implementation gap between this anticipated future state 
and the present reality remains great, as a result of the ongoing 
separate operational teams present in most organisations. 
 
Figure 42:  COSO ERM Model of Future Goal State, Source: COSO (2006, p.10) 
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5.3.13 Any initiative to implement a GRC programme in an organisation 
needs to be led by the executive; it needs senior level sponsorship in 
order to be effective.  The same is true of any large change 
management programme.  Once effectively implemented, the volume 
of available data can be significant, requiring aggregation and analysis 
in order to be appropriately mined and reported.  This may imply new 
skills being necessary within existing teams.  Historically, too many 
management reports are provided from raw spreadsheet data, none of 
which provides context or meaningful interpretation with regard to the 
actual level of risk being experienced and for which prioritisation of 
treatment is required, be it acceptance, transfer or reduction. 
5.3.14 Business research shows that people like their jobs; their silos; and 
their spreadsheets; which leads to an insufficient outrage about what 
is not known (Mefford, 2014).  However, in the corporate environment, 
21st century management operates on the basis of the brevity of 
reporting (usually expressed on three slides, with only a few bullet 
points), often removing the sense and explanation of detail behind 
required decision making.  This requires analysis skills in order to distil 
in-depth written reports. 
5.3.15 Spreadsheets are simple to create, but complex to manipulate and 
manage.  Many organisations are managing legacy systems and these 
are an important part of the infrastructure.  The transition and 
transformation from their usage to the adoption of “as a service” 
vendor software offerings creates gaps where history has not been 
captured in terms of knowledge of the working of those systems.  In 
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order to automate governance across the life cycle of information 
systems available, commitment in understanding of the impact of 
attrition of resources and intelligence occurring through both planned 
and natural wastage is required.  This creates risks that must be fed 
into the GRC system to be managed ongoing. 
5.3.16 In CS2, the researcher directly experienced both duplicative teams 
and redundant technology being accepted by a business going 
through continual transformation and people reduction.  Management 
requires new skills to be more discernible with regard to the quality of 
the reporting it is receiving; requiring intelligence to be able to 
appropriately interpret the data for best results . 
5.3.17 Any organisation must be able to evidence compliance with policy, 
with certifications; or mandated through legislation or regulation; and 
with best practice, if contractually obliged to do so.  The results of 
compliance activities need to be included in strategy setting and 
formulation of initiatives, rather than always being in the position of 
providing reporting ex post facto. 
5.3.18 The Board requires independent assurance that these activities are 
operating effectively, usually the purview of Internal Audit.  However, 
compliance evidence is not the total aim.  An organisation must be 
undertaking the activities for which the compliance evidence is the 
output.  Achieving and delivering security – the act of ensuring the 
impenetrability of networks, of infrastructure and of information – is the 
ongoing endeavour.  Risk activities should not be happening 
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independently of Compliance efforts; Governance needs to ensure 
that these are effectively drawn together. 
5.3.19 Using a GRC framework approach helps to elevate InfoSec 
management through IA through to IG, with leadership level 
discussions due to the specifically targeted use of non-technical 
speech acts.  The organisation needs to share information and have 
shared goals in order for it to be successful.  The UK National Health 
Service (NHS) Information Governance toolkit had already elevated 
the dialogue by enveloping the activity under a governance umbrella.  
5.3.20 All forms of risk and performance management need to be integrated, 
with budget, strategy and compliance.  Functions, processes, and 
systems fragmentation needs to be reduced or removed in order to 
eliminate inhibiting performance.  Quality, reliable, timely, current, 
useful and readily accessible information must exist and be able to be 
shared – and heard – in order for the organisation to effectively 
monitor and address the sensors available.  Intelligent risk taking is as 
important as the management and reduction of them, within the 
context and boundaries of known compliance requirements with 
legislation, regulation, industry standards and societal expectations. 
5.4 Ontology of IG 
5.4.1 According to Gartner, IG is defined as: 
“the specification of decision rights and an accountability 
framework to encourage desirable behaviour in the valuation, 
creation, storage, use, archival and deletion of information.  It 
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includes the processes, roles, standards and metrics that ensure 
the effective and efficient use of information in enabling an 
organisation to achieve its goals” (Gartner, 2010). 
5.4.2 As identified by AIIM, “The term “IG” itself is charged with many 
meanings, largely dependent on the role of those hearing the term” 
(AIIM, 2014, p.2).  Combining these available definitions, it can be 
interpreted that IG is intended to be a holistic approach to managing 
corporate information by implementing processes, roles, controls and 
metrics that treat information as a valuable business asset.  Whilst IG 
is not wholly synonymous with corporate governance it can be 
considered more akin to “GRC for information”.  However, an IG 
specialist will not necessarily, by default, hold a depth of 
understanding of InfoSec.  Nonetheless, taking this as a starting point 
makes it easier to progress from the currently insular and parochial, 
geographically bound IA approaches seen to date. 
5.4.3 The IG Initiative (2014a) provided a different definition: “the activities 
and technologies that organizations employ to maximize the value of 
their information while minimizing associated risks and costs”.  IG 
Initiative research (2014b, p.29) identified a Responsible, 
Accountable, Consulted and Informed (RACI) matrix for IG programme 
roles, as shown in Figure 43 below: 
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Figure 43:  IG RACI Matrix, Source: IG Initiative (2014b, p.29) 
 
5.4.4 The same IG Initiative research (2014b) identified the breadth of IG 
scope as outlined in the wheel in Figure 44 below: 
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Figure 44:  Facets of IG, Source: IG Initiative (2014c)  
 
5.4.5 An IG Reference Model has been in existence, shown in Figure 45, 
since 2012.  By the rhetoric used, the focus is Information and 
Records Management (another IRM) at its core but does not require 
much interpretation to extend it to incorporate IA. 
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Figure 45:  IG Reference Model © v3.0, Source: EDRM (2012)  
 
5.4.6 Bringing together the activities of operations (doing), management 
(controlling) and the environment (information and the supporting 
technology) requires a level of sustainability that is challenging given 
the lack of time available for appropriate reflection when faced with 
continual organisational and societal momentum.  This reality was 
borne out in the work of DeMarco and Lister (2013). 
5.4.7 The representation of the maturity steps from InfoSec to IA to IG were 
previously presented in Figure 24 (page 98).  This is where i3GRC™ 
enters, aiming to draw together the themes and models referenced in 
this chapter, from the top down, seeking to remove issues of 
interpretation, diffusion and confusion.  The leadership and 
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commitment of management towards openness, honesty, integrity and 
ethical behaviour is important in change management and 
transformation programmes.  Expectations with regard to employee 
behaviour when using digital devices has been discussed by many 
and the ongoing need to address this continues (McIlwraith, 2006). 
5.4.8 IG has historically focussed on the governance of records.  Most IG 
processes still reflect old approaches for managing physical records or 
documents, which in prior years formed the basis for managing a 
business.  With the digital transformation of businesses and the 
ongoing increase in storage usage and as the price to procure media 
lowers, many organisations are left sorting the “wheat from the chaff”, 
reducing “electronic fluff” in favour of identifying the transcendent from 
the trivial.  IG contains a strong element of striking a balance between 
risk, cost and value in the creation and storage of information.  The 
elements of risk management are common in theme with IA, where 
risk mitigation is part of the activity wheel. 
5.4.9 IG in the UK NHS (as per the aforementioned toolkit) includes: i) IG 
Management; ii) Confidentiality and Data Protection Assurance; iii) 
InfoSec Assurance; iv) Clinical IA; v) Secondary Use Assurance; and 
vi) Corporate IA.  Again, note the combination of terminology above.  
There are a number of areas for assurance and a number of 
mechanisms to measure the success of the implementation.  IG in the 
NHS was subject to a review that investigated “the structures, policies 
and practices of the Department of Health, the NHS and its suppliers 
to ensure the confidentiality and security of all records, and especially 
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patient records, and to enable the ethical use of them for the benefit of 
individual patients and the public good” (Cayton, 2006).  This should 
have been happening across the whole of the public sector, rather 
than having the health sector operating independently, particularly 
given the continuing requirements for greater information sharing.  As 
Pugh stated: “obligation and value must be determined by business 
people making systematic, informed decisions – the “governance” in 
“IG” (Pugh, 2011). 
5.4.10 IG needs a champion in the C-suite, but it is not clear whether existing 
CIOs will transform into being CDOs or Chief Information Governance 
Officers (CIGOs), or whether new positions need to be created either 
as peers of the CIO or reporting to them.  However, there is a risk that 
the boardroom cannot manage multiple Chiefs trying to be heard, 
which diminishes the effectiveness of the intended results. 
5.5 Contextual Analysis 
5.5.1 More complexity in the system hierarchy is leading to more human 
error and weaker system security, as well as a reduction in intellectual 
capital.  These are intrinsic problems of the information age.  As a 
triangulation of industry, research and theory is always required, at 
present, industry needs to catch up.  However, due to the lack of 
reflection time, there is evidence of repeated patterns of erroneous 
behaviour.  Coles-Kemp (2008) identified the blurred boundaries when 
reviewing InfoSec management system (ISMS) implementation 
against the Beers Viable System model. 
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5.5.2 Organisations have become so large and cumbersome with the 
volume of roles, disciplines and teams involved that it can take too 
long for tier 5 (usually CEO level) to hear what tier 1 (operational 
administration) have been telling tier 2 (management support) and by 
the time it reaches tier 3 (management) the information has been 
diluted beyond what tier 1 told them.  The researcher suspects this will 
be found to be at the core of what happened in the case of 
Volkswagen in 2015.  The reality should not be of surprise, given that 
others have written about it: 
One of the faults with current governance and management 
practice is that it is fuelled by the notion that the higher up you 
are in an organisation, the less you need to know about 
operational detail.  And yet, when we look at some of the recent 
security failures of European organisations, the source of the 
errors has been at the coal-face in the operational detail. (Holt, 
2013, p.37) 
5.5.3 This view had also been identified in Jones (2010): 
... senior management didn’t want to hear bad news – but that 
attitude is changing over the past 10 years and they now want to 
know everything.  The next level down don’t want to pass the bad 
news up to management.  If there’s a culture where people are 
trained across all disciplines and they understand each other’s 
issues and the way the company works – then they don’t get 
stove piped. 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
196 | P a g e  
5.5.4 Historical analysis identified that this aspect of management 
awareness – or lack thereof – was prevalent as far back as 1969 (SC 
Magazine, 2011, pp.26-30).  Management were unaware of the risks 
undertaken in their name.  This can be seen in organisations where 
(underneath the systems jargon) there is often a lack of a common 
agreement between departments even on what risk means to each 
party. 
5.5.5 By way of direct example, in January 2015 two tier 5 executives in the 
private sector case study [CS2], made the following proclamations to 
an internal employee meeting: “We do security like nobody else on the 
planet" and “There is unlimited resource available for security issues 
to be addressed”.  These two statements were in complete contrast to 
what (management) tiers 3 and 2 knew to be the reality – a lack of 
financial wherewithal to fund required improvements; continued 
attrition of key staff; notable penetration test findings; audit findings – 
both internal and external – all grave in nature and rendering the 
company out of compliance with contractual obligations, failing in its 
fiduciary responsibilities to adhere to specific legislative and regulatory 
constructs at the time.  This was an example of the disjoint between 
the message tier 5 receives from tier 4 and the ability to repackage it 
from tier 3 to tier 4 (Hotten, 2015). 
5.5.6 Most IT frameworks described as addressing governance are, in fact, 
addressing management.  Whilst the COBIT framework from ISACA – 
formerly the IS Audit and Control Association – is intended to provide 
a common language for business executives to communicate with 
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each other – the subject area of focus is IT-related goals, objectives 
and results (ISACA, 2010b).  The challenge this presents is an 
assumption that these are somehow different or separate from 
business goals, objectives and results.  Iterative changes in versions 
of COBIT have sought to address the gaps in the prevailing dominant 
narrative, but if the starting point is IT and implementation is effectively 
bottom-up, then this will lack top-down direction and support.  Shanes 
(2011, pp.46-52) reviewed the IAMM and supporting Assurance 
maturity framework.  As a model, there is an implicit distinction 
between governance and management embedded within the task 
areas.  However, the researcher would contend that the framework 
language presents another example of confusion, endemic in the 
industry, given that IRM is an intrinsic activity in the achievement of IA 
and should, by implication, not be being accounted for separately. 
5.5.7 Figure 46 below shows it is possible to plot current status against 
denoted maturity levels. 
 
Figure 46:  IAMM Self-Assessment Guide, Source: UK CESG (2013, p.9) 
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5.5.8 Maturity models usually use numeric scales.  This model differs, using 
a “traffic light” model. The Red/Amber/Green status is defined within 
the framework as below: 
 RED – There are crucial deficiencies against the performance 
required at this level.  Major elements of the business IRM and IA 
processes have yet to be addressed. 
 RED/AMBER – There are major deficiencies against the 
performance required at this level. Major elements of the 
business IRM and IA processes are not being addressed, and 
there are no credible plans to address the situation. 
 AMBER – There are noticeable deficiencies against the 
performance required at this level.  Some elements of the 
business IRM and IA processes are not being addressed, or 
whatever plans exist they have not been formally endorsed by 
the business. 
 GREEN / AMBER – There are only minor deficiencies against 
the Business IRM and IA processes required at this level. 
Credible progress is being made against plans endorsed by the 
business. 
 GREEN – There are negligible deficiencies against the 
performance required at this level.  Business IRM and IA 
processes are fully met. 
5.5.9 Archer RSA (2015), the globally renowned market leaders in GRC 
software, proposed a maturity model, depicted in Figure 47 below, 
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which acknowledged the challenges of separate domains and 
provided a trajectory for comparison: 
 
Figure 47:  RSA Archer Maturity Model, Source: Schlarman (2015)  
 
5.5.10 In implementation terms, basic security maturity has not yet been 
achieved by many organisations, rather it is compliance that has been 
achieved.  The Compliance function is not always welcome at the 
boardroom table though the relabeled cybersecurity function is finding 
itself requested more often to provide leadership assurance as to the 
maturity of implementation of existing controls. 
5.5.11 Management deals with compliance the same way a patient does on 
receiving bad news, creating delay and rationalisations (Deloitte 
University Press, 2015).  Management sees security in a more vague 
fashion – it is too abstract.  Day to day, a CISO could be measured on 
the basis of nothing going wrong, the organisation not experiencing a 
breach and not being in the newspapers / online media.  For some 
types of management, this creates the response to reduce budget 
rather than acknowledge that the current levels of spend are working.   
Management, in whatever form, is used to being rewarded for creating 
value, profit, or whatever they are creating. 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
200 | P a g e  
5.5.12 Compliance, security, and safety portend costs, and costs are to be 
avoided, minimized, and controlled.  Other combinations of words 
currently in the industry include data safety within the Cybersecurity 
space and safety critical systems.  The latter should be obvious given 
that industry is already seeing a need for greater alignment between 
security and safety constructs, particularly with the ongoing 
progression of driver-less cars and the Internet of Things (IoT). 
5.5.13 The following formal definitions for security and safety provide a 
reminder of context: Safety is the state of being “safe”; the condition of 
being protected against the consequences of failure, damage, error, 
accidents, harm or any other event which could be considered non-
desirable; and Security is the degree of resistance to, or protection 
from, harm.  It applies to any vulnerable and valuable assets, such as 
a person, dwelling community, nation or organisation. 
5.5.14 Associating security with safety can make for fleeting justifications.  
The challenge for those involved is to argue, and prove definitively, 
that the money spent to stop something from happening achieved that 
end.  However, we have seen through the available regular and 
annualized breach reporting (Verizon, Ponemon, etc.) that we are 
facing talented adversaries.  They have become necessary industry-
led proof – with increasing regularity – that there are consequences for 
insufficient attention being paid to addressing risk reduction. 
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5.5.15 Lower security spend rates usually translate into issues with culture, 
lack of appropriate risk management, lack of governance and usually 
stem from an organisation that has failed to integrate security into 
business strategy and objectives.  This reality arises when large 
organisations end up with multiple individual systems managed by 
dozens of autonomous development teams that are rewarded for 
speed and functionality, and who lack discipline about security.  This 
gap between software development and security was most recently, 
publicly, made clear in the headlines with the security exposure in the 
Apple applications store (Guardian, 2015). 
5.5.16 Further complexity exists in the number of external relationships being 
managed in order to deliver integrated services.  A lower security 
spend rate can be argued as appropriate if there is evidence of a 
reduction in risk factors.  However, without evidence of standardized 
security coding practices, secure code re-use (cutting down on 
security review costs, and even development costs); a forum in which 
to share best practices (because unfortunately employees are not paid 
to sit in collaborative meetings) then security reference architecture 
Large, global travel company does not have anyone on staff that 
understands how to do a Risk Assessment per NIST SP 800-30, 
Rev 1 or ISO 27005, as identified in the new PCI V3.0 standard.  
They run $500,000 in revenue every 60 seconds, on average, but 
they cannot run a standardized risk assessment. 
When you don’t have the capacity to determine or quantify either 
safety, or security, you cannot claim that you are truly managing 
anything in particular.  Where does that leave you?  With 
Compliance, because there is a formula and process to measure 
that (even though clearly that is then subject to question as 
Compliance does not equal Security). 
(Anecdote provided by respondent 35F, email correspondence, February 2015 
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methodologies are usually missing that would assist in achieving 
organisation “better - cheaper - faster”.  Security architecture has the 
potential to deliver that trifecta, at the foundational level of any GRC 
framework.  As Parker (2015) expressed it: “Good security is when 
nothing very bad happens.  And when nothing very bad happens, who 
needs security?  Security seeks a “natural” lowest level.  Periodic 
revitalization is necessary”. 
5.5.17 Technical assessments are seen as an overhead and are therefore 
removed to aid cost savings, resulting in systems builds lacking best 
or common practice and collaborative risk increasing.  This is leading 
to normalizing the deviance (Dekker, 2011, p.198).  The anecdote 
below helps to frame what continues to be the wicked problem at the 
core of this research. 
5.5.18 Responding to breaches does not drive long term or cultural change, 
rather it drives reactive responses and too many security leaders take 
advantage of them to buy the latest technology or demand staff 
increases.  Too many business leaders are happy to throw a little 
money at security because it looks like they are taking action and, in 
so doing, it gets the problem off their agenda.  For context, most 
research timelines show that it takes thirty years to change a societal 
attitude - smoking, drink driving, obesity.  Attitudes to security and 
privacy will continue to take time to percolate through to the fabric of 
society and for expectations to change, although the factors of the 
information age skew the timelines.  It took thirty-eight years for radio 
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to thrive; fifteen years for television to become popular; and only four 
years for the internet to flourish. 
5.5.19 Given the increasing interconnectivity and the global operations of 
many organisations, the researcher looked far beyond the immediate 
subject of IA.  The World Economic Forum (WEF) Cyber Risk 
Framework, represented in Figure 48 below, captures much of the 
scale of thinking required. 
 
 
Figure 48:  Cyber Risk Framework, Source: World Economic Forum (2012, p.13) 
 
5.5.20 The CERT diagram, presented in Figure 49 below, shows the 
relationships that drive resilience activities at the Enterprise level – 
and is a Management Model. 
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Figure 49:  CERT® Resilience Management Model, Source: CERT (2010)  
 
5.5.21 There is no explicit mention of IA or of IG, though what must flow 
throughout the model must be information, information that requires 
protecting end to end. 
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5.6 Theories of Professionalism 
5.6.1 Professionalism indicates expertise in an area, reflecting extensive 
knowledge, mastery, skill or relevant qualification(s).  Professionalism 
is accepted as being a consensus of norms, a collective commonality 
of approach to and execution of key roles, responsibilities, and 
activities that constitute the work undertaken by a profession.  It is 
generally seen as the identification and expression of what is required 
and expected of members of a profession.  Attributes of 
professionalism include: specialized knowledge; competency; honesty 
and integrity; respect; accountability; self-regulation; and image. 
5.6.2 Brock (2006) provided a history of the past challenges of defining 
professionalism and identified relevant theories.  Distinctions can be 
drawn between ‘being a professional’ which includes issues of status, 
reward, public recognition, and ‘behaving professionally’ which implies 
dedication, standards of behaviour and a strong service ethic (Helsby, 
1996, p.138).  Evetts (2003, p.558) suggested that being professional 
is not one, but a cluster of related concepts, in her examination of the 
changing nature of professionalism discourse. 
5.6.3 Professionalism is demonstrated by competence; personal integrity; 
responsibility; accountability and public duty.  One of the outstanding 
phrases heard during the Brexit vote in the UK in 2016 was when 
Michael Gove stated that “people in this country have had enough of 
experts” (Financial Times, 2016).  This encapsulated a global 
experience labelled anti-intellectualism (Williams, 2014), following the 
rise of experts and indispensable roles, such as doctors, lawyers, 
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contractors, and stockbrokers.  However, experts are human – and 
humans respond to incentives and so too many scandals were 
reducing faith (Koenig, 2012).  Professionals have expertise, a 
prerequisite to socio-political influence, and (almost always) built-in 
networks of professional colleagues and clients (Spada, 2009). 
5.6.4 In a UK parliamentary debate in 1992, Lord Benson defined nine 
obligations (principles) as to what constitutes a profession for the 
greater public good, represented in Table 11 below. 
# Obligation Description 
1 The profession must be controlled by a governing body which in professional 
matters directs the behaviour of its members. For their part, the members have 
a responsibility to subordinate their selfish private interests in favour of support 
for the governing body. 
2 the governing body must set adequate standards of education as a condition 
of entry and thereafter ensure that students obtain an acceptable standard of 
professional competence. Training and education do not stop at qualification. 
They must continue throughout the member's professional life.  
3 The governing body must set the ethical rules and professional standards 
which are to be observed by the members. They should be higher than those 
established by the general law.  
4 The rules and standards enforced by the governing body should be designed 
for the benefit of the public and not for the private advantage of the members.  
5 The governing body must take disciplinary action including, i f necessary, 
expulsion from membership, should the rules and standards it lays down not 
be observed or should a member be guilty of bad professional work.  
6 Work is often reserved to a profession by statute - not because it was for the 
advantage of the members but because, for the protection of the public, it 
should be carried out only by persons with the requisite training, standards, 
and disciplines. 
7 The governing body must satisfy itself that there is fair and open competition in 
the practice of the profession so that the public are not at risk of being 
exploited. It follows that members in practice must give information to the 
public about their experience, competence, capacity to do the work and the 
fees payable. 
8 The members of the profession, whether in practice or in employment, must be 
independent in thought and outlook. They must be willing to speak their minds 
without fear or favour. They must not allow themselves to be put under the 
control or dominance of any person or organisation which could impair that 
independence.  
9 In its specific field of learning, a profession must give leadership to the public it 
serves. 
Table 11:  Lord Benson's Professionalism Obligations 
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5.6.5 Professional bodies are structured to protect their reputations and the 
public interest simultaneously.  They have a key role to play in the 
political consultation process.  They also provide an important 
counterweight to centralised government administration through their 
systems of self-regulation (Spada, 2009).  Shifts in professional 
regulatory structures took place within the broader context of a general 
political shift from interventionist to regulatory modes of governance 
within the European Union (op.cit.).  In the UK, CESG responded to 
these changes by addressing nine attributes of Professionalism within 
the agenda for professionalising IA: i) Code of Ethics; ii) 
Competencies; iii) (Common) Body of Knowledge and Skills; iv) 
Knowledgebase; v) Register – record of all professionals vi) Practices 
and Principle; vii) Credibility; viii) Critical Mass and ix) Chartered 
status. 
5.6.6 Other models exist, covering different attributes – for example, Brock 
(2006) identified seven dimensions of professionalism: i) Knowledge 
Specialist knowledge, unique expertise, experience; ii) Education and 
training Higher education, qualification, practical experience, obligation 
to engage in Continuous Professional Development (CPD); iii) Skills 
Competence and efficacy, task complexity, communication, judgment; 
iv) Autonomy Entry requirement, self-regulation and standards, voice 
in public policy, discretionary judgment; v) Values Ideology, altruism, 
dedication, service to clients; vi) Ethics Codes of conduct, moral 
integrity, confidentiality, trustworthiness, responsibility; and vii) Reward 
Influence, social status, power, vocation. 
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5.6.7 Bott (2005, p.16) was clear that the creation of a professional body 
was only the starting point.  A level of regulation of members claiming 
relevance of professional ski lls was necessary to maintain trust.  
“The increasing rate at which new knowledge was becoming 
available and existing knowledge was being used in new ways 
led, in the 1970s, to increasing concern that professionals 
should keep their qualifications up to date and this process 
became known as continuing professional development (CPD). 
It can be defined as the systematic maintenance and 
improvement of professional knowledge and skills throughout 
an individual’s professional working life.” 
5.6.8 Evans (2008) designed frameworks on the basis of the concepts of 
attitudinal and functional development.  Attitudinal development is 
personal; functional development is organisational, attained by 
imposition.  In discussing the “human factors” of IA, attitudinal change 
is often referred to as being required.  This is different again to 
attitudinal development. 
5.6.9 Combining these professionalism attributes, the expected structure of 
a profession has been mapped against the existing, overlapping, 
competing membership bodies in Table 12 below.  Absent from the 
table are groups like APMG, ISF and IET.  The former is an 
accreditation body, not a membership body; ISF is a corporate 
knowledge transfer body and the latter is an engineering body. 
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Aspect ASIS BCS ISACA (ISC)² IISP ISSA 
Founded 1955 1957 1969 1988 2005 1984 
Full-time occupation 
identif ied (critical mass 
of workers performing 
similar w ork / community 
of practitioners) 
25,000 80,000 IT 
Professionals, 
of which 4508 
belong to the 
Information 
Sec Specialist 
Group (ISSG) 
140,000 125,000 - 
23,000 in 
EMEA and 
over 5,000 
in the UK 
2600 13,000 
Chapters, regionalised 
events 
234 
worldw ide 
Over 40 local 
branches and 
50 specialist 
groups 
Over 200 
chapters 
worldw ide 
140 
chapters; 34 
in EMEA, 6 
in the UK 
and Ireland 
Local 
events in 
London, 
Manchester 
and 
Cheltenham 
Over 135 
chapters 
worldw ide 
Journals, magazines Security 
Management 
IT Now ISACA 
Journal 
InfoSecurity 
Professional 
magazine 
Pulse 
magazine 
ISSA 
Journal 
Training or educational 
programmes provided  
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
CBK/BOK Yes Yes, SFIA Yes Yes Yes, Skills 
Framework 
Yes 
Entry requirements and 
validation process, 
competencies assessed 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Code of ethics 
established (internal and 
external) 
Yes, since 
1957 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Code of Conduct  Yes     
Communications 
network 
   Yes LinkedIn LinkedIn 
Practices and Principles   CoBiT 
RiskIT 
BMIS 
   
Tradition, w illingness to 
act for the common 
good, recognition of 
public responsibility 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Register – record of all 
professionals 
Member 
directory 
CLAS 
Member 
directory 
Member 
directory 
Member 
directory 
CLAS 
Member 
directory 
Member 
directory 
Support of law provided 
(professional lobbies for 
legislation, legal 
protection and legal 
recognition) 
      
Credibility Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chartered Status Yes, 
Security 
Institute – 
CsyP 
Yes, CITP   Intending to 
achieve this 
 
Table 12:  Elements of Professionalism - Spread of Duplication (figures accurate at October 2017) 
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5.6.10 In the researcher’s opinion, it would be beneficial for both practitioners 
and all employers, if ISACA and (ISC)2 moved beyond promoting their 
individual certifications towards jointly raising the profile and value of 
both IT audit and information security professions.  An IA practitioner 
(or their employer) in the industry could (and often does) end up 
paying fees for all of these bodies. 
5.6.11 Credibility is an important attribute expected of a profession, needing 
to be incorporated into the soft side of social science and which is 
distinct from the technical aspects of IA (Kelly, 2010).  There is no 
evidence that the groups and their membership lack credibility.  
However, this is a subjective quality.  Whilst an individual can claim it 
of themselves, it can be difficult to quantify whether others recognize it 
of the profession itself, in spite of their individual professional 
identities.  However, the researcher has witnessed a consistent lack of 
credibility on a daily basis but because it is contained within the 
profession and within organisations, it is not visible to a wider 
audience and is therefore not acknowledged. 
5.6.12 There are several types of professional knowledge (Watzlawick, 1978, 
p.26): i) Propositional – knowledge of content concerns the 
underlying theoretical basis of practice; ii) Process – the processes in 
which professionals engage whilst practising; iii) Personal – 
knowledge about self; and iv) Value-based – moral and ethical values 
and the beliefs one holds.  The gap identified by this research is 
propositional knowledge. 
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5.6.13 Bott (2005, p.18) discussed the concept of “reservation of title”, for 
professionals in areas considered to be in the public interest.  Under 
the Architects Act 1997, it is a criminal offence to call yourself an 
architect unless you are registered with the Architects Registration 
Board.  This sanction aspect is tied to “reservation of function”, a 
restriction by law, to people with appropriate qualifications or to 
members of particular specified professional bodies.  For example, 
only members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales or Association of Certified Accountants are allowed to audit 
the accounts of public companies.  Nonetheless, anyone can call 
themselves an accountant, so both reservations are not always tied 
together.  The mechanisms required to address this professional 
regulation do not exist in an IA context. 
5.6.14 Veterinary surgery is an example of both.  Under the Veterinary 
Surgeons Act 1966, you are not allowed to call yourself a veterinary 
surgeon unless you are registered with the Royal College of Veterinary 
Surgeons (RCVS).  In order to be registered, you must have proper 
qualifications.  In the US, title and function are controlled by means of 
registers maintained by State government.  There is a blend of 
approaches and sanctions in UK professions. 
5.6.15 Endicoytt-Popuvsky (2003, p.66) discussed sanction challenges from 
the US perspective: 
So far no IA educator has been held legally liable in court. ... 
Having an ethics course in an IA curriculum is good legal 
insurance against any liability claims.  If societal concerns 
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don’t motivate educators we should be motivated by the need 
to be legally protected in case problems arise from students 
misusing what we teach them. 
5.6.16 Other industry sectors ensure that malpractice is punished.  Nurses 
can be prosecuted for claiming to be a nurse and giving nursing 
advice or care if they are not on the Nursing and Midwifery Council 
(NMC) register.  The NMC act as arbiters of the Conduct and 
Capability hearings for misbehaving nurses and ensure pin removal 
and the removal of the right to practice nursing in the future . 
5.6.17 Research has shown that businesses are consistently asking that their 
needs be met in a timely manner even though they typically provide 
imprecise statements of their needs (Miller, 2013).  In response, the IT 
community has developed the concept of the “requirements 
specification” that sets out the precision needed by the enterprise 
architect, software engineers, and others.  An agreed-upon 
requirements specification is therefore frequently the starting point for 
many IT transformation programmes, and service-level agreements 
that encapsulate how the finished solution is to be delivered 
operationally.  These documents are mostly created by an IT service 
provider who might also deliver the product and judge the outcome.  
However, incomplete or incorrect requirements specifications are 
commonplace (Miller, 2015). 
5.6.18 This assumes the existence of either project or programme 
management teams.  However, security teams lack these resources 
because the area is often underfunded, under resourced and 
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unsupported, despite running large, transformational projects which 
should have had an analysis of business requirements undertaken in 
order to ensure the expected benefits that should be realised. 
5.6.19 The competency of understanding of contractual language and 
contract management needs to be added to the new competency 
framework developed by the work of Valentine (2015).  Given the 
maxim “the contract is king”, an IA practitioner needs to be able to 
review supplier/contractor/customer relationships and to engage with 
Procurement personnel.  From the outset, a contract must be 
constructed on the basis of what is required within the bounds of the 
legislative, regulatory and industry standards relevant to the 
organisation and their sphere of geographic operations. 
5.6.20 Commercial pressures continue to override the ability to embed IA into 
system design.  It continues to be expensive to implement technical 
security measures to protect information assets adequately.  If these 
are not in place, then systems are vulnerable and weaknesses are 
prone to exploitation by unknown threat actors.  A lack of security may 
be evident in the event of a breach.  There is often a visible financial 
impact, be it stock price, share price or profit margin.  Post breach 
reparation is required, including managing brand damage. 
Organisations must remove any conflict between job performance and 
security constraints by making security a part of workers’ job 
performance, in order to best achieve IA. 
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5.7 IA Professionalisation 
5.7.1 The term “IA Professionalism” was embedded within the NIAS and is 
also reflected in the National School of Government programme Risk 
Management and Accreditation Specialist Programme, IA 
Professionalism Stage 3 for accreditors.  [Note: – neither document 
was available online in 2015.  The NIAS was superseded by the 
National Cyber Security Strategy.]  An extract from the NIAS expected 
work programme is represented in Figure 50 below: 
 
Figure 50:  Delivering the IA Strategy, CSIA, Source: UK Cabinet Office (2007c)  
 
5.7.2 The description in the supporting Action Plan below addressed a 
number of the themes identified so far, including that of the need for 
finance level understanding: 
Practitioners of IRM and the associated IA-related roles should 
be skilled to a level commensurate with their counterparts 
dealing with financial and other high impact risks.  Clear 
competencies and career paths for IA-related roles across the 
Public Sector will be defined and linked where possible to 
existing qualifications and schemes, including ITPC, the 
Government IT Profession and the IISP (UK Cabinet Office, 
2007c). 
Current Situation Work Required Future State
Lack of professional skills hampers 
application of IA
Develop IA competencies in line with 
existing Government professionalism 
initiatives
Depts will have framework for IA 
career paths, competency  
structures and training
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5.7.3 The visualisation of the UK IA landscape represented as a continuous 
feedback loop, shown in Figure 51, includes the first reference to 
professionalisation as part of the requirements for progression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51:  The UK IA Landscape, Source: UK CESG (2010h) 
 
5.7.4 Research identified the required skills to fill the perceived gaps (Virgo, 
2014), including the provision of greater education and training across 
a wider audience, as depicted in Figure 52 below. 
 
National 
Security
CNI
Wider
Public Sector Public &
UK Economy
Governance
Policy and 
Culture
Counter-
Measures
Audit & 
Response
Awareness &
Information Sharing
Training &
Professionalisation
Risk Analysis &
Management
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Figure 52:  Pathway to IA Professionalisation, Source: Ensor (2011) 
 
5.7.5 Coleman (2005a) identified a CBK, a skills framework for IA and the 
result ultimately was the formation of the Institute of Information 
Security Professionals (IISP) in 2005.  The IISP was formed in 2005, 
with UK Government support.  The researcher was a director of the 
IISP from 2011 to 2017 and is a member of the Accreditation Panel.  
There is evidence regularly appearing in IISP submission forms 
showing a lack of understanding as to the contextual meaning of 
Governance.  However, equally, there is evidence of improvements in 
overall IA understanding. 
5.7.6 Ensor (2011) followed this up by defining a profession as an 
occupation requiring extensive education or specialized training.  A 
profession has cultural norms and cultural traditions etc.  IA also has 
these but it is not clear that they are laudable.  IA requires the right 
people with the right skills to protect and manage information.  As with 
any sector, unprofessional decision makers are a risk.  However, there 
are those who are motivated by a perceived morality in the profession, 
battling right and wrong, using technical skills to protect valuable 
business assets (ISACA, 2010b).  Unprofessional decision makers are 
a risk.  By implication, the right people with the right skills to protect 
and manage information will be adequately and appropriately trained. 
5.7.7 In 2010, the ISF, (ISC)² and ISACA joined forces to create “The 12 
principles of InfoSec” (Condon, 2010).  However, these are no longer 
available online.  Notwithstanding, in the researcher’s opinion 
consolidation between the identified groups is long overdue.  eSkills 
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(formed in 2003) worked with these groups to bring harmony across 
the various frameworks, particularly given the role of CESG in seeking 
to standardise and professionalise IA (in 2015, e-skills was taken over 
by The Tech Partnership).  The task is exacerbated by the volume of 
participants in the space. 
5.7.8 In the UK, an IA Skills Framework exists, as represented in Figure 53. 
 
Figure 53:  UK Government IA Framework, Source: Richardson (2012, p.211) 
 
5.7.9 This framework is supported by the CESG Certified Professional 
accreditation scheme managed by three professional bodies on their 
behalf: the IISP with eSkills, the BCS and the APM Group Ltd 
(APMG).  This is underpinned by the existing BoK contained within the 
BCS Skills for the Information Age (SFIA) framework and the IISP 
Skills Framework.  However, a certification scheme does not ergo 
achieve professionalism and cannot be described as a professional 
route map for the IA industry. 
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5.7.10 As the UK CESG IA professionalisation agenda pitted three separate 
membership bodies against each other – APMG, BCS and IISP - this 
has diluted the potential impact of creating a single robust IA 
professionals membership body, and thus risked the realisation of an 
IA profession.  They all represent some of the identified attributes of 
professional bodies, having: a community of practitioners; tradition; 
formal education/development process; a common body of knowledge 
(CBK); a communications network; entry requirements and validation 
process; recognition of public responsibility; willingness to act for the 
common good; code of conduct; and legal recognition. 
5.7.11 Table 13 below shows skill areas assessed for Accreditation purposes: 
A1 Governance D1 Internal and Statutory Audit  
A2 Policy and Standards  D2 Compliance Monitoring and Controls 
Testing 
A3 Information Security Strategy  D3 Security Evaluation and Functionality 
Testing 
A4 Innovation and Business 
Improvement  
D4 Penetration Testing 
A5 Behavioural Change E1 Secure Operations Management  
A6 Legal and Regulatory 
Environment and Compliance 
E2 Secure Operations and Service 
Delivery 
A7 Third Party Management  F1 Intrusion Detection and Analysis 
B1 Threat Intelligence and 
Assessment and Threat Modelling 
F2 Incident Management, Incident 
Investigation and Response 
B2 Risk Assessment H1 Business Continuity and Disaster 
Recovery Planning 
B3 Information Risk Management  H2 Business Continuity and Disaster 
Recovery Management  
C1 Enterprise Security Architecture H3 Cyber Resilience 
C2 Technical Security Architecture   
C3 Secure Development    
Table 13:  IA Framework Skills Areas, Source: IISP, updated 2017 
 
5.7.12 The first schools to teach security courses began doing so in the 
1990s in the US, and they started offering degree programmes in 
2000.  The National Security Agency (NSA) partnered with other 
organisations to designate certain colleges and universities as Centres 
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of Academic Excellence in IA Education (CAE/IAE) and Research 
(CAE/IAE-R).  This is the model that the UK CESG adopted.  Figure 
54 depicts the planned scope of work for CESG between 2010 and 
2015. 
 
Figure 54:  IA Professionalism Plans, Source: UK CESG (2010g)  
 
5.7.13 The US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS, 2008) combined 
the available CBK and BOK into an Essential Body of Knowledge 
(EBK).  There are multiple InfoSec related professional bodies, 
certifications and membership organisations.  The Certifications are 
based on the aforementioned CBK, BoK or EBK.  Depending on the 
certification undertaken by an InfoSec professional, they will be a 
member of a body by default. [See list in Appendix I, Section 10.19] 
5.7.14 Conklin and McLeod reviewed the EBK, competency areas and the 
corollary roles relevant in the industry (Conklin and McLeod, 2009).  In 
the UK, the BCS SFIA – the Skills for the Information Age framework 
and the IISP Skills Framework both co-exist.  The IISP Skills 
Framework was updated in 2016. 
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5.7.15 The BCS Security Forum hosted an IS Professionalism event in 
November 2007 and another debate on IT and Professionalism three 
years later (BCS, 2010).  In 2016, IAAC hosted a series of workshops 
reviewing the Cyber Profession.  This work reviewed the IISP Skills 
Framework from the point of view of the role levels referenced: Levels 
1 and 2: Knowledge; Level 3: Practitioner; Level 4: Experienced 
Practitioner – performing basic tasks without supervision, complex 
tasks with supervision; Level 5 – Skills Practitioner; and Level 6: 
Expert. 
5.7.16 Functions of IA professionals are described in the following terms: i) 
avoidance: preventing vulnerabilities and exposures; ii) deterrence: 
making attack less likely; iii) detection: quickly spot attack; iv) 
prevention: preventing exploit; v) mitigation: reducing damage; vi) 
transference: shifting control for resolution; vii) investigation: 
characterizing an incident; viii) sanctions and rewards: punishing the 
guilty, encouraging effective responders; ix) recovery: immediate 
response, repair; x) correction: ensuring no repeats; and xi) 
education: advancing knowledge and teaching others. 
5.7.17 The following CESG identified IA roles are included in the scheme, 
subject to continual addition: i) Security and Information Risk Advisor 
(SIRA); ii) IA Architect; iii) IA Accreditor; iv) IA Auditor; v) IT Security 
Officer; vi) Penetration Tester; and vii) Communications Security 
Officer.  Figure 55 shows the range of possible specialisms within the 
IA domain, all of which are necessary in order to provide the required 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
221 | P a g e  
level of assurance as to risk reduction and impact management for 
information assets. 
 
Figure 55:  IA Framework Roles, Source: UK CESG (2011)  
5.7.18 In 2008, the researcher was asked to review the curriculum for a newly 
proposed Master’s Degree course (MSc) in IA at London South Bank 
University (LSBU), focussed on providing the skills to protect 
information assets.  The intention was that an MSc in IA would offer 
strong employment prospects for graduates in many different sectors, 
although there was little evidence to support this on the basis of the 
types of roles being recruited for.  Subsequently, as a result of the 
2007/2008 financial crash and the resulting global recession, the 
number of roles available reduced significantly and the anticipated 
growth and maturation were not realised.  A new IA Masters was 
designed at and for Cranfield University in 2008, but in 2009 had no 
students taking the course (IAAC, 2010).  This reality is at odds with 
various research articulating a growing cyber skills crisis, though self-
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interest must be considered given the context o f the authors ((ISC)², 
2011d; ISACA, 2014). 
5.7.19 In 2011, available courses were reviewed and the difficulties of using 
terminology that is more akin to populist media rather than academia 
was raised as an issue (Furnell, 2011).  Higher education institutions 
who design the education programmes continue to label according to 
what is populist (i.e. Ethical Hacking, cybersecurity) as opposed to 
what is principled, as academia continues to struggle to gain students 
in order to maintain funding and population levels.  The lack of uptake 
of the various courses available may be because of difficulties with the 
terminology being used in the advertising and marketing or it may be 
as a result of a lack of understanding of what is covered in the course 
content and the value of it in terms of likely future employment. 
5.7.20 The researcher created a course syllabus for an MSc in IG, illustrated 
in overview in Figure 56.  The purpose was to evidence that a broader 
scope of inclusion is required in order to achieve IP.  The full course 
content is articulated in Appendix I, Section 10.3 . 
 
Figure 56:  Proposed MSc in IG, Simmons (2011) 
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5.7.21 This compared positively with the MSc designed by Richardson (2012), 
Figure 57 below, but showed the difference in focus, raising the purview 
to extend across the IS domain. 
 
Figure 57:  Proposed MSc in IA, Source: Richardson (2012, p.185) 
 
5.7.22 In 2014, the US DHS commissioned a paper to identify best practices 
for the path towards professionalisation for the cybersecurity industry.  
The paper also explored similarities between aviation and 
cybersecurity (US DHS, 2014).  By way of an example, the researcher 
engaged with a cybersecurity champion winner from the aviation 
industry who had never done a course in security, nor secure software 
design and yet was on a degree course for designing military planes 
for the future. 
5.7.23 Chittoor (2014) electronically shared an e-Governance Competency 
Framework (eGCF) for Digital India, Figure 58 below in which there is 
no reference to security, risk or safety roles, and yet the endeavour is 
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to achieve e-Governance in a digital landscape.  This may be forward 
thinking, assuming that these are functions of all roles.  However, this 
is yet another example of overlapping, duplicative language and 
interlocking disciplines that lack coherence and cohesion. 
 
Figure 58:  Digital India eGCF, Source: Chittoor (2014) 
 
5.7.24 In 2015, the (ISC)² membership group updated their Cybersecurity 
Principles and Learning Outcomes for Computer Science and IT-
Related Degrees: A resource for course designers and accreditors, 
((ISC)², 2015h).  The Principles sought to ensure that content would 
be integral to computing courses rather than a module added on.  
There has been notable development in this space across the UK 
academic institutions.  However, equally the concerns are beyond that 
of the computing sector specifically – they are business issues. 
((ISC)², 2015g) 
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5.7.25 The need for a change of view – for a holistic approach – was already 
identified.  McBride (2007) was heretic enough to suggest that there 
should be no more Schools of Computing, and that a more cross-
functional view was needed, in order for computing to be more 
divergent in thinking and delivery.  These views were criticised by 
colleagues in the industry (Spice, 2007).  Richardson (2012, p.210) 
developed an IA Skills Framework which contained a new holistic 
picture of the information domain, represented in Figure 59 below.  It is 
missing IG, though does reference utility, similar to Parker’s views 
(2010). 
 
Figure 59:  New Holistic Picture of the Information Domain, Source: Richardson (2012, p.210 ) 
 
5.7.26 Understanding of key tenets forms a central part of educational 
frameworks.  This has already been achieved with a number of large 
global private sector bodies – for example, the researcher is aware 
that BT and Shell have adopted the IISP and the International 
Information System Security Certification Consortium, Inc., (ISC)² 
frameworks respectively and expect relevant employees to take up 
membership of these bodies and undertake relevant training.  This 
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provides greater stability, strength, and longevity to the growth of the 
discipline by ensuring that the necessary understanding of terminology 
takes place. 
5.7.27 Effective delivery of holistic IA needs to advance understanding 
through education of leaders, practitioners and the user community in 
the fields of IO and cybersecurity including IM, services, exploitation, 
security and its assurance, critical infrastructure protection, national 
security and computer networks (Richardson, 2012, p.168).  This 
communication challenge was identified a decade previously in the 
Harvard Business Review (Nolan and McFarlan, 2005). 
5.7.28 Kovacich (1998) provided a written InfoSec Career Plan and updated 
this to embrace IA as the industry matured (2001).  However, the 
responsibility is largely on an individual to manage their own career.  
As a career plan, seeking to reach the “C” suite (e.g. Chief Information 
Security Officer [CISO]) to end up in a role for, at best, fourteen 
months represents a challenge in the context of the ongoing skills 
crisis.  The educational path for a doctor takes at least seven years 
with the expectation of ensuring career longevity thereafter. 
5.7.29 The ‘Inspired Careers’ website, sponsored by the UK government, 
various companies and implemented by the Centre for Research and 
Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) allows the visitor to browse 
cyber security careers and segments a career into the categories and 
associate job roles represented in Table 14 below, each of which have 
explanatory media on the website.  There is no reference to IA in the 
comprehensive listings. 
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Table 14:  Role titles  
5.7.30 By the late “noughties”, the UK public sector had “done” IA because it 
had to do something tangible and measurable; the Crown cannot sue 
itself nor shut itself down, a power the UK Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) has in the event of a significant data breach.  The 
repercussions are different for the private sector, where a company 
may suffer a drop in share price, damage to reputation and loss of 
senior executives as a result of a breach. 
Area Role Types 
Trainee/ 
Junior  
Junior Unqualif ied Vulnerability Assessor 
Technical Security Researcher  
Junior Programmer  
Security Administrator  
Systems Administrator (with security)  
Netw ork Administrator (w ith security)  
Risk and Regulatory Trainee 
Access Control Administrator  
NOC Operation Intrusion Analyst  
SOC Analyst  
Incident Response Centre Analyst  
Database Security Administrator  
Cyber Sales Support  
Researcher/Lead Generation  
Practitioner Vulnerability Assessor Practitioner  
Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst  
Junior Malw are Researcher  
Cyber Security Forensics Analyst  
PCI Consultant  
27001 Auditor  
Accreditor Practitioner CCP  
COMSEC Practitioner CCP  
Senior SOC Analyst  
Intrusion Analyst  
Cyber Sales Engineer  
Channel Marketing Manager  
Professional Services Marketing Manager  
Product Marketing Manager  
Product Manager  
Recruitment Consultant  
Researcher (Academia)  
Awareness Programme Facilitator Data 
Protection Officer  
Database Security Manager  
Senior 
Practitioner 
Penetration Tester (general)  
Evaluation Facility Product Tester  
Security Software Developer  
Security Architect/Senior Architect  
Senior Security Auditor  
Compliance Manager  
Senior Accreditor CCP  
Senior COMSEC CCP  
Security Operations Manager  
Cyber Incident Response Specialist  
Senior Intrusion Analyst 
Senior Forensics Analyst  
Cyber Pre-sales Consultant  
Security Sales Executive  
Security Business Development Manager  
Technical Account Manager  
Senior Recruitment Consultant  
Security Lecturer  
Security Services Account Manager  
Awareness Programme Coordinator  
Cyber Security Specialist Journalist  
Data Owner  
Principal Specialist Infrastructure Tester  
Specialist Application Tester  
Targeted Attack Specialist  
Malw are Reverse Engineer  
Principal Security Architect  
Principal Security Auditor  
Head of Compliance  
Information Security Manager  
Lead Accreditor CCP  
Lead COMSEC CCP  
Host-based Network Intrusion Analyst 
Senior Cyber Security Incident Response 
Coordinator  
Netw ork-based Intrusion Analyst  
Senior Database Administrator  
Security Product or Professional Services 
Sales Manager/Director  
Channel Account Manager/Director  
Principal Recruitment Consultant  
Head of Internal Recruitment  
Senior Lecturer  
Technical Director  
Lead Partner/Head of Division/CEO Cyber Security 
Professional Services  
Chief Information Officer (CIO)  
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)  
Head of Division/CEO Cyber Security 
Software Product 
Professor  
Head of Division/CEO Cyber Security 
Hardw are Product  
Chief Technology Officer  
Industry Influencer  
Head of Internal Audit/Audit Partner  
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5.7.31 Measuring the reduction in brand damage from an incident or 
decrease in market share due to loss of intellectual property can be 
difficult (Kelly, 2010).  However, following the Target breach in 2014, 
there was a 46 per cent fall in total revenue.  After a data breach in 
October 2015, Experian suffered their worst trading period in eighteen 
months – its stock price falling to its lowest level since May 2014.  
Similarly, in October 2015 following their public breach, TalkTalk 
shares dropped by over 10 per cent and by March 2016 the true costs 
of reparation (£60 million), including loss of customers (101,000) 
(Farrell, 2016). 
5.7.32 Yoran (cited in Hackett, 2015) described a failure in the security 
industry, given the volume of technology available designed to protect 
organisations from breaches and loss of information and yet this is in 
stark contrast with the data breach reports (Verizon, Ponemon etc).  
The implications of Yoran’s thesis are that either the technology is 
designed wrongly or the implementation is flawed. 
5.7.33 Grupe et al. (2003, pp.101-110) provided an extensive piece of work 
reviewing options for ethical bases for IT decision making, having 
identified the scale of the challenge individuals faced: “... the ethical 
framework of IT is based primarily on the tenets of individual ethics. … 
suffers from sins of omission (i.e. forgetting to ask relevant questions) 
and sins of commission (i.e. being asked to undertake unethical 
actions and not being able to invoke personal ethical standards by a 
superior)”. 
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5.7.34 The following list of ethical framework considerations was provided: i) 
“Golden rule – treat others as you wish to be treated; ii) Kant’s 
categorical imperative – if an action is not right for everyone, it’s not 
right for anyone; iii) Descartes’ rule of change (the slippery slope) – if 
an action is not repeatable at all times, it is not right at any time; iv) 
Utilitarian Principle (universalism) – take the action that achieves the 
most good; v) Risk Aversion Principle – incur least harm or cost; vi) 
Avoid Harm – avoid malfeasance or “do no harm”; vii) No free lunch – 
assume that all property and information belongs to someone 
(intellectual property); viii) Legalism – is it against the law?  Moral 
actions may not be legal and vice versa; ix) Professionalism – is an 
action contrary to codes of ethics?; x) Evidentiary guidance - is there 
hard data to support or deny the value of taking an action?; xi) 
Client/customer/patient choice – let the people affected decide; xii) 
Equity – will the costs and benefit be equitably distributed?; xi ii) 
Competition – consider the degree of privacy, cost and quality; xiv) 
Compassion/last chance – are decision biased in favour of one group 
or another?; xv) Openness/full disclosure; xvi) Confidentiality – have 
you reduced security features to hold expenses to a minimum?; xvii) 
Trustworthiness and honesty – IT accountable for its actions?” (Ibid. 
p.105).  Much of this work is corroborated by that of Dekker (2011).  
5.7.35 Schou and Shoemaker (2007, p.424) referred to historical activity 
thus: “... a formal code for cyberspace was published as far back as 
1989”.  The Internet Activities Board (IAB) from the Networking Group 
produced a directive entitled “Ethics and the Internet” (RFC 1087) 
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which identified the following five activities as being unethical and 
unacceptable: i) to seek to gain unauthorized access to the resources 
of the internet; ii) to disrupt the intended use of the Internet; iii) to 
waste resources (people, capacity, computer) through such actions; 
iv) to destroy the integrity of computer-based information; and v) to 
compromise the privacy of users. 
5.7.36 There is an Institute for Global Ethics (IGE), which holds the following 
five Ethical Values: i) honest and truthful; ii) responsible and 
accountable; iii) fair and equitable; iv) respectful and mindful; and v) 
compassionate and caring.  These two positions are shared as a 
starting point for consideration in terms of the IoT and the Artificial 
Intelligence considerations that new technologies are bringing into the 
industry.  The BCS has a Code of Conduct, as opposed to a Code of 
Ethics.  As identified by Raval (2012, p.9): 
A code of conduct, while acting as a compass attempting to 
always point at the true north, is a passive document.  Only a 
culture of constant vigilance by leadership can make a code of 
conduct effective.  Professionals still have to be equipped to 
recognize potential dilemmas and how to address them. 
5.7.37 Doing security, as opposed to talking about doing security, can 
present new risks.  Operational teams are usually attempting to 
achieve security whereas in large organisations there can be many 
different teams (Quality, Audit, Compliance, Risk, Legal, Sales, 
Leadership) seeking to present an outward view of the intentions – to 
stakeholders, to shareholders, to the Stock Exchange and beyond - 
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which can be significantly disjointed, particularly when it is not 
supported by budget and resources. 
5.7.38 Consistency of performance implies the need to ensure the IA 
discipline exists.  The term “discipline” indicates that a practice is 
performed consistently – and the term “ensure” implies a legal 
guarantee, something that Stewart (2014) was at pains to point out 
that InfoSec professionals needed to be careful with regards to usage . 
5.7.39 IA requires discipline because procedures have to be executed in a 
coordinated fashion by all participants at all times.  The first steps in 
establishing a systematic IA process is to define and document 
disciplined practice among the trusted individuals who access 
information or manage the process. 
5.7.40 However, whilst disciplined practice encourages IA, it also imposes 
additional requirements.  Workload pressures mean that people will 
not do everything that they should in order to be secure; they have to 
be positively motivated to perform those tasks.  Positive motivation is 
essential to the IA process by initiating, directing and sustaining 
multiple forms of interaction.  This “ensures a person’s willingness to 
execute a task consistently or achieve a goal, even if it is personally 
inconvenient” (Schou and Shoemaker, 2007, p.394).  
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5.8 IA in the context of Professional Identity  
 
5.8.1 Professionals have an important role in setting societal benchmarks,  
putting forth the initial test cases which change legal precedents in 
common law.  This is particularly true of the IA practitioner(s).  Being a 
professional requires signing up to a code of conduct; committing to 
continuous professional development; being suitably qualified and 
demonstrating trusted competence.  Generally, professional bodies 
exist to represent the interests of their members, protect the integrity 
of their relevant profession and raise the standards of their members’ 
work (Warren, 2016).  Sometimes they may assure the provision of 
quality services to the public.  The ability to put professionals out of 
work can be perceived as an asset to maintaining trusted professional 
identity. 
5.8.2 Professional identity is a self-concept, a constellation of attributes, 
beliefs, values, motives, and experiences that people use to define 
themselves in their professional capacity (Schein, 1978).  Professional 
identity is therefore fluid and dependent on individuals’ own subjective 
interpretations as they attempt to reconci le their role as part of a 
professional group in their own individual ways.  Table 15 below 
summarizes five professional identity structures described by Caza 
and Creary (2016). 
New security thinking involves a broader view of the business through the 
vantage point of “IA”, rather than a strictly traditional “guns, guards and gates” 
mentality – for those who came into IA through the Physical Security route.  
(Dunkel, 2010) 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
233 | P a g e  
 
 Intersection Dominance Compart-
mentalisation 
Holism Augmentation 
Description Individuals 
define 
themselves at 
the intersection 
of two 
professional 
identities  
(e.g. ITSec/ 
InfoSec and 
Cyber / IA) 
Individuals 
define 
themselves by 
one primary 
professional 
identity to which 
all others are 
subordinated 
(no agreement) 
Individuals define 
themselves in 
more than one 
professional role 
but identif ies each 
profession as 
different points in 
time (identity 
activation is 
context or 
situation-specif ic) 
Individuals 
define 
themselves 
with one holistic 
professional 
identity that 
encompasses 
all other 
professional 
identities 
Individuals define 
themselves with 
mult iple 
professional 
identities that are 
coactivated and 
complement, 
extend and 
enhance one 
another 
Level of 
cognitive 
complexity 
Low(est) Low Medium High High(est) 
Coactivation No No No No Yes 
Integration Integrated Distinct Distinct and 
separate 
Integrated Distinct and 
complementary 
Reference 
Group 
Individuals in the 
specif ic 
subspeciality 
(e.g. all nurse-
midw ives)  
Individuals in the 
profession at the 
top of the 
hierarchy (this is 
the most valued 
identity) (e.g. 
midw ives) 
Individuals w ho 
are in the identity 
group that is 
salient at the time 
Individuals w ho 
occupy the 
general 
superordinate 
category (e.g. 
life coach) as 
well as 
subcomponents 
(e.g. yoga 
instructor) 
Individuals w ho 
occupy any of the 
roles the 
individual inhabits 
Table 15:  Professional identity structures, Source: Caza and Creary (2016)  
 
5.8.3 The perception of society has an impact on the success of an industry.  
However, there is a lack of belief that IA occupations have sufficient 
well-defined and stable characteristics, in particular as a result of the 
interdisciplinarity and the cross-cutting themes.  Individuals work in 
established professions and emerging professions, sometimes both.  
Work identities, including but not limited to professional identities, are 
those meanings that individuals attach to themselves in the context of 
work (Dutton et al., 2010). 
5.8.4 Professional identity is a self-cognition.  The more cognitively attached 
individuals are to their profession, the more affectively committed they 
will be (Caza and Creary, 2016).  In the context of IA, there is a 
plurality of possible identities, evidenced by the complex array of 
duplicative and competing membership bodies – IISP, IRMA, ISSA, 
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ISC2, ISACA – resulting in either an intersectionist or a holistic 
individual.  There are now cyber specific designations, from ISACA for 
example.  Independent knowledge workers are common today – and 
this includes self-proclaimed IA professionals. 
5.8.5 Individuals draw from personal attributes, social group membership 
and work roles to assign meaning to who they are and what they do in 
the workplace (Ashforth et al., 2008).  In line with Benson’s focus on 
contribution to society, individuals claim purpose and meaning as a 
result of the construction of their personal identity.  Associating oneself 
with a respected profession provides pride, esteem, and well-being 
(Dutton et al., 2010). 
5.8.6 A professional may provide intangible services and the purchaser 
must take these on trust.  Not all service provision will be successful: 
half of legal advocates may lose their cases in court, and some 
doctors will inevitably lose some patients.  Strong educational 
background and qualifications are thus necessary, as is trust, 
measured by outward appearance and manner fitting the socially 
accepted standards of repute and respectability (MacDonald, 1995).  
Qualifications from education can be used to affirm professional 
identities – CISSP from ISC2, CISM from ISACA.  Vague job titles can 
create ambiguity and confusion over professional identity.  Safety, 
reliability, availability, security, and resilience are all aspects of this 
trustworthiness – also referred to as information provenance (Mansell 
and Collins, 2005).  Clients are vulnerable because they lack the 
expertise to judge whether the professional that they have hired is 
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doing a good job; they must rely on professional ethics and 
competency above and beyond the pure choice of market options 
(Friedman, 2006). 
5.8.7 There is a need to ensure that IS incorporates more reference to and 
understanding of the subjects contained in this thesis – those of 
InfoSec, IA, and IG (consider, in order: child, teenager, adult).  InfoSec 
as an IS discipline, with someone responsible for it, has been around 
since the early 1970s (Desman, 2002, p.x).  By 1988, it was identified 
that IS methodology needed to include security as a functional 
requirement in all stages of systems development, confirming that 
secure systems design requirements needed to be fully integrated 
(D'Aubeterre, Singh and Iyer, 2008).  Once this is understood and 
accepted as being on a progression to maturity, all three areas can be 
appreciated as related to the core discipline of IP. 
5.8.8 Discussion of industry progression was identified in Best (1996, p.53): 
“The profession of information science collectively and individually 
perhaps does not have sufficient will or motivation to advocate its own 
cause successfully against the much stronger commercially driven 
pressures of the IT professions”.  The importance of the IM theme is 
undiminished, more particularly with the emergence of the Big Data 
agenda and discussions about Data Lakes – another new industry 
term denoted to signify the resting volume of data available. 
5.8.9 The Chief Information Officer (CIO) is a 30-year-old role at this stage 
and yet even 20 years ago, was suffering from political battles with the 
Chief Operations Officer (COO) (Best, 1996, p.148).  The researcher 
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contends that core to this dynamic is an understanding of the 
constituent parts, in line with the following: 
We can manage the technology (most of the time) and the 
organization of knowledge (ditto), but we are not very good at 
dealing with people and organizations in this context.  We lack 
the necessary methodology for investigating and analysing these 
situations, and we lack proper understanding of the fundamental 
principles of individual and social behaviour involved in 
information use.  As pointed out earlier, there is a serious need 
for more research in this field (Ibid. p.135). 
5.8.10 Despite their title, CIOs are, largely, only responsible for technology 
infrastructure and not the information itself; they typically find 
themselves more concerned with updating network configurations and 
ensuring cloud architectures are in place than with policy issues 
affecting data.  This has left a gap into which a Chief Digital Officer 
(CDO) has been inserted, which is a cost drain and shows a lack of 
understanding and maturity by those already in the available roles . 
5.8.11 The Chief InfoSec Officer (CISO) has a responsibility to spend their 
time advising the organisation they serve about the risks to information 
from identified vectors and provide guidance on appropriate risk 
reduction mechanisms.  Yet largely the CISO cadre are still technically 
focussed and lack education and awareness across the breadth of the 
information domain, particularly in terms of compliance understanding, 
regulation, legislation, protection, preservation and overall IG. 
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5.8.12 The UK Public Sector SIRO role was designed to address IRM.  There 
is no specific private sector equivalent, though some organisations 
have a Chief Risk Officer (CRO).  However, the dominant narrative 
between the two roles can be worlds apart; the risks identified may be 
different; the appetites are not matched; and the thresholds are not 
equal.  This is not a level playing field; even the existence of the  
ISO31000:2009 international risk management standard has not 
consolidated views in this domain. 
5.8.13 A Physical Security practitioner may identify IA in terms of security 
passes and access to buildings. 
5.8.14 A Network Administrator might identify IA in terms of permissions, 
rights, and passwords. 
5.8.15 An InfoSec Professional tends to identify in terms of unauthorised 
access to electronic systems, hackers, firewall management, etc – in 
other words, in technology issues and solutions, across the technology 
space, rather than upwards and outwards across the organisation, 
embracing the information assets at a management and director level.  
Membership of IS Security Association (ISSA) and (ISC)², BCS 
Chartered IT Professional body and the IISP are all likely.  Most 
security professionals are members of American owned membership 
bodies and are therefore influenced by the newsletters and magazines 
that review the themes and influence the thinking. 
5.8.16 A more mature InfoSec Professional tends to understand the Five 
Pillars as an overlay on the technical issues, but their role is broader.  
There is a lot of distorting of the definitions in job descriptions.  The 
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role had been described as that of an ISSO – an IS Security Officer in 
the original 1998 edition from which Kovacich updated the description 
for the 2006 publication (Kovacich, 1998). 
5.8.17 IT Security practitioners would define it in terms of firewalls, intrusions 
detection and prevention, viruses and hackers, vulnerability 
assessments and a whole host of directly technical elements. 
5.8.18 An IG practitioner – who has a background of broader policy and legal 
understanding – would have the InfoSec CIA triad central to their view 
- but would also include Accessibility, Usability, and Authenticity – as 
some of their key drivers with regard to Information Access.  They 
operate with a wider understanding of information-based legislation 
such as the Data Protection Act and Freedom of Information Act.  For 
an IG practitioner, Records Management and IA are inter-connected. 
5.8.19 An IM practitioner knows to include Data Quality and frames their 
activities to include Knowledge Management. 
5.8.20 A Records Management practitioner knows that there will be times 
when a great deal of store will be placed on the accuracy, timeliness, 
and availability of core corporate records to evidence acts undertaken, 
agreements reached and decisions made, none of which will be 
possible without many of the elements possible through IA being in 
place.  Membership of the Information and Records Management 
Society (IRMS) is likely.  For many years, this group was the Records 
Management Society but renamed in 2010 to reflect how central the 
“information” element is to the success of Records Management – as 
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is also the case with (information) security and (information) 
assurance. 
5.8.21 An Audit professional will be familiar with the terminology of GRC, 
controls, and countermeasures across the whole space.  Internal 
Auditors have a role in providing assurance that policies and 
procedures are being followed on strategic, operational, financial, and 
compliance objectives addressing laws and regulations, and that the 
internal controls in place are adequate to mitigate risks.  Equipped 
with an in-depth understanding of the organisation’s culture and 
ethical environment, they are positioned to bring great value to the 
entire process of effective governance, risk management, and internal 
control through their insight into the organisation; the objectivity with 
which they view the organisation’s culture, system of internal control, 
and risks. 
5.8.22 For an IT Audit practitioner, membership of ISACA is likely.  However, 
to add to the confusion, IA for an Auditor will stand for Internal Audit, 
whereas within the same organisation, IA can also denote Information 
Architecture and Identity Assurance.  The IA practitioner and the 
Auditor come together around the topic of control.  They may not 
agree on the method selected to establish the control but the risk 
concerns need to be understood from the same terminology 
standpoint.  Both disciplines need to work together in responding to 
Audits too.  The IA practitioner needs to know that they have the 
evidence available and can present it in an appropriate manner 
without creating greater risk for their organisation; whilst the Audit 
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Professional needs to be able to absorb and understand the evidence 
provided, within the context of the business specifically, rather than 
necessarily through the lens of wider expectation (Bell, 2010, p.34).  IT 
Auditors work at the intersection between IT systems and the people 
who specify, develop, implement, use, manage and maintain them, 
and thus need to be competent and comfortable with a broad 
spectrum of issues (Hinson, 2007). 
5.8.23 Other roles and terms exist.  McFadzean’s Literature Review (2005) 
sought to identify useful frameworks for aligning IA with corporate 
strategy.  McFadzean referenced the work of Kovacich (2001) who 
had already seen the need to merge the roles of the Corporate 
Security officer and the IS Security officer to a more senior position, 
perhaps called the Corporate IA Officer.  The purpose of the role 
would be to “develop, implement, maintain, manage and administer a 
corporate-wide IA programme to include all plans, policies, 
procedures, processes, assessments and authorisations ready to 
protect and defend the corporation’s information and information 
systems, regardless of its location and environment” (Kovacich, 2001, 
pp.302-307).  This followed on from the use of the term “information 
guardians”.  This was a more solid paper than that previously written 
by the author and colleagues (Birchall et al., 2003) as the maturation 
of the thinking around IA was clearer to see and the definitions were 
more accurate and appropriate.  “IA could be said to represent a 
migration from a preventative approach to an enabling approach” 
(Birchall et al., 2004, p.7). 
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5.8.24 In 2011, the UK’s Data Protection Forum (DPF) signed an undertaking 
with the International Association of Privacy Professionals to allow for 
cross membership.  Quigley (2008) produced an extensive 
encyclopaedia of reference material on information ethics and security, 
without a single mention of IA.  The encyclopaedia is not lacking as a 
result of this omission.  This highlights that ethics and privacy are seen 
as being linked (Viscarolasaga, 2009, p.11) – and that professionals 
need to understand Data Protection (DP) in Europe in the context of 
privacy worldwide.  However, this is not a group that current IA 
practitioners would naturally migrate towards. 
5.8.25 With this number of possible perspectives, the lack of a formal 
professional IA body in the UK means that practitioners are often 
creating their own definitions and harnessing them at the expense of 
an available and defined reality.  The issue of definition continues to 
be important if it is accepted that the skills required from future IA 
professionals need to be taught by current academia through the 
available curricula. 
5.8.26 Barwise (2013) highlighted the importance of understanding the 
meaning of the terminology used in the context of the CIO, CISO and 
CTO roles and provided a steer as to who best to represent the 
concentric circles of overlapping domains.  The scope is nested in the 
same way as are the established disciplines of IA, IS and ITS, 
represented in Figure 60 below.  Complementary expertise is required 
between the domains and sharing of knowledge should lead to 
success. 
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Figure 60:  Corporate IG, overlapping domains, Source: Barwise (2013)  
 
5.8.27 The lack of a common curriculum that all IA students could take 
diminishes the acceptance of the profession.  There is no consistency 
in what is taught.  All IA graduates are not created equal.  Coming 
from a business background ensures the IA professional is well-
versed in relevant policies and procedures while those with 
engineering backgrounds will have a more technical, architectural 
perspective.  The discipline of IA is relatively young and maturity will 
not be guaranteed without academia supporting the transition required 
through more directed teaching. 
5.8.28 Wylder (2004, p.28) pointed out that skills change over time: 
The type of person chosen to fi ll the role of security manager 
may change depending on where in the li fe cycle an organisation 
falls.  In the early phases, a limited-function position emphasizing 
technical and administrative skills may be appropriate.  Later it 
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may be necessary to redefine the job to bring other skills into 
play. 
5.8.29 Blyth and Kovacich (2006, p.153) pointed out that: 
The [insert relevant title] who does not look ahead at the trends in 
society, technology, business, global competition, criminal justice 
systems, crime and any associated rapid changes will have a 
stagnant [insert interchangeable InfoSec or IA] program that fails to 
meet the needs of the business or government agency.  
5.9 Conclusions 
5.9.1 The findings of the research showed that business, academia, and 
government do not fully understand IA, neither in definitional terms nor 
in implementation requirements.  The lack of adherence to the 
available lexicon and taxonomy, and the lack of an international 
standard for IA conspire to continue the compounding of confusion, 
and the lack of progression of IA as a successful profession. [15ES, 
35F, 57S, 62S, 69S] 
5.9.2 As observed in the private sector case study [CS2], operating 
assurance in silos (including risk management, internal audit and 
compliance) has led to leaders being unable to trust the value of 
business intelligence provided to them.  Ill-disciplined governance 
efforts exacerbate these problems and often lead to false comfort and 
inadequate oversight.  It is a key industry challenge that much of what 
is known about by IA professionals cannot be discussed openly due to 
the likely increase in risk and the resultant decrease in share price that 
could occur. 
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5.9.3 Survey respondents and PAR in the public sector case study [CS2] 
identified that the concentrated focus on IT often causes management, 
when faced with almost every problem, to demand another IT solution.  
Corporate business is not yet in the information centric mindset which 
can be developed into one which embraces IG.  There is a long way to 
go before the level of sophistication is sufficient enough to embrace 
this. [39FE, 48S, 67S] 
5.9.4 Through the Literature Review, it was already identified that the IT 
industry is confused between governance and management (Weill and 
Ross, 2005).  Repeatedly, this researcher has come up against these 
misconceptions.  One survey respondent articulated that “The words 
governance and management are somewhat interchangeable – it’s 
mainly based on where you sit in the food chain”. [50S] 
5.9.5 Survey respondents alongside literature review also identified that the 
pace of change brought about by the Internet – and the IoT - has 
made society post-Euclidian and post-Newtonian; consequently, 
decision-making processes have to change. [34F, 35F]  This requires 
the combination of a number of elements - an Idea (the Truth or “Aha” 
moment), a well formed, well-educated Team (Execution), a Plan 
(Business Model), Funding, and Timing.  Research has shown that the 
greatest of these is Timing (Gross, 2015). 
5.9.6 The research identified that attributes of a profession include: i) a body 
of knowledge, ii) ethical guidelines, and iii) a professional organisation 
with a growing set of published papers and best practices (Cox, 2010, 
p.7).  Professionalisation as a process involves the creation of: i) 
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group norms; ii) qualifications (of which there are many); iii) codes of 
conduct / ethics (again, there are many); and iv) a professional body to 
oversee the conduct of members of the profession (this does not 
exist). 
5.9.7 As identified by the survey responses, the PAR case studies and 
through industry engagement, the researcher has identified that there 
is no unifying narrative of an IA profession as a result of the 
widespread roles and functions incorporated, alongside the multiplicity 
of professional identities. [46S, 60S, 74S]  In the UK, there are no 
specific IA bodies, save for IAAC which is a voluntary rather than a 
professional membership body.  However, to introduce a separate IA 
professional membership body into the existing domain may not be the 
best approach, given the areas of coverage of the existing 
longstanding groups, their membership numbers and global 
recognition.  Conflicting approaches identified throughout this research 
are indicative of gaps in the IA professionalism agenda. [69S, 76S] 
5.9.8 Through the lens of professionalisation, reviewing professional 
knowledge, professional identity, IA understanding, professional 
membership, and exposure to the industry, the researcher has 
considered whether an IA professional can be a cybersecurity 
professional and, conversely, whether a cybersecurity professional 
can be an IA professional.  The foreground understanding of IA 
professionals is rested within the dominant narrative of InfoSec, with 
an acceptance that cybersecurity is the prevailing term being utilised.  
This is creating multi-identity challenges. 
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5.9.9 Organisations, in all sectors, are left confused, considering whether 
the professional identity of an IA professional is different from an 
InfoSec professional is different from a Cybersecurity professional.  In 
austere times, organisations cannot be expected to support so many 
fractured disciplines, with multiple affiliations, membership fees, 
certifications, and codes of ethics. 
5.9.10 Trustworthiness and the constituent elements of trust were key 
themes that were identified from the survey research. [47S, 52S, 56S, 
57S, 69S]  Trust characteristics include reciprocity – the ability to 
demonstrate mutuality of governance measures; clarity of 
responsibility and liability.  These are important areas in organisational 
dynamics with the volume of outsourcing and off shoring, where third 
parties are performing the greater volume of actual business 
processing and teams need to have known and understood the legal 
implications of these activities and to have agreed baselines of culture 
and expected behaviour, irrespective of the prevailing culture.  
External demonstrability requires the ability for each participating 
entity to provide the necessary external representation to meet 
expectations and support the required confidence of stakeholders.  
This is most keenly felt in the financial sector though is equally 
prevalent in the health sector.  [CS2] 
5.9.11 The survey respondents identified many cross-cutting themes – 
product assurance, quality assurance, project assurance – achieving 
IA should be a normal part of business outcomes in the information 
age.  These are reliant on both the existence of and the maintenance 
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of quality information.  Quality, in security terms, can be expressed as 
a factor of accuracy, trust, and integrity.  Given the breadth and scale 
of what needs to be assured, the volume of “cyber” rhetoric is 
overwhelming. [20F, 39FE, 46S, 48S, 60S, 67S, 74S] 
5.9.12 In the private sector case study, it was observed that corporate 
business can take the view that neither information nor records 
management depend upon a threat to do the right thing.   Acceptable 
business risk, not just acceptable risk, is what needs to be striven for. 
[CS2]  This was the stance taken by the TalkTalk CEO, following their 
third breach in a year (in October 2015), in claiming that encryption 
was not mandated in legislation for data in transit or at rest 
(Zorabedian, 2015). 
5.9.13 From Cadbury (1992) [72S], through Turnbull (ICAEW, 1999) [84F], 
through Enron (Turnbull, 2002) [84F]), through the financial crisis of 
2007 onwards, there has never been so much information available 
and accessible and yet there are organisations behaving as if 
implementation of long established security frameworks, controls and 
safeguards is optional rather than required.  IP related legislation 
exists though historically it has lacked the ability to sufficiently punish 
proven misdemeanours.  EU Data Protection Authorities will have the 
capability of imposing increased fines on those who infringe existing 
guidance based on the EU GDPR principles.  These penalty structures 
may provide sufficient incentives to result in behavioural change in 
terms of data collection, processing and security.  In the researcher’s 
experience, there is no evidence that this will be the immediate 
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response.  Corporate governance needs to dictate a more appropriate 
approach.  These activities must become part of a wider organisational 
IP UCF. [14F, 41E, 46S, 60S, 74S] 
5.9.14 The empirical evidence gathered through this study produces a 
tautological conclusion.  Breaches will continue to be experienced for 
as long as IA is not successfully achieved, as a result of the barriers 
identified throughout this research.  Greater IA understanding, will lead 
to more controls being effectively implemented to reduce risk of 
breaches and their impact.  This change must be realised in the wider 
context of organisational IG, requiring deeper knowledge and ongoing 
education of InfoSec professionals, specifically.  Stronger alliance is 
required across all departmental disciplines, including: HR, Legal, 
Procurement, Sales, Marketing, etc., in order to protect the IP 
requirements end to end throughout the lifecycle, from creation 
through to destruction or preservation.  The real challenge faced is not 
in defining the goal but one of organisational dynamics, politics, 
influence, credibility, etc.  IA initiatives have to move from being the 
necessary evil to being a business enabler.  [39FE, 48S, 67S]   
5.9.15 During the course of this research, it has become evident that IA has 
much in common with existing governance frameworks - management, 
corporate etc.  Following iterative discourse analysis of the survey 
responses and synthesis of the combined evidence and literature 
review, the importance of IG in the context of IP was identified by a 
number of respondents, [20F, 58S, 60S, 71S, 77S, 81S], alongside 
the experience gained through the PAR activities. 
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5.9.16 It was in this context that utilization of a grounded theory led to the 
realisation of a step change being required from the existing GRC 
ontology.  In the researcher’s opinion, GRC requirements need to be 
seen as intrinsically the same across all sectors, with information 
being the fuel that maintains the engines of business, commerce, 
government, power etc.  [77S]  Frameworks which are able to 
visualise and express non-tangible assets are valuable data points.  
Research which compares InfoSec governance frameworks with 
environmental governance frameworks has much to benefit differing 
communities (Coles-Kemp, 2008). 
5.9.17 Thus the researcher developed a roadmap for the future of IA, 
resulting in the framework i3GRC™ (Integrated and Informed 
Information Governance, Risk, and Compliance).  As new pieces of 
information were made available, the search for a solution continued 
to change direction.  This was in keeping with the Keen’s entreaty 
(1980, p.18): 
Let us make sure we keep a few philosophers, historians, 
general systems theorists and social activists within our network: 
even if only to write useful survey papers.  Research is the 
professional core of a discipline, but for it also to be the 
intellectual core, we need to think about research, not just do it.  
5.9.18 For the theory building, use of the IT GRC label was discounted as the 
continual reference to IT skews the intentions and switches off the 
intended audience.  Enterprise GRC (eGRC) is another label in 
circulation.  This is a central tenet of i3GRC™ - that the scope is 
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enterprise-wide.  In January 2015, distillation of the theoretical 
elements of this study resulted in the encapsulation of the 
requirements – integrated and informed information governance risk 
and compliance – i3GRC™ and the visualisation of the supporting 
graphic.  This acronym was registered as a trademark in March 2015 
and was confirmed as a unique mark, with no detractors, in May 2015. 
5.9.19 Chapter 6 answers the fourth research question -  Is it possible to 
produce a framework suitable to support the route from IA to IG? – 
articulating the framework review that led to the distillation of the 
constituent elements of i3GRC™. 
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6 i3GRC™ – INTEGRATED AND INFORMED INFORMATION GRC 
6.1 Introduction 
 
6.1.1 Following the grounded theory exposition in Chapter 5, consolidating 
the data and identified phenomena from the study, this chapter 
addresses the final research question: Is it possible to produce a 
framework suitable to support the route from IA to IG?  The research 
evidence supports the researcher’s contention that repositioning and 
realignment of IA is required in order to ensure its’ survival, or it must 
be consigned to the history books.  The Researcher is advocating 
alignment with IG in order to best influence the required IP outcomes.   
Management of complex adaptive systems is ultimately the 
requirement in order to achieve IP, reducing the likelihood of risk from 
cybercrime.  This requires process standardisation in order to ensure 
repeatability and consistency of results, creating a UCF.  Executive 
level commitment is vital – “there is no such thing as too much 
accountability” (Nolan and McFarlan, 2005, p.10).  
6.1.2 The constituent parts of i3GRC™ require: integrating the compliance 
evidence with the external validation and verification; the ability to 
provide visible commitment to industry standards, applicable 
legislation and regulation; and the results from periodic self-audits that 
feed into corrective action plans (CAP) where required, with 
Powerful communication between people plays a critical role in a company’s 
bottom line.  Without it you’re toast! Ampoma (2012) 
“The art of communication is the language of leadership.” Humes (2003) 
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appropriate sharing with stakeholders on a need-to-know basis.  The 
approach needs to be test once, publish once, share as applicable – 
rather than the often exhausting and certainly resource draining 
multiple, duplicative audit efforts being carried out to evidence 
compliance with a multitude of regulation, legislation, and industry 
standards. 
6.2 Existing Models 
6.2.1 Work produced in 2009, during an IG programme conducted for 
EURIM (now the DP Alliance – a conservative political group 
supporting government ministers in understanding policy evaluation 
issues), aligned with industry activity identifying stakeholders with 
conflicting objectives for whom the imperative was to work together to 
address each of the goals within an IG framework (Kofsky, 2011).  The 
resulting model, shown in Figure 61 below, was produced from a UK 
Government, information centric standpoint. 
 
Figure 61:  Information Landscape, Source: Anderson (2009)  
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6.2.2 Also in 2009, the OCEG (2009a) produced the “GRC Capability 
Model”, for implementation of a federated GRC (within the business 
community), as represented in Figure 62 below: 
 
Figure 62:  GRC Capability Model, Source: OCEG (2009a)  
 
6.2.3 Racz et al. (2010, p.11) produced a model to represent business 
operations managed and supported through GRC in a strategic context; 
advocating the use of their frame of reference for future research of 
integrated GRC. 
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6.2.4 This has been subsequently reproduced, without attribution and 
enhanced, in Figure 63 below (Wright, 2011). 
 
Figure 63:  Frame of Reference for Integrated GRC, Source:  Racz et al. (2010, p.8) 
 
6.2.5 IBM has been advocating information integration for over a decade 
(IBM, 2005), the terminology maturing to Information Integration and 
Governance (IIG) in the 21st century.  Figure 64 shows the IBM maturity 
path for achieving IIG, moving Big Data from Operational to Strategic. 
 
Figure 64:  Mature IIG, Source: cited in IBM (2013, Slide 16) 
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6.2.6 The work undertaken by Vicente (2011) also identified the need for 
integration, as represented in Figure 65 below, presumably being 
conducted in parallel to that of Racz et al. (2010). 
 
Figure 65:  Integrated GRC Conceptual Model, Source: Vicente (2011, p.28) 
6.2.7 Having reviewed the volume of available data points, the task, through 
the Grounded Theory, was to identify new ways of addressing IP 
through the lens of systems thinking.  Senge (2002) addressed the 
discipline of systems thinking thus: 
Systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes.  It is a 
framework for seeing interrelationships rather than things, for 
seeing patterns of change rather than static “snapshots” ... the 
subtle interconnectedness that gives living systems their unique 
character. 
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6.2.8 Figure 66 below encapsulates the layers of activity required to be 
integrated, alongside the areas that employees, managers, and 
leadership need to be informed about, all of which have information at 
their core (Iron Mountain, 2014, p.11). 
  
Figure 66:  A Practical Guide to IG, Source: Iron Mountain (2014, p.11) 
 
6.2.9 The private sector needed to apply transformational thinking with regard 
to integration and reduction of complex structures in order to streamline 
data collection, evidence gathering, and overall IG.  However, the 
incremental improvements to the status quo that have been 
systematically implemented year on year appear not to be sufficiently 
appropriate given regular failures in InfoSec and privacy concerns.  By 
implication, there must be other impediments, includi ng corporate 
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culture and social environment, which are contributing to the continuing 
difficulty in this area and therefore a broader sweeping organisational 
change is required. 
6.2.10 The OCEG continued to invest in maturing their framework, upgrading 
the original GRC model to include Principled Performance focusing on 
integration, as shown in Figure 67 below. 
 
Figure 67:  GRC Capability Model Element View, Source: OCEG (2015b, p.16) 
 
6.2.11 Much work has been done in the public sector representing the large 
scale transformation that has been taking place during the early 21st 
century, as represented by Table 16 below, comparing between 
Command and Control Thinking and Systems Thinking: 
  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
258 | P a g e  
Command-and-Control 
Thinking 
 Systems Thinking 
Top-down, hierarchy PERSPECTIVE Outside-in system 
Functional specialisation 
and procedures 
DESIGN OF WORK Demand, value, and 
flow 
Separated from work DECISION-MAKING Integrated with work 
Output, targets, activity, 
standards: related to budget 
MEASUREMENT Capability, variation: 
related to purpose 
Contractual ATTITUDE TO 
CUSTOMERS 
What matters? 
Contractual ATTITUDE TO 
SUPPLIERS 
Cooperative 
Manage people and 
budgets 
ROLE OF 
MANAGEMENT 
Act on the system 
Control budgets, manage 
people 
MANAGEMENT ETHOS Learn through action on 
the system 
Reactive, projects CHANGE Adaptive, integral 
Extrinsic ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
MOTIVATION 
Intrinsic 
Table 16:  Organisational Command and Control vs. Systems Thinking, Adapted from Vanguard 
Consulting Limited (2001) and Seddon (2008, p.70) 
 
6.2.12 Thinking about IA in complex systems terms means considering 
achieving IA as an emergent property of systems – like safety (Cook, 
2000).  Complex systems are intrinsically hazardous systems.  If risk 
did not exist, controls would not be required.  Complex and large are 
not the same thing in the context of systems.  A complex system can 
still be a small system.  A complex system needs to be capable of 
being used by simple folk, rather than a simple system that is too 
complicated to use.  Depth of understanding is required in order for 
complex system creation to be successful. 
6.2.13 Complex systems are necessary for running large businesses, not 
spreadsheets – particularly in order to generate actionable 
intelligence.  From the available data, analytical skills are required in 
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order to generate the appropriate, proportionate and most beneficial 
actions.  These are relatively new skills within the InfoSec community. 
6.3 New Framework 
6.3.1 This research has followed a similar analysis approach to that of  
Coles Kemp (2008), Gericke et al. (2009), Racz et al. (2010), Vicente 
(2011) and Powell et al. (2010).  The latter identified the need for the 
use of an “IA Range Framework” to test and evaluate (T&E) 
interconnected systems to ensure the effectiveness of implementation.  
However, the researcher contends that this was previously addressed 
by the Orange book (UK HM Treasury, 2004). 
6.3.2 The requirement for future research of integrated GRC using the Racz 
model is the starting point of i3GRC™.  The whole process has led the 
researcher to believe that what is required is a holistic strategy for 
using and managing information to meet business objectives. 
6.3.3 IG provides this by assuring the quality of content and data, 
maximising its value and ensuring its security and privacy throughout 
the lifecycle.  Combining IA, IG and GRC achieves i3GRC™ – 
integrated and informed GRC. 
6.3.4 i3GRC™ was borne out of an observed need to implement a unified 
IG framework on a large, organisation-wide scale.  i3GRC™ can be 
viewed as a framework within which to articulate an IP conversation.  
i3GRC™ is an instance of an ontology for addressing IA from an 
enterprise perspective. 
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6.3.5 Figure 68 presents the graphic demonstrating the reference model for 
i3GRC™ which has been implemented in the private sector case study 
[CS2], forming an original and significant piece of research. 
 
 
Figure 68:  i3GRC™ Reference Model created by Simmons, 18 January 2015  
 
6.3.6 The i3GRC™ framework contains the following elements: i) setting 
corporate objectives; ii) identifying boundaries (legislation, regulation, 
industry standards, contractual requirements etc); iii) assessing all 
risks; iv) putting controls in place to reduce the identified risks to an 
acceptable level (proactive; v) monitoring all systems to ensure that 
the implemented controls are operating effectively (detect and check); 
vi) responding to all incidents, and to all other stimuli, both internal and 
external; vii) evaluating framework effectiveness through self-
assessments, internal audit, external [regulatory] audits; vii) improving 
the framework, adopting the Principled Performance ethos, ensuring 
that all of the information feeds [inputs] are used to continually improve 
the outputs; and viii) communicating constantly, positively, collectively 
and universally. 
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6.3.7 i3GRC™, therefore, requires vision to ensure that all organisational 
information sensors (from PPT) are being fed into the framework 
wherever possible.  The benefits of operating in this manner are 
manifold, including: i) provision of a central repository of all system 
and audit evidence; ii) improving decision support through a holistic 
and integrated view of risk and compliance posture; iii) consistently 
tracking of all Issues – spanning Audit, Compliance, Security, Risks, 
Exceptions to Policy; iv) more successful and faster Audit completion 
(Internal and External); v) ease of reporting - Executive Dashboard  
capability significantly increased – multiple Dashboards reduced and 
consolidated; vi) increased operational effectiveness; vii) increased 
completeness and accuracy of available information through 
automation; ix) ease of use for every level of employee – across 
decision making, prioritisation, issue ownership etc; x) reduced effort 
associated with manual self-assessments by integration of automated 
host scanning data; xi) standardized and automated Security Officer 
functions allowing them to focus on higher value activities; xii) 
evidence capture for compliance with confidentiality, privacy and data 
protection assurance requirements; xiii) Incident Management 
reporting end to end – assisting in breach management, external 
communications management, reparation, and resilience; xiv) 
improved information asset handling, reducing multiple asset sets, 
consolidating into one repository; xv) provision of backup evidence 
and support; xvi) storage of Business Continuity Plans, alongside 
Business Impact Analysis (BIA) following correlation with existing Risk 
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Registers and Corrective Action Plans to reduce duplication of effort; 
xvii) collation and management of Access Control configuration 
information, user identification and authentication is maintained; xviii) 
Storage of Certificate Management information to ensure appropriate 
renewal; and xix) Appropriate records management within the system, 
access control is managed, separation of duties occurs and 
information is segregated on a need to know basis. 
6.3.8 The US Military IA Policy Chart, which has been subject to regular 
updates, provides an end to end view of the scale of the requirements 
and operational links, highlighting the plethora of available related 
NIST standards and guidance.  Note, in keeping with the researchers’ 
concern regarding nomenclature, and the imminent demise of the 
usage of IA , in June 2017, this was relabelled as the “DoD 
Cybersecurity Policy Chart”.  From the perspective of a practitioner, 
the framework structure is applicable more widely than its intended 
military audience (US DoD, 2017).  Taking this inspiration, the scale 
and scope of the documentation required to be housed in the i3GRC™ 
repository is represented in Figure 69 below. 
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Figure 69:  Documentation Content Required to Achieve Full GRC 
6.3.9 The researcher adapted and implemented the GRC conceptual, 
strategic, organisational, technical and cultural aspects identified by 
Gericke et al. (2009, p.10) realising the first instance of the i3GRC™ 
framework in the private sector case study [CS2].  These have been 
adapted Table 17 below, in particular noting the scope of the 
operational requirements. 
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Fragments of a GRC implementation 
Conceptual  Establish a governance process, identifying oversight and reporting requirements 
 Establish risk management based on an enterprise architecture 
 Establish a compliance management process 
 Establish a corporate wide GRC repository 
 Introduce risk and regulatory intelligence 
Strategic  Assure support of top management  
 Develop a GRC Strategy 
 Identify required metrics and measurement 
 Identify roles and responsibilities 
 Review  Cyber Risk Insurance options 
Organisational  Integrate the GRC solution into the planning processes 
 Integrate the GRC solution into the budgeting processes 
 Integrate the GRC solution into the reporting processes 
 Integrate the GRC solution into the investor relations processes 
 Adapt the business processes from which the GRC key f igures are identif ied 
 Identify third parties, contracts, relationships, service level agreements, third party 
management – ensuring adequate provisions for security and privacy 
 Integrate organisational units and roles 
Operational  Identify system, data and information assets 
 Conduct Business Impact Assessments (BIA) 
 Conduct Data Privacy Impact Assessments (DPIA) 
 Conduct privacy assessments 
 Conduct security assessments 
 Conduct risk assessments 
 If  appropriate, conduct FMEA – Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 Identify controls (safeguards) to reduce identif ied risks –responsive and mitigating 
 Produce, maintain and update Risk Registers and Risk Treatment Plans (RTP) 
 Implement controls 
 Prepare for Incidents – ensure Data Breach Response is adequate and up to date 
 Ensure Physical Security is part of the whole system design 
 Ensure Business Continuity Plans (BCP) are in place, accurate and up to date – 
based on the BIA results 
 Ensure Disaster Recovery Plans (DRP) are in place, accurate and up to date 
 Deliver a suite of supporting policies and procedures against which to both deliver 
the programme and measure it 
 Develop Monitoring programme 
 Develop Audit assessment programme 
 Develop Compliance assessment programme 
Technical  Prepare the steps necessary to set the GRC software system into operation 
 Integrate the GRC software system into the IS landscape 
 Do a f inal inspection and handover the GRC software system 
 Ensure system monitoring feeds into GRC Monitoring programme 
Cultural  Establish an expert team 
 Adapt incentive systems of executives/employees 
 Develop education and training 
 Conduct education and training road shows 
Table 17:  i3GRC™ Framework Elements, Adapted from Gericke et al. (2009), p.10 
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6.3.10 Figure 70 provides a visual of how the layers should be reconsidered 
in the context of i3GRC™ .  Technology cannot be allowed to continue 
to hold greater influence over the most important element – the 
business imperative. 
 
Figure 70:  The Availability Equation: PPT, Adapted from Microsoft (2003) 
 
6.3.11 Across the plethora of existing industry Standards, there are obvious 
core themes running through them.  They all have Requirements, 
many of which are duplicative when reduced to their constituent parts 
– have a security policy, run antivirus, patch systems, run vulnerability 
assessments.  An organisation need only do these activities once in 
order to provide the evidence required to show both compliance but 
also actual embedded IA in action. 
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6.3.12 The most effective way to measure any improvement programme is 
through a capability maturity model premise.  The maturity model 
applicable to i3GRC™ is shown in Figure 71 below. 
 
Figure 71:  Maturity Model for i3GRC™ 
 
6.3.13 This is an adaptation of a BSI STAR model.  The expectation is to 
transition from reactive to proactive – from Level 1, Initial grading 
through Level 2, Managed (Reactive), through Level 3 (Defined) – 
which should be the Minimum target level, through to Level 4  
(Quantitatively Managed) to Optimizing at Level 5. 
6.3.14 For the evaluation of the i3GRC™, the “The Inputs-Outputs-
Outcomes-Impacts” model has been adopted through the lens of 
organisational performance management.  The following scope 
applies to the feedback steps: i) Input - people, money, equipment, 
policies etc; ii) Activities - processes – training, logistics, 
management; iii) Output - services provided; services use knowledge; 
monitoring of what has been invested, done and produced; identifying 
how activities have supported partners achieving their objectives; iv) 
Dimensions / Scores 1 to 3 
4 to 6 
REACTIVE 
Minimum 
Target Level 
10 to 12 13 to 15 
Communication and 
Stakeholder Engagement 
No Formal 
Approach 4.5 Proactive Improving Innovating 
Policies, Plans, Processes and 
Procedures, and a Systematic 
Approach 
No Formal 
Approach 4.5 Proactive Improving Innovating 
Skills and Expertise 
No Formal 
Approach 4 Proactive Improving Innovating 
Ownership, Leadership and 
Management 
No Formal 
Approach 5 Proactive Improving Innovating 
Monitoring and Measuring 
No Formal 
Approach 4.5 Proactive Improving Innovating 
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Outcome - behaviour; secure practices – say, for example, using a 
gold disk to ensure consistency of server build; multiple data points 
providing evidence available for evaluation and review; and v) Impact 
- reduced risk[s]; no audit findings; retained customers as a result of 
satisfactory service received and no breaches experience). 
6.3.15 The Owl graphic depicted in Figure 72 provides a visualisation of this 
evaluation model, derived from the Kellogg Foundation Logic Model. 
 
Figure 72:  i3GRC™ Evaluation Model, Source: Kellogg (2004) 
 
6.4 Framework Testing and Evaluation 
6.4.1 In the private sector case study, i3GRC™ has been used as a 
mechanism to describe the required integration and education across 
multiple disciplines in order to move towards a more successful era of 
IP.  An end to end technical description is available in Appendix II, 
Section 10.3.  It is also in the early stages of being used in several 
small to medium enterprises in the UK. 
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6.4.2 Considering the identified level of complexity in an outsourced service 
provision environment, consulting is always involved to aid client 
understanding.  However, clarity is not helped if the terminology 
remains obscure.  Figure 73 below provides an example of the 
resultant corporate bloat and cost to businesses in both the public and 
private sectors. 
 
Figure 73:  Duplicative Consulting Language, Source: CS2 
 
6.4.3 What is being proposed above is a team structure that requires 
oversight from a CISO, supported by a Project or Programme 
Management Officer (PMO), then supported by five separate teams 
addressing areas that are not individual verticals, all of which have 
cross-cutting themes.  To separate out the work in this manner creates 
a level of duplication and redundancy that is costly and unacceptable.  
6.4.4 Integration is the measurement of GRC maturity.  A UCF is required in 
order to achieve the beating HEART, as described in the Private 
Sector Case Study [CS2].  This requires a level of intelligence and 
abstract understanding of what each of the governance frameworks – 
the required legislation, regulation, industry standards and contractual 
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obligations - are seeking to achieve.  This is represented in the 
pictorial at Figure 74 below, which is by no means comprehensive. 
 
Figure 74:  UCF Span 
 
6.4.5 GRC industry technology exists and the researcher has actively 
engaged in enhancements to one of these toolsets, as part of the 
theory development of i3GRC™.  The development work has seen the 
incorporation of the research theory building into the practical 
implementation of an IS that co-ordinates multiple organisational 
sensors and distils the available data into management level risk 
reporting.  This work is discussed in detail in Appendix II, HEART - a 
Technical Research Conference briefing paper.  There are many 
proponents of management theory (McGregor, Adair, Covey, Drucker, 
Peters et al.) and the InfoSoc appears to be moving the dynamics 
from Theory X to Theory Y (MIT Sloan, 2011). 
6.4.6 The work of Adair, developed in 1973, remains apposite.  The Adair 
model addresses: i) Task completion (what is needed to achieve the 
mission); ii) Creating and sustaining a group of people to complete the 
job (bui lding a sustainable team) and Nourish people within the team 
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(develop individuals).  Action centred leadership is required, where 
three overlapping circles of activity are in balance (Power, 2011, 
pp.16-17), as depicted in Figure 75 below. 
 
Figure 75:  Action-Centered Leadership Model, Source: John Adair cited in Power (2011, pp.16-
17) 
 
6.4.7 This is the model the researcher employed as underpinning i3GRC™ 
in CS2.  These elements were in balance within the i3GRC™ 
framework of operation and created an enviable employee work 
environment.  Early indications of application of the framework in 
commercial settings, in both the private sector global outsourcing 
organisation represented in the Case Study work (substantive 
evidence) and other small to medium enterprises (SMEs) (learned 
observations), is that it is proving workable and appropriate, providing 
focus and resonance for management reporting; alongside increased 
effectiveness in internal and external compliance evidence and audit 
reporting. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
6.5.1 A relatively simple solution is required to this complex and wicked 
problem.  Standard engineering and metadata modelling tools are 
available and remain relevant.  However, IG structures need to have 
methods of responding to organisational change and disruption, given 
how prevalent these are in the information age. 
6.5.2 The i3 elements remain the challenge – to have achieved successful 
communication and integration across the multiple information system 
requirements.  To inform, companywide, requires a communications 
strategy of sufficient depth and commitment to maintain interest and 
content and distribute this consistently to ensure that the dialogue is 
two-way thus enhancing reporting.  The importance of communication 
– its creation and delivery – has been a fundamental cornerstone of 
the IA work carried out by the researcher throughout her career.  
Strategies for formulating effective communication approaches were 
written up in one of the books published by the researcher (Simmons, 
2012a). 
6.5.3 The more effort that is applied to simplification of implementation, the 
greater the benefits, rather than creating vertical silos for every new 
trend that arises within the industry.  This is part of the discipline 
integration called for within this research study.  This requires strong 
leadership, something that is not always present.  Without leadership 
empowerment, governance cannot be effectively provided.  The theory 
behind this provides a lodestone to return to regularly.  Maintaining 
clarity on the meanings of the terminology used is also critical. 
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6.5.4 Table 18 below combines the gaps and barriers identified in Chapter 4 
and shows how utilisation of the i3GRC™ framework will facilitate the 
development of the IA profession, using the theories of 
professionalisation, when aligned with the existing CBK and skills 
frameworks, and when understood in the context of intentions to 
charter the profession. 
Finding, gap, barrier How i3GRC™ speaks to this 
IA practitioners do not understand 
the ontology of InfoSec nor that of 
IA 
Ensuring that understanding starts from an 
information-centric position will reduce the focus 
on either InfoSec or IA, placing it squarely on IP 
in the context of IG. This was identified as 
necessary in both Case Studies, through 
observation of phenomena and also through 
analysis of survey respondents and data 
analysis. 
The shift in dominant narrative 
from IA to cybersecurity creates a 
schism that could have unforeseen 
consequences, diluting and 
narrowing practitioner and policy-
maker understanding 
Operating with an understanding of the scope of 
the new framework has been designed to 
improve the skills of IA practitioners in the 
context of required organisational outcomes, 
expanding existing knowledge to incorporate IG. 
Self-taught practitioners devalue 
the long term success of 
professionalizing IA 
Understanding IA in the context of a continuum 
through to IG will improve the depth of 
capabilities for IA professionals, as tested 
through the utilisation of the framework in the 
private sector case study. 
Lack of IA understanding results in 
higher cost(s) in the short term due 
to over-reliance on suppliers and 
technology products selected to 
reduce risk 
Utilisation of a framework that actively 
encourages participation by all parts of the 
organisation and removes the IT centric focus is 
designed to reduce spend and duplication of 
effort whilst at the same time achieving 
improved IP and enhanced evidence of 
information related legislative, regulatory and 
standards compliance. 
IA practitioners do not understand 
the relationships between InfoSec, 
IA, and IG 
The ontology of IG, once clearly understood by 
IA practitioners, signifies the progression for IA, 
to IG, answering the third research question: Is 
there a next area of focus for security 
professionals within the roadmap progression 
from IT Security, through InfoSec through to IA?  
i3GRC™ has been designed to actively 
encourage this realisation and delivery, through 
knowledge expansion and thus improving the 
professional understanding of IA practitioners. 
Table 18:  How i3GRC™ supports IA Professionalism 
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6.5.5 In order to ensure the efficiency of the programme, IA practitioners 
must understand their relationship to other assurance functions and 
regularly liaise with, rather than compete with, each other, as is often 
the case in large organisations where power and politics override 
safety and security (ITGI, 2012, p.31).  Data aggregation is also vital – 
particularly within the context of Big Data, in order to ensure value.  
Data fusion leads to information superiority and without embedding IA, 
this is not possible. [10FS] 
6.5.6 The integration of multiple organisational disciplines is vital to the 
successful operation of the framework.  For example, as identified in 
the findings (4.11.20) the IA community needs stronger allegiance with 
Data Scientists in order to understand the data available, “data mining” 
it appropriately and harnessing the available intelligence contained 
therein, as depicted in Figure 76. 
 
Figure 76:  The Search for Information Treasure, Source: Leming (2015)  
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6.5.7 As a reframing of the Protect, Detect, Respond model, there are  three 
core elements to consider as part of the future strategy for the future 
of IA: i) RESPECT - people, personalities, politics, professionalism and 
psychology; ii) REFLECT - best practice, available resources – internal 
and external; and iii) PROTECT - information, the citizen, connected 
devices and Society as a whole. 
6.5.8 It is intended that organisational utilisation of the i3GRC™ model will 
help to stop the long, slow drift into failure as identified by Dekker 
(2011), embedding IA and ensuring its alignment alongside Corporate 
Governance within the IG spectrum.  Process and risk definitions are 
currently different for Internal Audit, Corporate Risk, Compliance and 
IT departments.  It requires tenacity of purpose in order to achieve the 
required governance at a content level, to agree on consistency, as 
well as at an organisational and responsibility level. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
7.1.1 This chapter summarises the achievements of the research; discusses 
the limitations that were faced during the study; and identifies the 
areas of research that require future development. 
7.1.2 At the outset of the study, the researcher was a full-time IG and IA 
consultant, for whom the majority of work had been undertaken in 
support of UK public sector IA and compliance related activities.  The 
researcher was conscious of a context in which the 21st century 
experience was one of continued and escalating data breaches, 
losses and impacts on the InfoSoc that put both individuals and nation 
states at risk of real harm as a result of poor implementation of the 
known best practices in IA. 
7.1.3 What was evident to the researcher was that gaps in IA practitioner 
understanding would hinder realisation of the vision and objectives of 
the United Kingdom (UK) Cyber Security Strategy (previously the UK 
IA Strategy) to “professionalise IA”.  Alongside this, the researcher 
was observing changing use of speech acts with the dominant 
narrative shifting from IA to cybersecurity.  The previous shift had been 
from InfoSec to IA. 
“The future is a refuge from the fierce competition of our forefathers….And the 
upshot of this modern attitude is really this: that men invent new ideals because 
they dare not attempt old ideals. They look forward with enthusiasm, because 
they are afraid to look back.” (Chesterton, 1910) 
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7.1.4 Lack of consensus of norms, with individuals identifying to multiple 
inter-related groups was exacerbated by a lack of homogeneity of 
values and viewpoints.  The researcher was therefore keen to test IA 
understanding through challenging the status quo and to further 
explore IA professionalism and the barriers to achieving the culture 
change required in order to embed IA as a “business as usual” activity. 
7.1.5 The overall research conclusion is that the IA profession is built on a 
weak foundation due to the lack of collective terminology 
understanding.  The prevailing IA discourse was built on the 
assumption (in the literature) that “the business” was aware of the 
available material and cognisant of the significance of elements 
described therein.  However, the research findings showed 
discrepancies with this assumption on the basis that the core 
principles of IA, as distinct from InfoSec, have not been widely 
understood across multiple disciplines, nor embedded for long enough 
as to be second nature to those who find themselves responsible for 
the protection of both critical information assets and infrastructure.   
Stronger professional identity could ensure less risk of loss of IA to 
cyber. 
7.1.6 Creating new models and definitions for the practitioner space must be 
done carefully, in the context of many existing examples.  The 
researcher believes that the motivations of those involved in IA study 
should be to ensure they have adequately researched the issues 
related to the business or industry sector within which they are 
studying, given that IA is not implemented in the abstract.  IA 
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practitioners should take advantage of the extensive existing BoK 
rather than duplicating it.  The results of these efforts should be the 
delivery of the required outcomes for effective IP, thus reduced breach 
levels reaching the news media on a regular basis, and increased trust 
and confidence in the ability of many to provide adequate IP. 
7.1.7 The information infrastructures upon which the InfoSoc is being built 
are known to be neither safe nor secure enough to act as a trusted 
basis for the digital society.  This research illustrates that enough 
progress has not been made to secure cyberspace, at a time when 
growing systemic threats and vulnerabilities have been threatening to 
undermine confidence in the security of the InfoSoc.  At the same 
time, the cyber threat is growing to a point where the risk is no longer 
tolerable.  This poses risks of broader societal disruption when there is 
increasing dependence on those same IS. 
7.1.8 Market forces alone have not ensured a sufficient level of trust and 
confidence in information networks.  UK Government continues to 
create new groups to address the challenge, without empowering local 
police to adequately tackle cybercrime.  Public policy needs to lead 
and shape the IA environment to ensure the InfoSoc was built on 
robust, resilient and secure foundations whilst business freedoms and 
civil liberties were protected (IAAC, 2002).  The lack of government 
mandate for standards has not resulted in the market place self-
levelling.  It is anticipated that the EU GDPR will result in data 
processing changes across Europe which will have a consequent 
effect on global businesses.  In the researcher’s opinion, the EU 
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GDPR is unlikely to be the panacea some enthusiasts believe it to be, 
given the narrow area it seeks to address.  Much of EU business is 
reliant on global service provision for which EU law is not the starting 
point.  However, combined with the Network Information Security (NIS) 
Directive there may be some positive impact on organisational 
adoption of the change agenda required to embed IA for the sake of 
appropriate IP. 
7.1.9 The concerns raised in this thesis are strategic and operational, 
national and organisational.  It is crucial for IA understanding to have 
context and scope, to be able to map to client and customer business 
attributes, technology and tools. 
7.1.10 The historical analysis also showed that the challenges have long 
since been identified and written about, both academically and i n the 
practitioner field.  However, the research evidence showed that a 
great many practitioners are wholly unaware of this history.  The lack 
of understanding is deepening and widening with the passage of time. 
7.1.11 It was therefore identified that an important aspect of the research was 
to review how best to join up the professionalism agenda and apply 
findings to the continual delivery and improvement of IA within the UK 
public sector and beyond – in keeping with the Governments’ post -
Poynter review requirements (Poynter, 2008).  The professional 
membership bodies need to consolidate to reduce the level of overlap 
and duplication, to be taken seriously and to mature the profession for 
future decades. 
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7.1.12 The requirement to implement controls in order to deliver IA is often at 
odds with business requirements for profit margin maintenance and 
market share increase.  As a result, IA practitioners have faced ethical 
challenges that were not being addressed by the IA professionalism 
agenda. 
7.1.13 In the researcher’s experience, excessive use (and regular 
misunderstanding) of acronyms presents a challenge.  This is 
something the IT industry, in particular, suffers from.  Living in an 
information rich and intelligence poor age is presenting challenges.  
With the level of confusing and loose terminology coming from the 
government, it is apparent that the skills crisis will not be solved until 
the ignorance crisis is solved.  What is in existence is an education 
and, more realistically, an understanding crisis rather than a skills 
crisis.  Education is vital to addressing the skills crisis but this must be 
broad education, with deep learning and broad thinking. 
7.1.14 Philosophical thinking and outcomes will help to raise the bar of IA 
understanding for the professionals involved.  Higher education 
institutions need to consider the impact of the approach of rebranding 
related InfoSec courses as “cyber”, given that this is not tackling the 
breadth of issues identified in this research as requiring attention.   
Masters level course content is required. 
7.1.15 There are many who have taken on a role that has an IA element with 
insufficient IA understanding or background learning and are thus not 
providing an appropriate level of service to their organisations. 
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7.1.16 The research showed evidence of practitioners working with 
colleagues who “turn off” at the mere mention of security and who 
refuse to engage as security is seen as an obstacle to project 
progression. 
7.1.17 There are a number of confusing mixtures of the concepts of ITSEC, 
InfoSec, IA, IG and, latterly, cybersecurity.  There are those 
practitioners who would advocate the consignment of the CIA triad 
and the Five Pillars into the waste disposal and insist that improved, 
directed terminology be used.  However, the research indicates that 
the shift in dominant narrative from IA to cybersecurity is creating a 
backward step, a wrong turn in the lifespan of IP - from IA to 
“Computer Security”, addressing the security challenges of computers 
operating in the cyber domain - reducing the effectiveness of the 
originally intended best, common and good IA practice.  The research 
showed that the millennial generation are hearing only the term  
cybersecurity and existing InfoSec professionals and IA practitioners 
are being side-lined. 
7.1.18 It was also felt that there was a need to review the impact of politics 
and culture on the shifting priorities that hamper the success of 
embedding best practice that should, by now, be inherent in well-
performing organisations.  The research showed that greater impact 
was experienced in budgetary terms as austerity continued to reduce 
spend. 
7.1.19 In the interconnected Information Age, there has never been greater 
access to information nor adoption of technology.  This information 
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rich, time poor society will experience ongoing anthropological impact 
and consequences of social change that require deep philosophical 
thinking.  This research has shown the volume of vertical structures 
that exist, none of which are effectively communicating nor show 
evidence of understanding the overlaps between each domain.  What 
is required in the immediate future is a more horizontal vision, with 
disruptive teams and emergent properties of social behaviour, with an 
understanding of systems engineering. 
7.1.20 Secure system design and engineering principles are not uniformly 
applied in order to provide IP.  System Design principles would dictate 
the need to protect the information contained within any system being 
designed.  In the IoT environment, where form follows function, speed 
to market and demand for market share in the priva te sector continues 
to drive down the adherence to required IA principles.  Anderson 
(1972, p.40) identified this challenge long ago in stating “merely saying 
a system is secure will not alter the fact that unless the security for a 
system is designed in at its inception, there are no simple measure to 
later make it secure”. 
7.1.21 Artificial Intelligence Security (AIS) and the need to provide assurance 
as to the ethics and security in place when deploying robotics will be 
another key factor in the coming years.  Even though there may be 
complexity that is introduced by the scale of the IoT, the core 
principles of data, application, network, systems and hardware 
security are still applicable. 
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7.1.22 The core principles of providing assurance remain relevant and are 
not limited to the IT profession alone or to IA practitioners.  What is 
required in order to fulfil the UK National Cybersecurity Strategy is 
implementation of the available best practice elements (and adhering 
to them), cognisant of the broader understanding of the breadth and 
depth of IA, beyond cyber. 
7.1.23 Schneier (2013a) wrote about the relatively perilous state of the 
internet (with interconnected platforms whose level of assurance 
cannot be guaranteed) and the need to be involved in shaping a 
stronger future.  However, the US OPM breach, exposing the PII of 
over 18 million individuals, which started in 2014, was an example of 
the worst that can happen as a result of not embedding IA best 
practice.  The fallout from the breach has not been fully realised.  The 
breach impacted the security clearance of many InfoSec professionals 
across the globe that had heretofore been providing government 
related consulting services.  This breach was yet another example of 
rampant industrialised insecurity, despite continued investment in 
cybersecurity. 
7.1.24 One of the stated aims of informatics is to design systems that deliver 
“the right information, to the right person in the right place and time, in 
the right way” (Cohn, 2015).  Advocates of IA have constantly been 
attempting to secure this delivery using the same quoted phrase and 
yet there is no evidence of them being aligned with informatics 
professionals.  Across the InfoSec and IA industry, informatics is 
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neither a term nor a scientific approach that has featured largely in any 
of the reviewed literature. 
7.1.25 The researcher would contend that the conclusions of this research 
present a reality where IA needs to combine with another complex 
system - IG – or it will fall by the wayside altogether, wrongly 
subsumed under the dominant narrative of cybersecurity.  The 
researcher contends that it is in this context that the expectations of 
the digital economy demand that the IA industry understands and 
embraces the ontology of IG in order to address the skills crisis faced.  
This required an expansion of the existing IA professional practitioner 
identity, knowledge and understanding, through the creation of a new 
meta framework: Integrated and Informed Information Governance, 
Risk, and Compliance - i3GRC™. 
7.1.26 As the Information Age enters its next phase, focussed on robotics, 
artificial intelligence, and the IoT, the broader spectrum of informatics 
and cybernetics need to be more aligned.  The adoption of Cyber 
Assurance would have been a better term along the IP continuum, 
although it becomes axiomatic.  Cyber comes from the Greek word for 
“governance” so the present shift in dominant narrative from IA to 
cybersecurity, could have been “governance security”.   
7.1.27 Whilst the governance of security is absolutely the aim, linguistically 
and practically speaking, the effective implementation of IA is required 
in order to appropriately secure cyber space.  IA is the objective goal 
of InfoSec activities; this includes cybersecurity.  IA is about 
assurance that everything has been done to achieve a risk posture 
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that suits the needs of the organisation.  As a system, IA has become 
more complex, particularly with the increasing reference to 
cybersecurity and globalisation and, in order to gain stability, more 
structure is required.  IA is what is achieved when good IG is in place.  
The researcher believes that the timing of i3GRC™ is apposite.  
7.1.28 Guarino (1995) identified that a phi losophical and linguistic approach 
was required and necessary for development of knowledge research.  
Hypnosis and linguistics are important aspects of the future of social 
engineering.  The research has been influenced by linguistics and 
cultural anthropology, appreciating how the use theory of meaning and 
the divergent locutionary aspects of IA and InfoSec interchangeability 
make a difference to the IA practitioner’s ability to implement what is 
required of them, based on their own sphere of understanding.  This 
can be summed up as having addressed the haecceity (thisness) and 
quiddity (whatness, essence) of IA - what makes it what it is, including 
the origins of its definition, beyond that of InfoSec.  These are ancient 
terms grounded in ontological research and address the etymology of 
the subject area (Aquinas, 1268; Norris, 2015, p.27). 
7.1.29 The research sought to test the level of IA understanding as a key 
aspect of addressing the skills crisis.  This research identified an 
observed need to implement a unified approach to Information 
Governance (IG) on a large organisation-wide scale, as a result of 
evolutionary work analysing survey respondents, supported by 
experience gained over time from engaged PAR involvement in the 
field being studied (Wadsworth, 1998). 
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7.1.30 The Grounded Theory premise was that if IA practitioners lack 
awareness of the fundamental principles of their area of responsibility, 
it will be impossible to close the gap identified through various studies 
and surveys and being addressed through the professionalism agenda 
spearheaded by the UK GCHQ/CESG. 
7.1.31 There is a link between this and “the half-life of a fact” – everything we 
know has an expiration date (Arbesman, 2013) – and this is never 
more evident than in the InfoSoc, in the information age, dealing with 
IS.   
7.2 Achievements of the Research 
7.2.1 This research forms a bridge between theoretical and practical 
application providing an articulate contribution to IA knowledge and 
practice, using the acquired knowledge to share and induct know-how 
into IA professionals (Fitzgerald, 2003).  It has achieved the aims and 
objectives specified in Chapter 1.  Specifically, this research has: i) 
advanced professional IA practice, shortening the identified gaps in IA 
understanding through practitioner led knowledge sharing; ii) 
evidenced that there is an extensive body of available material through 
the literature review and IA Chronology, much of which appears to be 
unknown to many who proclaim to be “security professionals” which 
does a great disservice to the success of the IA professionalism 
agenda; iii) evidenced that the next stage on the IP roadmap is IG, 
within the maturity from InfoSec to IA to IG (see Figure 1, Figure 24); 
and iv) provided a unique, new framework to provide organisations 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
286 | P a g e  
with a holistic roadmap to achieving IP through the implementation of 
i3GRC™ – integrated and informed information governance, risk and 
compliance. 
7.2.2 i3GRC™ is an instance of an ontology for addressing IA from an 
enterprise perspective and is the resulting mechanism of this PAR 
study to visualise and conceptualise the next steps required in the 
industry to improve practical IP.  i3GRC™ can be viewed as a 
framework within which to articulate an IP conversation.  It is not a 
framework for professionalism nor professionalisation.  IA and IG are 
the outcome of the achievement of IP.  IA must be achieved in order to 
be able to evidence IP.  The achievement is guaranteed through IG. 
7.2.3 The historical chronology is a secondary unique contribution.  The 
historical research method allowed for the review of core texts, 
highlighting key reports, reviewing them critically, reflecting on their 
historical impact, political, cultural, economic, geographic and other 
contexts which made sense of them.  This is presented through the 
lens of holistic organisational IG, rather than through the lens of 
InfoSec, using content analysis and educated guesses about how 
audiences interpreted multiple historical texts.  This research 
contributes scientifically to the IS knowledge base of the IA domain, 
joining it into that of IG and GRC more fully. 
7.2.4 A further aim was to identify that, beyond the hard barriers of funding 
and technology, there are soft barriers in the areas of people, process, 
and politics that are adding to the lack of understanding of the core 
concepts required to achieve IP.  In CS2, the researcher tested and 
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validated these corporate political aspects, including the need to 
enhance the OSI model to include more relevant top  layers.  Ongoing 
implementation of i3GRC™ continues to prove how valuable this 
approach is, producing management level reporting not previously 
visible to the organisation. 
7.3 Limitations of the Research 
7.3.1 Longitudinal research in the Information Age suffers a time lapse 
disadvantage that risks the resultant findings being deemed out of 
date, worse still, irrelevant to the practitioner circles to which they 
pertain.  Alongside this limitation, practitioner research can be prone to 
over usage of colloquial dialogue, rhetoric, acronyms, and 
interpretations, which require academic translation. 
7.3.2 Another limitation has been the amount and sensitivity of participants, 
the majority being practitioners in relevant fields.  The findings and the 
description of their circumstances has made it difficult to write them up 
in full without creating greater vulnerabilities for the represented 
individuals and organisations concerned. 
7.3.3 At each point in the research process, the researcher faced criticism 
that the subject area was prone to ultracrepidate (Norris, 2015, p.37).  
The researcher believes this has been necessary to achieve the best 
outcomes for the research and the future of the IA profession. 
7.4 Reflections 
7.4.1 If this research had been undertaken in 2015, rather than 2010, it is 
likely that there would have been greater reference to “cyber”.  Cyber 
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is the medium – it is neither the skillset, nor the tool, nor the 
technology, per se.  Digital sabotage is what has been happening, 
most of the time, not “cyber war”.  However, in May 2017, a new 
exercise was launched by the UK government to create a 
comprehensive "Cyber Security Body of Knowledge” (CyBok), to 
inform and underpin education and professional training for the cyber 
security sector.  Given all the BOK identified through this research it is 
difficult to estimate the value of this exercise.  It is clear from the 
prevailing rhetoric: the elimination of IA is almost complete.  This was 
a core concern at the start of the research and there is no evidence of 
the usage of cyber as the dominant narrative succeeding in improving 
the level of information protection. 
7.4.2 The research framework has been systematic but simple.  The focus 
has been on data collection and iterative analysis of the themes that 
emerged.  This research has been valuable in terms of generating a 
significant volume of relevant historical data regarding IA definitions 
and maturation.  The body of observed data collected during this 
research, and the systematic analysis that took place, enabled robust 
conclusions to be generated.  The Literature Review presented in 
Chapter 2 is extensive.  It could be argued that a more focused, 
narrow literature search would have made the academic location of 
this work more explicit.  The research carried out by Cherdantseva 
and Hilton (2013b) identified the observable body of work available 
relating to defining InfoSec compared to IA.  Their study and this one 
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have taken place entirely independently and yet in all likelihood 
crossed over in terms of timeline and original points of interest.  
7.4.3 This research has involved a constellation of ideas, influenced by a 
number of theoretical positions, in order to situate the work in the 
areas of professionalism and the information society, providing a 
dialectical relationship with old knowledge sufficient to create new 
knowledge as a result.  The research addressed questions which are 
reprised in Table 19 below: 
Q# Question Methods Utilised Results 
1 Can IA professional 
practice be 
improved through 
enhanced IA 
understanding? 
Historical Research,  
Survey and 
Interviews, 
Contextual and 
Discourse Analysis 
This formed the basis of the ontological 
question, substantiating the reality 
identified through the research rather than 
the perceptions of those who have blurred 
definitions over time.  Through critical 
research, the lack of IA understanding has 
been empirically evidenced.  
2 How has the 
extensive body of 
knowledge 
influenced 
professionals? 
Survey and 
Interviews, 
Contextual and 
Discourse Analysis 
Discussed in detail in the Findings, 
Chapter 4.  Ill-informed, ill-educated 
practitioners relying on the inconsistent 
interpretation of security terminology and 
resultant requirements are at the heart of 
the issue of ongoing breaches.  The 
interlocking themes have been articulated 
as a narrative throughout this research.  
3 Is there a next area 
of focus for security 
professionals within 
the roadmap 
progression from IT 
Security, through 
InfoSec through to 
IA? 
Contextual and 
Discourse Analysis, 
PAR/Case Study  
Chapter 5 offers an alternative 
understanding of conceptual foundations 
and managerial frameworks of IA.  
Through the PAR case studies, 
practitioner research was shown to be 
able to embed the research within practice 
in ways that academic research cannot. 
4 Is it possible to 
produce a 
framework suitable 
to support the route 
from IA to IG? 
Grounded Theory, 
PAR/Case Study  
The research identified the need for a new 
framework to address the findings, 
i3GRC™, extrapolated in Chapters 5 and 
6.  Implementing an Integrated and 
Informed IG, Risk and Compliance™ 
framework across any organisation in any 
sector will realise IA and provide end-to-
end IP.  This framework provides a 
roadmap for a future of mature IG.  The 
framework was in the process of being 
implemented in CS2, though the 
researcher’s influence on the 
implementation was cut short as a result 
of corporate change. 
Table 19:  Research Questions Results Revisited 
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7.4.4 This practitioner research highlighted interdisciplinarity throughout, as 
well as through the theory building, identifying the cross disciplinary 
requirements for future success.  IA is multi-faceted and is not just 
“down to IT”, nor is it “down to Security”.  Security is ultimately the 
responsibility of everyone and, as such, IA should be embedded into 
the roles and responsibilities of everyone.  Legal, data, audit, 
compliance, IG, InfoSec and IT teams need to unify throughout 
organisations in order to achieve a comprehensive view of their 
information and extract value from the interactions.  In order to grow, it 
is necessary to ensure wider thinking and action have been 
encouraged. 
7.4.5 The fulcrum of this research has been the UK Cyber Security Strategy 
(op.cit.).  The findings support the theory that tackling the ability to 
ensure any single country provides a secure environment within which 
to operate in a complex, chaotic, real world connected setting requires 
a holistic and systematic approach, through the implementation of the 
i3GRC™ framework. 
7.4.6 The 1980s saw the rise of computing in the workplace and the  
necessary IP considerations have already been undertaken, the 
research has been done (Moreton and Chester, 1997, p.59).  
However, to date, there remains a lack of tangible evidence of 
successful implementation of embedded security, safety, and 
protection of information assets.  This thesis has evidenced that other 
priorities have prevailed. 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
291 | P a g e  
7.4.7 New regulations continue to be developed, along with greater 
demands for transparency; accurate information about company 
operations; robust and comprehensive risk management; evidence of 
regulatory compliance and efficient governance.  Changes in IG 
practices will also be required.  Ethical custodianship of data will need 
to be established in the IoT environment where more data is required 
to be shared in order to achieve expected efficiencies. 
7.4.8 Delivering IA means working within a complex adaptive system (CAS) 
for which both 100 per cent security and 100 per cent risk-free are 
unachievable goals (Hercock, 2009).  Therefore, the provision of 
complete assurance is bound by a depth of understanding of the 
scope of the system(s) and their intricacies.  The transfer of risk 
through the reliance on insurance is an option in the private sector but 
is not similarly available to the public sector. 
7.4.9 The researcher is affected by a society that continues to produce 
multiple publications on a subject area and yet has less and less well-
informed individuals in the roles where the information would be of 
most value.  The overriding impression at the end of the research is 
that enough has been written, particularly the entreaty that the IA 
sector must communicate with others, engage in outreach, be mindful 
of culture (Desman, 2002).  Post-structuralism, identifying causes of 
incidents, errors or breaches is more complex. 
7.4.10 Repetition creates legitimacy and normalizes the deviant (Dekker, 
2011, p.198).  Accuracy is a Newtonian-Cartesian idea and suggests 
that we can create one definitive account of events based on certainty 
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and methodological precision.  However, the Sony and Ashley 
Madison breaches indicated that whilst the immediate judgement is 
usually “cyber-attack”, the reality has turned out to be an “inside job”, 
usually a disgruntled employee – something that the industry has long 
been warned to watch out for (Dekker, 2011, p.199). 
7.4.11 In a complex system, there is no objective way to determine whose 
view is right and whose view is wrong (Dekker, 2011, p.200).  The 
requirements for Breach Identification and Incident Management 
struggle with this dilemma - reparation after an event on the one hand 
and protection from attack in advance on the other hand.  Ultimately, 
this is nothing new.  The castle walls and moat have always required 
defence. 
7.5 Suggestions and Future Work 
7.5.1 In this section, suggestions are made as to what future work should be 
carried out.  The nature of the ontological discussions possible in the 
future is to be welcomed.  Depending on the starting point of the 
researcher, and the direction taken, the benefit of the triangulation of 
cross referring resources helps to produce a more robust outcome. 
7.5.2 This research has opened up the following avenues of research for 
others to pursue: i) continued incremental enhancement of the 
i3GRC™ framework to allow the conversion of the framework to a fully 
mature roadmap that would effectively address the requirements of 
organisations to embed IP, as well as syntax development to support 
the graphical representation; ii) development of a competency 
framework to overlay IG on the IA competency framework, and align 
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with the Valentine (2015) competency framework research carried out 
to achieve Enterprise Technology Governance; iii) research into the 
confusion and misunderstanding(s) caused by excessive use of 
acronyms as shorthand for communication; iv) ensuring improved 
agenda correlation and membership consolidation focus across the 
Institute of Directors (IoD), the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
(CIPD), Chartered Quality Institute (CQI) and the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) with regard to embracing IG; v) review of the quality and 
adjudication of the provision of existing cyber related courses to 
assess adequacy of scope; vi) analysis of risk versus reward dynamics 
of business in relation to its impact on IA professionalism; vii) 
identification of the impact on future security models, where data 
losses experienced have escalated exponentially and, in parallel, the 
level of public dismay dims as they become inured; viii) investigation 
into the connection of professionalisation and ethics to i3GRC™and ix) 
analysis of the barriers to adopting a reservation of title and/or 
reservation of function (Bott, 2005) adaptation to the existing 
professional membership bodies structure. 
7.5.3 The researcher has worked closely with Goodger (2011a/b), 
throughout the period of this study and intends to continue to do so 
where the lines of enquiry have converged: the InfoSoc, Big Society, 
and the IoT.  Goodger’s work is looking at the integrated Information 
Ecosystem (aka Cyberspace) on the premise that Understanding, 
Protecting, Sustaining and Nurturing are the keystone capabilities 
required to safeguard the UK’s.  This is addressing small world 
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thinking, providing a Lodestone for future organisational framework 
development (Goodger, A. and Atkinson, S. R. (2011a/b). 
7.5.4 The researcher intends to work directly with David Miller on Active 
Management and Active Governance, addressing large IT outsourcing 
arrangements and contract management (Miller and Woodman, 2015). 
7.5.5 Finally, the researcher intends to work with leading UK academics to 
establish links between ISMS and i3GRC™.  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
295 | P a g e  
 
 
Part 4a – References and Bibliography 
 
Due to the scale of the historical review, an extensive Bibliography is listed 
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Part 4b - Appendices 
 
This section contains: 
Appendix I: Original Papers etc. 
 Original Papers 
 MSc in IG Course Curriculum 
 Annual University Posters 
 Survey Questionnaires 
 Research Demographics 
 Survey Memos 
 IA Search methodology used 
 Other IA Information Sources 
 Related Standards and Best Practice Resources 
 IA Definitions 
Appendix II 
 Public Sector Case Study [CS1] 
 Private Sector Case Study [CS2] 
Appendix III 
 IA Chronology 
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10 APPENDIX I: ORIGINAL PAPERS etc. 
10.1 List of Original Papers Prepared 
1. Simmons (2008) [book cover below] 
2. Simmons (2009) in Trim and Caravelli (2009) - A Journey Towards 
Resilience: Lessons from the British Experience, pp.131-148 [book cover 
below] 
3. Simmons (2011) MSc IG – Curriculum [below] 
4. Simmons (2012a) [book cover below] 
5. Simmons (2015a) [book cover below] 
The following articles are included: 
 Simmons (2012b) [below] 
 Simmons (2015b) [below] 
The following Posters are represented: 
 2011 [below] 
 2013 [below] 
 2014 [below] 
 2015 [below] 
The following Questionnaires are represented: 
 IAAC Review Questionnaire [below] 
 Private Sector Review Questionnaire [below] 
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10.2 Presentations Delivered 2009-2017 
1. Tackling the barriers to achieving best practice in IA in the UK Public 
Sector, ENISA Conference, London, 15 May 2009; 
2. Tackling the barriers to achieving best practice in IA in the UK Public 
Sector, ARCS Conference, Oxford, 17 June 2009; 
3. Tackling the barriers to achieving best practice in IA in the UK Public 
Sector, ARCS Workshop, Oxford, 1 June 2010 ; 
4. IA in the UK Public Sector: Tackling the barriers to achieving best 
practice, BCS IRMA, London, 14 December 2010; 
5. Addressing the Human Factors, Webinar presentation, November 2011; 
6. Professionalism and IA, BCS Gloucestershire, 17 January 2012; 
7. IA in the UK Public Sector: Tackling barriers to achieving best practices, 
an update, BCS IRMA, London, 14 March 2012; 
8. Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) IA: 
are we sure what it means and why we are doing it?, Cheltenham, 
Thursday 10 January 2013; 
9. Cyber Schmyber: The Relevance of Principles, presentation at BCS 
SecureSouthWest, 25 March 2013, London – slides available at: 
http://www.securesouthwest.com/presentations/SSW2/HPEnterpriseServ
ices.pdf; 
10. Transparency vs. Compliance, presented at Socitm SouthWest 
Conference on the topic of, 21 June 2013; 
11. The Skills Deficit: Is it Real?, presentation at IISP/Crest Congress, 19 
March 2014, London; 
12. Attended The Cyber Dimension of Global Security Challenges, Nigel 
Jones Senior Research Fellow and Director Cyber Masters Programme 
Cranfield University at the Defence Academy, 12 June 2014, 
Cheltenham; 
13. Systems, Synthesis and Synergy – where SCIT meets FoSS - 
presentation at Systems, Synthesis and Synergy, The Faculty of Social 
Sciences PhD Research conference 2014, Monday 30 th June 2014, 
University of Wolverhampton; 
14. Securing an organisation with Global Reach, presentation at Cranfield 
CyberSecurity Conference, Swindon, 21 October 2014; 
15. Cyber Schmyber, presentation at Global Institute of Cyber, Security and 
Intelligence (GICIS) CyberSecurity Intelligence (CSI) launch event, 
London, 21 January 2015; 
16. Making Friends with Internal Audit at ISACA Ireland Conference 2015 – 
Trust, Security, Agility, 23 October 2015, Available at: 
http://www.isaca.org/chapters5/Ireland/conference/pages/Agenda.aspx; 
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17. i3GRC – what’s that all about then, eh?! Keynote Presentation at PRISM 
International Conference, Barcelona, 28 October 2015, Available at: 
http://www.prismintl.org/News-Press/PRISM-Press-Releases/prism-
2015-europe-conf-barcelona.html; 
18. Cyber threats: hiding in plain sight, at ESRD 2015 – European Security 
Research: The Next Wave, 4 November 2015, Available at: 
http://www.esrdublin2015.eu/; 
19. There is nothing new under the sun, Data Protection Day presentation, 
Irish Computer Society, 28th January 2016; 
20. Cyber credibility crisis, BCS: University of Worcester, 4th April 2017; 
21. Cyber credibility crisis, BCS: London – Information Risk Management & 
Assurance (IRMA) Specialist Group, 11th April 2017; 
22. Cyber credibility crisis, AFCEA: Cheltenham, 11th May 2017; 
23. Terminology and Professionalism, BCS: London - Safe Security 
Research Day, 31st October 2017. 
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10.3 MSc in Information Governance – Curriculum Course flyer 2011 
Information Governance 
“Information Governance” (IG) is the set of multi-disciplinary structures, policies, 
procedures, processes and controls implemented to manage information on all media 
in such a way that it supports an organisation's immediate and future regulatory, legal, 
risk, environmental and operational requirements.  Central to IG is an understanding of 
the journey from IT Security, through Information Security (InfoSec), to Information 
Assurance (IA) – all of which are about maturing to a position of being able to 
demonstrate justified confidence in security measures, processes and practices in the 
management of information. Whilst IA has been seen to be the growth area in recent 
years, maturing out of InfoSec, the ultimate goal must be to embed a full IG framework 
across all organisations in order to fully embrace the full breadth of information related 
legislation, regulation, standards, policies, procedures, technology and people issues 
that need to be managed, handled and protected in today’s cyber dominated 
environment. 
Course Modules 
1. Principles of IA and beyond [IA] 
2. Standards and Best Practice Management of InfoSec [BP] 
3. Software Assurance [SA] 
4. Data Protection and Privacy [DP] 
5. Records Management [RM] 
6. Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery / Resilience [BC] 
7. Research Methods 
8. Dissertation 
 
Course Objectives 
The overall objective of the group of modules provided is to develop skills and 
techniques in IG to ensure that when you apply these principles in your organisation 
you will protect the right thing in the right way, from a pragmatic standpoint with a well-
Grounded Theory of understanding and will do so transparently. The IRM approach will 
help to ensure that you are protecting the "right thing", that is the information assets 
which matter most to the organisation. The technical InfoSec content will help to ensure 
that you are protecting it in the right way by selecting the most appropriate security 
control(s) which fit(s) the purpose. The IG principles will help you to do this 
transparently, that is, in such a way that an independent audit or assessment body can 
be satisfied that your measures, processes and practices comply with current 
regulations, legislation and standards and deliver the right level of assurance to 
stakeholders - citizens, customers, partners or shareholders.  
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Target 
This MSc course in IG is carefully designed to provide a comprehensive treatment of 
the broad subject areas. The course should appeal to managers who would like to gain 
a deeper understanding of IG and the principles for good information management and 
handling, enabling technologies and current best practices and, at the same time, it 
should appeal to IT professionals who would like to gain a broad treatment of the many 
facets of the information at the heart of all that they will encounter. Because of the 
speed of changes and innovations in ICT, IG practitioners are likely to find the course 
(or some of its modules) useful in order to keep abreast of the latest technologies and 
to deploy the best IG practices.  
Entry Requirements 
Normally a 1st or 2nd class honours degree or relevant professional equivalent.  
Alternatively, a lesser qualification together with appropriate work experience may be 
acceptable.  Recent graduates in IT or in management who would l ike to specialise in 
IG through a full-time programme.  Also those already in employment who wish to keep 
abreast of new developments and update their skills through part-time studies or by 
taking specific modules in block mode.  We also welcome applications from Honours 
graduates of other disciplines which have significant experience in the IT sector and 
beyond, particularly legal and ethical. 
The course includes the following units: 
IA Principles and beyond [IA] 
 IG Overview 
 IG Framework 
 IA – history – how did we get here? 
 Overview of relevant information-
based Legislation 
 Data Handling Review and other 
Government led initiatives 
 IA Maturity Model (IAMM) 
 Culture, Ethics and Professionalism 
 Internal and External Audit 
Data Protection and Privacy [DP] 
 Data Protection Principles 
 Maintaining public trust and respecting 
personal privacy 
 Information Sharing/Data Transfers – benefits 
and constraints 
 Privacy Impact Assessments 
 Gaining consent, Direct Marketing 
 Managing cookies  
 Data Quality management  
 Data breach management – and links to 
Security Incident Management  
 Data Protection in the workplace 
 Use of personal data in system testing 
Criminal Offences and the ICO’s power to fine  
 Handling subject access requests (SARs) 
 Binding corporate rules 
 PIMS and BS10012 
Standards and Best Practice 
Management of InfoSec [BP] 
 Information Risk Management (IRM),  
Risk Appetite and Risk Culture,  
Governance, Risk, and Compliance 
(GRC) 
Records Management [RM] 
 Records Management Program (RMP) 
 Records and Information Management (RIM) 
 Standards (ISO15489) and compliance 
 Vital and historic records  
 Archives, destruction, retention schedules   
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 ISO 27001 and ISMS 
 Payment Card Industry  Data Security  
Standard (PCI DSS) 
 COBIT, COSO, ITIL 
 Handling records in mergers and acquisitions  
 RM requirements in system decommissioning  
 RM links with DR and backup 
 RM links with email management and 
archiving  
 RM links with file plan and directory  
structures  
Software Assurance [SA] 
 How cyber security fits in 
 Threats and vulnerability analysis 
 Security controls (access control 
models and mechanisms) 
 Usable security 
 Designing security in 
 Firewalls and data encryption 
 Privacy Enhancing Technologies  
 Defense in depth 
 Cryptography  
 Identity Management  
 Human factors in security design 
Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery /  
Resilience [BC] 
 Including InfoSec in the business continuity  
management process 
 Business continuity and risk assessment 
 Business continuity planning framework,  
BS25999 
 Business Impact Analysis 
 Testing, maintaining and re-assessing 
business continuity plans 
 Selecting, developing and implementing 
disaster recovery plans  
 Embedding a resilience strategy  
 Addressing Counter terrorism in the planning 
Research Methods 
Topics on IA and IG 
Dissertation 
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10.4 Front cover of first book published 2009 
 
Figure 77:  Simmons (2009) 
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10.5 Front cover of Resilience book published 2009 
 
Figure 78:  Trim and Caravelli (2009) 
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10.6 Front cover of second book published 2012 
 
Figure 79:  Simmons (2012a) 
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10.7 Front cover of second book reprint 2014 
 
Figure 80:  Simmons (2015a) 
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10.8 ISSA Journal Article published 2015 
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Figure 81:  Simmons (2015b) 
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10.9 ISSA Journal Article published 2012 
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Figure 82:  Simmons (2012b) 
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10.10 PhD Annual Review Poster 2011 
 
 
Figure 83:  PhD Annual Review Poster 2011 
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10.11 PhD Annual Review Poster 2013 
 
Figure 84:  PhD Annual Review Poster 2013  
  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
395 | P a g e  
10.12 PhD Annual Review Poster 2014 
 
Figure 85:  PhD Annual Review Poster 2014 
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10.13 PhD Annual Review Poster 2015 
 
Figure 86:  PhD Annual Review Poster 2015  
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10.14 IAAC Review Questionnaire 2010 
Information Assurance 
A Review 
What does IA mean to/for you and how has this changed? 
“IA – valuing and protecting information” 
IAAC has been fundamental to shaping the IA agenda and thinking during the last 
decade.  Our last in depth analysis of understanding and attitudes towards IA took 
place in 2002. Revisiting the topic in this way should garner lessons learnt from 
experiences during the past eight years.  This will help to ensure that the UK 
Information Society encompassing Government, Private Sector and the Individual 
enjoys an information environment that is robust, resilient and secure for the 21st 
Century. 
Overview 
1.  If possible, can you remember when you first heard the term “IA” used? 
1. What does "IA" mean to you as a concept? (i.e. what is included / excluded?)  
Terminology 
2. How long (if at all) have you been using “ IA” as a term in your organisation?   
3. Is the term IA useful in your organisation (in terms of winning hearts and minds 
and changing behaviour, if required)?  If not, what is a better term for 
businesses and other operational organisations to use? 
4. Further to question 4, has your organisation changed its terminology over the 
last decade and, if so, what terms have been used, when and why were they 
changed? 
Drivers and Obligations  
5. To the best of your understanding, how different are public, private, academic 
and third sectors in meeting IA legislative, regulatory, statutory and standard 
compliance objectives?  Expand. 
6. What is the perceived impact(s) of not protecting Information Assets? 
7. Has your Board prioritised IA activities appropriately to address current 
information risks? 
8. Lower insurance premiums would be a significant factor for encouraging the 
adoption of best practices in IA – agree/disagree/ discuss: 
Standards and Measurements 
9. Is there a particular IA/InfoSec/IT standard that dominates your organisation’s IA 
policy?  
10. How do you measure the benefits of compliance with these standards (i.e. using 
particular metrics, key performance indicators [KPIs] etc)? 
11. How do you measure the benefits of IA (i.e. maturity modelling)? 
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Impact of Culture and Politics 
12. Would you say that changes in the political landscape have had an impact 
(either positive or negative) in terms of the ability of either a public or private 
sector body to deliver their respective services?  Explain/elaborate. 
13. Expanding on your thoughts/response to question 6, what impact (if any, 
positive or negative) has changes in public sector culture and attitude towards 
information assurance had on the abilities of the public sector, sub-contractors, 
clients and customers to protect information assets appropriately? 
Professionalism of ICT and IA 
14. To what extent has the progression of professionalising the industry (both ICT 
and IA) impacted positively (or negatively) in terms of embedding the 
requirements of IA within the relevant roles and organisational structures?  
Explain 
15. Where would you go for advice with regard to seeking professionals in this 
space – in terms of identifying what the accepted “common BoK” is (or should 
be) and how to access the approved qualified professionals? 
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10.15 Private Sector Review Questionnaire 2012 
What does Information Assurance mean to/for you and  
how has this changed over time? 
“IA – through the lens of Systems Theory” 
We are constantly hearing about a “cyber skills crisis” these days.  The central premise 
of this PhD research is that if we better understood the fundamentals of information 
assurance (IA) and its journey from computer security, through IT security to InfoSec 
and thence to IA, we would have a clearer perception of reality that holds less of a 
“crisis” and more of a need to engage with the many professionals already working hard 
across the industry.  IA is not yet fully accepted as an academic discipline so we have a 
way to go in explaining what it’s all about. Applying Systems Theory to it helps to think 
through the various component parts of what actually makes up IA and review them 
appropriately.  I would be very grateful if you would please complete the questionnaire 
below and be part of that educational process to improve the landscape for us all. 
Overview 
1. If possible, can you remember when you first heard the term “IA” used? 
2. What does "IA" mean to you as a concept? (i.e. what is included / excluded?)  
Terminology 
3. How long (if at all) have you been using “ IA” as a term?   
4. Is the term IA useful in your area/team/section/group….?  If not, what is a better 
term to use? 
5. Further to question 4, have you changed terminology usage over the last 
decade and, if so, what terms have been used, when and why were they 
changed? 
Drivers and Obligations  
6. How different are public, private, academic and third sectors in meeting IA 
legislative, regulatory, statutory and standard compliance objectives? (i.e. from 
your perspective, what differences do you see in client understanding of the 
issues) Expand. 
7. What is the perceived impact(s) of not protecting Information Assets? 
8. How do you measure the benefits of IA? 
9. Lower insurance premiums would be a significant factor for encouraging the 
adoption of best practices in IA – agree/disagree/discuss (i.e. would clients use 
this option and would it really help?): 
Standards and Measurements 
10. Is there a particular IA/InfoSec/IT standard that dominates your IA approach?  
11. How do you measure the benefits of compliance with these standards? 
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Impact of Culture and Politics 
12. Would you say that changes in the political landscape have had an impact 
(either positive or negative) in terms of the ability of either a public or private 
sector body to deliver their respective services?  Explain. 
13. Expanding on your thoughts/response to question 6, what impact (if any, 
positive or negative) has changes in public sector culture and attitude towards 
IA had on the abilities of the public sector, sub-contractors, clients and 
customers to protect information assets appropriately? 
Professionalism of ICT and IA 
14. To what extent has the progression of professionalising the industry (both ICT 
and IA) impacted positively (or negatively) in terms of embedding the 
requirements of IA within the relevant roles and organisational structures?  
Explain 
15. Where would you go for advice with regard to seeking professionals in this 
space – in terms of identifying what the accepted “common BoK” is (or should 
be) and how to access the approved qualified professionals? 
16. If you were to recommend one good, informative, educational book to a new 
Account/Privacy Security Officer to read, what would it be? 
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10.16 Research Demographics 
Table 20 provides the demographics for participants in both survey research 
and semi-structured interviews, coded as follows: 
E = Email correspondence 
ES = Survey respondent with extra email input and conversational follow-up 
ESk = Emails and Skype semi-structured interview 
F = Face-to-Face semi-structured interview 
FE = Face-to-Face semi-structured interview and email follow-up 
FS = Face-to-Face semi-structured interview and survey completion 
S = Survey respondent  
T = Telephone semi-structured interview 
Te = Teleconference with global private sector clients, i3GRC™ explained 
 
Code Sector Respondent 
Type 
Respondent 
Area 
Where How 
1F Academia Lecturer Industry expert UK Face-to-face  
2F Private Consultant  InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Face-to-face  
3F Private Consultant  IA Practitioner UK Face-to-face  
4T Private Consultant  Forensic 
specialist 
UK Telephone 
5F Private Consultant  IA Practitioner UK Face-to-face  
6F Private Consultant  IA Practitioner UK Face-to-face  
7ES Private Consultant  Politics UK Email and 
Survey  
8E Government Practitioner CSIA (as was) UK Email 
9E Private Consultant  Private Sector 
Outsourcing 
(Consulting) 
UK Email 
10FS Government Practitioner Defence, MOD UK Face-to-face 
and Survey 
11E Private Lawyer Legal UK Email 
12E Private Consultant  InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Email 
13F Public  Practitioner The National 
Archives  
UK Face-to-face  
14F Government Consultant  Ex military UK Face-to-face  
15ES Private Consultant  Industry SME 
(Smart Cards) 
UK Email and 
Survey  
16FS Private Consultant  IA Practitioner UK Face-to-face 
and Survey 
17E Private Consultant  InfoSec 
Professional  
USA Email 
18E Academia Practitioner Academia UK Email 
19F Private Consultant  InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Face-to-face  
20F Academia Lecturer IA Practitioner UK Face-to-face  
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Code Sector Respondent 
Type 
Respondent 
Area 
Where How 
21E Academia Lecturer Academia, IAAC UK Email 
22F Private Practitioner EU Skills Agenda Ireland Face-to-face  
23F Private Consultant  Cyber Security 
KTN (as was) 
UK Face-to-face  
24T Public  Practitioner London Met 
Police 
UK Telephone 
25E Private Professional 
body 
Information 
Records 
Management  
Society (IRMS) 
UK Email 
26F Public  Practitioner CESG UK Face-to-face  
27E Private Professional 
body 
(IISP UK Email 
28T Private Practitioner Cyber Security 
Champions 
UK Telephone 
29E Government Practitioner National 
Infrastructure 
Security Co-
ordination Centre 
(NISCC) 
UK Email 
30E Private Consultant  InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Email 
31ES Private Consultant  InfoSec 
Professional, 
consulting 
UK Email and 
Survey  
32ESk Academia Lecturer InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Email and 
Skype 
33Te Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
USA Teleconference 
34F Private Practitioner Software 
Management – 
Security 
Assurance 
USA Face-to-face  
35F Private Consultant  ISO 27001 Expert  USA Face-to-face  
36Te Private Practitioner Large global 
payments 
business  
USA Teleconference 
37Te Private Practitioner “Big 4”Audit Firm 
(A) 
USA Teleconference 
38E Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
USA Email 
39FE Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
USA Face-to-face 
and emails  
40Te Private Practitioner CIO, Worldwide 
Travel company  
USA Teleconference 
41E Private Practitioner GRC Professional 
(A) 
USA Email 
42E Private Practitioner GRC Professional 
(B) 
USA Email 
43F Private Practitioner “Big 4” Audit Firm  USA Face-to-face  
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Code Sector Respondent 
Type 
Respondent 
Area 
Where How 
44F Private Practitioner “Big 4 Audit Firm 
(B) 
UK Face-to-face  
45S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional, 
Healthcare 
USA Survey  
46S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional, 
retail  
USA Survey  
47S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
Australia Survey  
48S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
Australia Survey  
49S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Survey  
50S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional, 
Healthcare 
USA Survey  
51S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
USA Survey  
52S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Survey  
53S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
USA Survey  
54S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
Ireland Survey  
55S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Survey  
56S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
UK Survey  
57S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Professional  
Singapore Survey  
58S Private Practitioner InfoSec 
Management  
Australia Survey  
59S Private Practitioner InfoSec Policy 
leadership 
USA Survey  
60S Public  Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
61S Public  Practitioner CESG UK Survey  
62S Public  Consultant  Ex military UK Survey  
63S Public  Consultant  Ex military UK Survey  
64S Public  Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
65S Third Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
66S Academia Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
67S Private Practitioner IA SME 
Consultancy  
UK Survey  
68S Private Consultant  Independent IA 
consultant  
UK Survey  
69S Public  Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
70S Private Consultant  Independent IA 
consultant  
UK Survey  
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Code Sector Respondent 
Type 
Respondent 
Area 
Where How 
71S Public  Practitioner National Health 
Service (NHS) 
UK Survey  
72S Public  Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
73S Public  Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
74S Private Consultant  Independent IA 
consultant  
UK Survey  
75S Private Practitioner Military UK Survey  
76S Government Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
77S Government Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
78S Government Practitioner Local, IA 
Practitioner 
UK Survey  
79S Government Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
80S Public  Practitioner IA Practitioner UK Survey  
81S Government Practitioner Leeds CC, IA 
Practitioner 
UK Survey  
82F Public  Practitioner Healthcare 
professional  
UK Face-to-face  
83F Private Practitioner Manufacturing 
professional  
UK Face-to-face  
84F Private Practitioner InfoSec 
professional  
UK Face-to-face  
85ET Government Practitioner InfoSec 
professional  
UK Email and 
Telephone 
86F Government Practitioner InfoSec 
professional  
UK Face-to-face  
87F Government Practitioner InfoSec 
professional  
UK Face-to-face  
88ES Private Practitioner InfoSec 
professional  
UK Email and 
Skype 
89ET Academia Practitioner InfoSec 
professional  
UK Email and 
Telephone 
90ET Private Practitioner InfoSec 
professional  
UK Email and 
Telephone 
Table 20:  Research Demographics 
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10.17 Survey Memos 
The following are respondent comments taken from the Questionnaire returns 
and Interviews which have been utilised in the discourse analysis. 
Terminology 
Code Response commentary 
5F IA is an expansion of the InfoSec discipline 
6F IA fairly new in 2002 
10FS It’s a philosophy – need to tolerate risk  and highlight the value of risk  tak ing 
Level 1 = personal data 
Level 2 = business critical data 
Level 3 = robust 
10FS Do IAOs actually look after data?  Culture change plan  
10FS Much more focus on information – have an IM Strategy 
10FS For traction / prominence / focus – then risk  management  
10FS Cyber defence / Cyber security / Cyber attack - 3 way 
10FS Challenging ambiguity in an area of no clarity 
10FS The higher you get the less you know 
10FS Requires gravitas, confidence 
10FS Interdepartmental InfoSec officers, proactively adapting governance policy 
10FS IA delivery group in Cabinet Office (under John Suffolk ) – John Taylor runs it at MOD 
as SIRO 
10FS Putting it in job contract 
10FS Not techies  
10FS Stakeholder Management = a key sk ill 
10FS Generalist / break ing down complexity 
10FS £600m to be spent on cyber security – IA being subsumed into this….  
10FS Training delivered internally 
10FS DPO/FOI separate from IA, at the MOD 
10FS I believe the MOD has used the term InfoSec in the past 
It also uses Operations Security, but this use is confined to all types of security 
pertaining to a combat operational setting. 
10FS Observations: IA can be good and yet Records Management not yet  
implemented….short sighted and not in IG mode  
15ES Included:  
CSIA defines IA as the confidence that IS will:  
 protect the information that they handle;  
 function as they need to, when they need to; and 
 be under the control of legitimate users. 
(Ref: IA: A review of UK Government and industry initiatives, Nick  Coleman for 
CSIA, Oct 2004, page 6) 
Excluded: clear legal requirement for public sector bodies and private sector 
organisations to get it right. 
15ES .... outside core critical national infrastructure areas, the whole IA push has failed, but 
you don't ask  for comments at that level. So here is one: large sections of the civil 
service do not operate in the fact driven environment that we have to inhabit in the 
commercial and related environments (e.g. professional, academic) - and we cannot 
force them to change, because they are a third but unaccountable power in the 
country: elected representatives, appointed government, civil service. Local Govt 
largely follows in the wake of the civil service. So IA doesn't translate into many areas, 
but InfoSec does for those organisations that realise they must take the topic seriously 
as an extra component of ICT in their already well developed corporate governance 
strategy.  A final note: CESG and GCHQ only provide advice in many areas, advice 
that can be and, it seems, is often ignored. 
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15ES Have introduced both IA and InfoSec. IA has no impact. Have introduced the terms 
because (a) we previously assumed that professionalism would ensure that all involved 
would take InfoSec into account (but increasing threats meant a more formal 
approach), and (b) I naively hoped that IA concepts would drive the public sector to 
become much more competent (but, in the areas where we are involved, it didn’t).  
31ES It’s an umbrella term covering all the areas that can impact or effect the (overall) 
assurance that can be ascribed to information, i.e. how available is the information,  
how much confidence can we put on the integrity of the information and how 
confident  are we that the information can only be accessed/used by authorised 
people or processes. As such IA covers risk and threat analysis (business, 
technical and physical), system “fit for purpose” analysis, development and 
deployment of risk  mitigation controls and regular auditing to ensure that the 
controls are both fit for purpose and effectively implemented, and in regular use.  
Training, policies, procedures, and guidance are outputs from the IA process. 
35F Inconsistent and ill-informed / ill-educated Interpretation of security terms is at the heart 
of the issue 
48S IA is risk  management programme (identification, evaluation, treatment of risks) 
against the unauthorised access, use, corruption, loss or disclosure of information 
assets.  A positive way to present IA is to ensure that the right information is  
provided to the right Actors with the correct business justification for access, at the 
right time and in an auditable/trackable way. 
50S “IA” is likely to be confused with “Quality Assurance” which itself seems to have 
different meanings for different people, even within a single software devel opment 
organisation. 
50S My understanding of the scope of InfoSec has changed over the past decade.   
Previously I did not associate InfoSec with “availability” in the sense that DR 
activities would be of interest to a security professional.  Additionally,  I viewed 
“integrity” in the narrow sense of preventing unauthorized changes to data.  
53S What is in place to protect information based on their value (physical and digital) and 
how leaders are planning, action, and response that could lessen or eliminate related 
vulnerabilities? 
53S Cloud is introducing interesting approach with IA and IA Framework that provides set of 
questions that an organisation can ask cloud providers to assure themselves that they 
are sufficiently protecting the information entrusted to them and allow direct benchmark 
based somewhere to IA 
54S I think apart from the obvious changes in some technical terminology due to technology 
shifts, data, IM and the intelligence gained from information is now clearly seen in the 
main stream as a business asset more so than that stuff that sits in a file share or 
reside in a database. There is a greater need to understand what to protect and how to 
strategically safeguard it. Information is tangible asset that needs to be managed and 
can be assigned dollar value. Where in the past I think  in IT we were more concerned 
with the underlying infrastructure of services but not necessarily the data that actually 
flowed through out those piece of infrastructure. Many terms relating to data have 
evolved due to heavy regulation, data privacy and the wakeup call to the C level 
executives that found they were being sent to jail  due to the fact they were not  
protecting their organisations, customers and employees data.  
54S The term IA means to me as a concept is that the use of the data and where it 
resides is managed protected and the availability of the interconnected systems that 
house this information has appropriate controls and safe guards in place. I think  it 
also includes data classification, knowing the levels of protection that should be 
applied to the organisations data and understanding the threats levels and 
management of risk  needed to ensure CIA. 
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57S I was in a SANS Seminar in 1999 and that is where the tem “InfoSec” was clearly 
articulated. InfoSec covers protection of information received, created, processed and 
stored within/through people, technology (computers, applications and data and also 
physical documents/records. 
I first heard of IA term from my US colleagues while I was seconded to work  on 
government outsourcing project. These colleagues have worked on the US 
government defence projects. 
57S ....in this dynamic world, we learn, unlearn and relearn. Based on this philosophy, I 
have been involved in all domains of InfoSec (ISO 27001:2005) covering security 
architecture, policy, risk  assessment, security project implementation, managed 
security services and compliance/audit/assessment.  
57S In broad terms, IA is to build the confidence in the stakeholders of using the 
information provided and therefore have trust in the information residing in the 
systems and physical documents. 
57S IA to my understanding is the outcome of the security programmes and activities to 
build trust and confidence in using IS. 
a. It is a process whereby all  the elements of risk  associated with information 
(CIA, etc) are managed 
b. It includes “responsible” IM and information exploitation; it includes network  
defensive measures and physical and human measures to provide 
appropriate protection to the information to enable it to be used for the 
business/operational purpose 
c. It excludes IO and the use of information as a weapon 
57S Initially when I came across the terms, my understanding was superficial and did know 
how much I did know. Over the years doing consulting and implementation work  for 
clients, my understanding has deepened and appreciates the intent and purpose of the 
terms. 
57S ISF defines “Assurance is providing evidence to someone that  something is work ing as 
required.” 
59S IA is the practice of protecting “securing” all  assets and managing the risks 
associated; whether t ransmitted or stored electronically, physically or handled 
through administrative procedures. 
62S IA is an all embracing term.  True IA means that I can rely on what I am seeing and 
reading whether on a packet of frozen food in the supermarket, an warning sign on a 
motorway or an e mail from my bank. 
65S I do not believe the term IA is helpful to people who do not have a background in either 
secure systems or IA. 
60S IA is about managing the quality and security of information.  It is one part of  
information governance.  
Problem of overlapping definitions with ‘information governance’, ‘information quality’ 
and ‘InfoSec ’ – which are all terms that I use regularly in preference to ‘information 
assurance’ 
68S IA is based on a governance process which is designed to provide assurance that an 
organisation’s data is protected in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.  It is 
most commonly mapped against ISO 27001 controls and reporting.  
69S IA was “InfoSec” and changed to reflect demands of public sector. 
71S In the NHS we tend to use IG much more than IA. 
Our specialist group in BCS is  called IRM and Assurance however there is a rumbling 
going on about possibly changing the name to IG.  This has much more resonance 
when considered alongside Corporate Governance, Fiscal Governance and in the NHS 
Clinical Governance.  
72S Seems odd that Private and Public sectors use differing words for the same 
meaning!  
73S The term has only recently been adopted (2009) but is only known to a small subset 
of teams/individuals with the organisation. However it is used more when dealing 
with third parties where a relationship currently exists. 
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74S If InfoSec is about helping to stop bad things from happening, then IA is about helping 
to ensure that  good things happen.  It includes InfoSec, i.e. if bad things happen then 
good things aren’t happening, and includes strengthening those attributes of  
information that make information an asset for the organisation.  So, if the organisation 
needs some of its information to be accurate, then IA includes steps to improve the 
accuracy of that information, if it needs some of its information to be current to the 
second (as in t rading desks) then IA includes steps to reduce the latency in gathering 
that information, if it needs some information to be available to anyone on demand,  
then IA includes steps to improve the discoverability of, and access provided to, that  
information.  
75S CIA - In current academic role: I don’t think  academics know what any of these 
terms mean.  Peer Review? Huh. 
77S IG is the term which seems to be emerging at the moment merging IA, Knowledge 
Management, IM and IT into a consistent risk  based approach.   
A better term is IG when placing it in a business risk  management context. 
Table 21:  Terminology - Coded Respondent Commentary  
Drivers and Obligations 
Code Response commentary 
10FS All sorts of potential consequences: financial costs, legislative penalties, cost to life in 
operational settings and most often reputational penalties to the organisation  
10FS It can also have consequences to the individual, especially in respect of loss or identity 
or fraud.  
15ES Public sector organisations that I encounter take no constructive notice until hit  by the 
ICO – even then they are not fully embracing the requirements. Private sector tries 
much harder but is prepared to take risks.  
31ES There is a general failure of understanding the regulatory, statutory and standard 
compliance objectives though there are the odd beacons of understanding. Security 
controls are often added in as an afterthought, also security controls are often seen as 
a hindrance to doing business. These two statements go hand in hand. 
31ES It depends on the client. It could be just loss of reputation (a data loss splashed across 
the newspapers) or it could be loss of business (a competitor gets the client list and 
poaches clients or learns of a new product and brings their own to market first) or both 
(retailer losing customer credit card records, reputational damage plus customers 
leave and potential new customers shies away from the retailer).  
45S Increased cost (remediation activities, hiring of outside consultants/lawyers, etc.), 
potential financial consequences  
45S Loss of productivity 
45S Decrease employee morale 
46S Loss of intellectual property 
46S From my experience, it depends on the nature of the company. Public sector 
organisations tend to have quite a lot of control requirements around IA. For example 
many have to follow specific regulations and/or security requirements around 
protection of  data and systems. Service providers to these public sector organisations 
may also have to become accredited in order to provide services and be regularly 
audited to ensure they are meeting the accreditation requirements.  
46S Private sector companies tend to be a bit more hit and miss. It seems to depend on the 
nature of the business they are doing as to how much attention they pay to IA or 
“Security” as it is usually referenced. Companies in the bank ing and finance industry 
naturally pay a lot of  attention to IA given the type of personal data they are handling. 
Manufacturing companies tend to be a lot more lax in this area and seem to work 
under the misguided belief that no one would want to “hack” their organisation. About 
the only area that gets any attention is any online transacting they may be doing 
otherwise it is very difficult to get mindshare around IA. 
46S I think  this is quite hard. Often there is no tangible benefit that you can measure. It’s 
pretty hard to measure not being attacked, not losing data and no brand damage. You 
could potentially use Audit results, reports from tools that have been used to perform 
risk assessments, IPS/IDS reports, Firewall reports etc.  
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46S Insurance - I don’t  think  it would be a beneficial way to look at implementing IA as it ’s 
about more than just a reduced premium.  
47S Impact on delivery of services to customers/clients 
47S Animal hactivists / Political hactivists 
47S Socio-political changes 
48S There aren’t a lot of IA legislative requirements in Australia outside of Government – 
apart from some pretty weak privacy laws.  
48S Public Sector puts a lot of strength in the “need” to be compliant but there is generally 
lip service to the actual execution of compliance unless there is an audit or some other 
level of personal (and visible) accountability.  When this public visibility risk  is realised, 
then it is all hands to the pump to become minimalist compliant as soon as possible. 
48S In Australia, mostly reputational – but in saying that there are penalties for large data 
privacy losses – but the penalties are not readily applied – case in point was that 
Australia’s largest carrier exposed the data of their 700,000 customers but avoided 
penalty:  http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/break ing-news/telstra-avoids-fine-
for-privacy-breach/story-e6frg90f-1226490650522  
49S The different objectives / end goals and to a certain extent, resources of public, 
private, academic shape their focus on InfoSec. Based on previous experience, it 
depends on which industry that the client falls under. Their willingness / openness to 
invest resources will vary according to these objectives / end goals. For instance, 
where private agencies are concerned, their perspective might be to maximize InfoSec 
based on a minimal investment of resources whereas public agencies might invest 
more than what conventional risk  management wisdom would dictate.  
50S The client ’s senior staff seems to have limited awareness of the eth ical and legal 
implications of protecting PHI and PII, and generally seems to treat even basic security 
practices (e.g., wearing photo ID badges while in a facility where most staff have 
access to sensitive information) as a nuisance (US Healthcare).  
51S Financial Institutions more concerned than Industrial Companies  
56S Well, all above sectors are very different per realm and will be used very specifically in 
very different client environments and so all clients understand them also as an 
important way to protect their own company/client information, assets and products.  
They are using their own window to have an appropriate outlook to their own specific 
area and the specific way to protect these (standards, regulatory …).  
They all are focused on the legal and industry specific requirements and they are very 
concentrated to follow their general objectives related to all of these requirements.  
Therefore we will have a very high potential grade of investment chances in our future 
business life. 
56S To run in massive business and important intellectual business properties casualties. 
To lose trust and reputation on the market and as a result of this you run in unforeseen 
company turbulences.  
All of that makes it worth to invest finally in SECURITY products to protect all company 
assets and don’t lose the capital of the firm.  
57S Legal implications  
57S From a security professional point of view, work ing for government security projects is 
demanding but also enlightening.  One is challenged on all types of security issues 
and need to articulate/justify your actions to have trust and confidence in your 
initiatives.  
57S Next is the bank ing sector where the stress is more on compliance first and then 
security risk  management.  
57S Third group is companies that need to comply with regulations like SOX or have to 
meet the standards to meet certification requirements like ISO 27001:2005.  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
410 | P a g e  
58S Projects for government clients include stringent requirements for InfoSec covering 
people, technology and processes. Government clients lay emphasis and demand the 
best security, sometime going beyond the balance of security and risk . 
58S Based on the wide variety of customers that I have worked with in the past two 
decades this varies quite a bit.  I find that public/academic sectors are well ahead of 
many private institutions.  Seems that they have the attitude of everything is okay so 
let’s spend the money elsewhere.  
I also believe that many leaks that have been reported a re much higher for private 
sectors.  Well it certainly appears that way.   I even estimate that 65-80% are still at 
risk. 
58S This can range from exploitation, fraud, disruption and information disclosure and can 
in many cases causes un-repairable damage to reputation and in some cases 
complete loss of business.  Confidence in public sectors will be severely impacted.  
58S Appropriate implementation of monitoring and reporting tools is a first major step.  
Management will not spend money mitigating risks unless some measurable benefit is 
shown.  In many cases, management will reduce funding where inappropriate 
reporting has been implemented.  It’s important to keep management aware of the 
types of issues that occur and that they have been dealt with approp riately.  It’s also 
important to show the cost benefits 
63S IA is seen by some as something Zealots talk about! 
63S Because process is more prevalent in Public Sector, there is more visible adherence to 
IA. Private Sector, especially manufacturing, is less process focused; as a result, IA is 
less evident. 
65S I suggest that public organisations follow the rules laid down by their senior masters – 
i.e. Perm Secs or Cabinet Office central teams.  The private sector do what they need 
to avoid litigation and to sell products and services – if the requirement states certain 
IA objectives have to be met then they will meet them, but not always in a voluntary 
way.  I imagine academic organisations have centres of excellence where IA is taken 
very seriously but they will be exceptions.  The Curate’s egg comes to mind. The third 
sector is surprisingly variable but this is probably because of poor leadership from 
HMG and Whitehall. When the Minister for Digital Access and Inclusion and his core 
team do not does know that the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) is law what hope is 
there for IA in the 3
rd
 sector? In AbilityNet we take IA very seriously at all levels as we 
deal with some of society’s most vulnerable people. This is however an uphill struggle 
with little help from HMG at the present time.  Even the UK’s Digital Champion is only 
interested in getting 10 million people on line – but not on line safely.  
65S ....but more leadership across Whitehall would be useful – having done their bit on lost 
IT equipment and sensitive documents they appear to have lost interest in helping the 
general population.   To some of  my colleagues IA was seen as an activity by HMG to 
protect its own secrets rather than helping the public.  I have to say they had and still 
have my sympathy for tak ing such a polarised view.  
67S The compliance objectives that seem to work  are those where the regulations have 
some effective penalty (such as SOX and PCI DSS). This makes the impacted 
organisations (typically private sector and third party suppliers) take positive action. 
The US has more compliance objectives that includes an effective penalty. Bad press 
certainly causes reputational damage which impacts third party supplier but does not 
seem to impact public sector organisations  The public sector takes action only 
because they could end up with a ‘bad report ’ and typically they are less concerned 
with the costs of delivering IA. Academia certainly observes compliance objectives but 
I have no direct experience of how much effort and cost are applied to meeting IA 
objectives 
67S I suspect that the culture will only be adopted when a senior executive will pay the 
price for non-compliance.  
67S Getting caught is the crime. The effectiveness of audits to verify that information 
assets are protected appears  highly suspect. In most cases bad press is the only 
impact with no penalties and no loss of job or employment rights.  
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73S Academics are not providing enough good research (but that ’s because there is little 
funding available) and need to become more ‘business-centric ’ 
76S Public sector have the 70 mandatory requirements from the SPF - whilst all  sectors 
should take a risk  based approach to IA, Government probably has the best articulated 
framework. A compromise would certainly be damaging in terms of PR, but ultimately 
the majority of Government departments are effective monopolies and their customers 
have little choice over whether or not to deal with them.  
76S Private Sector has fewer mandatory imperatives, but along with the third sector, 
potentially a far greater impact in terms of “customer perception” should they become 
compromised.  Almost inevitably, it will lead to damaged revenue streams for these 
organisations. 
76S The academic sector is perhaps the most problematic. Traditionally, academia has 
focussed on sharing information and networks (such as JANET) are not renowned for 
their security features. Within academia, this is relatively well accepted through custom 
and practice, but can present substantial difficulties when academia attempt to work 
with the other sectors who are likely to seek evidence of how their information will be 
protected. 
77S Regulatory conformance is a priority but k ite marks and certifications are being seen 
as superfluous  
45S 
57S 
Financial loss (lost revenue, fines, penalties, lawsuits, etc.), loss of business  
45S 
57S 
73S 
Loss of reputation / reputational damage –  
Maintaining reputation = measure of benefit and measurement overall  
46S 
47S 
48S 
57S 
Impact on brand / brand damage which could potentially be irrevocable  
Table 22:  Drivers and Obligations - Coded Respondent Commentary  
Standards and Measurements 
Code Response commentary 
1F Better in terms of security may not be better in terms of efficiency 
10FS a. Through quicker/better achievement of the standards required by the MOD – IAMM 
Level 3 – and also a good way to ensure that the standard is maintained once 
achieved.  
b. Maturity needs followership just as important as leadership  
10FS IAMM dominates, but we are also interested in attainment of the ISO 27001 
10FS Managing issues – Head of IA Professions day job – undermining? 
15ES Confidence that we are protected 
48S Australian Federal Government InfoSec Management Framework 
Australian DoD – InfoSec Manual 
50S We have not identified compliance with any specific standard as a defined objective,  
and we don’t measure the benefits of compliance.  I would expect however that if we 
could demonstrate in an objective manner that we were in compliance with a relevant  
standard or set of standards, that this would provide benefits in terms of retaining my 
current account, competing for similar accounts, and as a potential legal defence in the 
event of a security incident by showing that we were diligent in following industry best 
practices. (Note: this response was from the US healthcare sector, where HIPAA is the 
prevailing regulation, for which annual risk assessments are required – disappointing to 
see such a lack of situational awareness .) 
50S We have no explicit programme of measuring the benefits.  If asked to do so, I would 
approach it by quantifying the cost of InfoSec risks both before and after implementing 
security controls.  Naturally, this would be time consuming (assuming a quantitative 
risk assessment had not previously been performed), and also highly subjective.  
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54S Stringent regulatory controls and laws around the management of data have impacted 
all services both negatively and positively. Those laws, standards/policies and 
regulations are forcing the public and private sector to protect their assets better. I think  
that key public sector needs to probably look at better defences from a cyber warfare 
perspective and what strategic approach is needed in the next decade.  
56S When you process the IA you should be in a stable way of life with a minimum of  
threats, vulnerabilities and an identified risk  potential and management. It’s also a 
benefit to achieve with IA the best cost balance (risk  management with the most cost -
effective way) which is possible to reach and to reach finally best future financial 
calculations and plans.  
58S With the implementation of standard toolsets and monitoring software.  For example,  
compliance testing software including vulnerability assessment  software.  Provision of  
high-level reports should be developed for management to understand the benefits 
provided by the IA group.  What did we block, what could have been the impact, etc. 
62S Having to sell the idea to the Board makes this difficult 
71S Self-assessments (NHS, PCI) 
77S Risk mitigation criteria 
77S Regulatory compliance 
77S Benefits expressed in risk  terms 
79S The Accreditor says “Yes”.  
15ES, 
52S 
Internal and external audit provide the measures 
31ES, 
72S 
Qualitatively – effectively the absence of serious damage 
Cybersecurity cannot be measured as there are no cybersecurity standards – 
paralysing level of audit 
Table 23:  Standards and Measurements - Coded Respondent Commentary  
Impact of culture and politics 
Code Response commentary 
1F State has responsibility 
7ES Security, data protection and privacy – it was suggested that the DPA should 
support the development of clearer and more transparent definitions of the regulatory 
boundaries and limits which should apply to data collection and online track ing. This 
might for example include proposals for a more streamlined and intelligible list of 
options to help consumers explicitly consent for their personal data to be used in 
different ways (which are properly acknowledged and understood by the individual 
when this access is granted). The overarching objective should be to ensure that  
consumers are informed, protected and empowered, whilst ensuring that forthcoming 
regulations in this area do not constrain innovation, job creation or economic growth. ** 
(email comms 27 February 2011) 
7ES Yes. "Computer says no" and "Data Protection" are the new excuse for poor service.  
Compliance overheads combined with intrusive surveillance powers have led to high-
value-added financial services moving key functions off-shore. You do not move to 
Switzerland to save money 
10FS Yes they do; it is important that the Government of the day plays due regard to the 
protection of information through its direct support and through its championship of  
other policies that might have an impact on the way information is used and protected  
10FS Need to survey to measure behaviour change 
14F When the eEnvoy was sponsor this was at Permanent Secretary level - Need an 
intelligent sponsor of HMRC to discuss 
15ES Large sections of the civil service do not operate in the fact driven environment that we 
have to inhabit in the commercial and related environments (e.g. professional,  
academic) - and we cannot force them to change, because they are a third but 
unaccountable power in the country: elected representatives, appointed government, 
civil service. Local Govt largely follows in the wake of the civil service [1]. So IA doesn't  
translate into many areas, but InfoSec does for those organisations that realise they 
must take the topic seriously as an extra component of ICT in their already well 
developed corporate governance strategy.  
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15ES Creation, definition and mandation of standards required  
15ES Single most valuable thing 
15ES Seeking regulation 
15ES Systematic selling off of assets to shore up misguided spending, population of country 
exceeds capacity to support 
15ES No more assets to sell; more taxation required – or stop doing trident and HS2 
15ES Corporate world not applying integrity to its services 
15ES On the fault line; Erosion of corporate culture 
15ES ** Previous public admin structures with their central policies, basic rules, and lots of  
freedom for the people out in the sticks to interpret policy and rules, allowed admin 
processes to adapt locally to local and even individual situations.  The new centrally 
dictated processes, increasingly dependent on and monitored by IT systems (Still 
relatively low powered by today’s standards) were poorly designed and unable to adapt  
to local needs, but the central teams simply became more and more isolated f rom 
reality and the quality of public admin started on a downward path.  Classic civil service 
recruitment and career structures remained, but the private sector saw the need for 
new sk ills to be recognised at the highest level in an organisation, for the development 
of new methods of communicating with the front line and responding as necessary – 
and eventually with the need for formal quality management and then IT based 
InfoSec.  Service delivery in the public sector was moving quick ly from armies of  
people to computer processes – and the management failed to understand the need 
for quality engineering, for formal quality management, for very carefully targeted 
recruitment (to get the right people in the right jobs) and for continual staff development 
by way of training.  … public sector failure to adapt results in situations where civil  
servants who want help are incapable of understanding what needs to be done.  The 
many critical reports by Parliamentary Select Committees bear witness to the 
incompetence of so many Whitehall departments. 
15ES 1997 to 2010 – no real opportunity to t rigger change at central government level – the 
power of the mandarins (the third pillar of government, the others being parliament and 
the appointed executive) blocked any change and in many departments are still doing 
so. 
15ES ....that Government sort of recognised the centrality of information and the need to 
control it when it set up the Government’s DG of IM, along with the DG of Identity 
Management. The argument then, though, and still is that we need a central 
department to handle and protect Government Information and ensure its CIA rather 
than some DG with no real teeth.  So is there a better way of “doing” IA than the UK is  
doing it now?  Your answer is “Yes”, because the current way is getting us nowhere.   
This of course needs a debate.  Your great one pager sets this going but we probably 
need a workshop for you.  Rather than re-organise IAAC, could I suggest your theme 
should be to re-organise Government? (email comms, 17 April 2011)  
15ES Get used to the feeling of déjà vu, is only another move through the cycle and in the 
end it still won’t have changed. Pre-NPfIT and the poisoned dwarf in Leeds, there was 
a central security team with Regional Security Managers that interacted with the GPs, 
PCTs etc and progress had been made over a number of years. When NPFIT knifed 
the NHSIA in the back and retreated behind their websites so they didn't actually have 
to deal with people it all  went to rats. Personally I did very well out of it all but security 
in the NHS went backwards and still hasn't recovered.  NHS was well ahead of the 
curve in the late 1990s but died in 2005. The N3 Muppets put paid to it, because they 
didn't understand it and saw it as getting in the way and returned things to the anarchy 
it is today. The GSi CoCo was a direct lift from the NHSnet CoCo, I know, I saw them 
lift it. BTW it was always about budgets and how they managed them (email comms 25 
April 2011). 
15ES I learned a while back that, under the gentle and capable hands of its former boss 
Richard Granger, that masterpiece of IT innovation called NPfIT (or ‘Connecting for 
Health’ as it subsequently preferred to describe itself) at one stage purchased, at a 
cost of £250 million, some 700 servers housed in several purpose-built data centres.  
Less than 6% of these servers were actually deployed or even had programmes 
installed.  The mere support costs for that little lot was around £100 million per annum 
and the k it, after two years, was entirely scrapped for a ‘refresh’ at a cost of a further 
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£200 million.  Total lolly squandered?  Around £1.2 billion.  It’s this behaviour – both on 
the part of the Department of Health and the vendors concerned (they know who they 
are) – I find immoral and utterly lack ing in integrity or competence. It hardly needs 
saying Government – especially Central Government – is particularly good at stuff like 
that (email comms 18 June 2010).  
24T It’s mak ing the UK almost anti-competitive 
24T Not always focussing on the right things  
24T (Service sector culture); Operational security (horizontal) given up in favour of Security 
Services (vertical) – for the almighty dollar 
24T Politics is reactive – blame when an incident – a memory stick  or a CD loss – but it is 
tangible result of a lack  of security 
24T Public sector procurement is an issue 
24T Shared Services swathe 6 years ago – under Labour – but as a Policy – there were 
various software providers who acted as a tribe – IBM, Microsoft etc – said they would 
all be undermined – that it would be a national security threat  
24T Thus, the private sector is running the public sector ICT 
24T Outsourcing to big providers = fatal.... 
24T Are the systems safe/are the right controls in the right place to maintain the safety? 
24T We have ended up with wrong systems architecture and this is leaving us with a legacy 
of problems. 
31ES There is more emphasis on IA these days but whether that is attributable only to the 
political landscape or whether it has been driven by the politics following some rather 
notable data losses by Government is difficult to assess. The cynic in me leans 
towards the later. 
31ES In the commercial sector there are some good examples but generally the feeling is 
that little has changed, and probably won’t change until the ICO gets some high profile 
successes. 
35F One of the messages coming out from my meetings with Banks, Insurance and Law 
Firms has been the scale and nature of the culture gaps.  The good news is that I have 
found a number of players look ing to organise practical training on how to handle them 
- beginning with incident response - and the need to get InfoSec, forensics, 
compliance,  legal counsel, marketing and PR work ing together while allowing IT to 
keep the business going .... 
35F Organisations don’t think  about security incidents – until they have one! Management 
attention quick ly subsides after clean up. Evidence from series of risk  assessment 
workshop  demonstrates phenomenon of short-term corporate memory…Use this small 
window of opportunity to get what you want – pre-prepare projects, proposals, 
endorsements ready when window opens. Incidents are great opportunity to improve 
processes, controls, culture – I coined the phrase ‘Surfing the Indignation” for 
increasing profile of InfoSec while management attention is still on the issue 
39FE Its people not just technology that needs patching 
39FE IA can be considered as a branch of Quality.  Thorough application of the combined 
disciplines of QA and of engineering are essential throughout many of today’s  
organisations, particularly in public administration: knowing what is to be done and 
carefully doing it.  However, experience shows that many of the people involved in 
public administration are unable to think  through the consequences of their designs.  
45S However, in those instances where security is a new operating paradigm for public 
sector entities, their response to security (particularly security incidents) has been 
known to be overzealous. 
46S It may be useful within my team if everyone has the same definition and understanding 
of the term. However, with customers, this is not really a well -known term so we tend to 
use a bunch of terms that covers IA like data, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation 
etc. as these are better understood by customers.  
47S … socio-political changes influenced by new media, applications and online services 
(Facebook etc). The younger generation is more connected and consumer driven,  
demanding more f rom employers and service providers. They vote with their ‘likes’ and 
‘dislikes’. Further, online political protests are tak ing on a new ‘voice’ with denial of  
service attacks seen as ‘free speech’ e.g. animal hacti vists, political hactivists etc. 
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48S Private Sector is more aligned to the 5 stages of grief:  Denial, Anger, Bargaining,  
Depression (revenge), and Acceptance.  I have seen this in a few companies, 
especially concerning PCI – the issue is one of the company being told to spend 
money on factors that are outside of their control (grief) and this requires tak ing 
leadership on the journey and trying to make the path as easy as possible. 
48S Wikileaks is driving a culture of fear in many Public Sector organisations but the 
influence of any political landscape is questionable.  I see positive impacts in Australian 
Federal Public Sector in regards to IA but in State politics there is a level of self interest 
in political parties who do not want to see the evils of history make it into the light of  
day.  In South Australia for example, the State Govt who have been in power for over 
10 years have fought the introduction of an Independent Commission Against 
Corruption and are currently writing the legislation so that all ICAC investigations are 
totally confidential.  This has not  been driving a culture of accountability in the State 
Public Sector. 
48S SOC processes drive measurements 
49S Compliance with standards provide assurance to the customer that Information security 
is being carried out correctly and IT assets are being protected adequately.  
51S Wikileaks Incidents as well as loss or theft of F35 Fighter Aircraft Design as well as  
loss or theft of  current  US Nuclear Weapons Designs have highlighted the importance 
of this. 
52S Referencing the number of fines by the Information Commotion’s [stet!] office towards 
the councils and government entities in recent years, it shows that IA is being taken 
seriously by the central government and in turn we are seeing a shift through the public 
sector. 
53S Identify and understand what has value to the considered business and the security it 
needs and where to allocate efforts and resources bridging the gaps between the 
actual state and the desired state 
53S The culture and behaviour is needed as well as awareness etc. appropriately is hard to 
define but regulation and compliance are tools for improving protection of information 
assets. 
56S Legal changes or regulations and political adoptions can provide and offer a new 
possibility of service sets/new UPSELL business as it was feasible before! With this in 
mind we should informed by legal or another alternative company instance when 
basics has changed and we can create more business profit and client benefit. This 
institution should teach sales and technical consulting personal as soon as possible!  
57S I have a few major government projects. They are very concerned about security and 
changing political landscape impacts their systems. That is why they have security 
clearance before one works on the project. The clearance is provided at a few 
categories depending on the nature of the information accessed and domain.  
57S The public sector client demands as many controls as many touch points to be 
implemented but the contractors may not be able to do so as their proposal did not  
factor in these costs. This results in stalemate and time is spent on interesting the 
intent of the contract and rounds of negotiation. Sometime it may end up in the solution 
deployment being delayed. 
62S Coalition government raised the priority of security in the cloud.  
69S Recent change of government, and their austerity measures, have all but k illed-off 
public sector IA efforts with the bare minimum being undertaken.  
70S Yes :- 9/11 => increased risk  awareness => increased risk  understanding, awareness 
and management capability.  
71S Culture of care in the NHS, not a culture of security; it’s changing but this will take 
time.... Public Sector and Private Sector – same issues, different scale(s) 
72S Positive changes in corporate governance in the private sector since the Cadbury 
Report  
76S Changes since the Hannigan Review have had a positive impact in public sector 
culture – primarily by raising awareness of the importance of IA. 
78S Currently yes its negative – Councils have to make significant cutbacks but we MUST  
ensure compliance to GCSx CoCo and it costs money (the Government haven’t  
thought this through correctly)!  
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80S Generally I would say the main driver for the public sector has been compliance and 
avoidance of bad publicity. The small culture change has been positive.  
7ES,  
73S 
They have concentrated on tick ing the boxes rather than protecting the assets. The 
growth of automated tools for generating and auditing procedures means that in some 
organisations no-one has read the processes, not even their nomi nal author, let alone 
understood them or their implications for operational efficiency, costs or "genuine" 
security 
Table 24:  Impact of Culture and Politics - Coded Respondent Commentary 
Professionalism of ICT and IA 
Code Response commentary 
7ES The impact to date has probably been minimal.  The BCS, for example, has made no 
real progress since it gained its Royal Charter and will not do so until its expels some-
one for professional misconduct. I used to lecture on the previous code - with case 
studies and am back on the disciplinary panel. I know and respect the reasons for the 
lack of progress. No-one is willing to commit the funds to fight an appeal to courts by, 
for example, some-one work ing for a well-known consultancy on a well-known 
government project. 
10FS The public sector has become much clearer about the imperative to protect public 
and personal information. Industry has been surprisingly cooperative but some 
organisations might not have the resources to invest in the protective measures now 
expected of them.  
10FS Public sector awareness has risen very significantly, but behaviours are changing 
much more slowly than policies and processes.  There remains much to do yet to get 
everyone to realise that forgetfulness and tak ing short cuts needs to be reduced.  
10FS There is a need too, to link  the home to the work  environment, to make the dangers 
of social network ing to become more obvious and to provide much greater “built -in” 
security so that systems default to safe without irritating the user. Such changes 
would then make the difference between the public and private sectors to draw closer 
together.  
10FS I do not think  professionalising IA or ICT has been the critical change.  The most 
important change has been to move the use and protection of the information asset 
out of the technical sphere and to move it – both benefits and accountabilities – firmly 
into the centre of the business domain.  
10FS Need good trainers and deliverers and policy writers  
10FS Need to dispose of home hard drives  
10FS I would approach the IISP; I would take advice from the big 4 auditing firms, the 
insurance sector and high street banks; in extremis I would go to top ICT managed 
service providers for advice. I would probably do as well to go to successful public 
sector departments, such as Home Office, DWP and MOD.  
14F Outstanding project leadership sk ills and well developed concepts  
14F System of systems and human factors (HF) and ability to improve and lead  
14F Right people, right potential  
14F Need to come out competitive 
14F Still another five years away 
14F Prosecutions needed 
14F What are the components? 
14F What would good look like? 
14F Land, sea, air and information – new battle space – not attributed, fighting SMART 
14F Information superiority 
14F Should be able to run CIO government provided operational leadership are 
supportive 
14F SDSR / National Security Strategy / Cyber Security Strategy?  
14F Policy, strategy – coherent? 
14F Motion and no progress 
14F Need clearly stated objectives and milestones  
14F Operational costs will be swallowed 
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14F Who do we engage moving forward? 
14F ECDL for Generation Z? 
14F Talent is key to the new reality – need to recruit and retain 
14F Part of delivering a good 21
st
 century government 
14F Do not adjust your mind (set) there is a new reality 
14F Climate change? 
14F 2008 crisis – fiscal etc 
14F Barriers to entry for adversary is low  
14F Issues – what are the needs and how can we align with these?  
14F Time constraints – no longer in a Cold War 
14F Academia to pay industry for their data? 
14F IA is only a post grad course really because it’s too involved 
14F Need on the job experience etc  
14F Mix of social science, behavioural required 
14F Need people who challenge the status quo 
14F Frogs in boiling water – 1999 - mistakes about to be repeated? 
14F High turnover in Cabinet Office staff – not read SEB reports  
14F How do you take your strategy forward in this fluid state?  With a cadre of 
professionals….  
15ES (ISC)² has a common BoK that has been honed over 14 or so years. The IISP has a 
common BoK that has been put together over 3 or so years. SAN Institute is a good 
source of good practice and there are a number of Universities that offer post 
graduate degrees in the IA/IS space (Royal Holloway being one of the best known). If 
I were look ing for an IA professional I would be look ing for someone with a CISSP of 
good standing (i.e. someone who has maintained CPD and entered their second or 
subsequent 3 year phase of membership),  someone who has membership of the 
IISP, someone who has held CLAS membership for three plus years or a person with 
an appropriate MSc. Preferably I would be look ing for a combination of two or more of 
these attributes 
17E Information security awareness is seriously miss-named in a way that inhibits 
proper selection of controls over the vulnerable human element. Everybody hates 
security. It gets in the way of work  performance; it’s a bother concerned with 
incidents that rarely happen; and being aware of security just assists people to 
take a chance and violate the security controls that they don’t like or even assists 
them in engaging in cybercrime. Hinson makes this clear in two of his quotes:  
       “No one wants security…” Steve Hunt  
        Mich Kabay: “…resisting the herd’s anti-security bias.” 
We should be creating InfoSec motivation, not just awareness, training, or 
education. Motivation is what counts. Calling it awareness deceives and 
misdirects management. Awareness, training, and education are worse than 
useless without first creating the motivation to support security that people don’t 
like. Hinson makes this clear by including the following quotes:  
 ISF Standard of Good Practice and the DTI Factsheet: “…link ing security to 
personal performance objectives/appraisals.” (taken from my early writings)  
 Mich Kabay writes about creating commitment to InfoSec  
 The NIST Special Publication 500-50 mentions motivation.  
 The Noticeboard advises, “Enforce the rules.” 
We must become very specific on this requirement because the human resources 
departments in many organisations resist the motivation controls that we must 
have. The controls are quite obvious when you consider what it takes to motivate 
employees and other stakeholders to engage in practices they don’t like. I have 
been recommending this in my consulting practice for 45 years. The control 
objective is to make and enforce security as part of job performance and not be in 
conflict with it. We do this in three ways:  
1. Include the requirement for InfoSec in all personnel and contract job 
descriptions and enforce it top to bottom in the hierarchy.  
2. Include security as an evaluation subject item in all annual personnel and 
contract job performance and appraisal reviews  
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3. Establish and uniformly apply fair and meaningful rewards for exemplary 
security and penalties for poor and failed security 
Here is one final note on Hinson’s otherwise excellent article. Hinson writes about 
needing to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of information. 
You may have heard me expound on this many times, but it is worth repeating  
because of its basic nature. I might conclude (but don’t because he is just being 
usage-correct) that he believes:  
 We don’t have to be concerned about protecting the possession of 
proprietary but not necessarily confidential information such as from 
commercial software piracy.  
 We don’t have to protect against modification of information that doesn’t 
affect its integrity (dictionary: good condition) such as in cyber-fraud.  
 And we don’t have to care whether information is useful as long as it is 
availability such as encrypted information where only the key is unavailable; 
the information still available, but just not useful in its present form.  
I’m sure he doesn’t believe this stuff, but CIA doesn’t cover it. I continue to point out 
that the excessive simplification of security factors by restricting InfoSec to protecting 
CIA is short-sighted and dangerous.  
20F It could be that professionalising IA is in error because it risks the journey to IG.  
20F Heads of Profession – not IA professionals – perpetuating unprofessionalism…. 
20F Research on professional bodies – IET, IIA, ICA, IOD, IPD – is there consistency in 
the sk ills sited? 
31ES Within central government there is now focus on the supply chain though from 
speak ing to fellow practitioners, this focus is somewhat fragmented. My experience 
however is that the supply chain is involved and to a high degree.  
31ES IA and InfoSec is a maturing profession and can only serve to enhance the role of 
IA/IS within an organisation. There is a lot of good practice with Government as 
exampled by the CESG CLAS scheme (CLAS = CESG Listed Advisor Scheme) 
which for a number of years has undertaken to create a body of IA professionals. 
Even this scheme has undergone a number of changes over recent time as the level 
of professionalism has increased. However there has been little transference of this 
expertise to into the private sector. However the existence of (ISC)² and its CISSP 
qualification, the emergence of the IISP coupled with a renewed drive on the security 
and risk  front from within the BCS will  help drive better practices into the commercial 
arena.  
39FE IG should exist outside IT within a corporate governance structure.   Security 
technology IS IT, but it is just IT.  Financial and other process Audit is not part of IT 
so why should security sit within IT.  The effect of that model is that they are both 
poacher and gamekeeper and that cannot be right.  Because of the changing 
characteristic of data security and its increasing legal obligation, existing within a 
legal structure I wouldn't resist.  Need to align with LEGAL.  
57S This is a sensitive question. My experience and exposure is as follows : 
 Client is concerned about security and wants the best 
 Contractor personnel unable to give the consideration and emphasis to 
security. Many not aware of hardening requirements, secure coding principles 
and some not aware of the ISMS policy 
 Touch points instituted for personnel to comply with Security. The challenge is 
that they are doing it because they are being told and not that it will  help to 
make a better product/outcome. They see security as an obstacle and wil l  
bypass if given the choice. 
 My personal view is that top management should walk  the talk  e.g. by walk ing 
around the office area or spreading/enforcing the mantra in town hall meetings  
 CISO tenure less than five years and turnover running at 20% per annum  – 
fired at twice the rate of any other professional (16 months as of Sept 2015)  
57S On the positive side, professionalising the industry serves to enhance better 
standards in terms of knowledge and methodology. However, on the negative side, 
InfoSec changes are rapid and this may impede the speed at which IT security is able 
to evolve to meet new demands / requirements. 
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57S If he is new entrant to InfoSec would suggest SANS Security Essentials (GSEC). I 
attend this course in 2000. The concept of Triad of Security ( C, I, A) was int roduced. 
Over the last 13 years, my understanding of the concepts has deepened 
tremendously and interaction/engagement with the clients has been positive and 
professional. Every issue can be analysed and presented with the attending facts 
(Risk  Assessment) and recommendations.  
47S My experience is there has been attempts to improve InfoSec (IA to a lesser degree) 
in the public sector (state Vic and federal Aust) however this has wavered during the 
GFC. There has been significant loss of resources (employees and contractors) in 
the public sector and significant cost cutting, resulting and a negative impact on 
IA/InfoSec. The public sector makes gradual advances as technology and the 
individuals in general improve in education and awareness, training, resulting in the 
protection of information assets. 
48S I like the idea of professionalising the industry as it has given business leaders a 
better term of reference to gauge the capabilities of individuals in recruiting but also 
has allowed for people to move further up the leadership ranks as the training allows 
for a much better alignment of IA to business strategy adding more value and 
influence to the organisation in IA. 
48S I had a case of the Senior Leader for risk  compliance had every professional 
certification under the sun but he had no experience and I had to train him in his role.  
49S Various certification bodies provide lists of certified professionals.  
50S I believe that  security tends to be perceived in many organisations as either a highly 
technical discipline or as an administrative issue, but not as an area of  management 
focus (comparable with finance, for example).  At my account, even though the ASO 
is shown on client-facing organisation charts as reporting directly to the Account 
Executive (and therefore part of the management team), in practice I report to a 
second-level manager and am excluded from management meetings.  This has a 
negative impact on my ability to encourage change at an account which for many 
years has not followed many basic security practices.   
51S Emphasis on ICT technology has had a negative impact on IA by providing a false 
sense of security (Good AV, Patching, Firewalls, IPS, Access Control are necessary 
but not sufficient to protect confidential information).  
52S There is a steady slow progress as when comparing to the past decade, IA positions 
were unheard of and now they are part of the DNA of any prominent organisation. 
There is a paradigm shift from compartmentalized ITSec functions with point based 
technical security solutions to hybrid federated IA functions focusing enterprise risk 
management as a whole. Requirements of IA within roles and organisational 
structures are yet to be seen.  
52S Senior peers, ISACA, local shapers, thought leaders, blogs, webinars, webcasts, 
conventions, trainings, specialised magazines…etc.  
53S Experience is an important key combined with leadership and tech knowledge  
56S I try to explain it this way: I believe that everyone is informed in a let’s say common 
syntax and understanding of the industry requirements and so it is a platform we can 
use for optimal communication between all relevant parties.  
56S It helps to let folks understand what we do, how we do it and why we do following 
these standards and requirements. 
56S Also a lot of reports in the industry are standardized more or less this way.   It allows 
us to work  with a lot of specialized teams on all these items, means we are more 
effective, quicker and more precise when following these standards, helping us 
DON’T forget any of these important aspects.   
59S With cyber-attacks steadily increasing, the majority of the culture realizes the 
importance of effectively securing their assets and their clients.  However, they 
continually face budget constraints and therefore must find more cost effective 
measures. 
61S Improvement progress is visible but the pace is frustrating 
65S I do not believe the term IA is helpful to people who do not have a background in 
either secure systems or IA. 
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67S In the public sector there is more of an awareness that the info may be sensitive and 
they are not the ‘owner’ of that info...still a long way to go before individuals in their 
day-to-day operations consider IA appropriately. Specialists in the field are aware but 
it needs to be wider and higher in the organisation.  
69S Professionalisation is (IMHO) yet to be completed with the relevant organisations 
(BCS/IISP) dealing with internal matters too much and failing to sell the benefits to IA 
consumers.  
69S Crystal ball - Public sector is expecting supply chain to be practice IA but contractual 
terms are woefully inadequate and not being policed – further breaches are 
inevitable. 
71S Continued failures of IT projects, such as the recently abandoned Identity Access 
Management system for NHS Scotland, does not paint a picture of the industry as 
one which can deliver any benefit.  Under these terms it is no surprise IT is one of the 
first casualties when it comes to cost saving since ‘they always waste the money they 
are given don’t they?’  
72S Cadbury Report improved Corporate Governance 
76S I have seen little evidence of impact. Competent individuals remain competent. The 
professionalisation of ICT has had little impact on recruitment practices, and hence 
there are still “less competent” individuals employed.  
77S This has had an overall negative effect as IA activities are moved out of main stream 
activities 
78S …but there are a lot of staff that have not had any real training let alone get certified 
in anything (if they did, they would almost certainly leave to a better paid job). 
79S They tend to over react. Also larger divergences in approach and what is 
“acceptable” security.  
79S Check all sources. No single source stands out at the moment.  
80S The competency of an organisation is based on the people it  employs. If minimum 
standards are required, such as professional certification (e.g. from ISACA and 
(ISC)², are starting to become standard requirements for ICT/IA roles this has a 
positive impact as it weeds out the real duffers. 
80S ISACA and (ISC)² are the only organisations with a reliable minimum level of 
competence required from their members in this area. 
10FS, 
77S 
Reduced – opposite to above 
46S, 
60S, 
74S 
Positive impact; but more mandatory processes should be considered when awarding 
Govt contracts. Important that they are mutually agreed, and not too bureaucratic .  
It’s the CIO and CTO that need to understand this – not just the CISO, also the CIRO, 
and the CRO – we have too many roles and verticals. 
46S, 
63S, 
75S 
Manufacturing lags behind 
Can’t aim for perfection but have to build in change gates  
Table 25:  Professionalism of ICT and IA - Coded Respondent Commentary 
InfoSoc 
Code Response commentary 
24T We are not creating homogenous foolproof easy to use, low cost computing 
24T Safety = people die; Security = ?? 
34F Decision making is currently too slow – because we are not communicating 
34F As low as reasonably practical 
35F My own opinion - there shouldn't be a "security market" at all - the sk ills, experience,  
knowledge and "ways of work ing" need to be embedded in every other industry, and 
then we can all retire. Things are heading that way, thankfully.  
35F Lack of understanding in the market = lack  of appreciation of true value of information 
assets in the market place 
41E Riding the dragon’s tail – GRC – in that order for a reason!  Not a fun ride if you go the 
wrong way around.  
Table 26:  InfoSoc - Coded Respondent Commentary  
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Barriers 
Code Response commentary 
14F  
(on 
behalf 
of 
IAAC) 
Insufficient action by governments 
 E Government wired up by 2005; gone off the boil. 
 eCrime strategy: good ideas, yet to be seen, make sure momentum keeps up!  
 Computer Misuse Act: over 10 years old (except for one minor review in 1999!)  
long overdue overhaul.  
 RIPA (Regulation of Investigative Powers Act): poor legislation, introduced too 
swiftly, already subject to change. 
 Data Protection Act: well-founded sentiments, but poorly executed causing 
immense confusion (Soham murder trial)  
 National and international cooperation at the work ing level works well between 
police forces  (National High Tech Crime Unit)  
 Grand Bargain between privacy and functionality 
 Intelligence, security and resilience – Paddy McGuinness 
 Expectations of service and dependencies  
Insufficient awareness by citizen 
 No coherent view on citizens’ role and responsibilities and liabilities yet  
 Education and behavioural norms by osmosis 
 When aware, the means to act responsible are not easily available  
Insufficient coherence of action by industry 
 Still not a board issue. 
 Information exchange on attacks and vulnerabilities still difficult 
 Benchmark ing is promising, but industry waits for the first to engage in it (first 
adaptors are waited for) 
 Protecting yourself is not (yet) been made easy with complementing 
technologies and services from multiple providers  
 Getting better, due to efforts of trusted bodies and trade bodies  
 
Table 27:  Barriers - Coded Respondent Commentary  
Observations: 
Risk management profession needs to welcome the assurance that the other IA provide that 
the controls they rely on are work ing effectively as intended (Marks, 2015, p.192). 
Goldman Sachs expose – 14 March 2012, Evening Standard – “Today if you make enough 
money for the firm (and are not an axe murderer) you will  be promoted.” Attitude / not putting 
the customer first…. 
When asked to provide a good book or resource for a new Security Officer, the following were 
the suggestions (three of which appear in the Bibliography in full Harvard format):  
 “Adaptive Security Management Architecture” by James S. Tiller  
 The Company InfoSec Policy 
 Something by Kevin Mitnick 
 “Security in Computing” by Charles and Shari Pfleeger (for those with strong technical 
backgrounds) or NIST 800-100; InfoSec Handbook: A Guide for Managers (for those 
with non-technical backgrounds).  
 CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide, 6th Edition.  Shon Harris.  Note that although this is  a 
study guide for the CISSP exam, it is also a well-written and frequently updated survey 
of security topics of interest to security practitioners. 
 “How to cheat at Managing InfoSec” by Mark  Osborne  
 “Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World ” by Bruce Schneier 
 “Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It” by 
Richard A Clarke 
 “The $100 Start-up” by Chris Guillebeau 
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10.18 IA Search Methodology and Other Information Sources for IA 
10.18.1 The research timeline can be described as follows: 
 2009-2010 IA literature: methods, technologies and management 
frameworks 
 2010-2011 IA literature: chronological historical development 
(continually revisited and updated) 
 2011-2014  IG / GRC / ethnographic research in action 
 2014-2016 Organisational structure, problem structuring and solving, 
mixed methodologies, reflexivity, Grounded Theory 
formulation and framework development. 
10.18.2 Several libraries, search engines and available databases were searched for 
publications information dealing with IA (last checked 7 September 2016): 
 University of Wolverhampton library resources - wlv.ac.uk/lib 
 COPAC - copac.ac.uk/ 
 The British Library - bl.uk/ 
 INTUTE - intute.ac.uk/ 
 World Catalogue – worldcat.org/  
 DOAJ – www.doaj.org/  
 OAISTER - oaister.worldcat.org/  
 ETHOS – ethos.bl.uk/ 
 Google Scholar – scholar.google.co.uk/ 
 Google – www.google.co.uk  and www.google.com and 
https://sites.google.com/a/aubih.edu.ba/cita-250/references  
10.18.3 Other sources utilised were: 
 Books 
 Government Reports  
 Official documents  
 Academic publications  
 Industry Publications / Reports 
 Vendor Reports 
 Industry Journals, including IS Journal (ISJ) 
 Online Sources – blogs, articles etc 
 Trade Body Reports 
 Membership Body Reports 
 Documents 
 Interviews  
 Direct observations 
 Participant-observation situation 
 IAAC library - http://www.iaac.org.uk/library-resources/library/  
10.18.4 Note: the researcher was responsible for the creation of a great many of the 
Briefing Papers available in the historical library repository of IAAC.  
  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
423 | P a g e  
10.18.5 Table 28 represents the collation of the volume of IA work identified:  
Academic 
Journals 
Ashley, B., Cox, S., Dean, T. and Stimeare, R. (1999) 
Bannister, F. (2002)    Cherdantseva, Y. and Hilton, J. (2013a) 
D'Aubeterre, F., Singh, R. and Iyer, L. (2008) 
Dark, M.J., Ekstrom, J.J. and Lunt, B.M. (2006)  
Endicoytt-Popuvsky, B. (2003) 
Ezingeard, J.-N., McFadzean, E. and Birchall, D. (2007) 
Gericke, A., Fill, H. G., Karagiannis, D. and Winter, R. (2009) 
Hamre, J. (1998)                              Ilies, I.M. and Boaru, G. 
(2011) 
Liles, S. and Kamali, R. (2006) 
Powell, R., Holmes, T.K. and Pie, C.E. (2010)  
Stahl, B.C. (2004)                             Valeri, L. (2001) 
Conferences 
and Panel 
Discussions 
Abdullah, N., Sadiq, S. and Indulska, M. (2011) 
Cherdantseva, Y. and Hilton, J. (2013b) 
Flechais, I., Riegelsberger, J. and Sasse, A. M. (2005) 
Gillon, K., Branz, L., Culnan, M., Dhillon, G., Hodgkinson, R. and 
MacWillson, A. (2011) 
Maconachy, V., Schou, C., Ragsdale, D. and Welch, D. (2001)  
McCumber, J. (1991) 
Piatek, M. and Newkirk, J. (2009) 
Saltzer, J. and Schroeder, M. (1975) 
Shanes, P. and Ciechanowicz C. (2011) 
Empirical 
Research 
Beauregard , J.E. (2001) 
Burnburg, M.K. (2003)                     Bush, S. and Evans, S. (2001) 
Cherdantseva, Y. and Hilton, J. (2013)     Cherdantseva, Y. (2014)  
Coles -Kemp, E. (2008) 
Cornish, P., Livingstone, D., Clemente, D. and Yorke, C. (2011) 
Dimopoulos, V.A (2007)                            Fox, J.M. (2003)      
Fenz, S., Goluch, G., Ekelhart, A., Riedl, B. and Weippl, E. (2007) 
McFadzean, E., (2005)   Weill, P. and Ross, J. (2005) 
Nanton, T.J. (2004)                                   Pappas, J.A. (2008) 
Racz, N., Weippl, E. and Seufert, A. (2010) 
Simmons, A. (2016)                                   Spafford (2001)  
Vaidya, T. (2015)                                       Valentine, E. (2015) 
Vicente, P.F.O. (2011) 
Books Blyth, A.J.C. and Kovacich, G.L. (2001 and 2006) 
Desman, M.B. (2002)        Herold, R. and Rogers, M.K. (2010) 
Herrmann, D.S. (2002) 
Peltier, T.R. (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005) 
Schou, C. D. and Trimmer, K. J. (2004) 
Schou, C. and Shoemaker, D. (2007) 
Table 28:  Special Issues, Conferences and Studies in IA Research Relevance  
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10.18.6 The following resources are provided as evidence of the breadth of 
availability of best practice guidance. 
General IA Search Resources: 
[Last Accessed 12 September 2016]. Available at: http://www.answers.com/topic/information-
assurance-2 
Norman Marks – blogs, articles etc. Available at: 
http://normanmarks.wordpress.com/2011/02/15/protiviti-provides-sound-insights-into-risk-
management-failures/ 
Industry Journals monthly publications and online resources: 
Government Computing – Government Computing Magazine, monthly, www.kable.co.uk, 
moved to www.guardian.co.uk/government-computing-network  
Cryptogram – monthly newsletter by Bruce Schneier - https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/ 
Corporate Compliance Insights - https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=corporate%20compliance%20insights%20james%20bone 
Data Loss information, www.datalossdb.org 
IISP - Institute of InfoSec Professionals – Pulse magazine, https://www.iisp.org/imis15/  
ISACA Journals 2000 through to 2017, Illinois: ISACA, www.isaca.org 
(ISC)² InfoSecurity Professional magazine, www.isc2.org   
ISM - InfoSec Magazine (ongoing), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/ 
ISSA Journals 2000 through to 2017, Oregon: IS Security Association 
IWAR, Information Warfare, http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/ 
Krebbs on Security – blog - https://krebsonsecurity.com/ 
TheGRCBlueBook.com - http://thegrcbluebook.com/  
The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) - https://ics-
cert.us-cert.gov/  
 
10.18.7 The researcher was involved in the UK Government Foresight Cyber Trust 
and Crime Prevention (CT&CP) Project in the Autumn of 2003.  The project 
produced the following related outputs: 
 Full papers  
 Social Risk Management – Practices and Behaviour in Cyberspace Dr 
James Backhouse, LSE 
 Social Learning and Trust in Cyberspace: Issues of Reciprocity Professor 
William Dutton, OII, Oxford University  
 Usability Issues and Trust in Cyberspace  
 Knowledge Technologies: Professor Nigel Shadbolt, Southampton University 
 Identification and Authentication: Professor Fred Piper, Royal Holloway 
 Autonomous Agent Technologies: Professor Nick Jennings, Southampton U. 
 Dependability and Trustworthiness: Professor Cliff Jones, DIRC, Newcastle 
U. 
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 Short papers 
 Crime and Crime Prevention: Professor Ken Pease, Huddersfield University 
 The Economics of Trust in Cyberspace: Jonathon Cave 
 Legislative and Regulatory Issues in Cybercrime Prevention: John 
Edwards  
 Civil Liberties in Cyberspace : Gus Hosein, LSE 
10.18.8 The project context and subjects raised are shown in Figure 87 below: 
 
 
 
Figure 87:  CT&CP Project Context - Subjects Raised, Source: UK HMG (2003a) 
  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
426 | P a g e  
10.19 Available Related Standards and Best Practice Resources 
Standards - listed in Standard number order, in the case of BSI 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc (AICPA) and Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA) (2006) Trust Services (SysTrust) Principles and Criteria for 
Systems Reliability – addresses Availability, Security, Integrity, Maintainability - 
http://www.webtrust.org/download/Trust_Services_PC_10_2006.pdf 
Australian Government Defence Signals Directorate Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber 
Intrusions - http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/mitigationstrategies.htm 
Basel Committee on Bank ing Supervision (2013) Principles for effective risk  data aggregation 
and risk  reporting, BCBS239 - http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs239.pdf This will change the dynamic 
of breach reporting.  From 2017 responsibility to report is within a week; from 2019 the 
requirement is to report within 15 mins.  
British Standards Institution (2003) BIP 0002 Guidelines for the use of personal data in system 
testing, Jenny Gordon and Louise Wiseman – Egg plc, September 2003, London: BSI 
British Standards Institution (2008) BIP 0008-1 Evidential Weight and Legal Admissibility of 
Information Stored Electronically. Code of Practice for the Implementation of BS 10008, London: 
BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2008) BIP 0008-2 Evidential Weight and Legal Admissibility of 
Information Transferred Electronically. Code of Practice for the Implementation of BS 10008, 
London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2008) BIP 0008-3 Evidential Weight and Legal Admissibility of 
Link ing Electronic Identity to Documents. Code of Practice for the Implementation of BS 10008, 
London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2001) PD 6668: 2001 Managing Risk  for Corporate Governance, 
London: BSI 
British Standards Institution (2006) BS 7858:2006 Security screening of individuals employed in 
a security environment – Code of practice, London: BSI.  BS 7858 is a key security standard 
that tells you how to screen staff before you employ them.  BS 7858 gives recommendations for 
the security screening of individuals to be employed in an environment where the security and 
safety of  people, goods or property is  of extreme importance. It also applies  when there is a 
requirement of the employing organisation ’s operations and/or where such security screening is 
in the public interest.  + Amendment 2:2009 
British Standards Institution (2001b) The Tick IT Guide: Using ISO 9001:2000 for Software 
Quality Management System Construction, Certification and Continual Improvement, London: 
BSI 
British Standards Institution (2004) ISO 13335:2004 Information technology -- Guidelines for the 
management of IT Security, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2012) BS ISO 14721:2012 Space data and information transfer 
systems.  Open archival information system (OAIS).  Reference Model, London: BSI.  A 
reference model for what is required for an archive to provide long-term preservation of digital 
information.  
British Standards Institution (1998), BS ISO/IEC TR 15846 Information technology. Software li fe 
cycle processes. Configuration management, London: BSI 
British Standards Institution (2012) BS ISO 16363:2012 Space data and information transfer 
systems.  Audit and certification of trustworthy digital repositories. London: BSI.  Sets out 
comprehensive metrics for what an archive must do, based on OAIS.  Known as the Magenta 
Book or the Pink Book, September 2011 
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British Standards Institution (2014) BS ISO 16919:2014 Space data and information transfer 
systems.  Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of candidate trustworthy 
digital repositories. London: BSI.  Specifies the competencies and requirements on auditing 
bodies. 
British Standards Institution (2000) ISO/IEC 17799 (BS 7799) Part 1:2000 Information security 
management: Code of practice for InfoSec management, London: BSI  
British Standards Institution (2004) ISO/IEC TR 18044:2004 Information technology -- Security 
techniques -- Information security incident management, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2002) ISO 19011:2002 Guidelines for quality and/or environmental 
management systems auditing, London: BSI 
British Standards Institution (2011) ISO/IEC 20000-1:2011 Information Technology Service 
Management, Part 1 Specification, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2011) ISO/IEC 20000-2:2011 Information Technology Service 
Management, Part 2 Code of Practice, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2012) ISO/IEC 22301:2012 Societal security – Business continuity 
management systems – Requirements, London: BSI.  ISO 22301 standard has replaced BS 
25999-2, and is considered the fundamental business continuity standard because it defines the 
basics of developing and managing the BCMS; this is the only certifiable business continuity 
standard. It is useful in the Do Phase according to ISO 27001 for the implementat ion of 
requirements given in its Annex A Chapter 14 (business continuity management).  
British Standards Institution (2012) ISO/IEC 22313:2012 Societal security – Business continuity 
management systems – Guidance, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2015) ISO/TS 22317:2015 Societal security – Business continuity 
management systems – Guidelines for business impact analysis (BIA), London: BSI.  Shows 
BIA paired with Risk  Assessment, in keeping with ISO22301.  
British Standards Institution (2015) ISO/TS 22318:2015 Societal security – Business continuity 
management systems – Guidelines for supply chain continuity, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2013) ISO/IEC 24762:2008 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Guidelines for information and communications technology disaster recovery 
services, London:  BSI.  This is the international standard that offers guidelines on the provision 
of ICT disaster recovery (ICT DR) services as part of business continuity management (BCM).  
British Standards Institution (2008) BS 25777:2008, Information and communications 
technology continuity management, Code of practice, London: BSI 
British Standards Institution (2006) BS 25999-1:2006 Business continuity management – Part 1: 
Code of Practice, London: BSI.  BS 25999-1 gives guidelines for the implementation of each 
business continuity element.  
British Standards Institution (2007) BS 25999-2:2007 Business continuity management – Part 2: 
Specification, London: BSI 
British Standards Institution (2013) ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security management systems — Requirements, London: BSI.  - The 
ISO 27001 Standard is the fundamental InfoSec management standard because it defines the 
basics of "building" and controlling an ISMS; this is the only certifiable InfoSec management 
standard, worldwide.  See http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27001.html and 
http://advisera.com/27001academy/knowledgebase/information-security-business-continuity-
standards/ 
British Standards Institution (2013) ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology - Security 
techniques - Code of practice for InfoSec controls, London: BSI - ISO/IEC 27002 (formerly 
ISO/IEC 17799).  This standard gives a more detailed description of implementation of controls, 
and is mostly applied in the Do Phase (Implementation) of ISO 27001.  
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British Standards Institution (2010) ISO/IEC 27003:2010 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security management system  implementation guidance — 
Requirements, London: BSI. This Standard focuses on the critical aspects needed for 
successful design and implementation of an InfoSec Management System (ISMS) in 
accordance with ISO/IEC 27001:2005.  
British Standards Institution (2009) ISO/IEC 27004:2009 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security management — Measurement, London: BSI.  This standard 
provides guidance on the development and use of measures and measurement in order to 
assess the effectiveness of an implemented InfoSec management system (ISMS) and controls 
or groups of controls, as specified in ISO/IEC 27001.  
British Standards Institution (2011) ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security risk  management — Measurement, London: BSI.  This 
standard specifies methods for information risk  assessment and treatment, and is useful in the 
Plan Phase according to ISO 27001.  
British Standards Institution (2011) ISO/IEC TR 27008:2011 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Guidelines for auditors on InfoSec controls — Measurement, London: BSI.  This 
standard provides guidance on reviewing the implementation and operation of controls, 
including technical compliance check ing of information system controls, in compliance with an 
organisation's established InfoSec standards. 
British Standards Institution (2013) ISO/IEC 27014:2013 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Governance of InfoSec, London: BSI.  
British Standards Institution (2011) ISO/IEC 27031:2011 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Guidelines for information and communications technology readiness for 
business continuity, London: BSI.  This standard has replaced BS25777 and describes the 
concepts and principles of information and communication technology (ICT) readiness for 
business continuity, and provides a framework of methods and processes to identify and specify 
all aspects for improving an organisation's ICT readiness to ensure business continuity 
British Standards Institution (2011) ISO/IEC 27034-1:2011 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Application security – Part 1: Overview and concepts, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2015) ISO/IEC 27034-2:2015 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Application security – Part 2: Organisation normative framework , London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (c.2017) ISO/IEC CD 27034-3 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Application security – Part 3: Application security management process, London: 
BSI. [conversion of OWASP] 
British Standards Institution (planned) ISO/IEC CD 27034-4 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Application security – Part 4: Application security validation, London: BSI. 
[cancelled]  
British Standards Institution (planned) ISO/IEC CD 27034-5 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Application security – Part 5: Application security – Protocols and application 
control data structure, London: BSI. [draft] 
British Standards Institution (planned) ISO/IEC CD 27034-6 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Application security – Part 6: Case studies, London: BSI. [draft] 
British Standards Institution (planned) ISO/IEC CD 27034-7 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Application security – Part 7: Application security assurance prediction, London: 
BSI. [draft] 
British Standards Institution (2011) ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security incident management, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2014) ISO/IEC 27036-1:2014 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security for supplier relationships – Part 1: Overview and concepts, 
London: BSI. 
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British Standards Institution (2014) ISO/IEC 27036-2:2014 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security for supplier relationships – Part 2: Requirements, London: 
BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2013) ISO/IEC 27036-3:2013 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security for supplier relationships – Part 3: Guidelines for information 
and communication technology supply chain security,  London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2014) ISO/IEC 27036-4:2014 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Information security for supplier relationships – Part 4: Guidelines for security of 
cloud services, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2011) BS ISO 30300:2011 Information and documentation — 
management systems for records.  Fundamentals and vocabulary, London: BSI.  This standard 
explains the purpose of a Management System for Records (MSR), the principles for successful 
implementation and provides the terminology for using MSR standards, compatible with other 
management systems standards. 
British Standards Institution (2011) BS ISO 30301:2011 Information and documentation — 
management systems for records.  Requirements, London: BSI.  This is the specification of 
requirements for developing records management policy,  objectives and targets to implement 
organisation-wide improvements.  This is done through defining roles and responsibilities, 
designing processes and systems, allocating appropriate resources and measuring and 
evaluating outcomes, to ensure corrective action is taken and continuous improvement occurs.  
British Standards Institution (2009) BS ISO/IEC 31000:2009 Risk  Management. Principles and 
guidelines, London: BSI.  ISO 31000 provides high level principles and generic guidelines for 
Risk  Management. 
British Standards Institution (2009) ISO/IEC 31010:2009, Risk management – Risk  assessment 
techniques, London: BSI 
British Standards Institution (2008) BS ISO/IEC 38500:2008 Corporate governance of  
information technology, London: BSI.  This standard provides guiding principles for directors of 
organisations on the effective, efficient, and acceptable use of Information Technology (IT) 
within their organisations. It applies to the governance of management processes (and 
decisions) relating to the information and communication services used by an organisation.  
These processes could be controlled by IT specialists within the organisation or external service 
providers, or by business units within the organisation.  This standard shows governance and 
management as critical to addressing business pressures and business needs.  
British Standards Institution (2013) PAS 555:2013 Cyber security risk .  Governance and 
management.  Specification, London: BSI. Offers an outcome-based approach to Cyber 
Security.  
British Standards Institution (2014) PAS 754:2014 Software Trustworthiness. Governance and 
management. Specification, London: BSI. 
British Standards Institution (2010) PD 25111:2010 Business continuity management.  
Guidance on human aspects of business continuity, London: BSI.  This standard gives guidance 
on the planning and development of human resource strategies and policies for the key phases 
following a disruption: Coping with the immediate effects of the incident, Managing people 
during the period of disruption (the continuity stage), and Sup porting staff after recovery of 
normal operations. 
British Standards Institution (2010) PD 25666:2010 Business continuity management.  
Guidance on exercising and testing for continuity and contingency programmes, London: BSI.  
This gives appropriate guidance on performing exercising,  including testing activities, for 
continuity and contingency programmes. Arrangements for information technology (IT) systems 
also fall under this general guidance. 
Building Security In Maturity Model Software Security Framework (BSSIM SSF) 
https://www.bsimm.com/online/  
Capability Maturity Model (CMM) http://cmmiinstitute.com/ 
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CERT – OCTAVE method is an approach used to assess an organisation’s InfoSec needs. 
http://www.cert.org/resilience/products-services/octave/ 
COSO, http://www.coso.org – The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) is a joint initiative of the five private sector organizations – AAA, AICPA, 
FEI, IMA and the IIA develops frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk  management (ERM), 
internal control and fraud deterrence.  
CRAMM (CCTA Risk  Analysis and Management Method) - 
https://managementmania.com/en/cramm -ccta-risk-analysis-and-management-method See 
also: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/auditing/qualitative-risk-analysis-
management-tool-cramm-83 
EA 7/03 (1997) EA exists to coordinate and lead the European accreditation infrastructure to 
allow the results of conformity assessment services in one country to be accepted by 
Regulators and the market place in another country without further examination, for the benefit 
of the European community and the global economy. http://www.european-accreditation.org 
European Bank ing Authority (2014) Guidelines on internet payments security  - 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/consumer-protection-and-financial-
innovation/guidelines-on-the-security-of-internet-payments 
ENISA - listed all the documents of National Cyber Security Strategies in the EU but also in the 
world (latest update April 2013). Available at: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-
and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/national-cyber-security-strategies-in-the-world 
Federal Agency for Security in Information Technology (2000) IT Baseline Protection manual, 
October 2000, Germany, Available at: 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/comsec/resources/standards/germany/itbpm.pdf  
ITIL v.3 (international) - IT Infrastructure Library - Global standard in the area of service 
management. Contains comprehensive publicly accessible specialist documentation on the 
planning provision and support of  IT services.  ITIL - IT Infrastructure Library, ITIL-ITSM, 
http://www.itil-itsm-world.com/ and http://www.itilofficialsite.com/home/home.asp  
IETF RFC2119 (1997) This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the 
Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.  Distribution of 
this memo is unlimited. https://www.iet f.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt 
ISACA – Business Model for InfoSec (BMIS) - http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-
Center/BMIS/Pages/Business-Model-for-Information-Security.aspx 
ISACA - COBIT - Control Objectives for information and related technology - Generally 
accepted information technology control objectives for information technology.  Covers 
effectiveness, efficiency, availability, integrity, confidentiality, reliability and compliance.    
http://www.isaca.org 
ISACA – RISK IT Framework for Management of IT Related Business Risks - 
http://www.isaca.org/knowledge-center/risk -it-it-risk -management/pages/default.aspx 
ISSA GAISP (2003) Generally Accepted InfoSec Principles GAISP v3.0, 
http://all.net/books/standards/GAISP-v30.pdf 
ISF Standard of Good Practice – “Updated annually, the Standard of Good Practice for InfoSec  
(the Standard) is the most comprehensive InfoSec standard in the world, providing more 
coverage of topics than ISO.  It covers the complete spectrum of InfoSec arrangements that 
need to be made to keep the business risks associated with information systems within 
acceptable limits, and presents good practice in prac tical, clear statements”.  Covers security 
management, critical business applications, computer installations, networks, systems 
development https://www.securityforum.org/tools/sogp/  The 2014 update features new 
guidance on: Cyber Resilience, Securing the Supply Chain, Mobile Device Security (BYOD),  
Data Privacy in the Cloud, Critical Infrastructure.  The 2014 Standard helped management of  
information risk  and enabled compliance with ISO/IEC 27002:2013, COBIT 5 for InfoSec and 
the SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls. It also provided organisations with detailed controls  
which help compliance with the US NIST Cyber Security Framework  and the UK Cyber 
Essentials Scheme. 
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ISO (2002) PD ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002, Risk  Management – Vocabulary – Guidelines for use in 
standards  
ISO (2004), PD ISO/IEC TR 18044:2004 Information technology— Security techniques — 
Information security incident management  
ISO (2005) ISO/IEC 27001:2005, Information technology – Security techniques – Information 
security management systems – Requirements 
ISO (2008) ISO/IEC 38500:2008, Corporate Governance of Information Technology, Geneva: 
ISO 
ISO (2009) ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009; Information technology – Security techniques – Evaluation 
criteria for IT security – Part 1: Introduction and general model  
ITIL – IT service management infrastructure library, https://www.axelos.com/best-practice-
solutions/itil 
NFPA 1600 (2013) - Standard on disaster/emergency management and business continuity 
programmes.  US National Fire Protection Association  
O-ISM3 - is an InfoSec management maturity standard published by The Open Group, a leader 
in the development of open, vendor-neutral IT standards and certifications. http://www.ism3.com 
OECD Guidelines for the Security of IS and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security – 
addresses laws, codes of conduct, technical measures, management and user practices, public 
education/awareness activities -  http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/15582260.pdf 
PCI Security Standards Council – payment card data security - 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/  
SABSA – the world’s leading open security architecture framework and methodology, business-
driven, open and inclusive, readily integrates with other frameworks and tool such as ITIL, 
ISO27000 series, COBIT etc.  It can be used as a compliance and governance framework for 
complex sets of standards.  http://www.sabsa.org/ 
SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls - https://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/  
SEI CMMI, Software Engineering maturity and measurement standards www.cmmiinstitute.com 
UK Cabinet Office (2014) HMG Security Policy Framework - 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316182/Security_
Policy_Framework_-_web_-_April_2014.pdf  
UK CESG IA Maturity Model (IAMM) - 
https://www.cesg.gov.uk/policyguidance/IAMM/Pages/index.aspx 
UK CESG Publication and Guidance available at: 
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/PolicyGuidance/Pages/index.aspx and 
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/publications/Pages/publications.aspx 
US HIPAA Security Rule – Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) - http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/security101.pdf  
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Computer Security Division, 
Computer Security Resource Center, Special Publications - 800 series and others. Available at: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html.  Many of these have been listed in the 
Bibliography.  
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Network Security Management Best Practice Resources 
20 Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense http://www.sans.org/critical-security-
controls/interactive.php  
Build and Operate a Trusted Global Information Grid (GIG) - (another pictorial) - 
http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/ia_policychart.pdf  
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) Top 35 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions  
http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/mitigationstrategies.htm  
Kaeo, M. (2003) Designing Network  Security, 2nd Edition, Cisco Press, 
http://www.ciscopress.com/bookstore/product.asp?isbn=158714249X  
Enterprise Information Protection - Detailed table of contents is at: http://asp-press.com/1-
878109-43-X/1-878109-43-X-TOC.pdf 
Establishing Wireless Robust Security Networks http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
97/SP800-97.pdf 
General Design Considerations for Secure Networks 
http://www.ciscopress.com/articles/article.asp?p=174313  
The Global Information Grid (GIG) is an all-encompassing communications project of the United 
States Department of Defense: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Information_Grid  
Improving Information Technology - http://www.auditnet.org/articles/DSIA201005.htm  
NSO Quant: Monitor Process Map - http://www.securosis.com/projectquant/nso-quant-monitor-
process-map 
The Jericho Forum - https://collaboration.opengroup.org/jericho/index.htm  
Network  management presentation with a strong vendor focus 
http://www.netcraftsmen.net/component/docman/doc_download/221-network -management-
best-practices.html 
Network  Security Architectures - 
http://www.ciscopress.com/bookstore/product.asp?isbn=158705115X  
Network  Security Auditing - 
http://www.ciscopress.com/bookstore/product.asp?isbn=158705941X  
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) 
http://www.cert.org/resilience/productsservices/octave/  
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) top 10 - 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project  
SANS InfoSec Reading Room http://www.sans.org/reading_room/  
SANS Network  Security Resources http://www.sans.org/network_security.php  
Securosis Research - http://www.securosis.com/research - includes a context pictorial  
The Psychology Behind Security https://www.issa.org/images/upload/ files/Sternberg-
Psychology%20Behind%20Security.pdf 
The Art of War http://astore.amazon.com/corporategovernance-20/detail/1590302257  
The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) 
http://www.opengroup.org/subjectareas/enterprise/togaf  
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Product Assurance 
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. August 1999. [Accessed 1 
March 2015]. Available at: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/  
Commercial Product Assurance Certification http://www.cesg.gov.uk/servicecatalogue/Product-
Assurance/CPA/Pages/CPA-and-other-schemes.aspx 
http://www.tscheme.org/  
http://www.crest-approved.org/  
Paradigms 
The following paradigms were identified in the research, to which i3GRC™ is now added:  
CIA Triad 
Parkerian Hexad 
Defence in Depth 
Keep it Simple, Stupid 
Least Privilege 
Need to Know 
People, Process, and Technology 
Prevention, Detection, Recovery, Response, Feedback (in an OODA loop)  
Privacy by Design 
Security by Design 
Shewhart Cycle or Deming Wheel (Plan, Do, Check, Act) 
RMIAS – Reference Model for IA and Security, 2014 
i3GRC™ – new paradigm, 2015 
Professional Qualification Resources 
Certified Protection Professional (CPP) offered by ASIS International  
Professional Certified Investigator (PCI) offered by  ASIS International  
Physical Security Professional (PSP) offered by  ASIS International  
Global IA Certification (GIAC) series administered by the SANS Institute 
Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) offered by the EC Council  
Certificate in InfoSec Management Principles (CISMP) administered by ISEB/BCS 
Certified InfoSec Auditor (CISA) offered by ISACA 
Certified InfoSec Manager (CISM) offered by ISACA 
Systems Security Certified Practitioner (SSCP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Certified IS Security Professional (CISSP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Certified Cloud Security Professional (CCSP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Certified Authorization Professional (CAP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional (CSSLP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Certified IS Security Professional (CISSP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Architecture (CISSP-ISSAP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Engineering (CISSP-ISSEP) administered by (ISC)
2
 
Management (CISSP-ISSMP) administered by (ISC)
2 
Essential Body of Knowledge (EBK) 
 Data security     Digital forensics 
 Enterprise continuity    Incident management 
 IT security training and awareness  IT systems operations and maintenance 
 Network security and telecommunications  Personnel security  
 Physical and environmental security   Procurement 
 Regulatory and standards compliance  Risk management  
 Strategic management    System and application security  
Cyber Security Body of Knowledge (CyBoK) - https://www.cybok.org/  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
434 | P a g e  
10.20 IA Definitions 
Table 29 below provides a range of selected definitions of IA from the available sources, be 
they government (G), practice (P) and academic (A).  
 
 Definition Source Date Title / Comments 
A Protection of information systems (IS) 
against unauthorised access to or 
modification of information, whether in 
storage, processing or transit and 
against the denial of service to 
authorised users, including those 
measures necessary to detect, 
document and counter such threats. 
McCumber, 
J 
October 
1991 
IS Security: A 
Comprehensive Model” in 
Proceedings 14
th
 National 
Computer Security 
Conference 
G Computer security assurance is the 
degree of confidence one has that the 
security measures, both technical and 
operational, work as intended to protect 
the system and the information it 
processes. Assurance is not, however, 
an absolute guarantee that the measures 
work as intended. Like the closely related 
areas of reliability and quality, assurance 
can be difficult to analyze; however, it is 
something people expect and obtain 
(though often without realizing it). For 
example, people may routinely get 
product recommendations from 
colleagues but may not consider such 
recommendations as providing 
assurance. 
NIST October 
1995 
An Introduction to Computer 
Security: 
The NIST Handbook 
Special Publication 800-12 
G Information operations (IO) that protect 
and defend information and IS by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation; including providing for 
restoration of IS by incorporating 
protection, detection and reaction 
capabilities. 
U.S. DoD 
3600-1 
Maconachy 
1996 
 
2001 
Debra S Herrmann (2002) 
refers to this but leaves out 
the confidentiality word. 
First available definition of 
IA, covering the Five 
Pillars of IA – availability, 
integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-
repudiation (so CIA+) 
G IO [measures] that protect and defend 
information and IS by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This 
includes providing for restoration of IS by 
incorporating protection, detection and 
reaction capabilities. 
IS Security 
(INFOSEC) 
Glossary, 
NSTISSI 
No.4009, 
CNSS 
Instruction 
4009 
SP 800-59 
August 
1997 
Originally The National 
Security 
Telecommunications and IS 
Security Committee 
(NSTISSC) and the 
Committee on National 
Security Systems (CNSS) – 
became the “National IA 
Glossary” - IA is a subset of 
IO – NOT a subset of 
InfoSec.  It differs from 
security assurance, 
because the focus is on the 
threats to information and 
the mechanisms used to 
protect information and not 
on the correctness, 
consistency or completeness 
of the requirements and 
implementation of those 
mechanisms (Brown and 
Topi, 2003). 
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G InfoSec. Information security is the 
protection and defense of information and 
IS against unauthorized access or 
modification of information, whether in 
storage, processing, or transit, and 
against denial of service to authorized 
users. Information security includes those 
measures necessary to detect, 
document, and counter such threats . 
Information security is composed of 
computer security and communications 
security. Also called INFOSEC. 
Information assurance. Information 
operations that protect and defend 
information and IS by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This 
includes providing for restoration of IS by 
incorporating protection, detection, and 
reaction capabilities. Also called IA.  
US DoD 
Joint 
Publication 
3-13, 
Definitions 
included in 
Joint Pub 1-
02 
 
 
 
 
 
US DoD 
9 
October 
1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
US DoD (1998) Joint 
Doctrine for Information 
Operations, Joint Publication 
3-13, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 
October 1998 updated 27 
November 2012 and 20 
November 2014, [Accessed 
13 September 2015]. 
Available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/n
ew_pubs/jp3_13.pdf 
G InfoSec: The protection of information 
and IS from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction in order to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
Protecting information and IS from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction in 
order to provide— 
1. integrity, which means guarding 
against improper information 
modification or destruction, and 
includes ensuring information non-
repudiation and authenticity; 
2. confidentiality, which means 
preserving authorized restrictions on 
access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal 
privacy and proprietary information; 
and 
3. availability, which means ensuring 
timely and reliable access to and 
use of information. 
SP800-18; 
SP800-37; 
SP800-53; 
SP800-53A 
SP800-60; 
SP800-66 
FIPS 199; 
FIPS 200; 44 
U.S.C., Sec 
3541 
44 U.S.C., 
Sec. 3542 
1998 
2004 
 
2005 
2008 
2008 
2004 
2006 
 
2002 
 
2002 
NIST publications, available 
here 
http://niatec.info/ViewPage.a
spx?id=241 
 
 
 
 
FISMA – Federal InfoSec 
Management Act 2002 
G IA - Measures that protect and defend 
information and IS by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This 
includes providing for restoration of IS by 
incorporating protection, detection, and 
reaction capabilities. Also called IA (JP 3-
13). 
IA — Actions that protect and defend IS 
by ensuring availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation. Also called IA (JP 3-12). 
US DoD 
Joint 
Publication 
1-02 
 
CNSSI-4009 
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms through to 
2009 
 
 
 
Updated in 2010 through to 
15 June 2015 
Inextricably linked with IO 
P IA is a holistic approach towards 
protecting information and IS by ensuring 
availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  
Although building on the discipline of 
InfoSec, the concept of IA raises the 
profile of security as a business critical 
operational function rather than as a 
technical support function. 
IAAC 2002 Protecting the Digital 
Society: A Manifesto for 
the UK, March 2002 
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A/
P 
IA is a management process, the 
purpose of which is to ensure that the 
critical information within an 
organisation and the systems and 
networks that manage it are reliable, 
secure and private, and that measures 
and processes are in place to counter 
malicious electronic based attacks.  IA 
encompasses other disciplines such 
as InfoSec management, risk 
management and business continuity 
management.  ‘IA goes beyond 
Business as Usual InfoSec as it is 
particularly concerned with high-end 
threats to systems that are critical not 
only to the enterprise but also to the 
wider national or international 
information infrastructure.’ 
IAAC 17 March 
2003 
Andrew Rathmell, 
Benchmarking IA in the 
Tele-communications 
Sector) 
G IA (IA) – the confidence that IS will 
protect the information they carry and will 
function as they need to, when they need 
to, under the control of legitimate users or 
the confidence that IS will function when 
and as they need to, are controlled by 
legitimate users and protect the 
information they handle 
There are five key principles, essential for 
safe electronic transactions: 
1. Confidentiality – keeping 
information private 
2. Integrity – ensuring information has 
not been tampered with 
3. Authentication – confirming the 
identity of the individual who 
undertook the transaction 
4. Non-repudiation – the individual 
who undertook the transaction cannot 
subsequently deny it 
5. Availability – ensuring information is 
available when required. 
IA is about meeting these requirements. 
UK CSIA June 
2003 
UK Government Strategy for 
IA 
P Assurance – measure of confidence that 
the security features and architecture of a 
system accurately mediate and enforce 
the security policy.  The policy need not 
be tied solely to issues of confidentiality, 
but may address requirements for 
availab ility, integrity of data or 
processing, reliab ility, safety or other 
factors.  Assurance is often neglected in 
planning for security: each security 
function should have an assurance 
requirement or metric.  Assurance may 
result from formal methods, or it may be 
partially determined by audit, penetration 
testing, simulation, testing or third-party 
reviews. 
Slade, R. 2006 Dictionary of InfoSec 
P IA is the confidence that the information 
assets with an organisation are reliable, 
accurate, secure and available when 
required.  IA includes Information held in 
every form (IS, on paper, other records, 
speech).  It embraces IM, including 
InfoSec management, information and 
records management, data quality, data 
protection, privacy (because of close 
IAAC 2006 IA in a Global Bank , 
presentation to BCS 
Birmingham IT Security 
Conference, June 2006, 
HSBC Holdings plc 
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confidentiality links and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD] guidance 
requirements) and physical protection.  It 
includes aspects of corporate 
governance, risk management and 
business continuity (resilience) and 
ensures that information is fit for purpose. 
A IA is ensuring that your information is 
where you want it when you want it, in 
the condition that you need it and 
available to those that you want to have 
access to it – but only to them. 
Blyth, A. and 
Kovacich, 
K.L. 
2006 IA, Security in the 
Information Environment 
P IA is about the protection of information, 
based around what we traditionally 
understand as InfoSec. It has at its core 
the principles of CIA.  However, IA 
reaches beyond this and explicitly 
connects with the concerns of the 
organisation by embracing the broader 
disciplines of risk and business continuity 
management. 
UK BCS 2007 Article by Debi Ashenden – 
representing both IAAC and 
BCS 
P / 
A 
IA defines and applies a collection of 
policies, standards, methodologies, 
services and mechanisms to maintain 
mission integrity with respect to people, 
process, technology, information and 
supporting infrastructure.  IA addresses 
information, not just information 
technology.  A chief information officer 
(CIO) is responsible for information, not 
just information technology.  IA provides 
for confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
possession, utility, authenticity, non-
repudiation, authorized use and privacy 
of information in all forms and during all 
exchanges. 
Willetts, K. 2008 Willetts took the original IA 
definition, enhanced it with 
the Parkerian Hexad and 
created an IA Architecture - 
IA
2
   
P IA - The term used to describe 
confidence in the processes of IRM. 
IPS April 
2010 
Draft Identity Rights Charter 
for consideration from the 
IPS Expert Panel - a thin 
representation.... 
P IA is the preservation of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information. 
 Confidentiality: confidential 
information must only be accessed, 
used, copied, or disclosed by users 
who have been authorised, and only 
when there is a genuine need. 
 Integrity: information must be 
protected from unauthorised access 
or revision, to ensure that the 
information is not compromised 
through corruption or falsification. 
 Availability: the information, the 
computing systems used to process 
the information, and the security 
controls used to protect the 
information must all be available 
and functioning correctly when the 
information is needed. 
Withheld 2015 Well known and respected 
UK security consultancy 
 
[This has to be highlighted 
as being a blatant and direct 
relabeling of InfoSec (the 
CIA) as IA and is therefore, 
by virtue of its existence in 
client reports, wrongly 
educating current 
generations of clients, 
private and public sector 
bodies and future IA 
professionals.  This is the 
reason for this research 
study.] 
Table 29:  IA Definitions  
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10.21 UK Public Sector IA Reporting 2007-2008 
Independent Police Complaints Commission Independent Investigation into the 
HMRC loss, 61 pages (IPCC, 2008); 
Kieran Poynter Review of InfoSec at HMRC, 109 pages (Poynter, 2008); 
House of Commons Justice Committee Protection of Private Data Report, 28 pages 
(UK House of Commons Justice Committee, 2008);  
Sir Gus O'Donnell Data Handling Procedures in Government, 46 pages (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2008b); 
Nick Coleman Protecting Government Information - Independent review of 
government IA, 31 pages (Coleman, 2007); 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Report on Surveillance Society, 119 
(main report) + 281 (supporting report) pages (UK House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 2008); 
Sir Edmund Burton, Final Report into the loss of MoD Personal Data, 76 pages 
(Burton, 2008); 
MOD Action Plan in response to Burton Report, 28 pages (UK MoD, 2008); 
House of Commons debate on Data Protection held on 12 June 2008 led by 
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer, 31 pages (Miller, 2008);  
Ministry of Justice Data Sharing Review, Richard Thomas, the Information 
Commissioner, and Dr Mark Walport, Director of the Wellcome Trust (Thomas and 
Walport, 2008); and 
Review of Criminality Information – Sir Ian Magee (Magee, 2008). 
The reason for referring to the number of the pages (where available) in the above 
reports is to highlight how much has been written around the subject area. 
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11 APPENDIX II: CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
11.1 Public Sector Case Study – GCSx [CS1] 
11.1.1 The researcher was engaged as a consultant security programme manager 
to assist a north east UK Council to achieve the government code of 
connection (GCSx) accreditation in order to maintain sensitive system 
connectivity.  The process was formulaic in nature with particular gateways 
to be passed, and continues to this day in various iterative versions.  At the 
time of joining the organisation, the Researcher ensured that sufficient 
background historical understanding was gained in order to ensure that any 
implementation plan created would achieve the required outcomes through 
successful design.  This history is provided in Table 30 below. 
Date Description Comments – what the researcher identified 
06/05/97 Finance and General 
Purposes Sub-Committee 
paper entitled 
“Information Technology – 
Contingency Planning 
and Disaster Recovery” 
“ICT Services are planning to introduce best practice 
notes during the course of 1997/1998 to aid 
departments to consider the issues involved”. None 
have been specifically evidenced.  
Sadly the copy available stated “never sent” at the 
top. 
25/06/97 District Audit Network 
Risk Assessment sent to 
xxxxx 
 
(Strategic Review ongoing at 
the time – 20 years later and 
little had changed) 
Lack of a defined and tested DR Plan mentioned 
Lack of security, fault and performance management 
on the Network  
Lack of standards, procedures and guidance for 
everyone to follow 
ICT Audit states that “activities of the Risk 
Assessment are a cause of concern”. 
10/99 External company – Risk 
Management Review of 
Council Computer 
Systems 
References issues with Backup, Disaster Recovery, 
implementation of Risk Management Cases for new 
systems…… 
12/06/00 External company costs 
for assessment of the 
Council against 
BS7799:1999 
The Council were considering certification to the then 
British Standard for InfoSec Management Systems 
(BS7799 – now an International Standard ISO 
27001). 
06/11/02 BS7799 Registration 
Project  
A BS7799 PID was created but this project did not 
appear to have been followed through.  
06/11/02 Council Policies and 
Principles Manual 
includes InfoSec  
Based on BS7799-2:2002 and follows its structure in 
its entirety. 
06/11/02 Detailed Application Risk 
Analysis 
Process and template prepared by internal employee 
responsible – not completed, embedded or shared.  
06/11/02 Council Homeworking 
Detailed Risk Analysis v1  
Document completed but no evidence of actions 
being followed up 
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? 2003 External InfoSec course 
reviewed 
Presumably with a view to it being embedded and 
available within IT Services and beyond – it included 
discussion/education about information 
classification….. 
26/06/03 Data Risk Analysis v1  Risk Management Process documented, with an 
Owner – but no evidence of it having been used / 
completed / shared.  
26/06/03 Detailed BS7799 Action 
Plan 
Owned document, incomplete.  If this had been 
followed up and completed the CoCo would have 
been easily achieved in a timely manner – instant 
responses would have been available and the 
BS7799 certification would have been evidence 
enough. 
27/06/03 Council InfoSec Action 
Plan 
Covering all aspects including InfoSec Policy and 
Infrastructure but Personnel and InfoSec Awareness 
sheets were blank/empty of tasks. 
Utilised an external company to assist in the 
completion of the tasks. 
03/ and 
04/07/03 
Asset Inventory and Risk 
Assessment done 
A comprehensive Risk Analysis was carried out on 
the IT Asset Inventory  
11/08/03 Corporate Business 
Continuity Planning 
introduced 
Internal Information Asset owner offered to workshop 
with ICT to develop the appropriate Service Level 
BCP.  BCP Guidance Notes prepared (dated June 
2003).  
18/02/05 IA CD received from 
CESG 
Part of an effort to extend advice given to central 
government to provide benefit to the wider public 
sector. 
17/10/05 Second Edition Of IA 
Guidance For The Wider 
Public Sector CD 
received from CESG 
Includes IS2 – providing policy and guidance on the 
risk management and accreditation of IS. 
Feb 07 ISO 27001 Audit Report 
(internal) 
Audit carried out in December 2006, reflecting that in 
2004 significant progress needed to be made and a 
previous audit was thus abandoned.  Work 
commenced in 2003 was not progressed and no 
progress was made since.   
The audit report said progress and likelihood of 
achieving the Standard was “adequate” yet a current, 
up to date copy of the standard was not present or 
available at the time. 
Ethically challenging reporting.  
01/04/08 Government Connect 
(GC) letter to all LA Chief 
Executives  
Signed by all GC strategic partners – requesting that 
Chief Executives champion their authorities early 
adoption of GC 
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01/04/08 GC letter GC becomes a cross government programme - 
GC stated as being a “key strategic enabler to 
improving public services for citizens and 
communities”.  
June 08 Audit of ICT Network 
Security – Action Plan 
Security roles to be clarified through job descriptions 
in new structure – committed to by Ian Cooper with a 
target date of December 2008 
“A policy on the connection of non-standard 
equipment to the network should be determined 
following an investigation into the feasibility of a cost 
effective method of locking out any non-
Council/approved equipment be undertaken”.  
Rejected due to the potential user disruption and 
amount of work generated as a result. 
07/07/08 GC letter to all LA 151 
officers  
Advising of DWP revised Data Access Policy 
22/07/08 Telephone call from DWP  DWP requesting Council place an order for 
connection 
18/08/08 GC letter to LA 151 
officers  
Detailing exemption process. 
22/09/08 Strategic Performance 
Management Group 
Agenda item – ICT Owners briefed service reps on 
GC 
29/09/08 Business Case submitted BC to outline requirements 
29/09/08 HCC letter signed by 151 
officer 
Request for exemption from DWP data access policy 
until 30/09/09 – Gareth Baker then had two weeks to 
produce a Code of Connection submission return to 
Government explaining what HCC was doing to meet 
the 92 requirements. 
24/10/08 GC letter to 151 officer Exemption request approved. 
07/11/08 DWP letter to LA Housing 
Benefit section 
DWP memorandum of understanding.  
03/12/08 GC letter to LA 151 
officers  
Advising of DWP file transfer arrangements  
03/12/08 PSF article on Remote 
Working 
CoCo controls preclude remote workers from using 
their own PCs at home, even when using a secure 
virtual desktop, thus requiring LAs to supply staff with 
council-controlled equipment.  
22/01/09 Land Registry e-
conveyancing Portal 
Guidance notes produced 
Arrived November 2009 - Land Registry Direct 
(LRD) would begin to be turned off from January 
2010 
02/02/09 Land Registry Full 
Network Access 
Agreement produced 
Arrived November 2009 - Land Registry Direct 
(LRD) would begin to be turned off from January 
2010 
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Mid 
02/09 
Guidance issued from 
Govt Dept BIS re ELMS - 
Electronic Licence 
Management System 
First heard about it on 15
th
 December 2009 with a 
lead time of two weeks to implement by the deadline 
of 28
th
 December 2009. 
05/06/09 GC Project Team Minutes First meeting took place where DWP Access Policy 
was discussed and the implications of the work 
ahead to achieve the project. 
08/06/09 Business Case submitted Revised BC to CAB to secure funding.  Finally, 
resources are made available and a project is 
instigated that has to operate under stressful 
conditions due to the tight timescales afforded.  
05/08/09 GC Project Team Minutes First mention of 8 character password requirement 
for all. 
Mid 
08/09 
More guidance issued 
from BIS to LA’s ref 
ELMS 
New bank account to be set up?  Contact details 
provided for the four main suppliers.  Who dealt with 
this and got on with the actions contained therein?  
First seen by ICTEG on 15
th
 December 2009. 
07/09/09 Cabinet Office letter sent 
to Section 151 Officer 
referencing change from 
version 3.2 to version 4.1 
of CoCo 
Council have until May 2010 to comply with the 
updated controls where a significant number have 
shifted from “should” to “must”.  This includes the 
mandatory protective marking of emails (for which a 
technology bid was put into the GC The Sequel 
Business Case – but rejected).  [GCSx project team 
only made aware of this letter on 7
th
 December 2009 
– letter went “missing in action” in the Council.] 
23/09/09 GC Tech Team letter 
confirming successful 
GCSx connection 
Despite some people’s cynicism, the project was 
successful and Revs&Bens achieved the required 
connection.  However, the snagging list was 
significant as a result of the “rushed” nature of the 
project.  This was compounded by the central 
government expectation that “connected” meant “the 
whole Council” rather than the then segmented 
network which therefore needed to be rolled out to 
the whole Council. 
05/10/09 “GC The Sequel” 
commences  
Immediately recognising the above need to roll out to 
the wider Council, a business case was put together.  
26/10/09 Final version of GC the 
Sequel presented to CAB 
for approval.  
£2.6m too steep for leadership but there was 
acceptance that the work still needed to be done and 
that CST needed to accept this as a Council wide 
issue rather than an ICT specific project.  It is about 
protecting information not bits and bytes, as such. 
06/11/09 Secure Infrastructure CST 
Briefing 061109 
Hard hitting CST report delivered – in order to ensure 
that CST understood the key messages and 
requirements across the Council.  Determined to bat 
this back to ICT and highlight that ICT should have 
brought the issues to the service areas to ensure that 
they factored them into their planning for 2010 
onwards, rather than the other way around.  
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This is a frustrating stance to take, given that the 
central government departments relevant to each 
service area will have been mentioning the usage of 
the GCSx for secure communications ongoing and 
are expecting and anticipating that this is in place 
already. 
17/11/09 Implementation Plan for 
CST 
Prepared as requested – along with a number of 
other spreadsheets and reports to fulfil a 
determination to put off the inevitable. 
17/11/09 ICT CAB agree in 
principle to the now 
reduced £616k project bid 
Agreement in principle reached to at least move onto 
a Phase 3 implementation which allows for training 
up all relevant users across the Council and 
delivering the necessary secure connectivity to 
Children & Young People (CYP), Streetscene, 
Citysafe etc. 
10/12/09 ICT CAB ……  Weeks lost in an internal political wrangle creating 
reporting documents to reflect history rather than 
preparing and planning properly for the future.  In the 
meantime the day to day project management 
suffered because it is impossible to be all things to all 
people – including attempting to meet the demands 
of service areas wanting to be connected next on a 
daily basis as the momentum grows despite the 
negativity from the top.  
Table 30:  Public Sector Case Study Historical Chronology  
11.1.2 By January 2010 the Council leaders came to an agreement and the project 
limped forward.  Amongst other successes, an organisation wide password 
change programme was implemented; the political landscape changed 
again; the ongoing Code of Connection continued; thousands attended face 
to face interactive InfoSec awareness sessions but the money ultimately ran 
out for external support and the Researcher was let go. 
11.1.3 The reason for sharing another chronological listing is to provide further 
evidence of a core tenet of this study.  The greater challenges faced by IA 
practitioners are invariably managing organisational politics, culture, team 
dynamics, rather than implementation of technologies per se. 
 
 
  
HM Courts Service staff breached government database of personal 
information  
Staff working for Her Majesty’s Courts Service have breached security on the government 
database that stores personal data about everyone in the UK.  Freedom of Information 
requests by Computer Weekly also revealed that the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) caught 124 council workers and sacked 24 of them for breaching security on the 
Customer Information System (CIS), which, with 90 million records, is one of the largest 
databases in Europe.  Email exchanges by IT security staff at the DWP and the Ministry of 
Justice also expose the weak grip the DWP had on the security of the five -year-old CIS 
database. (Ballard, 2010) 
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11.1.4 In the researcher’s experience, this was another organisation that benefited 
greatly from a positive engaging communication style actively encouraging 
participation ensuring employees willingly attended awareness sessions and 
shared their issues during and afterwards to maintain momentum for the 
wider IA improvement and reporting required. All efforts were resonant far 
beyond the ICT department itself and indeed beyond the local council to 
other related public sector bodies in order to leverage learning and share 
best practice. 
11.1.5 Within the context of the political domain, something keenly felt by Local 
Authorities, a number of key systems were in need of connection to the 
GCSx and there were obvious instances of system creation and system 
decommission which implied tax payers money had been wasted leading to 
a lack of trust by local citizens for “big government” IT projects, including a 
sense that the work done was building up a privacy deficit for future 
generations. 
11.1.6 In another example of the challenges faced by the public sector at the time, 
Fire Stations were to be considered to be “community” spaces and thus the 
public could freely enter at any time (in any numbers).  This would create 
physical security challenges needing new solutions: keys could be out on 
desks, that would need to be put in cupboards etc; data and information 
would need to be similarly safely stored away; all computer screens would 
need to be always locked; a clear desk policy would be required for all.  
These were significant challenges given that physical and InfoSec were, at 
the time, lax at a local command post level. 
11.1.7 For the Poll tax system at the time, a well-known public sector IT provider 
had charged back the Local Authorities for change requests to a system that 
they had designed wrongly.  It was a head tax but the system was set up to 
collect property details, which was excessive data collection.  This behaviour 
created a waste of public funds, on many levels.  The Complexity of these 
systems was not lost on the Researcher given that the better gains were to 
be had from greater synergy between systems, with improved data sharing. 
11.2 Private Sector Case Study – Services [CS2] 
11.2.1 The Researcher was asked to join the organisation and address Security 
Policy gaps.  In so doing, taking a purist view of what should be in place for a 
large organisation providing services to multiple clients worldwide with 
competing and complex global regulation, legislation and industry standards.  
Multiple deficiencies were found which, to reveal and discuss, would create 
further organisational risk and vulnerabilities.  Size and scale made for a 
cumbersome and thus lengthy change process.  The work required was 
beyond that of both InfoSec and IA, requiring greater alignment in the 
governance space, involving outreach across the whole organisation.  
11.2.2 Over the course of the intervening three and a half years, the Researcher 
was promoted to a Chief InfoSec Officer role with global influence.  A UCF 
was created in order to standardise the ability of the company to respond to 
external requests for assurance of compliance against the aforementioned 
multiplicity of requirements.  The organisation operated multiple (largely 
compliance only) ISMS – and required the Researcher’s i3GRC™ approach 
to unify for the sake of the global organisation and its reporting and thus for 
sense for its many international clients – and the different regulators 
requiring evidence. 
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11.2.3 The outcomes of the work are captured in the briefing paper provided at 
Section 10.3 below.  This was created for submission to a Technical 
Conference early in 2015 and helped to provide focus for the team, internal 
customers, external customers and organisational leadership.  
11.2.4 The tool was used as a global Account and Business Unit framework for: 
 Mapping security policy to legislation, regulation and industry standards  
 Defining security control requirements 
 Defining compliance landscape 
 Assessing compliance landscape 
 Assessing risk(s) 
 Recording Findings (from any source event)  
 Recording Exceptions to Policy  
 Recording Operational Risk(s) 
 Recording Audit evidence centrally 
 Reporting pan ES compliance, security, risk  status 
 Common platform, repeatable results 
 
11.2.5 Figure 88 represents the scope of Archer eGRC modules available in the 
platform. 
 
 
Figure 88:  Archer eGRC Graphic  
 
 Policy Management – Centrally manage policies, map them to objectives and 
guidelines, and promote awareness to support  a culture of corporate 
governance.  Single source policy set solution to house mapped global 
corporate policy content to Archer content with automatic link s to 47 
Regulations/Industry Standards.  
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 Enterprise Management – Manage relationships and dependencies within 
your enterprise hierarchy and inf rastructure to support GRC initiatives.   Single 
source rollup view into Assets, Client, Contract, Account and Infr astructure 
information.  
 Risk Management – Identify risks to your business, evaluate them through 
online assessments and metrics, and respond with remediation or acceptance.   
Customizable Account risk  assessments, Risk  ratings rolled into multilayered 
Dashboards to support the organisation. 
 Compliance Management – Document your control framework, assess design 
and operational effectiveness, and respond to policy and regulatory compliance 
issues.  Standard customizable Self-Assessments, Compliance ratings rolled 
into multilayered Dashboards to support the organisation.  
 Issue Management – Single source for all Findings, Remediation Plans, and 
Exception to Policy records, correlated to Account/Infrastructure across the 
organisation. 
 Audit Management – Centrally manage the planning, prioritisation, staffing, 
procedures and reporting of audits to increase collaboration and efficiency.   
Increased functionality for track ing Audit Events and Findings.  
 Threat Management – Track threats through a centralized early warning 
system to help prevent attacks before they affect your enterprise.  
Threat/Vulnerability Intelligence Clearinghouse, integrated Vulnerability 
Scanning provides associated view of overall risk  and compliance posture.  
 Incident Management - Report incidents and ethics violations, manage their 
escalation, track investigations and analyze resolutions.  
 Business Continuity Management – Automated approach to business 
continuity and disaster recovery planning, and enable rapid, effective crisis 
management in one solution.  Storing Business Impact Assessment results to 
correlate against risk  assessments and action plans. 
11.2.6 Another label used for internal marketing purposes was that of FREIA - 
because once fully built, Archer would house relevant Findings, Risks, 
Exceptions, Issues and Assessment requirements.  
11.2.7 The Risk Management module is intrinsically linked with other modules in the 
Archer Suite: 
 Policy Management  
 Enterprise Management 
 Audit Management  
 Compliance Management  
 Threat Management  
11.2.8 The integrated workflow and combined intelligence increases: 
 Visibility 
 Collaboration 
 Efficiency  
 Accountability 
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11.2.9 Figure 89 represents the benefits of implementing a full eGRC platform. 
 
Figure 89:  eGRC End to End Implementation Model  
11.2.10 Figure 90 presents the High Level Solution Overview for full eGRC 
implementation: 
 
 
Figure 90:  eGRC High Level Solution View 
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11.3 HEART – a Technical Research Conference briefing paper 
HEART – Holistic Enterprise Assurance, Risk and Trust 
– …… providing “a safe pair of hands” 
Author(s) Names - removed 
 
Abstract 
Sustainability of an organisation’s security posture in the future requires an 
understanding of the need to balance risk and opportunity – without visibility of either, 
the ability to thrive is less effective and more challenging given the volume of 
uncertainty.  For too long, the security approach has been one of addressing the 
Compliance portion of Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) initiatives.  This new 
approach moves the emphasis back to the G and R – Governance and Risk - in order 
to better position the organisation for future resilience.  As a global service provider, the 
Company has a constant need to be aware of the many threats and vulnerabilities that 
may affect our clients.  The ability to assess the potential impact of these is vital.  The 
vectors are sporadic and extensive and originate from the many crises facing the world 
today.  The challenge is to have available to our account teams the necessary  
information to allow for sufficient oversight to be assured that any threat facing a client 
can be risk assessed and managed through the effective implementation of appropriate 
controls on each and every occasion.  We have directly met this challenge by 
implementing a solution that gives us visibility of all assets – by leveraging a proper 
configuration management database (CMDB), linked to various feeds of data relating to 
device health and network performance and threat landscape.  This is supported by the 
creation of a new legislative, regulatory, industry value standard and geography 
landscape vectors that help to position the data for priority and impact.  Together this 
will enable the Company to operate in a more agile and resilient manner, as a business 
as well as for all clients, through greater visibility of account risk and health status per 
region, per geography and per industry sector. 
Problem statement 
FY14 has so far reported 1,367 data breaches and more than 63,000 security incidents in 95 
countries
1
.  Mid-year 2014 data breaches exposed over 502 million records, far exceeding the 
mid-year point in 2013, the previous all-time record setting year.
2
  Corporate espionage is on 
the rise.  The maturity of CNE – Computer Network Exploitation – will be realised in the near 
future.  Hacked stolen credentials led the way as the root cause.  The Company handles the 
largest volume of credit card data worldwide – by a factor of billions.  It is vital for the 
Company’s Leadership Team (LT) to provide ongoing assurance to its customers that the 
Company is providing them with a secure environment; we must secure our customers data, 
information assets and intellectual property - maintaining an effective and appropriate “safe pair 
of hands”.  Currently, most accounts do not have a “one view” of their landscape and instead 
must go to many locations to “pull” data sets and seek to correlate the data points effectively 
enough to understand whether their client is at risk or not.  This can only be identified through a 
combination of knowledge across the information assets we are charged to protect for our 
clients, the timeline within which they expect us to update those assets (network devices, 
firewalls, servers etc), the service level(s) they expect us to maintain and our abil ity to do so.  
This is made all the more challenging through the Cloud environment where the risk of design 
flaws affecting the safety and security of the information are paramount.  There is also a need to 
build security into Enterprise Reference Architecture ensuring consistency of implementation of 
                                                                 
1 http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/insider/ 
2 http://datalossdb.org/ 
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required controls so that we can demonstrate the appropriate Governance, Risk , and 
Compliance (GRC) throughout the lifecycle of the design, build, manage and maintain 
processes, end to end.   We have previously lacked the ability to do this because we did not 
have a fully operational, mandated global corporate tool available for coll ation and reporting of 
the required information.  We have had multiple toolsets – threat intelligence, security incident 
and event monitoring, security operations centres – all collating data at the node level.  None of 
this has been collated and analysed in such a way as to present a holistic picture that best 
represents what most concerns executive leadership.   
We are also subject to consistent ongoing findings with regard to Identity and Access 
Management (IAM) which, alongside Asset and Inventory Manag ement (AIM), require 
significant global consolidation of processes and information sources to reduce risk.  
Our solution 
The Company Enterprise Security Information System (ESIS) Next Generation (NG) platform 
(built using the RSA Archer application) expansion through FY14 and across FY15 includes 
enhancements that extend the current reach, adoption, use, coverage and value of the tooling 
across the global enterprise.  The fundamental premise of the solution is to provide ES 
executive leadership with a true view of global risk – through the provision of a collation service 
for multiple data feeds generating a central repository for key 
information points required to assess and manage risk.  This is 
security intelligence at the macro rather than the micro level – across 
the whole GRC landscape.  ESIS NG will take the data currently 
housed on multiple global SharePoints under the guise of the 
ASGCM – the Account Security Governance and Compliance 
Management dashboard – and replicate this, with improvements and 
enhancements in a fully supported and backed up enterprise 
management system, with global repository capability and 
appropriate executive management reporting functionality providing 
an effective risk context – to creative a robust Account Infrastructure 
Profile (AIP) for all  accounts, business units, data centers etc.  This will utilize feeds from other 
corporately available sources - including Salesforce.com, ArcSight, RTOps, Ticketing, ESM, 
Redfish, CMDB, Aries, ADMS, ESL – in order to best represent a number of key elements for 
the full enterprise: risk to the business; risk to the clients ; opportunity to the business. 
RSA Archer is an industry-leading eGRC tool, as defined by the Gartner Magic Quadrant. EDS 
purchased this tool, when Archer was a start -up company, and became one of their first 
customers.  The tool itself is highly  
customizable, based on an SQL backend 
database, with multiple “modules” that can be 
purchased, to address various needs: Security 
Operations, Incident Management, Vulnerability 
Management, Risk Management, Policy 
Management, etc.  The Company CISO team 
has mapped extensive content  libraries, 
including standards and frameworks as well as  
regulations to the Company Security Policy 
framework. This provides a robust and 
comprehensive InfoSec management system 
from which the organisation can evidence its 
compliance with a multitude of international 
standards and regulations including ISO 27001 
certification, PCI DSS compliance, NIST 
guidance and US Federal regulations.  Given 
the current lack of ability to effectively present  
risk to the Company LT, the resulting capability to do so will be a significa nt governance 
enhancement providing real, transparent evidence of the much vaunted “safe pair of hands”.  
The work the team has done so far will be invaluable to the Separation team as the larger global 
corporate entity separates into two separately traded companies.  There will be an even greater 
need to have multiple sets of data for multiple parts of the global business – all requiring 
Industry Geography 
Client’s 
Business 
Solution 
AIP 
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knowledge of contracts signed; services sold; legislative framework; regulations and industry 
standards requiring compliance evidence and monitoring.  This will provide all parts of the 
organisation with heat maps of opportunity, as well as reducing duplication of effort and 
reporting, as the teams coalesce and streamline operations.  
Evidence the solution works 
For the purpose of this TechCon brief, the AIP module is our customisation of the Enterprise 
Management Module – which is designed to catalogue assets as well as basic customer data 
and provides an overlay of intelligence to generate opportunity heat maps as well as account 
security health status.  Our customisation takes this a step further by linking the asset data to an 
Account Infrastructure Profile.   
As of the writing of this brief, we have built out the 
design of the AIP module in Archer using static data 
sets. The development team is working through the 
creation of records based on regular manual 
reports; the goal being to automate as much of the 
data loading as possible, over time.  
The largest benefit of the solution is realised once 
all of the other modules are built out.  The Policy 
module has been the initial focus as that provides 
the ability for Archer to perform risk scoring.  The 
provision of data sets from Salesforce.com, the 
composite CMDB (called ESL), and business unit hierarchy (Polaris ) are primary objectives for 
FY15.  Additional data feeds on the roadmap may include: ArcSight, Airwatch, and 
ThreatCentral (crowd-sourced threat intelligence).  The graphic shows the architectural 
roadmap for integration of the automated data feeds.  
Competitive approaches 
The enterprise GRC platform market has matured to a strategic focus on enterprise risk 
management and business performance. The next market phase includes integrated 
performance and risk management, industry- and function-specific applications, and mobility. 
Taking into account this maturity and the increasing professional expertise of GRC users, the 
CISO office has been applying its expertise to developing areas of the tooling which no other 
organisation is addressing, nor currently capable of achieving.  Intellectual property is being 
utilised to create an extensive legislative landscape view within the Enterprise Management 
Module (the Account Infrastructure Profile) being built to provide this global view for all  
accounts.  What the Company CISO team have done with the Archer technology (ESIS) and the 
reporting and visibility capability this will provide for an organisation with the global scale and 
magnitude of the Company, is not available anywhere else in the market. 
Current status 
The Policy Management solution is currently in beta testing in the Company and throughout 
FY15 will see month on month progression as we build out the profiles for all identified 
Company accounts, as well as Data Centres and business units and roll out Risk Management 
(to maintain comprehensive Risk Registers for every Account, Client, Business Unit, 
Organisation, Group, Data Centre across the global organisation).  This will enable us to report 
per region, per geography, per industry sector on risk and account health status for the 
Company.  The biggest challenge – working with others and attempting to abide by the global 
corporate approach, in transition to two separate trading entities throughout FY15. 
Next steps 
Once ESIS NG has been built out and contains all the required information points of the 
company, “GRC as a Service” is the next part of the development roadmap.  The ability to 
harness this tooling to effectively provide a mirror service: both reassuring the Company LT and 
global corporate leadership that the Company has its landscape under control and is managing 
its daily operational risk environment effectively and providing the same visibility through 
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appropriate reassurance to the client landscape, external auditors and beyond as required.  
$3m estimated annual savings, plus $1m annual dollar value of future opportunity (minimum), 
plus $6m available spend from USPS due to US Fed support of use of Archer technology for 
GRC purposes.  The development of this approach will provide the organisation with a unique 
market leading position to move the GRC tooling landscape forward but also the InfoSec 
management industry.  This is the perfect marriage of process and technology with the people 
being supplied by a team of intelligent, innovative company employees! 
References 
http://www.emc.com/security/rsa-archer-governance-risk-compliance/index.htm 
http://uk.emc.com/security/rsa-archer-governance-risk-compliance/index.htm 
http://gcn.com/articles/2014/09/03/archer-rsa-cdm.aspx 
http://www.csg.ethz.ch/education/lectures/ManSec/HS2013/Quadrant 
 
NOTE: adapted from an original internal paper for a Technical Conference (TechCon) which was also utilised with 
external lawyers to validate the suitability of the programme of work for patentability of the software enhancements.  
Therefore, this information is commercially sensitive and has been edited.  References are not in Harvard style as this 
paper is “as presented”.  
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12 APPENDIX III: IA – A Chronology 
12.1 Overview 
12.1.1 This began as a UK specific endeavour but, through the course of 
the research, the scope of review broadened to include references to 
IS related events across an extensive timeline to evidence longevity 
of intention and purpose.  In reviewing the contents, it is possible to 
trace the history and influence of a number of interrelated information 
themes 
12.1.2 The researcher believes that as a result of the volume of available 
material, there is evident a plethora of confusing descriptions and 
explanations and it is only as a result of an exercise of 
chronologically recording and reviewing the history of how each 
ontology has been used, that there can be hope of addressing the 
skills crisis risking the success of the professionalism of IA.   
12.1.3 It is possible to categorise a number of era as below: 
 1986-1991 Era of discovery 
 1992-1998 Era of transition 
 1999-2005 Era of fame and glory 
 2006 onwards Era of mass cybercrime, cyber espionage, state sponsored 
espionage, digital espionage utilising computer network  exploitation (CNE)  
12.1.4 These era could also be represented as per Figure 91 below 
 
Figure 91:  Technology Era 
 
12.1.5 These map to the more commonly understood Industrial and 
Information era.  Ogren and Langevin (1999) articulated the era as 
“Security epochs”: 
 Revolutionary War to the mid-1820s, mid 1830s - 19
th
 century ended with WW1 
 WW1 and Soviet Union emerging 
 1920 to 1946 global recession, rise of international communism as Europe 
collapsed – leading to American democracy crisis 
 Cold War 
 Information age – technological developments, chemical and biological 
weapons etc 
 Cyber Security .... IoT 
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12.1.6 These issues affect everyone, worldwide.  Automating broken 
processes in the Information era, in order to achieve the IoT requires 
greater foresight to ensure IA is built in.  The Foresight era is where 
we find ourselves now – with sufficient information available and 
easily accessible to distil enough knowledge to advocate appropriate 
change in order to design a safer and more secure future.  For the 
key events that stand out over the last few decades (11 September 
2001 – USA; 7 July 2005 – London; 7 January 2015 – Paris; 13 
November 2015 – Paris; 22 March 2015 - Brussels) – the historical 
reflections are that the information was available but the intelligent 
analysis of it was not done in time to realise the benefits of the 
available knowledge and wisdom. 
12.1.7 The following chronology provided by Ranum (2010) depicts a potted 
history of where we have come from and implies where we are 
heading: 
1995 - install firewalls;  
1996 - punch big holes through them;  
1997 - announce “firewalls are dead”;  
1998 - install intrusion detection systems; 
1999 - turn off all the signatures;  
2000 - announce “intrusion detection is the pet [sic] rock of computer security”;  
2001 - install log aggregation systems; 
2002 - ignore them;  
2003 - complain that intrusion detection still does not work; 
2004 - worry about data leaking from the network;  
2005–2010 - give employees mobile devices; 
2006–2010 - give employees direct-from-desktop Internet publication capability 
via Facebook, Twitter, etc; 
2010 - give employees control of their own IT—when is it all going to sink in? … 
On one hand, we’re worried about data leakage, and on the other, we take 
steps to make said leakage as easy as possible. 
12.1.8 In other words, we continue to experience repeated patterns of 
behaviour and the capacity to run the risk of fulfilling expectation by 
doing so.  Applying technological solutions to technological problems; 
seeking to develop new technologies to address old technology 
faults, does little to address the human factors.  The risks that 
consumerisation in the workplace brings will not be halted unless we 
ensure these issues are embraced within appropriate organisational 
security policies and procedures in order to deliver effective IA. 
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12.2 What is IA? 
12.2.1 IAAC defined IA as “the certainty that the information within an 
organisation is reliable, secure and private.  IA encompasses both 
the accuracy of the information and its protection, and includes 
disciplines such as InfoSec Management, Risk Management and 
Business Continuity Management.  IA is central within any holistic 
approach to business assurance and should be embedded as an 
integral part of corporate governance and risk management 
processes” (IAAC, 2003). 
12.2.2 This definition focuses attention on the centrality of information to 
holistic business assurance.  The point is to alter perceptions such 
that IA comes to be seen not as an “add-on” but as something to be 
embedded throughout an organisation; the aim must be to develop  
12.2.3 Further definitions largely concur: 
“IA is achieved – and must be maintained – through a process that includes 
the assessment of threats to an information system, an analysis of the 
vulnerabilities in the system, an understanding of the impact of a system 
failure, and the application of technical and non-technical countermeasures to 
reduce the risk to an acceptable level for the business” (US NIST, 2001b).  
“IA is a holistic approach towards protecting information and IS by ensuring 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation.   
Although building on the discipline of InfoSec, the concept of IA raises the 
profile of security as a business critical operational function rather than as a 
technical support function” (Anhal et al., 2002).  
Central government defines IA as “the confidence that IS will  protect the 
information they carry, and will function as they need to, when they need to,  
under the control of legitimate users.” IA should be seen as  both a business 
enabler and a business protector, “ensuring users of IS are not unwittingly 
exposing themselves to unacceptable risk” (McFadzean, 2005). 
12.3 What is IAAC? 
12.3.1 IAAC’s mission is to advance IA to ensure that the UK’s Information 
Society (InfoSoc) can count on a robust, resilient and secure 
foundation.  It is a private sector-led, not-for-profit forum engaging 
key stakeholders in public and private sectors. 
12.3.2 Its actions include contributions to government policy development; 
specific briefings to its members, meetings and conferences on 
relevant issues.  IAAC produced the first Manifesto for the UK – 
“Protecting the Digital Society” in 2002.  It addressed all the issues 
(and more) that are now being repeated in 2016 as concern(s) grow 
with the interconnectivity arising from IoT. 
12.3.3 IAAC was uniquely positioned to lead the debate in the UK on IA at 
the top of the wave, with the following characteristics: 
 professional,  
 independent (commercially and politically), 
 UK focused with international perspective and 
 multiple stakeholders. 
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12.3.4 IAAC has been successful in: 
 addressing the concept of IA with its Manifesto; (then with CSIA and DTI) 
 inspiring public private collaboration with its paper “Sharing is Protecting”;  
(then with NISCC, ENISA) 
 Stimulating public awareness raising with its debate on Cyberhood Watch; 
(then with ENDURANCE, NISCC) 
 Informing Decision Makers on IA aspects with the presentation of “DIAN 
Guidelines” and setting up the Director’s IA Network . 
These outputs are crossed referred to in the below Chronology. 
12.4 Why IA? 
12.4.1 The long term goal is to achieve a good level of IA throughout the 
Digital Society, for the systems and data that people rely upon in 
their daily lives to be well behaved.  This means:  
 That IS will protect the data they process, store, and communicate; 
 That they will function as they need to;  
 That they will function when they need to;  
 That they will function under control.  
12.4.2 Government has always preferred self-regulation whilst wishing to 
endorse strong ecommerce as vital for the UK in terms of position 
and development.  However, whilst the private sector have generated 
multiple solutions, there is insufficient evidence to confirm the 
success of this approach. 
12.4.3 Over the past decade Turnbull, Enron, Corporate Social Reporting, 
Higgs, the FSA, vendors such as Microsoft, Oracle and IBM have all 
contributed to increased board awareness of risk management.  
Then there was the HMRC data breach of 2007 which resulted in the 
following swathe of reports that highlighted the need for and 
importance of IA: 
 IPCC independent investigation into the HMRC loss, 61 pages, (IPCC, 2008) 
 Kieran Poynter Review of InfoSec at HMRC, 109 pages, (Poynter, 2008) 
 House of Commons Justice Committee Protection of Private Data Report, 28 
pages, (UK House of Commons Justice Committee, 2008) 
 Sir Gus O'Donnell Data Handling Procedures in Government, 46 pages  (UK 
Cabinet Office, 2008b) 
 Nick Coleman Protecting Government Information - Independent review of  
government IA, 31 pages, (Coleman, 2007) 
 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Report on Surveillance 
Society, 119 (main report) + 281 (supporting report) pages, (UK House of  
Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2008) 
 Sir Edmund Burton, Review into the loss of MoD Personal Data, 76 pages ,  
(Burton, 2008) 
 MoD Action Plan in response to the Burton Report, 28 pages, (UK MoD, 
2008) 
 House of Commons debate on Data Protection held on 12 June 2008 led by 
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer, 31 pages, (Miller, 2008) 
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 Ministry of Justice Data Sharing Review, Richard Thomas, the Information 
Commissioner, and Dr Mark  Walport, Director of the Wellcome Trust , 
(Thomas, 2008) 
 Review of Criminality Information – Sir Ian Magee (Magee, 2008) 
12.4.4 The benefits and returns from creating a corporate IA culture and 
corporate IA programmes are expected to include: 
 More assured continuity of business processes and services and of the 
business itself 
 Greater efficiency and higher levels of performance of internal operations  
 Better security, integrity, reliability, and utility of IS and data (higher levels of  
maintenance of the corporate information infrastructure)  
 More reliable, and better leveraging of, the goodwill, trading and support  
relationships established with partners, stakeholders, customers, investors,  
government and the public. 
12.4.5 The risks of neglecting this aspect of corporate governance might 
include: 
 Higher operating costs, including both daily costs due to inadequacies of the 
information inf rastructure (e.g. from poor records management) and irregular 
costs due to major incidents or adverse events 
 Greater uncertainty in forecasting and planning future costs  
 More difficult and less beneficial relationships with partners etc  
12.4.6 As stated: “IA must be maintained throughout the life-cycle of a 
system, as threats change with the changing political or business 
environment, vulnerabilities appear and disappear as the 
configuration of the system changes and new weaknesses are 
discovered, and the impact of systems failure changes as 
dependency on a system develops” (UK Cabinet Office, 2007a). 
12.4.7 Sir Edmund Burton (IAAC chair during the life of this research) 
highlighted that “the theme of IA had been a continuing challenge for 
government departments since 2001 (Room, 2009).  The following 
chronological review of developments during the last decade and 
more, show the maturation during a period of time. 
12.4.8 Material in the IA space is being produced weekly if not daily and 
thus the volume is staggering.  The Literature Review is as accurate 
and up to date as possible up to the date of thesis printing.  This is 
supported by the IA chronology below which traces some of the 
historical events that have impacted the information industry.  The 
flow is intended to be reflective of the growth and maturation of the 
information industry and IA specifically.  Every effort has been taken 
to refer to the most appropriate and obvious sources.  Any glaring 
omissions are unintentional.  The endeavour has been to highlight 
key points from each publication (where available, directly from their 
summary details) in order to plot a course through to the present day, 
focussing on the most seminal, pivotal and influential publications (in 
whatever format).  A number of the works are from a personal 
collection and, in some cases, are now unable to be sourced online – 
a reflection of records management in the 21st century.  Contact the 
author for access if unsuccessful. 
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12.5 IA Chronology 
12.5.1 1440s – invention of Johannes Gutenberg’s printing press. 
12.5.2 1512 – Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus in his textbook, De 
Copia stressed the connection between memory and reading, urging 
students to annotate their books(Carr, 2011, p.178). 
12.5.3 1710 – separation of ownership of information from its production, 
with the introduction of the Copyright Act. 
12.5.4 1727 – Benjamin Franklin introduced the first public library to 
Philadelphia, enabling wider access to knowledge sharing. 
12.5.5 1766 – Freedom of the Press Act in Sweden 
12.5.6 1775 – Samuel Johnson, in conversation with others regarding the 
merits of reading is quoted as saying “Knowledge is of two kinds. We 
know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find information 
upon it.” (Carr, 2011, p.143). 
12.5.7 1780s – Jeremy Bentham credited with the design of the Panopticon 
(originally formulated by his brother Samuel) which has often been 
articulated in the context of the “surveillance society” of the 21st 
century (McMullan, 2015). 
12.5.8 1789 – All Writs Act – which compels people to do things within the 
limits of the available legislation. Various future rulings diluted its 
intent though  context is king (Lewis, 2016).   
12.5.9 1808 – the first documented “man in the middle” attack.  15th – 24th 
August 1808 - Lord Cochrane destroys a series of French 
semaphore stations along the coast of the bay of Marseilles – taking 
care to copy rather than remove the signal books, leaving the 
originals to burn amidst the other papers.  As a result, the French did 
not feel it necessary to alter their signals and the British could lie off 
shore and read those covering the movement of shipping and reports 
of sightings of the British ships “from the promontory of Italy 
northward”. [Taken from Admiral Lord Cochrane – The autobiography 
of a Seaman.  This story is picked up and adapted copied by C S 
Forester in a Hornblower story and appears again in one of Patrick 
O’Brian’s Jack Aubrey Books). 
12.5.10 1830s – there was a private sector telegraph covering stock 
movements in Paris.  In 1836, two bankers from Bordeaux bribed 
telegraph operators to add signals on the price movements of 
government stocks (sent by post to the provinces) to the network 
used for official government transmissions.  The fraud ran for two 
years before it was detected, but the trial collapsed because the law 
on the Government monopoly of traffic was unclear.  It was tidied up 
in 1837 (Flichy, 1993). 
12.5.11 1852 - Records of Common Council – regarding records release. 
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12.5.12 1861 – the First Battle of Bull Run, also known as “Battle of First 
Manassas” – the first major battle of the American Civil War, created 
through misinformation and the art of information warfare. 
12.5.13 1867 – law on electronic signatures clear because of existing 
legislation – common law liabilities already exist. 
12.5.14 1883 – Augustus Kerckhoffs (Kerckhoffs,1883) stated six design 
principles for military ciphers, listed below: 
1) The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable;  
2) It should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy 
hands; 
3) It must be possible to communicate and remember the key without using written 
notes, and correspondents must be able to change or modify it at will;  
4) It must be applicable to telegraph communications; 
5) It must be portable, and should not require several persons to handle or 
operate;  
6) Lastly, given the circumstances in which it is to be used, the system must be 
easy to use and should not be stressful to use or require its users to know and 
comply with a long list of rules. 
Modern computing renders much of the content moot, however his 
second axiom remains critically important and is referred to as 
Kerckhoffs principle. 
12.5.15 1885 – the public sector purchased its first typewriter, apparently 
much to the protest of calligraphers in the Civil Service (Shanes, 
2011)! 
12.5.16 1919 – GCHQ formed as the Government Code and Cyber School. 
12.5.17 1942 - the UK Government focus was only on the C of CIA 
(Confidentiality) 
12.5.18 1943 – AIIM International was founded as the National Microfilm 
Association, later becoming the Association for Information and 
Image Management.  In the 21st century, the focus shifted to 
enterprise content management (ECM) embracing content/document 
management, business process management, enterprise portals, 
knowledge management, image management, data warehousing and 
data mining (Kahn and Blair, 2009). There is no direct reference to 
security and yet the intrinsic links need to be understood within the 
information landscape. 
12.5.19 1944 – Simple Sabotage Field Manual produced by the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), designed to “assist privy personnel in 
devising methods that would cause dithering, delay, distress and 
destruction, from telegraph operators to railway engineers” (Rid, 
2013, p.73) 
12.5.20 1945 – Vannevar Bush (1988) wrote an article entitled “As we may 
think” describing an imaginary information retrieval machine, the 
Memex. 
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12.5.21 1945 – Samuel F.B. Morse introduced the telegraph and people 
worried about confidentiality of the messages being transmitted so 
within a year, a commercial encryption code had been developed to 
protect telegraphed messages.  “A few years after that, the US 
government sought ways to tap into the protected messages” 
(Garfinkel, 1995, p.118). 
12.5.22 1948 – A Mathematical Theory of Communication Available at: 
http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/history/seminal.html) – Claude 
Shannon’s seminal paper (found on a list of other seminal papers). 
Provided a mathematical theory for encoding information by applying 
a value to it – either 0 or 1.  From this begat bits and bytes.  Shannon 
is viewed as a founder of information theory and an architect of our 
digital world. 
12.5.23 Late 1940s – cybernetics - concerned with the study of 
communication and control systems in living beings and machines .  
The more recent use of the cyber- prefix has been adopted as a 
result of the more literal meaning “through the use of a computer” 
(Kingova, 2013). 
12.5.24 1957 – BCS formed. 
12.5.25 1958 – Public Records Act - An Act to make new provision with 
respect to public records and the Public Record Office, and for 
connected purposes.  Updated in 2005 and again in 2011. 
12.5.26 1960s onwards - cyber temporary or nonce words appear in modern 
parlance – cyborg being the most memorable. 
12.5.27 1961 – The economics of information – Stigler’s pioneering article 
begins thus:  “One should hardly have to tell academicians that 
information is a valuable resource: knowledge is power. And yet it occupies 
a slum dwelling in the town of economics” (Best, 1996, p.22). 
12.5.28 1962 – First formal computing department in Purdue University, 
Indiana, US. 
12.5.29 1963 – the term “hypertext” was coined by Ted Nelson, implying that 
each text in systems occupies a position in a multidimensional space. 
12.5.30 1965 – the idea of the “paperless office” was first introduced (Peltier, 
2002, p.3).  Given where we are in the 21st century, some five 
decades later, we are far from the “paperless office” and much of the 
information leaks and data breaches are experienced as a result of 
the mishandling of information that is left lying around desks and 
offices – printers, fax machines, photocopiers - rather than being 
properly managed and controlled. 
12.5.31 1966 – Cybermen first appear in the Doctor Who series – The Tenth 
Planet. 
12.5.32 1966 – Freedom of Information Act in the US (under Lyndon 
Johnson) 
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12.5.33 1967 – historical knowledge of software initiatives gaining 
momentum.  First packet switched network developed at the National 
Physical Laboratory in Middlesex, UK. 
12.5.34 1968 – McLuhan, Fiore and Agel (1968) developed the concept of 
online hypertext and the global vi llage. 
12.5.35 1968 - computer systems starting to take off – government already 
taking wrong turns; subsequently written up in books like Crash 
(Collins, T. and Bicknell, D. - 1997)  and Software Runaway (Glass, 
R.L. - 1998). 
12.5.36 1969 – saw the launch of the first node of Arpanet in the US, made  
between two computers in California. 
12.5.37 1970s – software security assurance work began.  TCP/IP protocols 
agreed, Arpanet progresses to the Internet.  The first real email was 
introduced in 1970. 
12.5.38 1971 – Raymond Tomlinson invented email, choosing the @ symbol 
to signify location of receivers of messaging, when he launched the 
service to a US government network.  He died in March 2016. 
12.5.39 1972 – File Transfer Protocol (FTP) developed. 
12.5.40 1972 – Bad Vulnerability Management – a Computer Security 
Technology Planning Study, J.P. Anderson – highlighted here only to 
show how far back vulnerabilities have been being talked about and 
addressed.  There are two volumes available (see the Bibliography).  
The content addresses the changing landscape of the movement 
from closed systems (largely internally facing, with a known number 
of users) to more open systems (with external connectivity and a less 
predictable user base).  The “malicious user in the context of a 
resource shared system presents a new type of threat, control of 
which is necessary before the objective of full use of shared 
computer systems can be realized” (Anderson, 1972, p.10).  The 
summary highlighted the difficulty of having raised issues that 
required significant control and these having not being met 
favourably.  This has been a constant refrain throughout the 
intervening years.  Maintaining secure systems takes time and costs 
money.  Anderson noted “merely saying a system is secure will not 
alter the fact that unless the security for a system is designed in at its 
inception, there are no simple measures to later make it secure” 
(Anderson, 1972, p.40).  Reference monitors, trap doors, penetration 
testing, file encryption techniques, bui lding secure systems..... the 
groundwork is evident in these papers. 
12.5.41 1972 – Cyborg, novel by Martin Caidin – which inspired The Six 
Million Dollar Man and The Bionic Woman. 
12.5.42 1973 - first overseas connection to ARPANET introduced when a 
connection was established via a satellite link and then land line to 
University College London and then to Brighton. 
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12.5.43 1976 – Governance included as part of ISACA discussions and 
group focus. 
12.5.44 1978 – Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) invented. 
12.5.45 1979/1980 – Usenet invented. 
12.5.46 1980s – “The early 1980s witnessed a flurry of interest in the 
application of IM concepts to the harnessing of distributed 
information and computing resources in the university sector” (Best, 
1996, p.144). 
12.5.47 1981 - the Council of Europe Convention established standards 
among member countries, to ensure the free flow of information 
among them without infringing personal privacy.  The original 
purpose was to facilitate the flow of data.  This is referred to as the 
Strasbourg Convention of 1981 and was the original data protection 
law. 
12.5.48 1982 – William Gibson, science fiction writer, coined the phrase 
“cyberspace” in his science fiction novella Burning Chrome (Goodell, 
1996).  Cyberspace is defined as the “notional environment within 
which electronic communication (esp. via the internet) occurs” 
(Oxford English Dictionary).  Gibson spoke about the use of the term 
in the 2000 documentary “No Maps for These Territories” - “All I 
knew about the word "cyberspace" when I coined it, was that it 
seemed like an effective buzzword. It seemed evocative and 
essentially meaningless. It was suggestive of something, but had no 
real semantic meaning, even for me, as I saw it emerge on the 
page”. 
12.5.49 1984 - the UK's first Data Protection Act was introduced. This was an 
act of Parliament designed to protect individuals who have 
information about them held on computer. The act obliged 
organisations holding personal data to register with the Data 
Protection Registrar and agree to abide by the principles of data 
protection outlined in the act.  These principles included: obtaining 
and processing data fairly; ensuring accuracy and relevance of 
information; and taking effective measures to prevent unauthorized 
access to data. Individuals have the right to be told if a third party 
holds information about them, obtain a record of that information, and 
require correction if necessary.  The 1998 Data Protection Act gave 
employees the right to see their personnel records. 
12.5.50 1985 – veteran comedian Ernie Wise made Britain’s first ever mobile 
phone call. 
12.5.51 1986 – the CIO – Chief Information Officer was introduced as a role 
(Best, 1996, p.148). 
12.5.52 1986 – the launch of Fuji’s first disposable camera was the biggest 
technical breakthrough. 
12.5.53 1988 - The Morris Worm – introduced new speech acts into the 
relevant disciplines. 
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12.5.54 1989 – ‘hacking’ was by now a fashionable media term (Goodell, 
1996). 
12.5.55 1989 – Bash was first written (Lucas, 2015, p.4) 
12.5.56 1989 – 10,000 nodes reached on the Arpanet and it becomes clear it 
is getting larger than anticipated. 
12.5.57 1989 – ISF founded - the InfoSec Forum (ISF) is a non-profit 
company that provides insightful guidance and opinions on a variety 
of security information. It combines the in-house expertise, 
experience and collective knowledge of over 300 members across 
the world to provide easy to use tools and methods that assist its 
members with a wide range of issues and challenges whether they 
are compliance driven or strategy related (see for example ISF, 
2013). 
12.5.58 1991 – Computer Ethics Institute formed and created The Ten 
Commandments: 
1) Thou shalt not interfere with the works and files of other people.  
2) Thou shalt not sneak around in other people's computer files.  
3) Thou shalt not use a computer to steal and do negative things.  
4) Thou shalt not use a computer to bear false witness. 
5) Thou shalt not copy or use proprietary software for which you have not paid.  
6) Thou shalt not use other people's computer resources with no authorisation or 
proper compensation.  
7) Thou shalt not appropriate other people's intellectual output.  
8) Thou shalt think  about the social consequences of the programme you are 
writing or the system you are designing.  
9) Thou shalt not use a computer to harm other people.  
10) Thou shalt always use a computer in ways that ensure consideration and 
respect for your fellow humans. 
[Sic. The confusion of "thou" and "you" is in the original.] 
12.5.59 1991 – Gulf War – It is widely believed that the Gulf War was the first 
information war.  “In many ways, the Gulf War was the harbinger of 
IA.  The ability to rapidly integrate commercial and military 
information technology from multiple companies and countries and 
the ability to dynamically reconfigure it was critical to the success of 
the Allies” (Herrmann, 2002). 
12.5.60 1991 – McCumber’s CIA Model – the CIA triad is borne – 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability are widely discussed as 
attributes of security. 
12.5.61 1991 - World Wide Web developed and introduced...... CERN makes 
WWW freely available, websites and web browsers developed during the 
1990s. 
12.5.62 1992 - Cadbury Report – defined Corporate Governance as “the 
system by which organisations are directed and controlled.  The 
Board of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
organisations”.  This set the tone for the organisational level of 
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attention required to the subject area and introduced the term 
stakeholder into our day to day dialogue. 
12.5.63 1992 – 1,000,000 hosts on the internet. 
12.5.64 1992 – COAST formed – Computer Operations, Audit and Security 
Team in Purdue University. 
12.5.65 1992 - Basel Capital Accord – this was first published in 1988, 
replaced again in 1999 with a more comprehensive and risk-sensitive 
framework to include operational risk areas.  It was finally 
implemented in 2007 and is now on its third iteration.  Given the 
depth of available resources, knowledge and regulation behind risk 
management thinking in the financial services sector, a lot of which 
was adopted within the public sector, it is alarming to appreciate the 
level of the collapse within the banking industry during the latter part 
of the first decade of the 21st century. 
12.5.66 1992 – ‘cypherpunks’ – a group of California libertarians – set up an 
email list to purpose and discuss how cyberspace could be used to 
guarantee personal liberty, privacy and anonymity. 
12.5.67 26 November 1992 – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines for the Security of Information 
Systems  - “These guidelines apply to all participants in the new 
information society and suggest the need for a greater awareness 
and understanding of security issues, including the need to develop a 
"culture of security" - that is, a focus on security in the development 
of IS and networks, and the adoption of new ways of thinking and 
behaving when using and interacting within IS and networks. The 
guidelines constitute a foundation for work towards a culture of 
security throughout society”.  This was a theme that was being 
considered towards the end of the 20th century, being talked about 
nearly twenty years ago and yet it is still a struggle to achieve it in the 
second decade of the 21st century. 
12.5.68 27 November 1992 – Amended proposal for a Council Directive on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data.  This 1992 proposal 
would be further debated and negotiated before enactment as 
Directive 95/46 (the Directive) – which became the 1998 Data 
Protection Act in the UK. 
12.5.69 1993 – The term Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) originated in 
the US in 1993. The OECD phrased ‘Information Infrastructure’ 
consisting of those information and communication technology 
facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or 
destroyed, either (1) have a serious impact on the health, safety, 
security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functions 
of governments, or (2) causes the functioning of a critical 
infrastructure which it supports to be seriously disrupted’. 
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12.5.70 29 April 1993 - US House of Representatives Subcommittee of 
Telecommunications and Finance, first session, Rayburn Office 
Building – John Gage, Director of the Science Office at Sun 
Microsystems gave a hands-on demonstration of how the world was 
going digital (Goodell, 1996).  It served to show the breadth and 
scale of the potential of digital technology and how easily locatable 
any individual would become but also how much information would 
be traceable and accessible as a result of the operation of so many 
databases. 
12.5.71 May 1994 - High Risk/High Potential: An Executive Report on the 
Management of Information Technology in Local Government, Audit 
Commission (2014a) “There is a risk that change will outpace the 
ability of IS to support it.  Councils must endeavour to align their IS 
with changes in their organisation.  Knowing where the organisation 
is going is a necessary starting point.” ...... “There must be corporate 
standards for shared data which must be owned, managed and 
reconciled with the operational packages that are purchased.  Those 
who use IT need no longer be beholden to IT specialists.  They can 
gain control and shape the council’s IT strategy to meet their 
changing needs and obtain the IT support that they require”.  This did 
not start to happen for at least another decade.  “Users must become 
better educated and trained if they are to get the best out of existing 
systems.  Failings are often caused by user error or ignorance rather 
than any weakness on the part of the provider..... Authorities should 
underpin their training programmes with a skills audit of their staff.” 
One of the key components of any IA strategy is embedding IRM as 
a fundamental activity throughout the organisation.  “Whilst most 
Councils acknowledge the need for effective IS, other issues tend to 
distract attention. ….The management of statutory change has 
become all-absorbing for councils.  There is a risk that managers 
‘sideline’ the development of their council’s information strategy.” 
12.5.72 May 1994 - High Risk/High Potential: A Management Handbook on 
Information Technology in Local Government, Audit Commission 
(2014b) - This report was the full detail of the Executive Summary 
above.  It provides an excellent “history” timeline for the growth in 
usage of ICT in local government.  The continual implications were of 
savings that may be possible for the appropriate deployment of new 
technologies.  However, there was a clear understanding that this 
would require re-working of Service Level Agreements to reflect the 
reality of the contractual nature of the activities.  There was a 
reference to the need for “a federal IT Strategy”.  Given that this 
review is showing where some of the “cracks” are in terms of the use 
of terminology, it is likely that anything with the branding of “federal” 
implies too strong a US link and that this could have unwittingly 
alienated the intended audience.  As one would expect there was 
acknowledgement that “as the number of users increase, so does the 
risk” and the recommendation was to provide advice to include 
“security of data stored on fileservers and personal computers; 
managing data stored outside the central IT department and 
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implications of the Data Protection Act”.  There was a rather 
prescient point on page 52 – “the causes of failure are rarely 
technical”.  On page 73, there was a “call to arms” in the conclusion 
implying the need for a National Framework for IT – “the government 
should initiate discussions with the local authority associations to 
identify the benefits of further national specifications”.  In March 
2011, a new Government ICT Strategy was released. 
12.5.73 June 1994 – NSTISSI No. 4011 – National Training Standard for 
Information Systems Security (InfoSec) Professionals – discussed 
information states and security measures required to be 
implemented. 
12.5.74 1995 – BS7799 – the first British Standard for InfoSec management 
is issued. 
12.5.75 1995 – 16 million people using the internet worldwide, most of them 
computer enthusiasts (Lucas, 2015, p.xviii). 
12.5.76 1996 - (96/938) Keeping it Confidential booklet from the DTI (as was) 
and companion booklet “Protecting Business Information – 
Understanding the Risks” – “An organisation’s information is one of 
its most important assets.  It needs to be protected, particularly since 
it is often shared within the organisation and with trading partners” .  
The booklet is about classification and protection of information and 
the provision of assurance of effective management of IP in 
organisations.  Security measures should be justifiable, practical and 
necessary.  Effectively this is a handbook for helping to implement 
what was the Manual of Protective Security (MPS), without needing 
to have access to the restricted document.  The terminology is 
addresses business risk, impact, threat, vulnerability... these terms 
have been used for at least two decades and yet there is still a 
requirement to either explain them or be apologetic for them. 
12.5.77 1996 - first UK council website was launched. 
12.5.78 1996 – the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) was founded. 
12.5.79 1996 – saw the first real concerns about investment in IT; reality of IT 
implementations saw failures to bring proposed benefits.  The 
problem was identified as “confounding information with IT”, as 
articulated by Best (1996, p.21). 
12.5.80 1997 – Nicholas Negroponte – former Director of MIT Media Lab – 
declared that the internet would bring about world peace, and the 
end of nationalism. 
12.5.81 1998 - Corporate governance was recognised by the Critical 
Infrastructure Assurance office (CIAO) who chose to partner with the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the National Association of 
Corporate Directors, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and the IS Audit and Control Association (ISACA) – and 
hosted a number of summits to raise awareness of the role of 
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corporate directors in safeguarding the information assets of their 
organisations. 
12.5.82 1998 – Moonlight Maze began but was not discovered for a further 
two years.  This is the code name for a long term infiltration of 
American defence institutions.  Over 17 years later, it is of concern to 
acknowledge the lack of progress, in technological terms, given that 
it can still take over 200 days to identify an infiltration in a network. 
12.5.83 1998 - Parkerian Hexad – Donn Parker adds possession, utility and 
authenticity to the existing CIA triad, viewing these as atomic 
elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.84 March 1998 - Protecting Critical Information Infrastructures 
Conference and Exhibition - the first of several run over the 
subsequent years capturing the flavour of the time period where the 
subjects elucidated through the publications reflected herein were 
brought to a wider audience for discussion and dissemination. 
12.5.85 During 1998, Neil Fisher (now Chair of IAAC) was involved in 
providing talks on IA and its journey from Information Warfare, to the 
MoD.  This provided audiences with the opportunity of the beginning 
of real learning about the IA concept in the UK. 
12.5.86 December 1998 – Our competitive future: Building the Knowledge 
Driven Economy - This paper set out the Governments ambitious 
goal of developing the UK as the world’s best environment for 
electronic trading by 2002.  Embedding IA was always going to be 
fundamental to achieving this goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.87 1999 – US Department of Justice identified IA as a national priority in 
the US for the protection of the critical information infrastructure. 
1998 Highlights and Lowlights 
 The Data Protection Act 1998, which built on an EC directive of 1995 was introduced 
with the explicit aim of protecting the right to privacy.  It embedded the 8 Principles into 
the process. 
 CERIAS formed – the Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance 
and Security, Purdue University.  
 “We are stak ing our future on a resource that we have not yet learned to protect”, 
George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Lucas, 2015, p.1).  
1999 Highlights 
 Carnegie Mellon refers to the term survivability.....  
 Tony Blair made a statement that “all government departments” would be BS7799 
certified – this was quick ly changed to compliant once the cost implications were 
clear.  
 Scott McNealy, cofounder of Sun Microsystems, made the infamous statement “You 
have zero privacy anyway.  Get over it!”. 
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12.5.88 5 March 1999 – Building confidence in Electronic Commerce – A 
Consultation Document - A paper designed to consult on the 
proposed implementation of the government’s policy target of 
achieving 25 per cent of dealings by citizens and businesses with 
government as electronic by 2002.  This was the beginning of the 
electronic and transformational government agenda, seeking to 
encourage trust in the use of online systems for government 
purposes. 
12.5.89 March 1999 - Cabinet Office Modernising Government White Paper 
– advocated that the public sector “use new technology to meet the 
needs of citizens and businesses and not trail behind technological 
developments”.  This was a significant sea change in UK 
Government ICT positioning at the time and was the birth of 
“Information Age Government”. 
12.5.90 1999 - National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) 
was established with an announcement by the Right Honourable 
Tom King MP.  Resourced by existing Security Service and CESG 
baselines, it acts as an umbrella organisation co-ordinating relevant 
activities in several departments and Agencies, including the Security 
Service, CESG, Cabinet Office, Home Office, MoD, DERA, DTI and 
the Police.  Note the pattern forming that for each US announcement 
soon after there is a UK equivalent. 
12.5.91 1999 – ISO15408 The Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation (abbreviated as Common Criteria or CC) is 
released - an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for computer 
security certification. 
12.5.92 1999 – Tim Berners Lee - “I have a dream for the Web [in which 
computers] become capable of analysing all the data on the Web – 
the content, links, and transactions between people and computers. 
A ‘Semantic Web’, which should make this possible, has yet to 
emerge, but when it does, the day-to-day mechanisms of trade, 
bureaucracy and our daily lives will be handled by machines talking 
to machines” (in Jones and Ashenden, 2005, p.165). 
12.5.93 1999 – Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA, 
undated) - was used in a major exercise in the US Government as far 
back as 1999.  Australia’s Federal Government has seen SABSA use 
and adoption in a number of agencies. 
12.5.94 May 1999 - the Organisation for Economic cooperation and 
Development (OECD) endorsed the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance which constitutes the chief response by governments to 
the G-7 Summit Leaders’ recognition of corporate governance as an 
important pillar in the architecture of the new century’s global 
economy.  These Principles defined “corporate governance” as “the 
systems by which business corporations are directed and controlled” 
[ICGN Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles – 
Adopted July 9, 1999 at the Annual Conference in Frankfurt]. 
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12.5.95 September 1999 - (Turnbull Report) Internal Control: Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code (ICAEW, 1999) – required that 
companies ensure that they have a sound system of internal control 
and effective risk management processes which the Board reviews 
regularly, applicable to the “security of tangible and intangible assets, 
business continuity issues”.  Turnbull requires companies to ensure 
their system of internal control is a) embedded in the operations of 
the company b) is capable of responding to change and c) includes 
procedures for reporting major weaknesses immediately.  The 
guidance required companies to manage their key risks, remedy 
weaknesses promptly and review all aspects of internal control on a 
regular basis. 
12.5.96 19 November 1999 Bruce Schneier wrote the following, which is 
apposite considering the currency and veracity of the statements 
(Schneier, 1999): 
Predictions 
 As systems get more complex, security will get worse. 
 As systems become more interconnected, security will get worse. 
 Unless manufacturers are held liable for security failures, security 
will get worse. 
 The only long-term solutions are to either embrace insecurity or 
eschew "Internet-years" style complexity. 
 In the short term, the best course of action for enterprises is to 
outsource security to companies that have the expertise to 
understand the systems being secured.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.97 2000 – the era of “Electronic Government” (eGov) began.  This 
spawned many prefix laden activities where “electronic” was put in 
front of numerous initiatives – including e-governance, e-democracy, 
much in the same way as later in the decade “cyber” was put in front 
of initiatives (Kesar, 2011).  Note that in the transition, the preceding 
term was “hi tech crime” but “cyber” has adopted the same trajectory 
as a prefix for many other terms beyond its original intended scope 
and meaning. 
2000 Highlights / Lowlights 
 UK Freedom of Information Act. 
 UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. 
 93,047,785 hosts on the internet. 
 Amazon, Ebay and Yahoo suffered hack attacks in 2000 that led to share price falls.  
Ebay lost $4.56 billion, Amazon $6.67 and Yahoo lost £17.24 billion.  
 Aug 00 Hacker hits 9 .gov.uk (4 LAs); 450 more sites in 5 weeks . 
 This decade includes global public use of the Internet, search engines, Google, 
dot.com boom and bust, Web 2.0, social media, 1 trillion web pages in 2008. 
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12.5.98 January 2000 - Putting IT into Practice: New Technology and the 
Modernising Agenda (Hellawell, 2000) - This document was honest 
from the start.   “It’s not easy.  Nor is it cheap.  It’s very fast moving 
and it’s no longer optional.  Public sector managers and members 
have exactly the same mountain to scale as their private sector peers 
– they have to develop an e-business strategy”.  The terminology has 
been the same for a full decade.  Key words and phrases: Business 
driven, ICT enabled; hybrid managers required; committed 
leadership necessary; “IT department to come out of the closet”; 
citizen centred viewpoint.  The report contains reference to a case 
study showing that Knowsley Council had implemented “community 
digital television” in 2000 and yet Hull City Council were only 
considering utilising this technology a full ten years later in 2010.  It is 
a good example of how long and slow the process of change is 
across the public sector – particularly without a centrally driven 
mandate to insist on certain implementations for the greater good.   
Knowsley were smart and made the most of government fundi ng 
available at the time.  There was never going to be enough funding to 
go around what were over 400 councils at the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.99 March 2000 – eEurope Initiative, European Commission - owned by 
the Information Society DG seeking to make the EU the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world 
with improved employment and social cohesion by 2010 (Chissick 
and Harrington, 2004). 
12.5.100 27 March 2000 – Protecting the Information Society – monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP01 (IAAC, 2000a). 
12.5.101 April 2000 – eGovernment Strategic Framework - written to fulfil the 
commitment of the 1999 Modernising Government White Paper.  
“The Strategic Framework was accompanied and followed by 
numerous other reports aimed at specific components of the 
electronic government strategy” (Chissick and Harrington, 2004). 
IAAC established, 21 March 2000 - promoting the concept of IA over information 
security – providing the only forum in the UK in which industry and government could work 
together to develop policies that would ensure the emergence of a secure and dependable 
information infrastructure.  During the year, IAAC’s e-Security Monitor provided its’ 
members with an up to date and comprehensive reference source on IA developments 
worldwide.  The Aims of IAAC are stated as follows: 
 To provide a forum for networking and information exchange on Information 
Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection policies; 
 To conduct and disseminate forward-looking analysis into Information Assurance 
and Critical Infrastructure Protection policies;  
 To enable business, government, law enforcement and citizens to jointly create, 
and influence the policy development of solutions to the challenges of the 
Information Society; 
 To promote the creation of a safer and better protected Information Society in the 
United Kingdom and to assist those organisations with intentions similar to thos e of 
IAAC to foster awareness of, and action on, Information Assurance globally;  
 To engage in education and outreach activities either alone or in co-operation with 
any company, association, public authority, or other body or person for the purpose 
of promoting the objectives of the Council. 
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12.5.102 April 2000 – UK Policy Developments – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC – providing updates, BP02 (IAAC, 2000b). 
12.5.103 18 April 2000 - Defining the Critical National Infrastructure - 
workshop hosted by IAAC followed up with a detailed report 
providing rhetoric and content for senior executives to utilise and 
learn from in terms of placing the core critical protection themes 
within their organisations. 
12.5.104 17 May 2000 – e-Business Risks seminar held by IAAC at which 
cyber themes were discussed – cybercrime, cyber-fraud, cyber-
shoplifting.  So for these themes to be gaining such traction and 
media attention in late 2010 and early 2011 seemed surprising to the 
author, given that the issues at their core are not new and many 
solutions have already been talked through.  As an industry, it is 
important to start to move beyond talking for the sake of talking, 
mainly to an audience of peers, as it does not seem to be 
professional enough when we should have progressed well beyond 
reaction to proactive behaviours (IAAC, 2000c). 
12.5.105 May 2000 – US Policy Developments – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC – providing updates, BP03 (IAAC, 2000d). 
12.5.106 May 2000 – The European Union’s Approach to IA and CIP Policy – 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP04 (IAAC, 2000e). 
12.5.107 June 2000 - eGovernment, an international study of online 
government (Oakley, 2000) - “Attitudes to privacy, co-operation, 
technology, equity and to government itself differ enormously 
between the countries involved.  Nevertheless, benchmarking is a 
hallmark of any serious attempt to change practice in organisations 
and it is in that spirit that the report is offered”.  Again, this is a good 
example of where a concept had been already gaining traction (that 
of privacy) and yet it took all of the subsequent decade for it become 
more widely embedded into the vocabulary and thinking of people 
working in IS related roles.  It seems to be the case that despite 
things in the information age moving incredibly quickly – as predicted 
in Moore’s Law - the actual human is not keeping up at the same 
pace (Intel, undated). 
12.5.108 June 2000 – International Organisations and CIP Policy – monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP05, (IAAC, 2000f). 
12.5.109 June 2000 – eEurope 2002 Action Plan endorsed by the Feira 
European Council.  The aim of the Action Plan was to make 
available: 
 A cheaper, faster, secure internet; 
 To invest in people and sk ills in order to meet the next bullet point; and  
 To stimulate use of the internet by accelerating electronic commerce,  
promoting electronic access to government services and health services 
online. 
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12.5.110 June 2000 – Russian and Chinese Policy Overviews – monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP06, (IAAC, 2000g). 
12.5.111 July 2000 – France and German Policy Overviews – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP07, (IAAC, 2000h). 
12.5.112 July 2000 – North European Policy Overviews – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP08, (IAAC, 2000i). 
12.5.113 July 2000 – Executive Summary, COBIT, governance, Control and 
Audit for Information and Related Technology (ITGI, 2000)  Even in 
2000, there was acknowledgement that information travelling through 
cyberspace without constraints of time, distance and speed leaves us 
with increasing dependence on information and the systems that 
deliver the information, increasing vulnerabilities and a wide range of 
cyber threats.  This document was first issued in 1996. 
IT Governance is described as providing the structure that links IT 
processes, IT resources and information to enterprise strategies and 
objectives.  The vocabulary was about the need for management to 
ensure, through due diligence that IT control objectives are 
understood and well managed. 
12.5.114 August 2000 – CIP Policy Developments in Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP09, (IAAC, 2000j). 
12.5.115 September 2000 – CIP Policy Developments in Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece – monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP10, 
(IAAC, 2000k). 
12.5.116 September 2000 - UK Online (2000) – major campaign announced 
by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair with the intention for the UK to 
become the best country in the world for e-commerce.  This included 
a £1bn drive to get all government services online by 2005 and £15m 
to help businesses make the most of the web. 
12.5.117 October 2000 – Australian and Canadian Policy Overviews – 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP11, (IAAC, 2000l). 
12.5.118 2 November 2000 – Protecting Critical Information Infrastructures, 
Dr Andrew Rathmell, Chairman, IAAC for Compsec 2000 - In his 
speech, Dr Rathmell talked about the fact that building the 
dependable infrastructures upon which the InfoSoc relies posing a 
bewildering array of new problems to public policy makers and 
corporate leaders alike.  “although there is a growing recognition 
amongst business of the importance of assuring information assets, 
many sectors and organisations do not yet recognise that IA is a 
business critical activity”. (Rathmell, 2000) 
12.5.119 October 2000 – Pacific Rim Policy Overview – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP12 (IAAC, 2000m). 
12.5.120 December 2000 – Israel, The Arab States and North Africa CIP 
Policy Overview – monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP13 
(IAAC, 2000n). 
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12.5.121 December 2000 – Risk Analysis – a Review, by the IAAC 
Dependencies and Risk Working Group (DRWG) – concluded that 
although some methods and tools exist for assessing risk at the 
system and organisation level, none were suitable for assessing risk 
across dependencies.  Also, methods for mapping dependencies 
need to include political and social elements rather than just technical 
ones (IAAC, 2000o). 
12.5.122 2000 - Chance or Choice? Risk Management and Internal Control 
guidance for Local Government outlined the need for corporate 
management teams to drive the commitment to risk management 
throughout their organisations. 
This remains the case and the author continues to see many 
organisations where there is a disappointing lack of cohesion 
between IT risks and corporate risks. (SOLACE, 2000) 
12.5.123 2000 - Corporate Governance in the Public Sector– The Role of Risk 
Management, (Alarm, 2000) – This paper gave public sector senior 
managers, elected members, non-elected board members or non-
executive directors some practical ideas on how to try and ensure 
that their organisation has in place the necessary requirements to 
achieve effective risk management and so contribute to effective 
corporate governance. 
 
12.5.124 2001 - Risk Management in the Public Sector, CIPFA/ALARM the 
point of highlighting these related risk reports is to show that there 
has long been available guidance on embedding corporate risk 
management practices that are robust.  However, it has not always 
been the case that the intrinsic links between InfoSec risk 
management and corporate risk management are as well established 
(CIPFA, 2001).  The guide’s coverage includes:  
 What is risk  management? 
 The elements of successful risk  management  
 Embedding risk  management within the organisation  
 Identifying the risks  
 Assessing the likelihood and impact 
 Determining the response and agreeing action. 
2001 – Highlights / Lowlights 
 e-everything continued “in anger” – e-government, e-procurement, eEurope, e-
Procurement, e-Commission..... supplanting previous cyber formations – i.e. e-
commerce, not cyber-commerce.  During this time, cyber took on the more negative 
formations- cyberwar, cyber attack , cybercrime, cyberterrorism and cyberbullying. 
 March 01 ‘PoisonBox’, ‘Hi-Tech Hate’ groups target .gov.uk, sites including Local 
Authorities.  
 June 01 Alldas.de (previously attrition.org, then zone-h.org) lists several UK Local 
Authority sites defaced.  
 July 01 Three Welsh Local Authority sites attacked. 
 CESG IA Review. 
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12.5.125 January 2001 - Field Fisher Waterhouse (FFW) “Preparing for e-
government seminar” scheduled for 14 March 2001, letter to all 
Heads of IT in Local Councils - FFW sent out a pack to all Heads of 
IT in Local Councils including relevant articles – most of which 
reflected the key issues that need to be borne in mind in 
implementing the new systems.  The concerns at the time were much 
more about managing outsourcing contracts and IT procurement. 
12.5.126 January 2001 – Critical Infrastructure Protection and Crisis 
Management in Britain – monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, 
BP14 (IAAC, 2001a). 
12.5.127 30 January 2001 - Ross Anderson, Why InfoSec is Hard – An 
Economic Perspective – Anderson (2001) is a key industry figure 
who has been writing and contributing for many years.  This is a 
seminal paper that highlights how “information insecurity is … due to 
perverse incentives. Many … of the problems can be explained … 
clearly and convincingly using the language of microeconomics: 
network externalities, asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse 
selection, liability dumping and the tragedy of the commons.”  
12.5.128 2 February 2001 - Communication from the European Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament Creating a Safer 
Information Society by Improving the Security of Information 
Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime - This 
Communication discussed the need for and possible forms of a 
comprehensive policy initiative in the context of the broader InfoSoc 
and Freedom, Security and Justice objectives for improving the 
security of information infrastructures and combating cybercrime, in 
accordance with the commitment of the European Union to respect 
fundamental human rights. (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001)  IAAC (and no doubt many others) commented 
on this in March 2001.  It was part of an increasing movement at the 
time that saw greater involvement from Europe and thus raised the 
whole subject of InfoSec further up the required agenda. 
12.5.129 February 2001 – Protecting Online Financial Services through New 
International and National Supervisory Regulations – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP15 (IAAC, 2001b) 
12.5.130 2001 - National Audit Office survey published – 82 per cent of central 
government departments agreed that risk management was 
important to the achievement of their objectives, but few had risk 
management objectives and policies. Only 57 per cent of 
departments had procedures for reporting risks and only a third said 
that regular risk reports were an effective component of managing 
risks in their department.  Since 2003/2004, all central government 
bodies have been obliged to publish full Turnbull-style internal control 
statements, covering both financial and non-financial risks. 
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12.5.131 6 March 2001 – Enabling Business Through IA, Protecting Critical 
Information Infrastructures presentation by Dr Andrew Rathmell, 
Chairman (IAAC, 2001c) – Rathmell addressed the annual Protecting 
the Critical Information Infrastructure conference, speaking of how e-
business and e-government brought tremendous benefits but, at the 
same time, increased dependence means increased risks.  National 
and international IA required new policies and partnerships (a 
decade on, in 2011, this is what the same kinds of people are saying 
about “cyber” security – without appreciating that it is the same 
thing).  Rathmell made a clear case for it not being solely a 
government issue and for it also not being solely a technology issue.  
Policy, legislation and technology-based capabilities should be 
developed at the information content and service layers, as distinct 
from the carriage and transmission infrastructure layers.  IAAC had 
also raised the issue of there being a need to engage with the “digital 
citizen” and the consumer.  This led on to the theme of Cyberhood 
Watch, akin to Neighbourhood Watch. 
12.5.132 19 March 2001 – Military Dependency on Civilian Infrastructures – 
IAAC briefing paper highlighting that being part of the global ‘ambient 
network’ and a global Information Infrastructure presents new 
challenges, repeating much of the earlier March paper, BP16 (IAAC, 
2001d). 
12.5.133 Spring 2001 – IAAC Board and Secretariat members contributed a 
chapter on InfoSec to an Institute of Directors’ Guide to InfoSec – 
which was released to 52,000 CEOs across the country.  IAAC’s 
Code of Ethics for Computing and Network Usage was included in 
the IoD Guide and launched to the public in March 2001. 
12.5.134 April 2001 – IAAC launched Policy Papers on IA following a year-
long consultation with its members and the government, private 
sector and academia.  These papers covered threat and risk, current 
and future research and development initiatives and trends, best 
standards and guidelines for IA and Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP) and recommendations on conducting a national public 
education and awareness programme for IA.  Some of the latter 
became embedded in GetSafeOnline. 
12.5.135 3 April 2001 – The Costs of Cybercrime - At the time of writing the 
IAAC BP17, it was stated that “The FBI will not investigate a security 
incident unless the monetary damage is above US$5000, someone's 
life was in danger, or interstate commerce was affected”.  No doubt 
the intervening time period has moved those goal posts. The 
By now, there is growing acceptance that, given the value of intangible assets to 
contemporary businesses, IA is a theme that should be an integral part of corporate 
governance.  Information is fast becoming the most valuable corporate asset, and is 
essential to the survival of a business.  In order to practise IA effectively, information assets 
within an organisation need to be identified and then valued. 
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conclusion had some interesting points, including that “the only way 
for the average internet user to quantify loss will be through direct 
experience and historical precedent” (IAAC, 2001e). 
12.5.136 April 2001 – IoD IA Business Security and Trust in the Internet Age, 
London - This document only describes IA in terms of the 
Confidential, Integrity and Availability (CIA) triad of the InfoSec 
Management System (ISMS) and is quite technologically focussed 
rather than expressing the breadth of IA as we have seen it to 
historically actually mean.  So this means a generation of directors 
have been ill informed. In terms of intention, it was ahead of its time 
but it went backwards in 2005 with an InfoSec publication which was 
actually more of an IT security work.  It was presumably deemed too 
difficult to sustain the use of the term IA at director level. 
12.5.137 2001 – CESG Review - Government IA work began when CESG 
went onto a repayment regime for its government work.  CESG 
focussed on project work and there was felt a need to take a more 
forward look.  Therefore Cabinet Secretary Richard Wilson asked Sir 
Edmund Burton to look at the issue.  This was meant to be a narrow 
look but Burton concluded that there was a much wider set of 
government and national risks.  He recommended the creation of a 
central sponsor to champion IA across the public sector and to 
private sector and individuals.  The review report identified a need for 
additional Government funding for IA activities (Room, 2009). 
12.5.138 22 May 2001 – First Annual Computer Privacy, Policy and Security 
Institute, Attorney General John Ashcroft – this speech addressed 
cybercrime and cyber criminals and could equally be presented in 
present day, removing reference to connecting to the internet via a 
modem.  Cyber rhetoric was on the agenda and the need to address 
the risks through improved legislation and understanding by 
professionals was raised at that time.  Yet a decade on there 
appears to have been less progress than one would imagine was 
appropriate for the “information age”. 
12.5.139 May 2001 – Technical Security Issues and Trends for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection – monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, 
BP18 (IAAC, 2001f). 
12.5.140 6 June 2001 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE 
OF THE REGIONS - Network and InfoSec: Proposal for a European 
Policy Approach (European Commission, 2001) - This 
Communication provided the strategic outline for action in this area.  
It was considered to be a first step and not a definitive action plan for 
network security in Europe. However, it already made suggestions 
for actions in order to establish a framework for a common European 
approach.  The next stage was for the framework and the proposed 
actions to be discussed by Member States and the European 
Parliament. The Commission proposed to launch a thorough 
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discussion with industry, users and data protection authorities on the 
practical details of implementing the actions proposed. 
This is an interesting document as a pivot point of acknowledgement 
of the change coming from the distinction between the historical 
closed loop systems to the more open and connected complex 
systems of the 21st century.  The convergence was highlighted as 
being an area requiring policy and legislation change, particularly in 
relation to national security.  The definition of security requirements 
for network and IS as described in this paper use the CIA 
characteristics at the core, plus authentication. 
12.5.141 8 June 2001 - Establishing Trust in Cyberspace: Regulation or Self-
regulation? IAAC seminar at CBI Conference Centre, London.  The 
topic was “on the table”, albeit from a perception that was pre-9/11 
2001, at the time. 
12.5.142 June 2001 – The Domain Name Systems (DNS) and the Protection 
of Corporate Identity on the Internet – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP19 (IAAC, 2001g). 
12.5.143 June 2001 – IA Model, Maconachy et al. (2001) – mapping 
information states to InfoSec needs. 
12.5.144 July 2001 – The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) was set up to 
co-ordinate government responsibilities for dealing with disasters.  It 
was unable, however, to use its position at the heart of government 
to lead a strategic response to the new threats post 11 September 
2001 (see Defence of the UK report below). 
12.5.145 July 2001 – Worth the Risk, Audit Commission - The risk 
management approach to internal control plays a significant part in 
securing good governance structures. Identifying and dealing 
appropriately with the key strategic risks facing an authority enables 
it to identify the key actions it must take to deliver its main goals.  
This paper was intended to help local government bodies in England 
and Wales to improve the way in which they identify, evaluate and 
manage significant risks. The idea was for it to help local government 
members and officers to assess whether their risk management 
activities were satisfactory and developing in line with the best value 
initiative.  Included in this management paper: 
 An introduction to risk  management and its benefits  
 Risk management in local government  
 The role of members  
 What senior officers can do to implement better risk  management  
 Pitfalls to be aware of. 
12.5.146 2001 - Private Security Industry Act – addresses the question of 
standards, education, training and regulation of security 
professionals and providers.  The Security Industry Authority was 
formed following on from this. 
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12.5.147 18 July 2001 - IAAC Y2K Lessons Learnt - highlighted that the Year 
2000 (Y2K) experience left senior managers feeling that “their 
involvement in IT security was complete.....due to the finite deadline 
and the fact that no major problems arose”.  However, the benefits 
were that it afforded the allocation of funding, gave legitimacy to such 
a project and established some momentum.  “General tendency to 
see IA and InfoSec as a technical issue to be delegated to the IT 
section by senior management. 
Without management support, it is difficult for an InfoSec Manager to 
implement effective IA strategies and measures on a company-wide 
basis.  A key message was that operating without full Board support 
makes it difficult to effectively deal with the different dimensions of IA, 
such as personnel concerns, awareness, legal considerations, policy 
concerns.  To re-engage senior management, however, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that IA is essential to the organisation”.  
The language of change (p.34) – sought to promote the concept of IA 
over that of InfoSec.  The US had some success with this tactic, 
according to Nancy J. Wong of the CIAO.  A decade later the same 
tensions, concerns and internal justifications have arisen, as cyber 
subsumes IA.  Similar challenges arise around digital vs IT and 
business continuity vs resi lience. 
12.5.148 19 July 2001 - IA and Good Corporate Governance Issues and 
Options Paper - seminar held at Institute of Chartered Accountants 
for England and Wales, London followed by the publication of the 
paper.  Again, linking the issues of IA and Corporate Governance in 
alignment with the Turnbull report requirements. 
12.5.149 19 July 2001 – IA and Corporate Governance seminar, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants for England and Wales, London – 
“Underwriters simply do not know what the risks are and therefore 
have no history of losses by which to set premiums” (Chris Cotterell, 
Safeonline).  Whilst the published outputs implied that IRM had its 
origins in petrochemicals and then in the insurance industry, it has 
proven difficult over the last decade to generate sufficient interest 
and support from the insurance industry as a whole to take on 
policies that support businesses in insuring themselves against 
“cyber risks”. 
12.5.150 July 2001 – National R&D Strategy for IA – Policy Paper prepared by 
IAAC. 
12.5.151 26 July 2001 - Establishing Trust in Cyber-Space: Regulation or 
Self-Regulation (BP20) (IAAC, 2001h) - This paper examined 
whether market forces will solve the problem of assuring the UK’s 
critical information infrastructures or whether the state needed to take 
a more active role. It argued that new, collaborative models of 
regulation needed to be adopted and that the market could not be left 
to provide the necessary security. The concern was that the 
government needed to take a number of steps, including 
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11 September 2001 – terrorist attack on New York’s Twin Towers 
There was a definitive impact on the rhetoric of risk and threat assessment and response 
and the legislative statutes as a direct result of 9 September 2001. 
consideration of additional regulation in relation to security standards 
and incident reporting. 
12.5.152 September 2001 – Raising Awareness of IA in the UK – Policy 
Paper prepared by IAAC (2001i). 
12.5.153 September 2001 – A Safety Critical Software Approach to InfoSec – 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP21 (IAAC, 2001j). 
 
12.5.154 September 2001 – Building Partnerships to Protect Europe’s 
Information Infrastructures, (Rathmell, 2001) - “....failing to maintain 
an informed view of the level of cyber-threat will soon be an 
unsustainable risk for board level decision-makers”.  Again, a decade 
on in 2011, cyberspace is being discussed as if it were a new and 
burning topic – and yet the evidence shows that those involved in the 
discussion have already done so on several previous occasions and 
in many ways could do worse than revisiting conclusions previously 
reached and updating these, rather than at the expense of the public 
purse continuing to hold meetings, conferences, seminars and the 
like on a subject that has sufficient body of evidence to refer to 
already.  Determinedly having more and more talking shops appears 
to put off the need to actually move into action mode and yet this is 
the kind of example that baffles history students year in and year out 
– when they can see that information was available to people who 
should have known better than to repeat the mistakes of those that 
had gone before, if only they had paid attention and got on and done 
something constructive rather than sitting around and talking about it 
some more. 
12.5.155 10 October 2001 - Statement of Eugene H. Spafford, Professor of 
Computer Science and Director of Purdue University's Center For 
Education and Research in IA and Security, House of 
Representatives Science Committee - Spafford stated that: 
…a myth that is often repeated, namely that industry will find incentives to 
solve our security problems.  To the contrary, it is largely because of industry  
practices that we currently face such security problems! Industry is 
concerned with getting products to market as quickly as possible, at the 
lowest cost. The result is often software with extraneous, poorly designed 
and poorly tested features. To spend extra time or money on better security  
is to put the companies at a disadvantage in the marketplace. Instead, many 
software companies have disclaimed all liability in their licenses, and sought  
to insulate themselves from adverse reactions and scrutiny of their 
software… In the current market that does not offer consumers significant  
choices, and where there is no liability for faulty products, there is little 
likelihood that industry players will invest in fundamental research to improve 
products. 
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Apart from the most obvious security changes that Microsoft made in 
terms of their Trustworthy Computing platform, there is much truth in 
what Spafford was saying (Spafford, 2001). 
12.5.156 26 October 2001 – USA Patriot Act – The title of the Act is a 
contrived seven letter acronym (PATRIOT), which in combination 
stand for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
of 2001.  The Act reduced restrictions on law enforcement agencies' 
ability to search telephone, e-mail communications, medical, 
financial, and other records; eased restrictions on foreign intelligence 
gathering within the United States; expanded the Secretary of the 
Treasury’s authority to regulate financial transactions, particularly 
those involving foreign individuals and entities; and broadened the 
discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining 
and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts. The 
act also expanded the definition of terrorism to include domestic 
terrorism. The act was set to expire May 29, 2011.  On May 26, 2011 
President Barack Obama signed the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension 
Act of 2011, granting a four year extension of three key provisions – 
roving wiretaps, searches of business records and conducting 
surveillance of “lone wolves” (individuals suspected of terrorist -
related activities not linked to terrorist groups). 
12.5.157 15 November 2001 - “Presenting the InfoSec Case to the Board of 
Directors, Audit and Control” (NACD, 2001) – conducted by the 
National Association of Corporate Directors, the Institute of Internal 
Auditors and KPMG – only one quarter of the respondents indicated 
that InfoSec on the board’s agenda at least once a year, whilst only 
one eighth of respondents’ boards discuss InfoSec at least quarterly.  
IAAC recommended that: 
…as Corporate Governance guidelines are rewritten and updated,  the role 
and importance of IA as an integral part of corporate governance process 
must be clearly articulated, and that IA auditing and reporting requirements  
should be incorporated into the regular auditing process.   ...Greater attention 
should be given to building a business case for IA in business language.   
The issue of language must also be considered.  Senior management needs 
to hear a business case articulated in business terms if the concept of IA is 
to be accepted.  There is a clear need for improved communication between 
the Board and the IT Security Department, so that both parties understand 
their roles and the reporting functions expected of them.  
The same statement could be made in 2017, and people would nod 
wisely, agreeing that something must be done, and yet doing 
nothing. 
12.5.158 16 November 2001 - Building a Safe and Secure Information 
Society: UK Public Policy Requirements, IAAC Recommendations 
(IAAC, 2001k) - This paper provides IAAC’s recommendations for 
action by the UK Government to promote trust and confidence in the 
nation’s information environment.1 Trust and confidence can be 
developed by promoting IA.  The term IA ensures that the focus is on 
holistic business assurance; i.e. assurance of information as a 
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business enabler relevant to the highest levels of management.  
Government has a central role to play in promoting trust and 
confidence in on-line activities both by acting as an example of good 
practice and by virtue of its position as the largest single procurer of 
goods and services in the UK economy. 
Conversely, poor standards of IA in critical and public systems will 
undermine confidence throughout society and in the private sector.  
The following actions should be prioritised: 
 Adherence of all public bodies to best IA practice, implementation of  
ISO17799 as part of a good corporate governance approach;  
 Encouragement of public sector bodies to take additional steps to promote 
trust (e.g. trust marks, codes of ethics, user education programmes,  
comprehensive incident monitoring and reporting);  
 Audit of government IA performance by independent body (e.g. Parliament;  
NAO);  
 Enforcement of minimum IA standards on suppliers to public sector at all  
levels.  
Existing mechanisms should be used to promote adoption of good IA 
practice. The following actions should be prioritised: 
 Imposition of mandatory minimum standards compliant with ISO17799;  
 Promotion of IA-aware culture;  
 Development of “no-blame” mandatory reporting of InfoSec incidents parallel 
to existing incident/accident reporting mechanisms. 
It is disappointing reading, when you review all the reports written in 
2007/2008, given that all the recommendations were there, available 
and shared with the right people ahead of significant public sector 
data breaches, loss of trust and damage to reputation. 
12.5.159 18 November 2001 - IA and the Public Sector, Neil Fisher, IAAC 
presentation – the presentation utilised the themes highlighted in the 
paper referred to above - Building a Safe and Secure Information 
Society: UK Public Policy Requirements. 
 
 
 
 
12.5.160 November 2001 – Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
(ETS, 2001) – this was the Convention that sought to harmonise 
national legislation across European states – on cybercrime – 
strengthening and aligning national investigative capabilities, given 
that cybercrime is a boundary-less activity and great co-operation is 
required between various agencies. This convention has still not 
been ratified by the UK even though it was represented in March 
2010 (UK OPSI, 2010).  It was signed by the Council of Europe, 
more countries than the EU – including Canada, Japan, the United 
States, and South Africa on 23 November 2001, in Budapest. 
19 November 2001 - Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act – a UK legislative response to 
the 9 September 2011 terrorist attacks on New York City was introduced, receiving royal 
assent on 14 December 2001.  
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As of July 2015, the non–Council of Europe states that have ratified 
the treaty are Australia, Canada, Dominican Republic, Japan, 
Mauritius, Panama, Sri Lanka, and the United States. 
12.5.161 November 2001 – Information Flow in IA – Policy Paper prepared by 
IAAC, BP22 (IAAC, 2001l). 
12.5.162 November 2001 – Information Sharing Review: Sharing is Protecting 
– Policy Paper (IAAC, 2001m). 
12.5.163 27 November 2001 - IA: A different perspective, Neil Fisher, IAAC. 
The most significant statement in this report is as follows: 
What 11 Sep 01 has exposed is that the second wave of realisation of the 
Digital Age is that people are involved within these Digital Environments and 
they must be identified in a non-repuditable way to allow society to operate 
in a safe, secure and protected way. The lesson is that People matter hugely  
and that IA is not just about information and infrastructure issues but about  
(digital) life itself. 
12.5.164 December 2001 – IA and Good Corporate Governance – Policy 
Paper prepared by IAAC, BP23 (IAAC, 2001n). 
12.5.165 15 January 2002 - IAAC hosted a Roundtable to help solidify the 
work towards IAAC’s White Paper “IA and Corporate Governance: 
Engaging Senior Management”.  The intention was to identify priority 
areas that require further work and to agree actions that can be taken 
forward in terms of linking IA and corporate governance.  By 
emphasising IA, the intention was to promote security to the highest 
levels in corporate leadership and to link IRM into business 
assurance at the top level.  IAAC’s working groups also identified on 
a number of themes: 
 Standards work ing group – acknowledged BS7799 provides good practice; 
 Dependencies and Risk  Work ing Group – identified that a 3 Tier Model – 
upper, middle and lower organisational approaches – was required;  
suggesting tools and techniques.  The outputs eventually became the DIAN 
Guides – Directors IA Network  Guides; 
 Information Sharing Group linked their activities to CPNI, WARPs and the 
eAware agenda.  
The rhetoric was starting to consider measurement and metrics, 
measuring trust, security and benchmarking IA but provided an 
acknowledgement that IA is not always a quantifiable entity.  The 
identified positive and negative incentives for 2002 were: 
 Negative incentives include damage to reputation and avoidance of  legal 
liability both for entity and individual directors  
 Positive incentives include competitive advantage (through using IA as a 
marketing differentiator), lower costs as a result of reduced insurance 
premiums, impact on shareholder value and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).  
There was an emphasis on the need for a strong audit function: 
“There is a need for the audit community in the UK to better acquaint 
itself with the new risk environment and the processes that need to 
be implemented in order to manage it, so that it can accurately report 
to the Board on the effectiveness of controls.” 
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12.5.166 15 January 2002 – Microsoft, through Bill Gates – launched the 
Trustworthy Computing Initiative (TCI) (Microsoft, 2002).  Gates’ 
called upon employees across the company to fundamentally rethink 
their approach to product development and strive to deliver products 
that are “as available, reliable and secure as standard services such 
as electricity, water services and telephony.” (Source no longer available) 
12.5.167 February 2002 – Identity Theft Highlights the Importance of ‘Data 
Responsibility’ – Policy Paper prepared by IAAC, BP24 (IAAC, 
2002a). 
12.5.168 February 2002 – the acronym GRC was borne from a realisation of 
the growing importance of the combination of services relating to 
Governance, Risk, and Compliance being delivered by Forrester 
(Rasmussen, 2015). 
12.5.169 March 2002 – US Critical Infrastructure Protection Policies since 11th 
September – Policy Paper prepared by IAAC, BP25 (IAAC, 2002b). 
12.5.170 19 March 2002 - Bob Evans, OeE Presentation - Resilience: From 
Potential to Actual - Quoted Sir Richard Wilson, Head of the Civil 
Service as saying “IA is right in the centre of the playing field… In a 
networked world, threats can arise and spread far more quickly than 
we are used to… It is important for government to have its own 
house in order”.  The rhetoric has always been there but the resultant 
expected follow through does not appear to be evident, perhaps, 
hence the volume of repeated reporting.  There were several core 
themes to this presentation: 
 Core business process must include IA risk  assessment e.g. ISO 17799;  
 You get what you pay for: do you know what you paid for? 
 The need to cover the end to end security threat, both physical and electronic;  
 The need for HR involvement and supporting internal policies.  
2002 – Highlights / Lowlights 
 US Sarbanes-Oxley Act Introduced to restore investor confidence after the 
collapse of Enron.  
 Engineering discipline cross over starting to be seen – safe and reliable software 
required.  
 IAAC embraces holistic definition for IA and works with Government on NIAS. 
 Feb 02 Regional Local Authority suffers Syn Flood attack on Server then Router. 
 July 02 SQL Injection vulnerability in several Local Authority sites. 
 August 02 Local Council DoS attack using similar MAC addresses – printers 
unavailable.  
 eEnvoy appointed as Central Sponsor for IA.  
 CSIA Secretariat set up (by 2010, this became known as the Information Security 
and Assurance [IS&A]) – a unit within the UK Government’s Cabinet Office.  
 eGovernment Strategy Framework Policy and Guidelines for Security issued.  
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12.5.171 2002 - DTLR e-gov@local, Towards a national strategy for local e-
government - Overall the report identified a number of possible local 
government services that could be provided through electronic 
means. This document can be seen as a “where it all began” paper in 
terms of e-Government and the later Transformational Agenda.  It 
identified Privacy and Data Sharing requirements would need to be 
addressed through the development and delivery of Standards, 
which were due to be available in Spring 2002. 
12.5.172 2002 - Audit Commission - Councils and e-Government, Research so 
far (Audit Commission, 2002).  This report included the comment: 
“The real driver is about customer focus, not about ICT.  It’s about a 
new relationship between the council and the customer” .  The 
research showed that Council officers cited a lack of ICT skills and 
knowledge among staff and difficulties with engaging senior officers 
and members among the key barriers to success.  Original research 
conducted by MORI in 2001. 
12.5.173 April 2002 – Proposal for a COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION on 
attacks against IS Brussels, 19.04.2002, COM(2002) 173 final, 
2002/0086 (CNS) (Commission of the European Communities, 2002) 
- Member States were supposed to bring into force the measures 
necessary to comply with this Framework Decision by 31 December 
2003.  So there was clear identification of the need to secure against 
expected electronic attack in the future. 
12.5.174 April 2002 – DTI InfoSec Breaches Survey (UK DTI, 2002) – 
identified that a “root cause” of the low investment in IA “appears to 
be that security is treated as an overhead rather than an investment.  
Business people find it difficult to apply normal commercial 
disciplines to IT security. ….. It is also the case that most IT security 
professionals have a technical rather than commercial background, 
and so may lack the skills in the development of commercial 
business cases”.  This document set a dangerous precedent of 
implying that a commercial business case is what is actually 
required, when many of the other renowned publications concur that 
embedding good IA is not about embarking on a project with a start, 
middle and end, but about changing the culture throughout the 
organisation so that IA becomes knitted into the fabric of everything 
that is done rather than being viewed as a project that has a fixed 
ending. 
12.5.175 2002 - Cabinet Office - Privacy and Data Sharing: The Way Forward 
for Public Services, Performance and Innovation Unit.  This 
document referenced Public Service Trust Charters – which are 
Information Charters, a notion which reappeared in 2010 as if they 
were a new idea.  This document, referred to as the “PIU Report” 
encouraged the implementation of an analytical framework for 
privacy and ideas for improving and auditing data quality.  The 
important point to note is that any references to “privacy” in a UK 
context, refer to Data Protection as “the concept of privacy as such is 
not recognised under English law” (Chissick and Harrington, 2004). 
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12.5.176 April 2002 - Is Britain on Course for 2005, The third KPMG 
Consulting e-government survey, (first published in Spring 2000) 
(KPMG, 2002).  The e-government agenda was about ensuring that 
the entire population could access the service provided by their 
government and council in a way that they found convenient and 
comfortable.  The case was for coherent multi-channel approaches to 
public service – integrating these with traditional channels rather than 
replacing them.  This is worthy of note particularly as there will be 
many citizens who feel that they are being forced down an “all things 
online” route rather than have traditional channels still being made 
available to them.  However, there are of course cost implications to 
this which are not always considered. 
12.5.177 April 2002 – Will Broadband Rollout undermine InfoSec? – Policy 
Paper prepared by IAAC, BP26 (IAAC, 2002c). 
12.5.178 16 May 2002 – saw the launch by IAAC of Protecting the Digital 
Society: A Manifesto for the UK (written February 2002) (IAAC, 
2002d).  This was an important document that set forth a three 
pronged workshop agenda covering the following initiatives at the 
time: 
1. Public Policy; 
2. Corporate Governance and Information Risk  Management (IRM, in 2010, 
resurfaced as an acronym and phrase of note); 
3. Information Sharing and Awareness. 
The document states that “IA is complementary to top-down risk-
based management and audit approaches”.  The manifesto linked IA 
to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and being inclusive of data 
protection (DP), privacy, protection of one’s “logical neighbours” and 
measures to promote ethical use of new technology in the InfoSoc.  
“IA is as much a part of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as are 
environmental or human practices so IA is likely to move onto the 
CSR agenda before too long.” 
This significant piece of work in the IAAC portfolio called for a 
“comprehensive national UK strategy”: 
the creation of a comprehensive national strategy to ensure that the UK’s  
InfoSoc can count on a robust, resilient and secure foundation. … As the 
topic of IA is perceived to be boring and technical, the extensive coverage it  
receives in times of crisis gives a distorted picture to the public. 
One of IAAC’s key roles has been to assist “HMG in ensuring that 
messages are co-ordinated, integrated and focused”. 
IAAC committed to reporting every December, benchmarking the 
UK’s performance in trust and security.  The intention was to provide 
innovative analysis, regularly reviewing how the UK was progressing 
towards bui lding a secure electronic environment and contrast the 
UK with examples of good practice from around the world.  Whilst the 
regularity of the reporting fell by the wayside, this particular piece of 
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research re-introduced the opportunity to survey the IAAC 
membership in late 2010. 
The work that was undertaken included: 
 Examining available approaches and tools in various sectors; 
 Identifying best and current IA practices/capabilities;  
 Providing good practice guidance based on real-world cases, noting 
sectoral variations and identifying gaps and requirements for better 
practices. 
“Economics of Trust and Security” appeared as a theme.  At the time, 
there was no systematic measurement of how government policy can 
actually boost trust and confidence and how policy instruments can 
improve security in the complex, adaptive systems that constitute the 
globalised information infrastructure.  To improve policy making, 
there needed to be a systematic evaluation of the economics of 
InfoSec, the costs and benefits of various policy options and case 
study work on the impact of particular interventions.  Corporate 
governance standards were encouraging companies and public 
sector bodies to adopt good practices in risk management, including 
management of information risk.  The concern was that security 
management standards were not widely enough adopted and 
needed to be complemented by management and audit mechanisms 
that could give Boards the assurance they currently lack. 
The concept of Resiliency was raised within the strategy and was 
adopted by Central Government prioritizing business continuity more 
broadly in the public sector, progressing towards the introduction of 
the Civil Contingencies Act in 2004. 
The manifesto articulated that the information infrastructures upon 
which the wider “information environment” is being built are neither 
safe nor secure enough to act as a trusted basis for the digital 
society. Increasing dependence on IS at a time of growing systemic 
vulnerabilities and threats threatened to undermine confidence in the 
InfoSoc and poses risks of broader societal disruption. 
The Blair Government is committed to ambitious targets for the digitisation of 
government and for making the UK a leader in the global information 
economy.  In order to avoid the crisis of confidence that has recently  
manifested in some of the UK’s physical infrastructure, the InfoSoc must be 
built on secure and robust foundations.  Today, however, the information 
infrastructures that underpin the information environment are vulnerable to 
attack by criminals, terrorist and foreign adversaries.  As we have moved to 
a society in which instant electronic access to all government and many 
financial services is expected, disruption of the information infrastructures 
could effectively bring society to a halt.  Yet, lack of trust in the internet as a 
medium for secure t ransactions is a key factor in preventing business and 
citizens going on-line; this not only derails the Government’s visions but also 
sets back the UK’s economic growth and international competitiveness.  
The manifesto also reflected that market forces alone would not 
ensure a sufficient level of trust and confidence in information 
networks. Public policy, it was felt, needed to lead and shape the IA 
environment to ensure the InfoSoc is built on robust, resilient and 
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secure foundations whilst business freedoms and civi l liberties are 
protected.  Public policy to date had been a mix of a “hands -off” and 
self-regulatory pro-business approach combined with periodic 
“heavy-handed” interventions in the name of public security and 
safety. In general, there had been too little government lead and 
government intervention but in some cases government intervention 
has been overzealous and ill conceived.  Nonetheless, partly by 
coincidence and partly by design, the UK state was coming to take 
more of a lead through a range of regulatory and legislative 
instruments.  The time was therefore ripe for a systematic re -
evaluation of UK public policy. 
12.5.179 22 May 2002 - CYBER HOOD WATCH: Empowering the Digital 
Citizen, Dr Andrew Rathmell, CEO, IAAC, InfoSec in the Public 
Sector, presentation (IAAC, 2002e) - The idea was that Cyberhood 
Watch would mirror Neighbourhood Watch – which protects 
individual homeowners against burglary and petty theft, vandalism, 
low level crimes - but for the online environment, where it is important 
that people are protected against identity theft, industrial espionage, 
masquerading etc. 
12.5.180 22 May 2002 - Making UK Online Succeed, InfoSec in the Public 
Sector, presentation by Neil Fisher, Vice Chairman, IAAC - The 
intentions at the time were: 
 To make the UK the best and safest environment in the world for e-commerce;  
 To ensure that everyone who wants it has access to the Internet by 2005; and  
 To make all Government services available electronically by 2005.  
12.5.181 May 2002 – Dealing with Cybercrime – Policy Paper prepared by 
IAAC, BP27 (IAAC, 2002f). 
12.5.182 May 2002 - Engaging the Board: Corporate Governance and 
Information Risk, Aarti Anhal, Stephanie Daman, Kevin O’Brien and 
Andrew Rathmell (IAAC, 2002g) – “The single most important finding 
[of a survey of IAAC members] is that, even amongst companies with 
a commitment to IA, there is little agreement on concepts and 
terminology or on methods for assessing benefits.  Nonetheless, 
there is a consensus that existing best practices and standards for 
managing and hence benchmarking IA strategies are inadequate.  … 
To achieve success in this information economy, enterprise 
governance and IT governance can no longer be considered 
separate and distinct disciplines” (ITGI, 2002).  Risk Management 
involves the following steps: 
 Identifying the risk  
 Identifying the consequences of failing to manage risks effectively  
 Mitigating the risk  
“dependency risk” entered into the domain of thinking and articulation 
– and was built upon to develop resilience strategies etc. 
This report also acknowledged that “IA costs money”.  It is not a 
saving: ... “In general, companies will do the minimum required in 
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order to comply with negative incentives.  To go beyond this, an 
organisation needs to see real business benefits in doing so”. 
The report referenced the 2001 CBI Cybercrime Survey which 
highlighted that “loss of reputation, through adverse publicity and loss 
of trust, is a greater fear than financial loss for most organisations” 
(Mark Grossman, Liability for you if you’ve been hacked {August 
2000}, cited in IAAC, 2002g) 
IA has its own social aspects such as data protection, privacy and the 
concept of being a good citizen and neighbour, as IA can easily be 
compromised by someone else’s poor practices – the chain is only as strong 
as its weakest link. 
The holistic nature of IA was emphasised by ISACA which described 
the sister concept of IT Governance in the following terms: 
In the information economy, successful enterprises integrate information 
technology (IT) business strategies, culture and ethics in order to attain 
business objectives, optimise information value and capitalize on 
technologies.  Extended enterprises, which incorporate customers, business 
partners, vendors, stakeholders and constituents, rely on the efficient and 
effective sharing of information, including goals/expectations, status and 
ultimately knowledge.  Making this at all mission critical to most enterprises 
… and making it happen as it should happen requires IT governance ( ITGI,  
2002).  
Y2k demonstrated that IA is essentially a management issue 
requiring executive attention, rather than a technical issue.  The 
DTI’s InfoSec Breaches Survey 2002 stated that “People have 
traditionally associated InfoSec with technology and administrative 
processes.  Effective InfoSec is just as much about educating and 
managing staff, managing incidents to avoid reputation damage, and 
providing business partners with assurance about security.” (UK DTI 
2002) 
Formed in October 2002 in the Cabinet Office to support Andrew 
Pinder in his role as Central Sponsor, Dr Steve Marsh became 
Director of the CSIA.  The unit’s mission was to provide assurance to 
government that the risks to the UK national information 
infrastructure are appropriately managed.  It was realised that this 
was broader than an OeE agenda item, including defence and 
national security issues.  CSIA was made a separate cabinet office 
unit reporting to Sir David Omand.  In 2010, the CSIA became known 
as the InfoSec and Assurance (IS&A) unit and thereafter the Office of 
Cyber Security and IA (OCSIA). 
This was another solid, influential document produced by IAAC, 
providing many of the foundations of what have subsequently been 
embedded as best practice building blocks for IA across the public 
and private sectors.  Key phrases include:  
Corporate Governance now calls for effective management of risks but board -
level awareness is not yet being t ranslated into effective controls.  … Assurance 
of a company’s information assets is critical to realisation of stakeholder value 
and of business potential in an economy that increasingly relies on information 
technology and business transactions using the Internet.  However, there is still 
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a tendency to under value the importance of IA and to ignore the benefits that 
can be gained from improved security and providing more information and 
reassurance for users.  
There was an interesting attempt at mapping IA onto BS7799 – “BS 
7799 is a comprehensive work of reference and is intended to 
facilitate the identification of a wide range of IA controls….The Code 
contains a detailed set of controls that will satisfy the IA requirements 
of most IT environments across all functional domains.” (p.17) 
Historically, in the UK, IT audit has been a feature of the Institute of 
Internal Auditors qualification programme since the early 1980s so 
there has been oversight of IT activities for a considerable period of 
time and a great deal of learning about what has worked and what 
has not across a great many IT projects can be gleaned from audit 
reports across the land, particularly in the public sector.  Yet this 
report highlighted that there was concern at the lack of available data 
upon which to base computer security risk-management decisions, 
believing that too much of it was anecdotal and not representative of 
any specific industry or group (Hoo, 2000, p.19). 
The report concluded thus, “It is through ensuring that good IA 
standards and practices encompass small companies as well as 
large organisations that an overall governance framework will 
emerge that is no longer a “recommended framework” but an 
“obligatory” one.  The standards will not have been mandated by 
Government, but will come about because industry and government 
see their value and expect compliance with them as the “normal 
practice” for business (Hoo, 2000, p.20).  The belief at the time was 
that “There may come a time when regulation is necessary but it 
would be far preferable to achieve the same result by a combination 
of soft regulation and a market-based approach. 
Such approaches are less likely to become “box ticking” exercises; if 
boards can be motivated to act of their own accord, then the 
substance rather than the form of IRM will be adopted.” 
This is interesting to reflect on in 2011, given other rhetoric that 
implied, at the time, that allowing “the market” to decide, would not 
achieve the required cultural shift to embedding IA in a meaningful 
way, which appears to have actually been the case, given the 
ongoing slew of breaches and need for both technological, people 
and process controls to be in place in order to manage and maintain 
an information infrastructure effectively. 
Security and risk are often presented to Boards through the tried and 
tested approach of “Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt” (FUD).  Well 
governed companies have been seen to perform better over time, 
thereby increasing share value.  Businesses with effective 
governance plans manage risk better and rebound from setbacks 
more quickly.  IA will become an increasingly important element of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
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As with environmental pollution, the security of the networks upon 
which society increasingly relies is a common responsibility. 
This report references a lack of actuarial data which has been a 
significant factor in restraining the development of a mature 
insurance market.  The reports’ author believed that organisations 
that employ risk mitigation measures and also have in place the right 
measures to obtain IT specific insurance, stand a greater change of 
obtaining a lower insurance premiums.  Saving money provides a 
powerful incentive for senior managers to comply with (IA 
requirements). 
12.5.183 May 2002 - InfoSec Consultancy A Study for The DTI Prepared by 
Chris Sundt Independent Security Consultant (Sundt, 2002) - This 
Report was commissioned by the DTI to look at existing and 
emerging issues affecting the confidence users may have in the 
supply of InfoSec services.  This was occasioned by the public 
debate surrounding the issue of whether the implementation of the 
Private Security Industries Act should encompass InfoSec 
consultants.  The report addressed the entire range of InfoSec 
services.  It found that InfoSec skills are part of a broader picture.  
The commonly held view that InfoSec specialists were simply 
computer security experts underestimated the increasing complexity 
and importance of modern IS.  It was emphasised that InfoSec was 
essential to many business models and had to be seen as an integral 
part of the risk management process. 
12.5.184 June 2002 – NHS Information Governance Toolkit first launched (UK 
NHS, 2015).  It is described as follows: “The Information Governance 
Toolkit is a Department of Health (DH) Policy delivery vehicle that the 
Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) is commissioned 
to develop and maintain.  It draws together the legal rules and central 
guidance set out by DH policy and presents them in a single 
standard as a set of information governance requirements. 
The organisations in scope of this are required to carry out self-
assessments of their compliance against the IG requirements ”. 
12.5.185 25 June 2002 Business Software Alliance (2002) - Government at 
Risk for Major Cyber Attack in Next 12 Months, IT Pros Say Again, 
reference to the fact that almost a decade ago, cyber-attacks were 
under discussion and solutions were being found. 
12.5.186 June 2002 – Do IT Security Consultants need a Licence? – IAAC, 
BP28, (IAAC, 2002h). 
12.5.187 July 2002 - In the service of democracy, a consultation paper on a 
policy for electronic democracy (OeE, 2002a) - e-Democracy was 
described as being about using new technology to energise the 
democratic and political life of the nation.  This document attempted 
to clarify some of the issues and propose a policy that responded to 
the opportunities and challenges that e-democracy was likely to 
bring.  Security and privacy issues were raised within the document.  
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This was sent to all Local Government Councils in September 2002 
via the Local Government Association (LGA). 
12.5.188 July 2002 – Company Law Post Enron – Interim Report to the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, from the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting 
(CGAA, p.11) Issues.  This report set out the progress to date of the 
work of the CGAA. 
The Group was set up to oversee and co-ordinate the response in the UK to 
the issues raised in the aftermath of the collapse of Enron and other 
corporate failures, and to ensure that UK systems of financial reporting and 
audit regulation are reviewed thoroughly by the appropriate regulators with 
the aim of making clear that they are effective and continue to provide 
appropriate underpinning for strong and efficient national and international 
capital markets.  This report fulfils the Group’s commitment to provide a 
progress report  to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer by the summer o f 2002.  
12.5.189 15 July 2002 – Should OFCOM regulate InfoSec? – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP29 (IAAC, 2002i). 
12.5.190 15 July 2002 - Open Source Software use within UK Government, 
Version 1 (UK OeE, 2002b) - A position paper written at the time.  A 
Google search can easily provide reference to a great many stories 
relating to the UK Government improving its speed and commitment 
to open source technologies in 2009, 2010 and 2011 – so this 
continues to be a challenge for the public sector, balancing the 
economic gains to be found from the use of open source software, 
with the increased need to manage perceived data privacy and 
information-based risk issues. 
12.5.191 24 July 2002 – House of Commons Defence Committee, Defence 
and Security in the UK, Sixth Report of Session 2001-02, HC518-1, 
The Stationary Office, London - This was quite a significant “after the 
event” review report.  It stated that “As time passes and memories of 
even such terrible events as the attacks of 11 September begin to 
fade, the urgency of the priority given to issues of defence and 
security may diminish.  There is an increasing temptation to impose a 
conventional or historic template on the response to a radical new 
threat.” (paragraph 283)  This detailed and sweeping review 
concluded that the MPs were “disappointed both by the lack of 
imagination and radicalism in looking for new solutions to match the 
new threat and by the lack of strategic co-ordination and direction 
provided by central government”. (UK House of Commons Defence 
Committee, 2002) 
12.5.192 August 2002 – Digital Identities – monthly briefing paper produced 
by IAAC, BP30, (IAAC, 2002j). 
12.5.193 September 2002 – Dealing with Cyber-terrorism – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP31, (IAAC, 2002j). 
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12.5.194 September 2002 – Data Quality included in the NHSIA framework - 
Concerns over data quality have consistently been an issue with 
regard to embedding InfoSec of information assets.  This report 
highlighted some of the key elements to be considered. 
12.5.195 September 2002 – e-Government Strategy Framework Policy and 
Guidelines, Version 4.0 (UK OeE, 2002c) - This document set out a 
framework for the expression of security requirements for the 
procurement and acceptance of e-Government services and their 
implementation. It also described the approach to assuring the 
presence and proper operation of the security countermeasures put 
in place to meet the security requirements.  This framework 
document and others derived from it were intended to be 
implementation independent expressions of security requirements. 
Implementation constraints were limited to only those necessary to 
meet government security requirements. Suppliers were free to 
propose differing implementations constrained only by any 
interoperability requirements that may be necessary for operational 
reasons. This framework document did not identify specific services 
as it was intended to apply to the provision of services in general. 
Annex C presented a set of example scenarios that illustrated many 
of the security issues to be addressed.  The list was not intended to 
be complete and would be added to and amended as experience 
with electronic service provision develops.  The security 
requirements expressed in the framework document represented a 
call for general alignment with best e-commerce practice, to which 
government believed it must itself conform.  The document, as 
issued at the time, addressed only functional security requirements 
and those non-functional aspects of the implementation that permit 
the services to be readily assured. Assurance, it stated, would also 
be needed to ensure the presence and proper operation of those 
functions. 
12.5.196 September 2002 – eGovernment Strategy Framework Policy and 
Guidelines, Business Services, Version 2.0 (OeE, 2002d and Cabinet 
Office, 2002a) - This document built on the e-Government security 
policy that set out the e-Government security requirements.  It 
specifically addressed those security requirements related to the 
provision of business services to support access to e-Government 
services.  The e-Government registration and authentication, 
confidentiality and trust services framework documents are 
concerned with proper access of clients and government users to e-
Government services, confidentiality of private information involved in 
transactions and the ability to make binding commitments 
electronically. 
12.5.197 September 2002 – eGovernment Strategy Framework Policy and 
Guidelines, Confidentiality, Version 3.0, OeE, (2002e) Cabinet Office 
(2002a) - This document addressed a category of electronic 
information not previously covered in government security guidance. 
It complemented existing Cabinet Office guidance on safeguarding 
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‘protectively marked’ information (RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, 
etc) provided by the Manual of Protective Security (MPS).  It was 
anticipated that individual instances of private data handled by e -
Government systems would not normally warrant a protective 
marking.  However, there was appreciation that there existed a 
potential overlap between level 3 confidentiality and material given a 
RESTRICTED protective marking (see section 3.5.1).  In those cases 
where a protective marking is required, e-Government service 
providers and implementers could be provided with appropriate 
guidance from MPS. The case where this was felt to be most likely 
was in protecting major aggregations of private e-Government 
information.  The detail of this was considered to be beyond the 
scope of the framework but, for indicative purposes, it was expected 
that such aggregations would normally warrant a RESTRICTED 
protective marking.  It was considered that guidance from the MPS 
would always take precedence over that arising from the 
confidentiality framework.  This framework could also have been 
applied to protection of ancillary information generated as a 
consequence of electronic service provision, for example, system 
management information and information on the performance and 
uptake of e-Government services. Information not covered by the 
MPS was to be handled in line with this framework.  It was noted that 
the physical and procedural security aspects are important elements 
of a multi-layer approach to the protection of private information but 
these were not covered by this framework.  Service providers were 
expected to consider these aspects as part of the overall process for 
ensuring and maintaining confidentiality.  Information marked as 
PRIVATE should, at government departmental discretion, be handled 
as RESTRICTED when in a government domain operating under 
MPS, but should not require baseline security measures.  By and 
large, confusing rhetoric that reads almost like a tongue twister.  
Given that the extension of central government secure networks 
rolled out to the local government platform through the 
implementation of the Government Secure Extranet (GCSx) 
programme some years later, there was a lot that needed clarification 
in order to ensure a smooth transition of working practices to a wider 
audience.  Perhaps this is the kind of area where the gap in 
translation lead to confusion and inertia, thus data based mishap and 
loss. 
12.5.198 September 2002 - e-Government Strategy Framework Policy and 
Guidelines, Network Defence, Version 2.0 (UK OeE, 2002f) - The 
essential difference between the business services and network 
defence frameworks was that the business services framework dealt 
with protection of the systems and services against failure not 
prompted by attack (for example against compromise of service 
through faulty software) and the network defence framework was 
concerned with protection against malicious and inadvertent attack.  
If the framework had been implemented and adhered to then there 
would have been little need for the huge volume of guidance and 
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reporting that has flowed since. This document introduced the 
concept of the PRIVATE marking and then promptly said to handle it 
the same as RESTRICTED – which was the beginning of years’ 
worth of wider confusion across the public sector with regard to 
protective marking of information assets, in line with previous 
commentary. 
12.5.199 September 2002 - e-Government Strategy Framework Policy and 
Guidelines, Registration and Authentication, Version 3.0 (UK OeE, 
2002g) - This document was concerned with the registration and 
authentication of citizens and organisations seeking to access 
government services electronically. It applied in circumstances where 
government needed to have trust in the identity (real-world or 
otherwise) and authority of those it was dealing with to ensure that 
there was no breach of privacy or confidentiality, theft/misuse of data, 
or other harm.  The framework included those cases where 
anonymous or pseudonymous access was considered to be 
acceptable. 
12.5.200 September 2002 - e-Government Strategy, Security Architecture, 
Version 2.0 September 2002 (UK OeE, 2002h) - This security 
architecture was developed as part of the government's commitment, 
in the Modernising Government white paper, to developing a 
corporate IT strategy for government. It was prepared by the OeE, 
part of the Cabinet Office, on behalf of the e-Champions.  The 
security architecture was seen as an evolving document that would 
be re-issued from time to time in line with changes in security 
framework policy and guidelines, implementation experience for UK -
Online services and market developments. 
This document was aimed at those procuring and providing e-
Government services, including Central Government Departments, 
non-departmental public sector bodies, Local Authorities and other 
local government bodies charged with the provision of e-Government 
services. It also encompassed regulatory bodies responsible for the 
proper audit and control of public assets and information.  In addition 
it included the suppliers and service providers seeking to offer 
services themselves, provide and operate such systems on behalf of 
government or provide equipment in support of e-Government 
services. 
12.5.201 September 2002 - e-Government Strategy Policy Framework and 
Guidelines, Trust Services, Version 3.0 (UK OeE, 2002g) - This 
document was intended to set out a number of levels of confidence in 
trust services used to support e-Government transactions. It was to 
be read in conjunction with the Security Framework document.  The 
policy was intended only to cover commitments made between 
clients and government in the context of e-Government services. 
This included communications between access and back office 
systems that are necessary to provide an end-to-end service. It did 
not apply to government-to government transactions that were not 
concerned with e-Government service provision.  It was considered 
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acceptable to require a client to install a standard commercial 
security product in order to access e-Government services, for 
example a web browser with an up-to-date version of the Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. However, the requirement of client-
installed custom software to access e-Government services was to 
be avoided. 
12.5.202 September 2002 – eGovernment Strategy Framework Policy and 
Guidelines, Assurance, Version 2.0, (OeE, 2002h; Cabinet Office 
(2002b) - This document was aimed at those establishing, procuring 
and providing e-Government services. This included Central 
Government Departments, non-departmental public sector bodies, 
Local Authorities and other local government bodies charged with the 
provision of e-Government services. It also encompassed regulatory 
bodies responsible for the proper audit and control of public assets 
and information.  It included the suppliers and service providers who 
wished to offer services themselves, provide and operate such 
systems on behalf of government or provide equipment in support of 
e-Government services.  It was also relevant to security authorities 
that could have used the document to assess the suitability of offered 
solutions and accredit them for operational use.  The intention was 
that central government departments and agencies must comply with 
the framework when installing and operating electronic business 
services. They were to: 
a. ensure that a security concept is developed as part of service concept 
development; 
b. ensure a security policy exists (preferably compliant with BS7799 [as 
was, ISO 27001 is now]); 
c. ensure that a threat and vulnerability analysis to their systems has 
been conducted; 
d. ensure a risk assessment to their systems has been conducted; 
e. ensure that the system has been designed, implemented and tested to 
minimise the risks with appropriately assured countermeasures, both 
technical and non-technical; 
f. ensure that systems are operated in a secure manner, including:  
 ensuring that processes are in place to receive and act upo n current  
security alerts, warnings and briefings (e.g. use of UNIRAS by a 
government department);  
 ensuring that any patches and updates are tested and implemented in a 
timely fashion; 
 ensuring that threat and vulnerability assessments and hence risk 
assessment are reviewed on a periodic basis; 
 ensuring that compliance with this framework is reviewed on a periodic  
basis. 
It was strongly recommended that other public sector bodies adopt 
the recommendations of this framework in respect of transactions 
that they conduct with businesses and the public or which are 
conducted on their behalf.  Where the provision of e -Government 
services was to be provided commercially, by a third party, the 
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procuring body was to consider mandating compliance with this 
framework as part of the contract. 
The Security Framework uses the internationally recognised 
Common (evaluation) Criteria (CC) Protection Profi le (PP) model to 
define the information technology security environment, objectives 
and requirements for a secure information technology service or 
product (Chissick and Harrington, 2004). 
For protectively marked information or where there is an enhanced 
integrity and availability requirement the assurance requirements are 
determined by using HMG InfoSec Standard No.1 (IS1).  HMG 
InfoSec Standard No.3 (IS3) defines the functionality needed to 
provide assured connections between business domains. IS1 is not 
currently applicable to material that is not protectively marked, (i.e. 
most data within the e-Government domain), however, it can be used 
for integrity and availability.  IS3 can be used to recommend 
functionality requirements for the integrity and availability of business 
domain connections. In the e-Government domain for each level of 
service needed (OS1 – OS13) for authentication, trust, confidentiality 
and network defence there will be an associated set of functionality 
and assurance requirements. 
The Assurance Framework specifically addressed how business 
sponsors, service providers and developers should ensure that e -
Government services are designed, configured and operated in a 
secure manner.  It built on the approach set out in the Security 
Framework document and detailed a methodology for assessing 
whether the threats and vulnerabilities to e-Government security 
systems have been met by appropriately assured countermeasures 
for each security objective. However, this still placed “Assurance” 
squarely in the IT domain. 
There is a requirement for an “Assurance Framework” which 
addresses the ways in which trust in the implementation of security 
elements can be assured.  Part of establishing assurance is 
documenting the security policy, design and operation.  This aids the 
security review process, leading to accreditation. The key 
components listed above assume the following suggested 
documentation set: 
a)   security concept; 
b)   security policy; 
c)   security design; 
d)   security operating procedures. 
The Requirements for Secure Delivery of Online Public Services 
(RSDOPS) made available in 2010 is so similar it is hard to 
understand why it was necessary or justified to spend tax payers 
money and time in re-writing what was already available just because 
it had not been fully adopted (CESG, 2010d).  Also, the ongoing 
struggle to implement a workable protective marking scheme across 
the wider public sector continues to hamper successful 
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implementation of best practice due to misunderstandings with 
regard to how high a level to protect information.  The solutions are 
borne in addressing human factors with regard to balancing an 
individual’s perceived impression of how vital, important or critical all 
of the information they handle or exchange on a day to day basis 
actually is when risk assessed against a workable model. 
12.5.203 September 2002 - Local Government Information Unit (LGiU) - The 
abc of e-government The “threat to privacy” is highlighted particularly 
with regard to “the sharing of data” and the threats posed by the 
“increasing use of partnerships with the private sector for the de livery 
of public services”. ... “The boundaries between information held in 
the public and private sectors are likely to become increasingly 
blurred.  This raises the dangerous possibility of the misuse of data 
by the private sector for purposes of commercial gain”.  The 
document concluded that “The type of society that is created in the 
course of the electronic revolution and the extent to which citizens 
benefit from digital technology depends very much on the political 
choices that are made today.  Councils have an important role to play 
in influencing these choices and shaping the future” (UK LGiU, 
2002). 
12.5.204 October 2002 – How can you embed IA in the Board Risk Agenda? 
– monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP32, (IAAC, 2002l). 
12.5.205 October 2002 – “IA and Corporate Governance: What Every Director 
Must Know” – Jonathan Armstrong, Mark Rhys-Jones and Andrew 
Rathmell, Eversheds and RANDEurope.  This report pulled together 
the above themes as previously articulated.  “One of the key assets 
for any business is the information it holds.  In today’s fast moving 
and competitive world, it is inconceivable that such a valuable asset 
will not be stored, retrieved and manipulated through the use of 
information technology.  The necessity to preserve and exploit a 
company’s assets therefore requires directors to ensure that they 
effectively manage their information assets” .  Director’s existing 
duties – a fiduciary duty to act and exercise powers in good faith and 
in the best interests of the company; to exercise such skill and care 
as may reasonably be expected of the role and to carry out the duties 
imposed by statute. 
“Failure to embrace new technology can quickly result in a business 
falling behind its rivals.  The trick is to adopt a strategic approach to 
IA that will ensure a company benefits from its investments in IT 
whilst sensibly managing the risk”. 
12.5.206 October 2002 – Engaging the Board: Benchmarking IA (in 
association with Microsoft) InfoSec and IT Security are the most 
common descriptions for this portion of the corporate risk profile.  
The benchmarking implied that the term IA was becoming more 
widely used.  However, the reality appeared to be that whilst the 
elements were being increasingly adopted, the term itself had a 
relatively low usage.  IA issues were rarely raised to board of director 
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level. IA has to be measured to be worthwhile – on the principle that 
what can be measured can be managed. 
12.5.207 October 2002 – A Roadmap For Action – Insuring Digital Risk – 
John Ridd and Rand Europe for IAAC (2002m)  This report identified 
that Directors and officers have a duty to ensure that their companies 
carry adequate insurance – yet such insurance does not appear to 
be readily available.  The contention was that stakeholders in 
businesses and enterprises whose operations include a digital risk 
needed to recognise: 
 That they have a digital risk ; 
 That their digital risk  is not covered by existing general policies;  
 That even specialist e-business and cyber policies do not cover all digital 
risks and most do not cover business interruption;  
 That they need to bring IT properly into the risk  management process and 
integrate IT with business processes; and 
 That they must work  with their insurers and technology suppliers to ensure 
effective insurance cover as required by their corporate governance and 
fiduciary duties.  
12.5.208 November  2002 - Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, The national 
strategy for local e-government, www.localegov.gov.uk - This was a 
customer access strategy; aimed at re-designing administrative 
processes to make employees’ jobs easier, more productive and 
more effective.  Consultation took place initially through DTLR and 
LGA.  The Strategy referenced from the outset the need to get the 
consent of the citizens concerned in order to use their data legally.  
“That consent will not be given if people do not trust government to 
keep personal information secure and to use it properly”. 
12.5.209 November 2002 – Risk: Improving government’s capability to handle 
risk and uncertainty, Summary Report, Cabinet Office, Strategy Unit 
Forward by the Prime Minister – “In many ways life today is far less 
risky than in the past. Yet risk seems to matter more than ever, partly 
because we are so much more aware of the risks we face, and partly 
because of the sheer speed of change in science and technology” .  
Risk handling should be supported by best practice, guidance and 
skills development – organised around a risk “standard”; setting a 
culture which supports well-judged risk taking and innovation.  Risk 
management has been found wanting in many recent policy failures 
and crises.  Examples include policies that have proceeded without a 
full assessment of their vulnerability to events, and major change 
projects, for example in IT, which have gone ahead without 
contingency plans. These were highlighted “in the PAC report 
Improving the Delivery of Government IT Projects.  Inquiries such as 
those by Lords Phillips (BSE) and Cullen (Ladbroke Grove rail crash) 
also make recommendations for improving the handling of risk and 
communications with the public.  While a number of these failures 
have been down to poor risk management, others raise concerns 
that public trust has been lost by a failure to be open about the 
nature of the risk”. 
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12.5.210 December 2002 – Promoting a Culture of InfoSec in Europe – 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP34 (IAAC, 2002n). 
12.5.211 December 2002 – Microsoft launched their Trustworthy Computing 
agenda embracing four pillars – 1) Security, 2) Privacy, 3) Reliability 
and 4) Business Integrity. 
 
 
 
12.5.212 January 2003 – HMG’s Minimum Requirements for the Verification 
of the Identity of Organisations, e-Government Strategy Framework 
Policy and Guidelines, Version 2.0, OeE, Cabinet Office (HMG, 
2003b) HMG’s minimum requirements for the verification of the 
identity of organisations was one of a series of documents developed 
as part of the Government’s commitment, in the Modernising 
Government White Paper, to develop a corporate IT strategy for 
Government. It was prepared by the OeE, part of the Cabinet Office, 
on behalf of the e-Champions.  It was a clear and concise document 
that set out the framework as required to be followed. 
12.5.213 January 2003 – HMG’s Minimum Requirements for the Verification 
of the Identity of Individuals, e-Government Strategy Framework 
Policy and Guidelines, Version 2.0 , OeE, Cabinet Office (UK HMG, 
2003c) HMG’s minimum requirements for the verification of identity of 
individuals is as per the preceding reference.  It has been prepared 
by the OeE, part of the Cabinet Office, on behalf of the e-Champions.  
This document built on the e-government security policy and the e-
government authentication framework policy. It specifically 
addressed the Government’s minimum requirements for the 
verification and validation of the identity of an individual.  
12.5.214 January 2003 – Insurance and Information Risk Management – 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP35 (IAAC, 2003a). 
12.5.215 February 2003 – Deterring Cyber-crime – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP36 (IAAC, 2003b). 
12.5.216 February 2003 – Establishing the European Network and InfoSec 
Agency (ENISA) Consultation preceding the actual formation in July 
2004. 
2003 – Highlights / Lowlights 
 8 April 2003 Report of London Borough website defaced.  
 16 June 2003 Cabinet Office Draft Civil Contingencies Bill. 
 EU Reuse of Public Sector Information Directive.  
 The National Archives (TNA) was formed.  
 During 2003,  IAAC members contributed to the Foresight Cyber Trust and Crime 
Prevention programme. 
 CESG releases the National IA Strategy (NIAS) with the CSIA. 
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12.5.217 February 2003 – The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (US 
DHS, 2003) – signed off the Whitehouse, the first Cyber Security 
Strategy.  The UK followed six years later.  The Czech Republic 
issued theirs in 2011. (Czech Republic, 2011). 
12.5.218 15 March 2003 – Building in Security – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP37 (IAAC, 2003c). 
12.5.219 17 March 2003 – IAAC hosted a workshop/seminar for the UK 
Telecommunications sector and used the following definition (which 
was then used for other work throughout the year): 
IA is a management process, the purpose of which is to ensure that the 
critical information within an organisation and the systems and networks that  
manage it are reliable, secure and private, and that measures and processes 
are in place to counter malicious electronic based attacks.  IA encompasses 
other disciplines such as InfoSec management, risk management and 
business continuity management.  IA goes beyond Business as Usual 
InfoSec as it is particularly concerned with high-end threats to systems that 
are critical not only to the enterprise but also to the wider national or 
international information infrastructure (Rathmell, 2003).  
This was the beginning of what became the UK Government’s IA 
Maturity Model (IAMM).  An important feature of this definition is that 
it focuses upon services that are more likely to face extreme risks 
(e.g. nation state or terrorist attack). InfoSec, in the main, was still 
only considered to be in the early years of maturing towards IA so the 
definition was provided to add perspective.  However, the part it has 
to play in protection and governance was better understood and 
appreciated as a result of many instances of e-crime that had been 
reported in the preceding few years.  A key part of the model and the 
differentiator was that IA was clearly set as being not just about 
technical issues.  The model was abstracted from six different 
methodologies e.g. OECD Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
COSO/Treadway Commission, Turnbull. 
12.5.220 20 April 2003 - Promoting Information and Network Security 
awareness Among Citizens: A Global Report and Lessons Learned, 
Aarti Anhal, Shawna Gibson, Lorenzo Valeri (Anhal, Gibson and 
Valeri, 2003).  This report provided an examination of the existing 
InfoSec awareness-raising and educational initiatives worldwide 
targeted at citizens aimed at promoting trust and confidence in the 
use of ICT.  “Much work remains to be done ...before one can truly 
state that all citizens are sufficiently aware of the risks, rights and 
responsibilities pertaining to their safe use of ICT” . 
12.5.221 April 2003 – Cyber Terrorism: An Emerging Threat – monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP38 (IAAC, 2003d). 
12.5.222 April 2003 – Reform of the Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990, 
(Internet Crime Forum, 2003) - the Legal Subgroup review took place 
addressing the changing backdrop of criminal activities taking place 
in the internet domain.  Proposed amendments to the CMA were 
provided. 
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12.5.223 2003 – IT Governance: A Manager’s Guide to Data Security and 
ISO27001/ISO27002 T- his text book was first published in 2003 and 
the authors (Calder and Watkins, 2008) defined IT Governance as 
“the framework for the leadership, organisational structures and 
business processes, standards and compliance to these standards, 
which ensure that the organisation’s IS support and enable the 
achievement of its strategies and objectives”. 
12.5.224 May 2003 - e-gov the local e-government standards body, The 
National Standards Authority for Local e-Government - Both the 
agency and the documents appear to no longer exist electronically.  
However, they set about to embrace security and data standards 
within a framework.  Given how much subsequent work has been 
done to achieve this, time and effort appears to have been wasted 
rather than using that which has already been made available.  
12.5.225 May 2003 – The Insider Threat: The Enemy Within – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP39 (IAAC, 2003e). 
12.5.226 May 2003 – A United Kingdom Government Strategy for IA, Draft 
Version 0.3 issued by the CSIA -  This strategy set forward a number 
of critical actions that needed to be undertaken: 
 Appointment of a Senior Responsible Officer for pan-government systems; 
 Development of the Gateway Process to include IA; 
 Production of annual information audit statements by departments;  
 Develop a Common Good requirements process; 
 Develop and fund an IA Technical Capability Strategy;  
 Security professionalism for IT staff; 
 Review and maintenance of communications provision;  
 Training for Chief Information Officers (or equivalent) and Senior 
Responsible Officers; 
 Maintenance and development of pan-government infrastructures; and 
 Co-ordination of government response to international IA initiatives. 
The business case was claimed not to be clear or available at the 
time.  The Strategy acknowledged that “IA is essential for the delivery 
of those government outcomes that are dependent on realising the 
benefits of ICT” (p.14).  The Strategy set out with an overarching top 
down approach but ended up being delivered by bottom up tasks like 
CESG Claims Tested Mark and the Tiger Scheme.  Departments 
were required by the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that their key 
systems were compliant with BS7799 (the InfoSec management 
standard) by 2003 and that all systems should be compliant by 2005 
(p.35).  There is a lack of evidence in government reporting to prove 
that this work was achieved satisfactorily.14 May 2003 – Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the European Network and InfoSec Agency – held by 
The Working Party on Telecommunications and Information Society 
Services of the Council of the European Union.  Detailed the scope 
and objectives of ENISA. 
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12.5.227 23 May 2003 – the Directors IA Network (DIAN) met for its inaugural 
meeting with the aim to: 
 Raise awareness of IA amongst UK corporate boards;  
 Help produce aware and educated personnel who can contribute to IA in the 
UK; 
 Steer practical work  from the IAAC and others that will assist boards in 
meeting their IA duties; 
 Provide UK Government with advice from industry specialists. 
An IA Framework was created as represented in Figure 92 below: 
 
Figure 92:  DIAN IA Framework, Source: IAAC (2003m) 
 
12.5.228 4 June 2003 – Intellect (The Technology Trade Association) 
launched the eAware programme in the UK, based on a European 
initiative.  Report issued in September. 
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12.5.229 4 June 2003 – the CSIA role was explained to IAAC (UK CESG 
2010g) – “to provide assurance to government that the risks to the 
national information infrastructure are appropriately managed”.  CSIA 
defined IA as the confidence that IS: 
 Will function when they need to; 
 Will function as they need to;  
 Will be controlled by legitimate users; 
 Will protect the information they handle; and 
 Are under the control of the legitimate user.  
So the CSIA was providing strategic direction for government IA 
activity, sponsoring ‘common good’ developments; supporting the 
accreditation of pan-government systems and supporting resilience 
of government and national ICT.  IA was seen as a ‘golden thread’ 
that should run through many government initiatives such as : 
 Continuity of government and its service 
 Defence Strategy 
 National Counter-terrorist Strategy 
 National Resilience Strategy 
 e-Economy and e-Government Strategies  
 National Crime Strategy 
 NHS IT Strategy 
 CJS IT Strategy and so on.... 
To provide coherence and support for these initiatives what was 
being sought at the time was central strategic support to: 
 Ensure that government has a core risk  management capability, to support  
public sector IA; and 
 Ensure that government influences and benefit from IA activity in the wider 
environment that is not directly under its control  
The kind of activities that were planned to be supported were: 
 Improving understanding and dissemination of threats, vulnerabilities and 
impacts 
 Ensuring the availability of appropriately sk illed staff 
 Developing and maintaining a technical capability, from provision of high 
grade security to a wide commercial supply of base security products  
 Ensuring that the public sector ‘culture of security’ develops to address new 
risks 
 Leveraging government procurement to support IA aims 
 Promoting wider awareness of, and education in, IA 
 Influencing international activity through, for example, standards bodies.  
The CSIA Director at the time observed “why do you need 
compliance if it is obviously the right thing to do?” (Marsh, 2003)  
Indeed, if only that was the case as the future showed from that point 
onwards. 
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For context, there were over 450 Local Government Councils at the 
time and now there are 375.  Trust was already a key concern and 
requisite component.  It was accepted thinking that security is a 
process that had to be engaged in. 
12.5.230 June 2003 – Reacting to Cyber-crime – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP40 (IAAC, 2003f). 
12.5.231 June 2003 - Policing the Information Society – A Way Forward, 
EURIM paper - This is particularly interesting to revisit given that 
most of the content was re-presented during 2010, further evidencing 
the author’s contention that little has changed in the intervening 
passage of time.  It appears that the same people have attended the 
same meetings and talked about the same topics to each other at 
length with little or no discernible change. 
12.5.232 2003 – IA Guidelines for Boards and Senior Management - Internal 
audit was by now recognised as an essential element within a 
corporate governance framework.  The document advised that to 
deal with IA, an auditor should focus particularly on the specific risks 
relating to the creation, processing and storage of information and 
the control and security of the hardware, software and processing 
infrastructure that form the IS. 
The Guidelines covered: 
 Audit; 
 Risk Management; 
 Implementation;  
 Culture;  
 Support; 
 Legal perspective; 
 Planning (Scenario Gaming); and 
 Return on Investment. 
The report recommended that information on IA incidents should be 
recorded.  It was considered that having available information 
regarding data found to be inaccurate or incomplete, security 
breaches, identified hacking attempts, virus or other ‘malware’ 
(malicious software) attacks, would aid the assessment of whether 
any additional measures should be taken to address risks.  The 
report noted that quantitative data – including statistics, recovery 
time-scales, and the impact and costs of IA compromises – would 
provide important input into an assessment of the costs and benefits 
of introducing additional controls to mitigate those risks or improve 
the processes of recovery. 
To deploy risk management successfully within an organisation, it 
was believed necessary to embed an awareness and understanding 
of risks and ways to manage them while conducting business as 
usual.  Employees of an organisation should be aware of their 
responsibility to manage risk in their sphere of influence.  This could 
range from simply ensuring that one’s actions do not adversely affect 
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the safety or security of others – a responsibility on all employees – 
to strategic board level accountability for IA in general.  The starting 
point was for the Board to own, and be seen to own, the main 
strategic business risks facing the organisation.  By demonstrating 
ownership, the Board members act as role models for the behaviour 
of all managers and other employees. 
Referenced within the guidance are other resources including The 
Association of Insurance Risk Managers (AIRMIC) Guide to 
Integrated Risk Management (AIRMIC, 2002) which sets out a road 
map for any organisation to integrate risk management within 
business as usual (see www.airmic.com).  Also HM Treasury Orange 
Book – “Management of Risk – A Strategic Overview with 
supplementary guidance for smaller bodies” (UK HM Treasury, 
2004), which follows on from other detailed risk management 
documents already existing in central government, aiming to provide 
guidance on how to develop a strategic framework for the 
organisation consideration of risk.  It also provides advice on tools 
and techniques that may be adopted by an organisation to support its 
risk management processes across the whole range of risks. 
Information owners should exist in all disciplines – including HR, IT, 
Finance, Operations and Strategy – as they play a pivotal part in the 
successful implementation of IA.  On top of these roles, the key to 
the successful implementation of IA is the coordination of IA with 
other disciplines such as Risk Management, InfoSec and Audit.  It is 
important that everyone involved in IA implementation understand his 
or her role.  Consideration should be given to providing briefing and 
training to ensure that there are no misunderstandings. 
IA measures fall under three general headings: 
1. Protect and Prevent; protection of Information Assets 
2. Detect; detecting incidents – not everyone is obvious and the greatest risk  
occurs when an incident goes undetected 
3. React and Recover; log and monitor incidents and events. 
An IA culture is built on: 
 Values and principles  
 The Body of Knowledge (policies, standards, procedures) 
 Setting attitudes and influencing behaviour (including staff training)  
 Making the IA aspects of tasks easy rather than difficult  
 Monitoring, measuring and feedback to encourage approved behaviour  
The guidance included a Checklist for creating a strong IA culture 
1. Is the Board clear as to the company’s IA values and principles, and how are 
these communicated to staff? 
2. When were IA policies last reviewed, and are they consistent with current  
values and principles? 
3. Does management behaviour demonstrate the important attached to IA or 
contradict it? 
4. Do IS reflect the company’s IA values, principles and priorities?  
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5. Is feedback given to staff on the IA aspects of their decisions and 
behaviour? 
6. Do IA procedures or constraints get in the company’s way, and if so how has 
this been resolved? 
Key messages included the following: 
• To be effective, those responsible for defining policy and conducting risk  
assessments have to be separated from those who deliver the solutions.  
• Following the relevant legislation and guidance in relation to IA will result in 
positive benefits for any company.  This can be considered Good Practice.  
• An effective approach to IA does not just make good business sense, it is  
also a matter of law and Directors ignore the subject at their risk. 
So in the breadth of this report can be found sufficient foundations to 
build an IA framework for any organisation. 
12.5.233 2003 – The National Archives (TNA) was formed (Ficenec, 2011) - 
Born out of the combination of several government organisations; the 
Public Record Office, the Historical Manuscripts Commission, the 
OPSI and HMSO, UK Government’s official archive contains 1,000 
years of history from the Doomsday Book to the present day – and it 
was where a lot of “old” versions of government department websites 
were transferred to when the new coalition government came into 
power in May 2010 and started making expansive changes across 
the central government information landscape. 
12.5.234 July 2003 – Information sharing: A ‘no brainer’ approach to Improved 
Risk Management – monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP41 
(IAAC, 2003g). 
12.5.235 August 2003 – Measuring the Benefits of InfoSec – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP42 (IAAC, 2003h). 
12.5.236 August 2003 – Protecting Critical Infrastructures Against Cyber-
Attack, Adelphi Volume 43, Issue 359 (Lukasik et al, (2003) - This 
paper provided a review of some significant study done into the cyber 
preparedness of various countries.  It highlighted the need for more 
skills and training in the subject area, something that was finally 
properly picked up in the UK Cyber Security Strategy published in 
November 2011 (originally launched in 2009).  The paper also 
highlighted a dearth of in-depth research in IA expressing a concern 
that time was of the essence, but given the paper was written (at the 
time of writing) almost a decade previously, IA research has not 
caught up or delivered into the perceived space.  The paper also 
gave a good account of the UK Government’s Information Age 
programme, putting it all together in one place as an overview of the 
elements that made up the strategy (p.67). 
12.5.237 September 2003 – Who is responsible for investigating e-Crime? – 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP43, (IAAC, 2003i). 
12.5.238 September 2003 – Raising Citizen Awareness of InfoSec: A 
Practical Guide, a report by RAND Europe for the eAware project 
(Wooding, Anhal and Valeri, 2003). 
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12.5.239 October 2003 – Sharing is Protecting: A review of Information 
Sharing – a report produced in association with IAAC and the 
National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC). 
12.5.240 October 2003 – Awareness Raising in Europe – monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP44, (IAAC, 2003j). 
12.5.241 November 2003 – Understanding Trust – monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP45, (IAAC, 2003k). 
12.5.242 11 November 2003 - An Engineering Approach to the Design of 
Accurate and Reliable Security Systems, Dr John Leach (Leach, 
2003) - an article on Threat Based Security Engineering (TBSE), 
which was deemed to be necessary to help re-frame the thinking, at 
the time, with regard to the “threat” aspect of the Threats, 
Vulnerability, Risks conundrum. 
12.5.243 December 2003 – The Draft Civil Contingencies Bill – monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP46, (IAAC, 2003l). 
12.5.244 December 2003 - Office of the Deputy Prime Minister One Year On, 
The national strategy for local e-government www.localegov.gov.uk  
Whilst the progress was deemed to be good, at that point, “the 
average Council” wanted for “government to develop data protection, 
authentication/security and common solutions to reduce costs, 
uncertainty and implementation time”. 
12.5.245 2003 - “delivering service improvement through addressing”, The 
National Land and Property Gazetteer (I&DeA, 2003).  This report 
referenced the need for improved data quality and analysis which 
has been an ongoing theme for many years within the industry – and 
continues to be of paramount importance to the triad element of data 
integrity that is at the foundations of IA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.246 17 January 2004 – IAAC reviewed the IA Strategy from Government 
(draft issued April 2003) reiterating previously available advice and 
guidance. 
12.5.247 9 February 2004 – Sir Andrew Turnbull wrote to all Permanent 
Secretaries to make clear “the importance of IRM as a crucial 
component of the board level governance function”.  This “call to 
arms” included the advice that: 
  
2004 – Highlights / Lowlights 
Government Spending Review. 
The UK CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT 2004 was enacted, advising all organisations to 
maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that i f an 
emergency occurs the person or body is able to continue to perform his or its functions.  
International focus on detection of IEDs.....but consideration by security personnel of the 
impact of the social and psychological aspects of this threat vector started to spill into other 
areas of the “theatre of security”.  
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 The management of information risk  is a Board level function;  
 They should nominate a Board member to take ownership of information risk 
– e.g. appointment of Senior Information Risk  Owner (SIRO); and  
 The head of e-government was to work  through a board level group of  
SIROs to ensure the development of culture and processes for effective IRM 
and for measuring and auditing of performance.  Given this was the “call to 
arms”, it is  in stark  contrast to the k ind of statements are lined up alongside 
the reporting done post the HMRC breach which identified a significant lack 
of the appropriate leadership or embedded culture.  
12.5.248 16 February 2004 – Deception in Computer Networked Defence – 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP47, (IAAC, 2004a). 
12.5.249 16 March 2004 – Assured International Passenger Name Record 
Data - monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP48, (IAAC, 
2004b). 
12.5.250 2 April 2004 – Cabinet Office IA Stakeholder letter – introducing the 
document entitled “Protecting our Information Systems: Working in 
Partnership for a Secure and Reliable UK Information Infrastructure ” 
(UK Cabinet Office, 2004a) and calling for participation and support.  
The key message was that trust and confidence in IS is essential to 
ensure uptake of online services.  There was a restatement of the 
fact that “it’s not just a matter for the IT department” nor is it “all about 
firewalls”.  This is an easy to read document in plain English. 
12.5.251 16 April 2004 – InfoSec and the Ordinary User - monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP49 (IAAC, 2004c). 
12.5.252 16 April 2004 – Reform of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 - monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP50 (IAAC, 2004d). 
12.5.253 April 2004 – Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention Foresight Project  
This UK Government Foresight Project set out to explore the 
application and implications of next generation information 
technologies in areas such as identity and authenticity, surveillance, 
system robustness, security and IA and the basis for effective 
interaction and trust between people and machines.  The Author was 
involved in this project and the research and thought at the time were 
in keeping with awareness of the available legislature.  The findings 
have been proven out so far.  The Internet of Things was forecast as 
was the inability to address security from the outset (UK HMG 2003a; 
Backhouse et al., 2003 and UK Government Office for Science, 
2009). 
12.5.254 8 June 2004 - IA Delphi Questionnaire (Birchall et al., 2004) 
research undertaken by Prof David W Birchall and Prof Jean-Noel 
Ezingeard – in conjunction with the Henley Management College 
colleagues.  The authors wrote about the continued difficulties in 
articulating IA and gaining board level understanding and 
acceptance, as evidenced in the responses to their research 
questionnaires. 
12.5.255 16 May 2004 – Meeting public sector IA requirements - monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP51 (IAAC, 2004e). 
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12.5.256 May 2004 – Achieving information assurance, Research strategy 
project.  Achieving information assurance is a journey (Nanton, 
2004). It referenced the IAAC National R&D Strategy for IA – “Our 
current strategy for addressing IA in the acquisition process is the 
greatest Achilles Heel”.  Achieving IA begins with a senior level 
management commitment (typically at the Chief Information Officer 
level) based on a clear understanding of the perceived threat. 
12.5.257 May 2004 – Technology Risk Checklist (The World Bank, 2004) – 
included cross mapping to the thirteen layers of e -security covering 
both hardware and software network infrastructures.  The rhetoric 
included reference to “cyber risk mitigation processes” across a 
comprehensive checklist that preceded the SANS Top 20. 
 Risk Management  
 Policy Management  
 Cyber Intelligence 
 Access Controls / Authentication 
 Firewalls  
 Active content filtering 
 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
 Virus scanners 
 Encryption 
 Vulnerability testing 
 Systems administration 
 Incident response plan (IRP) 
 Wireless security 
12.5.258 16 June 2004 – Teaching the Teachers - monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP52 (IAAC, 2004f).  This paper is particularly 
prescient given the ongoing skills crisis and attempts to address it in 
more recent times (2014/2015). 
12.5.259 16 July 2004 – Transnational Co-operation in the fight against cyber-
crime - monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP53 (IAAC, 
2004g). 
12.5.260 16 August 2004 – Revising Business Continuity - monthly briefing 
paper produced by IAAC, BP54, (IAAC, 2004h). 
12.5.261 18 September 2004 – Delivering IA: What needs to be done? - 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP55 (IAAC, 2004i). 
12.5.262 October 2004 - NCC Guidelines Number 289 – Guidelines for IT 
management – Protect and Survive, Defending against Application 
Hacking, David Tracey - defined “Application Vulnerability Testing” as 
a key part of a robust InfoSec management programme (NCC, 
2004a). 
12.5.263 October 2004 - Working with Business, Your business made easy – 
Survey of English local authority websites from a business 
perspective (UK ODPM, 2004c) - This survey concluded by stating 
that “most local authority websites have much to do when it comes to 
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providing information and services for businesses.  Coverage is 
extremely patchy.” 
12.5.264 18 October 2004 – The changing cyber-crime threat - monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP56, (IAAC, 2004j). 
12.5.265 October 2004 – Project Endurance – The Security Company and 
NHTCU launched with support from Cabinet Office and Home Office 
– The Endurance mission was to bring about a change in the 
attitudes and behaviour of the UK's Home Internet users.  It aimed to 
inform citizens and micro enterprises about the need for and the 
“how to” of basic internet security (use of firewall, anti-virus, patches, 
back-up) and IP (log in, phishing, etc). The initiative was developed 
following a Private Discussion Meeting hosted by IAAC in May 2004 
and brought together interested parties from industry and 
government.  The intentions were to provide users with information in 
the following areas: 
 Learn the basics: updating anti-virus and operating systems, installing a firewall;  
 Protecting personal and financial information;  
 Password usage and protection;  
 Counter-fraud measures; 
 Spyware and adware protection; and 
 Back ing-up systems. 
12.5.266 5 November 2004 - Improving IT procurement: The Impact of the 
Office of Government Commerce’s initiatives on departments and 
suppliers in the delivery of major IT-enabled projects – Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 877, Session 2003-2004: 5 
November 2004 - Much has been put in place by the OGC to 
improve skills but take-up remains low.  This report mentioned 
security at appropriate points, including the need for a Security Policy 
to be in place per organisation.  This work is supported by various 
other outputs at the time from the same department (UK Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, 2002, 2003, 2004a/b/d/e). 
12.5.267 20 November 2004 – The FoIA as a path to good IA - monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP57, (IAAC, 2004k). 
12.5.268 November 2004 - Socitm Insight - Knock, knock: who’s there? An 
overview of authentication for electronic service delivery, Executive 
briefing (Socitm Insight, 2004b) This Briefing considers identity and 
authentication issues.  The issue was being revisited in 2011 but this 
chronology shows that the issues have been fleshed out and 
elucidated already. 
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12.5.269 1 January 2005 – Emergent European frameworks for Network and 
InfoSec - monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP58 (IAAC, 
2005a). 
12.5.270 19 January 2005 – EURIM – IPPR E-Crime Study, Partnership 
Policing for the Information Society, Building Cyber communities: 
Beating Cybercrime - This report includes the following interesting 
statement “Governments have yet to provide their law enforcement 
agencies with the skills and resources to handle e-crime within their 
own boundaries let alone to organise co-operation across boundaries 
on a routine basis.  Unless and until they do so, they need to provide 
industry and individuals with effective frameworks that enable them 
to work in partnership with law enforcement to protect themselves 
and to obtain redress”.  A sufficient framework existed within ISO 
27001 at the time, and subsequently the National IA Strategy was 
launched in 2008 with a Delivery Plan that provided equally sufficient 
foundation to build upon.  However, more time has passed since this 
was written and progress appears to have been slow, given the 
volume of mistrust in government’s capability to protect and secure 
personal data, rather than its apparent ability to lose data and breach 
trust. 
12.5.271 Jan 2005 – SANS Beyond the Preoccupation with Certification and 
Accreditation – Guide to Conducting IA Systems Engineering During 
the Development of Tactical Systems (Esser, 2005).  The premise of 
this paper was that “Striking a balance between providing optimum 
performance and a robust IA posture is not an easy task, but can be 
made easier by following a disciplined IA systems engineering 
process and conducting critical security design activities at key points 
during system development” – thus alluding to the “build security in” 
mantra that came after this date.  “This guide attempts to chart a 
course for the tactical system developer that interlaces crucial IA 
activities alongside standard DoD acquisition and systems 
engineering design activities, ensuring security features are standard 
elements of system design and life-cycle supportability plans”. 
12.5.272 1 February 2005 – Identity Management and IA, Executive Summary 
- monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP59 (IAAC, 2005b).  
IAAC had embarked on a work programme focussing on issues of 
Identity Management and the interrelationship with IA.  This paper 
explains those links. 
2005 - Highlights 
 March 2005 – Computer Misuse Act 1990 (Amendment) Bill issued. 
 Launch of Transformational Government Strategy. 
 Google Maps and Google Earth open up mapping to the public .  
 1 April 2005 – NHS Information Authority closed.  
 BS7799 became an international standard, ISO17799. 
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12.5.273 1 March 2005 – IA and the SME - monthly briefing paper produced 
by IAAC (2005c), BP60. 
12.5.274 March 2005 – Hampton Review, ‘Reducing administrative burdens: 
effective inspection and enforcement, (Hampton, 2005)  This report 
was undertaken by Philip Hampton to consider the scope for 
reducing administrative burdens by promoting more efficient 
approaches to regulatory inspection and enforcement, without 
compromising regulatory standards or outcomes. 
12.5.275 1 April 2005 – Realising the Cyber-Trust and Crime Prevention - 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP61, (IAAC, 2005d). 
12.5.276 1 May 2005 – Cyber Hood Watch - monthly briefing paper produced 
by IAAC, BP62, (IAAC, 2005e). 
12.5.277 July 2005 – Code of Practice on the Managing of Police Information 
(MOPI) – National Centre for Police Excellence, Home Office (ACPO, 
2005) – This has been a core piece of collateral for the police force in 
response to the requirements to provide advice and guidance with 
regard to the appropriate (and secure) management of information in 
all its forms. 
12.5.278 18 August 2005 – Professionalisation of the InfoSec industry, Nick 
Coleman (Coleman, 2005a) This IAAC Briefing Paper agreed a 
Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) and ultimately formed the IISP.  
The IISP went on to develop a Skills Framework in line with the SFIA. 
12.5.279 18 August 2005 – IA: A review of UK Government and industry 
initiatives, written by Nick Coleman, Chair of the Security Alliance for 
Internet and New Technologies (SAINT) (Coleman, 2005b) – 
published by the Cabinet Office – the report “documents the 
development of IA in the UK and its importance to government and to 
industry”.  The definition of IA – “ensuring that data vital to the 
functioning of our nation is protected securely” is somewhat narrow, 
given the wealth available resources to provide a more robust view.  
However, this work identified a significant amount of effort being 
applied to addressing issues of achieving good IA.  It was clear that 
“one challenge to fostering cooperation is that the groups have little 
knowledge of the work and activities of other groups”.  The 
subsequent mapping work identified at least 96 organisations 
providing advice and guidance, whitepapers, events etc in this area – 
suffice to say there is no shortage of resources available on the 
subject – potentially too many for anyone to pick a clear message 
from. 
This was the first iteration of work done prior to the HMRC 2007 
breach and is therefore supported by follow up reporting (Coleman, 
2007 and 2008, King, 2008). 
12.5.280 September 2005 – The Public Private Boundary on the Internet, 
(Internet Crime Forum, 2005) – the Legal Subgroup paper identifying 
key issues with regard to the changing nature of our private lives in 
the context of world wide web. 
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12.5.281 18 October 2005 - Identity Assurance (IdA): Towards a Policy 
Framework for Electronic Identity IAAC Position Paper v1.0.  This 
Paper pulled together the various outputs of workshops held by IAAC 
during the preceding year on the subject of Identity Assurance and i ts 
links with IA. 
12.5.282 25 November 2005 – IA Governance Framework, CSIA, Cabinet 
Office – Working in partnership for a secure and resilient UK 
information infrastructure .  This was the end result of the earlier 
consultation and embedding the term IA Governance – “ensuring 
stakeholder confidence that IS risk is managed pragmatically, 
appropriately and in a cost-effective manner”.  This framework thus 
acknowledged that IA governance is “an integral element of 
corporate governance”.  IAAC had been calling for this join since 
early in 2002.  This document addressed all the right areas.  There 
was a section entitled IA in the Procurement Process that reflected 
“A project fails if it does not meet its IA objectives, since the 
information delivered by the service and upon which the business 
relies may not be adequately protected...... This can only be 
achieved by treating the IA requirements applying to the system or 
service as an integral element of the business throughout the entire 
procurement process”.  However, the document confuses “a specific 
security policy statement” with “a Risk Management and 
Accreditation Documentation Set [RMADS]” – these are not the same 
thing – and in many ways there is a translation service required in 
order to understand the totality of the framework – if you are not “au 
fait” with government security standards and publications you might 
struggle to know how best to progress with the content provided 
therein (Original consultation in 2004 – UK Cabinet Office, 2004a). 
 
 
12.5.283 30 January 2006 - Transformational Government in a responsible 
way - IAAC Response to the Cabinet Office consultation paper on 
Transformational Government – Enabled by Technology.  This report 
contained the following: ‘The Government will further develop its risk 
management model’.  In developing this model it is important to take 
explicitly into account the risks resulting from joining up previously 
stove piped systems.  However, the transfer of risk between 
departments is not well handled, as shown by the Bichard Report. 
2006 - Highlights 
 25 January 2006 – Police and Justice Bill – included set up of the National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA). 
 IAAC launch of ID Assurance programme.  
 Guardian Free our Data campaign begins.  
 EU Inspire Directive for Open Spatial Data.  
 Confidence as a concept is added into the IA rhetoric .  
 PCI Security Standards Council is born – as a Standards setting body NOT as an 
enforcement body; enforcement is driven out through the “brands”. 
 Wikileaks founded by Julian Assange - https://wikileaks.org/ 
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This was considered to be a general governance level issue that 
should be addressed, explicitly.  In the Strategy, government 
expressed its ambition of developing a holistic approach to identi ty 
management, which should enable provision of trusted services 
(par.39/7). It also announced a new Ministerial focus on finding and 
communicating a balance between privacy and efficiency with 
respect to data sharing (par. 39/4). 
In order to support developing insight in this, IAAC rolled out a 
consultation process in which government and industry stakeholders 
met with academia and international experts. 
The intention was to deliver an Identity Assurance Roadmap for the 
UK by July 2006, which would aim to provide a baseline insight and 
inform government and industry policy making. 
12.5.284 2006 – Information Governance in the Department of Health and the 
NHS – Cayton, “The coherence, clarity and consistency in the way 
information is governed within and between the various bodies 
involved in the development, delivery and monitoring of NHS care 
and services will need to be improved to support an electronic NHS.”  
12.5.285 May 2006 – Pervasive Computing – a Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology “postnote” publication, Number 263 (UK 
Office of Parliamentary Science and Technology, 2006a) addressing 
this topic.  Privacy, safety, security and technology issues were all 
identified at the time. 
12.5.286 June 2006 - IA in a Global Bank, Stephanie Daman presentation to 
BCS Birmingham IT Security Conference, HSBC Holdings plc 
(Daman, 2006) - Daman (a long standing and active IAAC member) 
provided what has to be the most comprehensive and clear definition 
of IA. “IA is the confidence that the information assets with an 
organisation are reliable, accurate, secure and available when 
required.  IA: 
 Includes information held in every form (IS, on paper, other records,  
speech);  
 Embraces IM, including InfoSec management, information and records 
management, data protection, privacy (because of close confidentiality links 
and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 
guidance requirements) and physical protection;  
 Must be maintained throughout an organisation’s lifecycle in the face of  
changing threats, vulnerabilities and dependencies; 
 Includes aspects of corporate governance, risk  management and business 
continuity (resilience); and 
 Ensures that information is fit for purpose”. 
12.5.287 July 2006 - Roadmap for Identity Assurance in the United Kingdom 
(IAAC, 2006).  This was the anticipated Roadmap which described 
identity as “a collection of attributes which helps to distinguish one 
entity from another”. This is what makes identity a key component in 
numerous economic, social and political transactions. 
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12.5.288 July 2006 – Hi-Tech Investigative Research: The illicit trade in 
Pharmaceuticals (Wright, 2008b) – detailed analysis for the City of 
London Police by Detective Sergeant Paul Wright. 
12.5.289 10 August 2006 – A United Kingdom Strategy for IA – Cabinet Office 
The first sentence stated that “Information is a critical asset for any 
organisation”.  The vision for this strategy was “to enable a UK 
environment where citizens, businesses and government have 
confidence that IS enable them to conduct their lives and businesses 
more efficiently, flexibly and safely. 
Individuals and organisations have realised the full benefits of ICT 
through IA which is embedded within the culture of organisations and 
is an invisible but indivisible part of the everyday processes driving 
business delivery.” 
12.5.290 September 2006 - Call for Evidence by the House of Lords on 
Personal Internet Security.  This was the beginning of a volume of 
relevant work, identifying the concern of the average citizen that all 
may not be well in the internet space in terms of the protection of 
their privacy and the security of their personal data. 
12.5.291 September 2006 – UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO, 
2006) A Report on the Surveillance Society for the Information 
Commissioner by the Surveillance Studies Network, Full Report.  The 
now infamous line “sleepwalking into a survei llance society” was 
borne around this time as a result of the increased media attention in 
the subject area. 
12.5.292 September 2006 – IAAC Symposium Lord Toby Harris suggested a 
Consumer Bill of Rights with the core premise that Every citizen and 
consumer has a right to demand protection of their data:  
a) “Don’t Give Others My Data Without My Permission” – This raises interesting 
questions for the management of identity and the issue of user control and 
usage transparency for government.  
b) “Don’t Lose My Data” – It is extremely inconvenient (an understatement) 
when this happens in electronic environments, as it can have very 
detrimental effects, even devastating, on the person whose information goes 
missing.  
c) “Don’t Abuse My Data” – This is fundamental for the establishment of robust 
frameworks to regulate the use of data, preventing inappropriate or 
illegitimate use.  
d) “Don’t Waste My Time” – How to handle processes such as authentication in 
the most efficient manner, to avoid repetition and duplication? Reducing the 
inconvenience to users should be a key concern. 
e) “Can I Prove Who I Am and Can You Prove Who You Are?” – This is about  
getting the processes of establishing identity right, in particular at the stages 
of registration and authentication. 
f) “Can You Be Assured That The Information Provided Is Accurate and If Not,  
Can It Be Corrected?” – Again, a challenge particularly for the provision of  
public services. 
However, within the above a number of issues must not be forgotten.  
The right to demand protection of your personal data is enshrined 
within the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 – that is rather the point of 
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it. The ability to address any corrections requirements is also account 
for in the DPA 1998.  The DPA also already provides individuals with 
the right to control who has access to their personal data.  However, 
the deployment of technology and processes is not necessarily in 
keeping with the most appropriate legislative compliance in this 
regard.  Hence, the most recent changes with regard to cookie 
collection under the EU Electronic Communications Framework. 
12.5.293 October 2006 – Data Encryption – a Parliamentary Office of Science 
and Technology “postnote” publication (Number 270) addressing this 
topic.  Legislation, reliability concerns and drawbacks were all 
discussed (UK POST, 2006b). 
12.5.294 October 2006 – Computer Crime – a Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology “postnote” publication (Number 271) 
addressing this topic.  Legislation, user awareness and policing 
issues were all identified (UK POST, 2006c). 
12.5.295 November 2006 – Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective, 
Professor Richard B Macrory.  Every area of the public sector was 
subject to some level of scrutiny of their information-based practices, 
in particular seeking to improve efficiencies and enhance 
effectiveness. 
12.5.296 November 2006 – Managing your risk appetite: A practitioner’s 
guide, published by HM Treasury.  This publication robustly 
discusses risk appetite as a required output of risk assessment and 
emphasises the need to ensure that the board’s attitude to risk must 
be appropriately cascaded throughout any organisation. 
12.5.297 December 2006 – Varney Report, Service Transformation (Varney, 
2006) – The “language” was beginning to change.  This report 
contained significant reference to identity management systems but 
no direct mention of InfoSec nor IA.  However, it did mention 
“security considerations”, “safety and security practices”, “security 
issues” and “security and privacy”, though all still “ICT security” 
focussed. “Government needs to move quickly to a rationale on 
proportionate sharing of identity information which respects privacy”.  
The stated intention “beyond 2012” is that “the public and private 
sectors are converging on a common identity management regime 
that puts the UK at the leading edge of international practice and 
commands high levels of public confidence about good service, 
security and privacy”.  This is critical to bear in mind given the 
cancellation of the Identity Card Scheme after the May 2010 election 
and the subsequent search for a suitable “home” (government 
sponsor or otherwise) for progressing with a sensible identi ty 
management platform for the country as a whole. 
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12.5.298 10 January 2007 – HMG Transformation Government Enabled by 
Technology, Annual Report 2006 (UK Cabinet Office, 2005c).  This 
report contained lots of reference to information and data sharing but 
no real references to InfoSec nor IA. 
12.5.299 30 January 2007 – IA Risk and Decision Makers The BCS Security 
Forum hosted a “Hot Topics” debate at which Lt Gen Sir Edmund 
Burton, Professor Brian Collins (Department for Transport), Dr Paul 
Dorey (BP, at the time) and John Smith (Prudential) all spoke about 
the need to communicate the importance of risk management to 
decision makers, to engage with them and to move the dialogue 
forward. 
12.5.300 February 2007 – Internet Governance – a Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology “postnote” publication, Number 279 (UK 
POST, 2007a) addressing this topic.  The Internet Governance 
Forum was highlighted in the paper – the group first met in October 
2006. 
12.5.301 February 2007 – ETSI White Paper No. 5: ICT Product Proofing 
Against Crime – addressed the Five I’s: Intelligence; Intervention; 
Implementation; Involvement and Impact, across the CRAVEN 
characteristics of “hot products”: 
 Concealable;  
 Removable; 
 Available;  
 Valuable;  
 Enjoyable and 
 Disposable.  
12.5.302 5 March 2007 – Statistical Data on Network Security – a report 
produced by the European Commission detailing the prevailing 
trends.  This makes for interesting reading a decade later. 
12.5.303 March 2007 – Business Leadership of Technological Change – Five 
key challenges facing CEOs - This Cranfield University sponsored 
study highlighted the need for business leaders to create networks 
2007 – Highlights / Lowlights 
 May 2007 – IAAC took part in the IA Strategy review. 
 July 2007 – Cabinet Office Power of Information Review (reporting not until 2009).  
 During 2007/2008 – there were serial breaches of both information security and data 
protection. 
 Identity Assurance  focus.  
 Cabinet Office Power of Information Review.  
 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Investigation of Protected Electronic  
Information: Code of Practice) Order 2007.  
 NIAS updated.  
 Several high profile data breaches, including the HMRC Child Benefit Data Loss . 
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for knowledge sharing amongst each other and beyond and to 
ensure that they undertake personal learning, given that the 
commitment to staying on top of the information age requires making 
the time available to do so.  This is important learning for the 
professionalism agenda (Tranfield and Braganza, 2007). 
12.5.304 21 May 2007 – Delivering the IA Strategy, New Structure Version 
1.10.  The Strategy puts IRM at Board level (UK Cabinet Office, 
2007c). 
12.5.305 June 2007 - IA07: A Partnership for Delivering the National IA 
Strategy - A delivery plan document used for discussion at IA07.  
This document stated that the framework “is to be fully implemented 
by 2011” so there is some catching up to be done.  “The private 
sector is encouraged to overcome the challenges to sharing IA best 
practice for their own benefit and that of their customers and to 
expand the reuse of technology;” – this completely misses the point 
that the barriers are often not within the gift of the private sector to 
resolve as they are bound up in the legal requirements and statutory 
obligations of the public sector body they are seeking to partner with.  
“Business and industry will provide training and information so that all 
staff have a basic understanding of IA and its implications”.  The 
reality is, of course, that the private sector is happy to provide the 
services but nobody is buying much at the moment, nor spending the 
money on this as the economic downturn continues and so often it 
can be seen that training budgets are slashed so the ongoing training 
provision is floundering. 
IRM: Ownership of IA at Board level - Successful management of 
information risks is helped by an organisational culture where people 
appreciate IA. The IA Board representative will ensure that training is 
provided and that everyday IA processes and procedures are 
organised effectively.   
Standards and Compliance 
 Adhering to a framework of segmented national IA standards developed by 
government IA specialists work ing together with key industry stakeholders.  
This will likely include best practice industry standards (e.g. ISO 27001) and 
regulatory instruments in commercial contracts; 
 Use of specific tools, such as criteria for deciding whether information is 
critical or not coupled with records of tested and approved security solutions;  
 Internal audit to monitor compliance, develop performance metrics and 
compliance track ing. 
Other key elements were fleshed out as represented in the action 
plan in Figure 93 below. 
 
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
518 | P a g e  
 
Figure 93:  Delivering the IA Strategy, Source: UK Cabinet Office (2007c) 
 
12.5.306 22 June 2007 - National IA Strategy  re-launched.  It reinforced the 
mantra that “information is a valuable asset”.  The Strategy provided 
alignment with the Transformational Agenda.  It defined IA as being 
“the term given to the management of risk to information” – which is a 
somewhat interesting (and unnecessary) tweaking to the already 
existing definition(s) of IA.  “This NIAS sets out a coherent approach 
to management information risk (sic) by making it an integral and 
effective part of normal business process”.  It acknowledged the role 
played by the private sector in achieving government policy and the 
challenges this creates.  The aim was to create a “UK environment 
where citizens, businesses and government use and enjoy the full 
benefits of IS with confidence.  Note this was shortly before the 
HMRC data breach that brought such confidence (and the potential 
diminishment of such) into sharp focus in the mind’s eye of the entire 
UK public. 
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12.5.307 June 2007 - Confederation Suisse IA Situation in Switzerland and 
internationally, Semi-annual report 2007/1 (January – June), Feder 
Office of Police.  This is a classic example of a report with IA in i ts 
title that has content that is specifically InfoSec related and is wholly 
about just the technical aspects (virus increase, Trojans, worms, 
hacking incidents etc.).  It is misleading and misrepresentative of the 
subject area but is included in this review as an example of the kind 
of information available and being shared in the e-crime space that 
has an impact on the development of public policy to support the 
requirements that needed to be addressed. 
12.5.308 July 2007 – IATAC State of the Art Report (IATAC, 2007) – 
discusses Software Security Assurance historically and to the 
present day and yet 8 years later the challenges and opportunities 
remain largely unresolved with evidence of greater risks, threats and 
resultant breaches being realised. 
12.5.309 July 2007 – Grids and e-Science – a Parliamentary Office of Science 
and Technology “postnote” publication, Number 286 (UK POST, 
2007b) addressing this topic.  Grids were identified as being useful 
for dealing with increasing amounts of data produced by science, 
business and government.  This was prior to the marketing term, “Big 
Data”. 
12.5.310 14 August 2007 – Government’s Role in Identity Assurance - 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP63 (IAAC, 2007a). 
12.5.311 September 2007 – Cyber-Crime Investigation and Enforcement; 
Designing Out E-Crime: Removing vulnerability and reducing 
temptations and From Awareness to Action? On-Crime Prevent 
Programmes (EURIM 2007) – a EURIM co-ordinated set of papers 
providing detailed analysis of the available resources and partnership 
working. 
12.5.312 November 2007 – Data Loss Prevention: A Time to Revisit Old 
Policies – a Symantec paper addressing policy and procedure review 
following data breaches. 
12.5.313 7 December 2007 – National IA Strategy - monthly briefing paper 
produced by IAAC, BP64 (IAAC, 2007b). 
12.5.314 December 2007 - Privacy Impact Assessment handbook and 
surveillance society conference (ICO, 2009) - The Information 
Commissioner’s Office hosted a conference entitled 'Surveillance 
Society: Turning Debate into Action' at the Bridgewater Hall in central 
Manchester. 
12.5.315 December 2007 – China: Reducing Your Vulnerability to Commercial 
Espionage (Security Information Service for Business Overseas, 
2007) – a reporting detailing the threat to Intellectual property and 
technology in China – on the premise that “awareness is half the 
battle”. 
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12.5.316 December 2007 – Cyber Attack: A Risk Management Primer for 
CEOs and Directors (Atlantic Council, 2007) – business focussed 
and talked about the need to create a security culture. 
12.5.317 December 2007 – Data Handling Procedures in Government: Interim 
Progress Report, issued by Robert Hannigan (UK Cabinet Office, 
2007d). 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.318 1 February 2008 – The Needs and Concerns of the Citizen - monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP65, (IAAC, 2008a). 
12.5.319 1 February 2008 – How UK Government can Gain Citizen Support - 
monthly briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP66 (IAAC, 2008b). 
12.5.320 20 March 2008 - The National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom, Security in an interdependent world - This is an interesting 
and important document but contains no direct reference to IA.  It 
highlighted that: 
 “Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most of her long 
history.  
 More secure, in the sense that we do not, currently, have to face a conventional 
threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power.  
 But more vulnerable, because we are one of the most open societies, in a world 
that is more networked than ever before, with new threats that can emanate 
from state and non-state actors: terrorists, home-grown or overseas; insurgents 
or criminals. 
 Terrorism, cyber-attack , unconventional attacks, using chemical, nuclear or 
biological weapons, as well as large scale accidents or natural hazards – any 
one of these could do great damage to the country” (Burton, 2011). 
12.5.321 2 April 2008 – Guidelines for the cooperation between law 
enforcement and internet service providers against cybercrime – 
produced by the Council of Europe. 
12.5.322 25 April 2008 – Canadian Association of Police Boards – A Report 
on cybercrime in Canada – produced by Deloitte, reviewed the 
changing trends of criminal activities, the lack of reporting and the 
perceived lack of support from law enforcement. 
12.5.323 1 May 2008 – Citizen Control - monthly briefing paper produced by 
IAAC, BP68 (IAAC, 2008c). 
12.5.324 1 May 2008 – Digital Identity Governance Framework - monthly 
briefing paper produced by IAAC, BP69 (IAAC, 2008d). 
2008 - Highlights 
 Amended Computer Misuse Act (CMA) came into force 
 GRC a more oft used acronym. 
 First UK National Security Strategy.  
 Revision of Data Handling Procedures.  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
521 | P a g e  
12.5.325 5 May 2008 - UK State of Security (A high level overview of the 
players and roles that govern security within the UK), by Gareth 
Niblett.  This paper set out a full A-Z of all those who have an 
“interest” in areas of “security” within the UK in the form of a 
catalogue listing the following: 
 Government Interests 
 Law Enforcement Interests 
 Military and Intelligence Interests 
 Organisational Interests 
 Industry Interests 
 International Interests 
 Academic Qualifications 
 Product Certifications  
 Professional Certifications 
 Technical Accreditations  
 United Kingdom Legislation 
 European Directives  
 International Agreements 
 United States Legislation 
 Regulations 
 United Kingdom Standards 
 International Standards  
 Methodologies. 
In many ways, given efforts that went on in late 2010 to gather 
together similar levels of data, this was a valuable resource that 
should have been kept up to date.  There is a great capacity to do 
things on a snapshot basis rather than investing sufficient energy in 
the appropriate maintenance of the wealth of available material.  
12.5.326 23 May 2008 – Hi-Tech Crime Strategy and Budget for 2011 - robust 
paper identified both the scope of the problem space and suggested 
recommendations for tackling the identified issues for the UK City of 
London Police (Wright, 2008a). 
12.5.327 May 2008 – Insecure Internet Access via wireless, Detective 
Sergeant, Hi-Tech Crime Team, City of London Police (Wright, 
2008c) - Recommending the creation of e-crime prevention officers. 
12.5.328 10 June 2008 – Insecure Internet Access via Wireless – this report 
highlighted the need for partnership between the public and private 
sector in the future in order to help to address the increasing threat of 
cybercrime. 
12.5.329 June 2008 - Data Handling Review - This report put in place a set of 
mandatory measures for government on protecting personal data, 
committing government to report annually on the progress made in 
meeting the requirements of the review and work on information risk 
that will be necessary in the future.  (There was an interim report in 
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December 2007). (UK Cabinet Office 2007c, 2008a, 2008d, UK 
CSIA, 2008). 
12.5.330 June 2008 – Data Handling Procedures in Government (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2007d, 2008a) - This was the final report on data handling 
procedures across government. The report set out how government 
was improving its arrangements around information handling, 
management and protection. 
12.5.331 11 June 2008 – Improving internet safety – a paper written by the 
Security Forum of JANET UK to address the trends and concerns at 
the time.  The key theme was the ability to establish ownership for 
the identified responsibilities. 
12.5.332 June 2008 - Protecting Government Information, Independent 
Review of Government IA (Coleman, 2008).  This report was the 
result of Nick Coleman’s independent review during 2007 where the 
key question asked was “How well is government doing?” – i.e. is IA 
adequate enough across government to provide stakeholder 
confidence in the government’s IA?  The issuance of the final report 
itself ended up being delayed as a result of the October/November 
2007 HMRC data breach.  There were 10 key recommendations put 
forward, much of which were picked up in the Data Handling Review 
itself and these were also embedded in the Code of Connection 
requirements on many public sector organisations in joining up to the 
central government networks.  The following Computer Weekly 
opinion piece (King, 2008) rather sums up the state of affairs: 
The list of recommendations makes for equally gloomy reading.  Here is why.   
We've been talk ing for years, even decades, about the need for strong InfoSec  
governance, accountability, and setting minimum standards.  This is nothing 
new.  But here we are heading towards the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century and a report about and for the Government - the highest authority in the 
land - is highlighting a need to "Define minimum standards that (public 
sector) departments sign up to".  Good grief.  What on earth have they been 
up to all these years?  If there were a book entitled "InfoSec for dummies" then 
that would be on page 1.  It shows just how far behind the public sector is and 
makes for good explanation as to why it is subjected to so many data breach 
incidents.” 
12.5.333 July 2008 - Report into the Loss of MoD Personal Data - Sir Edmund 
Burton’s review (Burton, 2008).  This included MOD's action plan in 
response to the report, supported by the MoD Action Plan (UK MoD, 
2008). 
12.5.334 July 2008 - Poynter Review (Poynter, 2008) - The final report by 
Kieran Poynter, the Chairman and Senior Partner of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, on the circumstances that led to the 
significant loss by HMRC. [Note: the recommendations from the 
various reports are readily available and Simmons (2009) wrote 
specifically about how best to utilise these and achieve best 
practice.] 
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12.5.335 11 July 2008 – Internet Governance Forum – a paper written by 
Shriti Vadera, at the time, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Business and Competitiveness.  This was a detailed review of the 
use of internet at the time for sharing views with regard to significant 
global political elections. 
12.5.336 July 2008 - Cross Government Actions: Mandatory Minimum 
Measures (UK Cabinet Office, 2008d) - A core set of mandatory 
minimum measures to apply across central government to protect 
information. Measures for the protection of personal data were 
subsumed within IA Standard No 6 – HMG Security Policy 
Framework (SPF) mandatory requirement 14 (UK Cabinet Office, 
2009e, f and g).  This went through several updates and revisions, 
the last known being in 2013. 
12.5.337 July 2008 – Consultation on Legislative Options to Address Illicit 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) File-Sharing – a comprehensive report into this 
prevailing issue at the time (UK BERR, 2008). 
12.5.338 2008 - Managing Information Risk, A guide for Accounting Officers, 
Board members and Senior Information Risk Owners - This Guide 
provided Plain English Information Risk descriptions including the 
“human dimension” (now referred to as human factors) and included 
a number of helpful checklists.  The language was clear and easy to 
understand (UK HMG 2008a). 
12.5.339 September 2008 - UK Cybercrime Report – identified the difficulty of 
addressing the problem whilst not having government level 
responsibility for collating and classifying cybercrime data adequately 
addressed (Fafinski and Minassian, 2008). 
12.5.340 16 October 2008 – Parliament and Internet Conference E-Crime 
Reduction Partnership workshop report (EURIM) – addressing the 
national e-crime strategy vision of effective partnership working 
across the Police Central E-Crime Unit (PCEU), the Fraud Authority 
and the e-Crime Reduction Partnership.  Global partnerships were 
identified as a further outreach requirement. 
12.5.341 November 2008 - Information Matters: building government’s 
capability in managing knowledge and information  (UK HMG 2008b) 
was published by The National Archives in conjunction with the 
Knowledge Council, addressing the importance of management of 
knowledge and information and the need to improve in these areas.  
Government was advised to regard the management and exploitation 
of knowledge and information as a core responsibility, supporting 
business objectives and delivering business benefits. This strategy 
built on a number of similar initiatives in relation to different types and 
uses of information. There should not be significant additional cost 
associated with delivering the strategic objectives outlined here, but 
there should be tangible benefits. 
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12.5.342 November 2008 – Taking Stock, Taking Action (UK ICO, 2008a) – 
ICO report As the ICO rightly phrases it, “information governance” or 
the apparent lack thereof is the bigger issue – at an executive level, 
along with a lack of leadership. 
12.5.343 26 November 2008 - ICO’s Privacy by Design (UK ICO, 2008b) 
report and conference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.344 12 January 2009 – Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors – 
produced by Mitre’s Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) in 
conjunction with SANS.  It leverages the existing SANS Top 20 
attack vectors.  It is a consistently well-known fact that there are 
obvious steps that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of the impact 
of or the realisation of a known threat. 
12.5.345 February 2009 - Power of Information Taskforce Report (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2009a) was published – aiming to look at the ways in which 
government can improve its use of digital technologies and 
information.  The Making Public Data Public initiative will deliver 
improved access to public information both in central government 
and the wider public sector. 
12.5.346 February 2009 - Tim Berners-Lee (TBL) “Raw data now” speech at 
TED.  Subsequently, TBL was appointed as an expert advisor by 
Gordon Brown.  The reflection at the time was on dealing with US 
federal and state open data stores (data.gov and datasf.org etc) and 
advising that the UK Government should adopt the same approach to 
opening up their raw data stores for wider usage and exploitation.  
TED stands for Technology, Entertainment and Design.  It started out 
(in 1984) as a conference bringing together people from those three 
worlds. Since then its scope has become ever broader (Berners-Lee, 
2009). 
12.5.347 March 2009 - Building in...InfoSec, Privacy and Assurance – a high-
level roadmap (Jones, 2009), Nigel A Jones, Director Cyber Security 
KTN – IAAC participated in the formulation of this.  The roadmap 
sought to deliver on the following vision:  “The development and 
procurement of software and systems which are resilient and 
sustainable by design, where requirements such as security and 
privacy are, as a matter of course, defined at project i nitiation and 
implemented and assured throughout in risk-based, whole-life 
processes”.  In fairness, the Information Commissioner had set about 
a similar course in November 2007 but was overshadowed by the 
HMRC data breach. 
2009 – Highlights / Lowlights 
 Tim Berners-Lee “Raw data now” speech at TED.  
 Tim Berners-Lee appointed as expert advisor by Gordon Brown.  
 US federal and state open data stores – data.gov, datasf.org  etc. 
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12.5.348 March 2009 – Database State Full Report (Joseph Rowntree Reform 
Trust Ltd, 2009), commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Reform 
Trust Ltd, issued 23 March 2009.  A meeting of academics and 
activities with an interest in privacy attempted to map Britain’s 
database state, identifying the many public sector databases that 
collect personal information, and provide a traffic light colour grading 
to their abilities to adhere to the UK Data Protection Act Principles.  
12.5.349 May 2009 – IA Standard 6 (IAS 6) This is part of UK Governments 
Security Policy Framework (SPF).  SPF is a response to government 
data breaches uncovered in the government's Data Handling Review. 
IAS 6 requires all government agencies to submit reports of 
compliance to the UK Cabinet Office to prove that the methods they 
use to process and store sensitive personal information are secure.  
The original reporting deadline was 15 June 2009.  IAS 6 is 
supported by Good Practice Guide 15, which is published by the UK 
Cabinet Office and the Communications-Electronics Security Group 
(CESG).  CESG gives a more prescriptive explanation of not only the 
data that must be collected for the report, but also how to collect it. 
12.5.350 June 2009 - “Digital Britain Report” published (UK DCMS, 2009), 
aiming to secure the UK’s position as one of the world’s leading 
Digital Knowledge economics, recognising that the digital world is 
now a reality. 
12.5.351 June 2009 - Office of Cyber Security (OCS) launched.  As well as 
cyber-defence and cyber-attack coordination, the OCS will act as a 
conduit for InfoSec collaboration between government and industry 
experts.  The OCS will have charge of a cross-government 
programme of work, while a multi-agency Cyber Security Operations 
Centre (CSOC), based at GCHQ in Cheltenham, will coordinate the 
protection of critical IT systems. 
12.5.352 June 2009 - National Cyber Security Strategy published in order to 
ensure that “Citizens, business and government can enjoy the full 
benefits of a safe, secure and resilient cyber space: working 
together, at home and overseas, to understand and address risks, to 
reduce the benefits to criminals and terrorists, and to seize 
opportunities in cyber space to enhance the UK’s overall security and 
resilience”.  This was a consultation in advance of the actual Strategy 
which was launched in March 2010 (UK Cabinet Office, 2009b). 
12.5.353 July 2009 - Power in People’s Hands: Learning from the world’s best 
public services  This report addressed the need for UK public 
services to innovate rapidly and to learn from the best services 
around the world (UK Cabinet Office, 2009c). 
12.5.354 July 2009 – IA09 Conference Special – UK Government’s IA event 
review.  Topics for discussion included the recently released UK 
Government Cyber Security Strategy and the CESG approach to 
defining what constitutes an IA practitioner. 
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12.5.355 October 2009 - Government ICT Strategy, (UK Cabinet Office, 
2009e).  The strategy explicitly covered InfoSec and IA stating that 
“Recent data losses within the public sector have rightly raised the 
profile of IA.  However, without appropriate levels of data sharing, 
Government will be unable to meet its aim of joining up services and 
providing easier access to personalised services for citizens and 
businesses.    Effective, proportionate management of information 
risk is essential to meet the challenge of delivering personal services 
enabled by ICT, as well as making us more effective and efficient.  
Work to enhance InfoSec and IA through the National IA Strategy 
cuts across all elements of this ICT strategy and is embedded within 
all work-streams.  The ICT strategy will deliver a secure and 
proportionate infrastructure that will allow public sector bodies to 
match their information risk appetite with their information risk 
exposure - users of that infrastructure will be able to take IA for 
granted without feeling that their effectiveness has been 
compromised”.  Published in January 2010. 
12.5.356 December 2009 - Putting the “Frontline First: Smarter Government” 
addressed the rebalancing of the relationship between “the centre 
and the frontline” (UK HM Treasury, 2009a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.357 January 2010 - “Protecting Information in Government”.  The first 
“annual” report from the Cabinet Office on its implementation of the 
Data Handling Review Acknowledgement that managing information 
risks is an ongoing task (UK Cabinet Office, 2010a). 
12.5.358 January 2010 – Government ICT strategy: smarter, cheaper, 
greener.  The strategy applies to the UK public sector, whether 
central government, local government, wider public sector or 
devolved administrations. It is aligned with the Transformational 
Government and Digital Britain strategies, the National IA Strategy, 
the Cyber Security Strategy, Building Britain’s Future, Excellence and 
fairness, the Operational Efficiency Programme (OEP) and the 
2010 – Highlights / Lowlights 
 Jan - data.gov.uk and data.london.gov.uk launched.  
 Apr - Ordnance Survey makes some mapping data open.  
 May - David Cameron letter re central and local data transparency. 
 May - Tim Berners Lee, Nigel Shadbolt and Tom Steinberg appointed to                      
Cabinet Office Transparency Board.  
 Jun - Eric Pickles announces local government publication of £500+ spend/contracts 
by Jan 2011. 
 Oct - UK Open Government Licence released. 
 Oct - Ordnance Survey makes more mapping data open.  
 Oct - David Cameron and Francis Maude reiterate support for open data.  
 This decade includes mobile devices, cloud computing, the semantic web, 
Twitter and the Internet of Things.  
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recommendations of the Power of Information Task Force (UK 
Cabinet Office, 2010b). 
12.5.359 January 2010 - data.gov.uk and data.london.gov.uk launched as the 
early fruits of TBL labour etc. 
12.5.360 March 2010 – Cyber Crime Strategy launched (UK Home Office, 
2010). 
12.5.361 March 2010 – ISACA COBIT 5.0 Design Paper Exposure Draft 
issued.  This is the starting point for the maturation in ISACA thinking 
in the area of IT Governance, where the professionals involved have 
rightly seen that the growth in the assurance framework areas leads 
to a need for greater IG and their new standard seeks to capture 
these strands.  This paper points out that “Effective enterprise 
governance of IT results in improved performance as well as 
compliance to external requirements, yet successful implementation 
remains elusive for many enterprises.  Processes need to be 
supported with carefully prescribed roles, responsibilities, and 
accountabilities.  They also require an appropriate set of guiding 
principles and organisational structures that fit the culture, style, skills 
and operational norms specific to the enterprise, inclusive of all 
stakeholders and role players”.  There is a strong strand on ethics 
and culture in the resultant product (ISACA, 2010b). 
12.5.362 April 2010 - Ordnance Survey - makes some mapping data open. 
12.5.363 April 2010 - Busy Reader Guide for Improving IA at the Enterprise 
Level CESG National Technical Authority for IA (UK CESG, 2010c).  
This Briefing puts forward the case for improving IA at an Enterprise 
level in a short and concise manner.  It is easily readily and digestible 
and has a checklist at the end that is actionable.  In particular, this 
Briefing places IM as being important in the IA space.  It also 
includes the clear Enterprise level approach required – and the 
notion that HR need to ensure they are prepared to address non-
compliance. 
12.5.364 May 2010 - David Cameron letter regarding central and local data 
transparency to LA CEOs – the new Coalition government set out its 
stall with regard to intending to ensure greater transparency of 
information and transactions across the public sector. 
12.5.365 12 May 2010 - Government plans to scrap £15bn of IT projects – the 
new Coalition government moved quickly into action mode in setting 
out its plans for the future of Government IT projects and spend. 
12.5.366 25 May 2010 - A Freedom or Great Repeal Bill was discussed.  By 
2011 this had changed to a Protection of Freedoms Bill. 
12.5.367 27 May 2010 – HMG IA Maturity Model and Assessment Framework 
(UK CESG 2010i), Version 4.0 issued by UK Cabinet Office and 
CESG, with three main IA goals identified below and an Assessment 
framework to be utilised for measuring maturity, measured on a five 
level maturity scale (Level 1 - Initial; Level 2 - Established; Level 3 – 
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Business Enabling; Level 4 – Quantitatively Managed; Level 5 - 
Optimised: 
 Embedding IRM Culture within an Organisation 
 Implementing Best Practice IA Measures  
 Ensuring an Effective Compliance Regime is implemented.  
12.5.368 June 2010 - Eric Pickles announces local government publication of 
£500+ spend/contracts by January 2011. 
12.5.369 July 2010 - Requirements for Secure Delivery of Online Public 
Services Part 1 Principles and Part 2: Security Components (UK 
CESG, 2010d/e/f and 2012a).  This weighty tome revised, 
repositioned, and set out to replace the E-Government Security 
Framework (e-GSF) last updated in 2002.  Part 1 (Principles) 
describes the scope, context and the approach to be followed in 
determining security requirements for future public service systems.  
Part 2 (Security Components), this part, describes the security 
components that are used to express the security requirements.  At 
122 pages long, this is a significant document, particularly given it is 
ultimately ISO 27001 and other best practice combined and 
reworded. 
12.5.370 However, both documents were issued quietly in the summer and 
have had no real “air time” or follow through as yet (March 2011).  
The following key chapters are of note: 
 Chapter 2 End user security components – this chapter covers the security 
components relevant to the people and businesses accessing the service;  
 Chapter 3 Server security components – this chapter covers the security 
components relevant to the ICT hosting the service;  
 Chapter 4 Network  security components – this chapter covers the 
components relevant to the network  infrastructure which is used to access 
the services; 
 Chapter 5 Business logic security components – this chapter covers the 
components relevant to the software application that implements the service;  
 Chapter 6 Assurance security components – this chapter covers the 
components relevant to gaining confidence in the end-to-end security of the 
public sector services (UK CESG 2010d and 2010e). 
12.5.371 October 2010 - UK Open Government Licence released – which will 
support the framework for publication of information in the context of 
the “Raw Data Now” requirements. 
12.5.372 October 2010 – CPNI issued Sources of Guidance on Security in 
the Telecommunications Sector – a helpful compendium single 
source for the publicly available advice, guidance, standards, good 
practice, best practice etc, relating to the security of 
telecommunications systems. 
12.5.373 October 2010 - Ordnance Survey makes more mapping data open – 
this has been a necessary step following the amount of available 
data through the ongoing progress of Google Maps. 
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12.5.374 October 2010 - David Cameron and Francis Maude reiterate support 
for open data, making recommendations to Local Authorities as to 
how to go about achieving this. 
12.5.375 Late 2010 - Office of Cyber Security and IA formed.  After a decade 
of discussing and seeking to implement IA, following the election of 
the UK Coalition Government, the CSIA became known as the Office 
of Cyber Security and IA (OCSIA 2011).  This appears to the author 
to be a subtle hint towards the difficulties in having to constantly 
explain what IA is and what it means – without the context of InfoSec 
- as well as a perceived need to keep in step with the media thinking 
in terms of “hot topics” that “sell” the story on any particular day.  
12.5.376 December 2010 - A Taxonomy of Operational Cyber Security Risks 
(Cebula and Young, 2010).  Given that this is a CERT publication 
from the Carnegie Mellon Institute, renowned as being a source of 
core knowledge in most subject areas related to the security industry, 
it is particularly disappointing in review of the report to find that whilst 
purporting to present a taxonomy of operational cyber security risks – 
there is nothing specifically cyber in nature about the risks presented.  
However, the report does helpfully identify and organize the sources 
of risk into four classes: (1) actions of people, (2) systems and 
technology failures, (3) failed internal processes, and (4) external 
events and is a good general resource for “security risks” per se, but 
not explicitly “cyber” risks and is another example of how the 
hijacking of the term does a disservice to the reality of what is being 
described.  Within the document, “Operational cyber security risks” 
are defined as “operational risks to information and technology 
assets that have consequences affecting the confidentiality, 
availability, or integrity of information or IS” – so, these are rather 
InfoSec risks then, and there is no need for the flagrant use of the 
“cyber” term. 
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12.5.377 January 2011 - All local authorities in England were required to 
publish spend and contract data. 
12.5.378 January 2011 - OECD/IFP Project on “Future Global Shocks” 
“Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk” (OECD, 2011)  This has 
been a widely received and referenced report.  There is an 
interesting concept referenced within – that of an “IA engineering 
framework.  … Counter-Measures need to be considered within an IA 
engineering framework, in which preventative and detective 
technologies are deployed alongside human-centred managerial 
policies and controls”.  The report provides useful historical 
chronology pointing to how the rhetoric arrived at the “cyber” label: 
Towards the end of the 1990s, analysts began to use the phrase information 
assurance.  This is an altogether softer form of analysis, which recognises that 
in the absence of solid risk data it is better to identify all the elements that 
make it more or less likely that there will be a security breach. The approach 
retains many elements of risk analysis and does not altogether dismiss the 
virtues of security standards, but it also seeks to borrow ideas from the social 
sciences: management science to understand how organisations work and 
how security considerations operate within them; anthropology and 
criminology to identify how individuals and groups behave and are motivated; 
psychology to develop an understanding of ― people factors in the design of 
ICT and security; and economics to understand how organisations make 
security decisions (Backhouse and Dhillon, 2000, p.34). 
12.5.379 January 2011 – Supplier IA Assessment Framework and Guidance 
(UK CESG, 2011)  This is an interesting document providing IRM 
guidance and question sets and tool specifications that can be used 
2011 Highlights / Lowlights 
 A year of civil and cultural uprising; “Arab Spring”, Occupy Wall Street and beyond etc....; 
2014 = year of breach/data loss. 
 Cybercrime cost the UK economy £27bn a year, UK OCSIA and Detica Report, February 
2011 – The Cost of Cyber Crime.  
 All local authorities in England publish spend and contract data. 
 “Cyber security is the latest name for something we’ve been doing for quite some time, 
and that’s information assurance (IA).  IA is 80% of ‘cyber’ and that’s defensive 
aspects.  Then there are offensive aspects of cyber, which you can put down to 
penetration testing, IT health checks, monitoring networks, et cetera.  And that’s 
responding, really, to the new threat.  Terrorists.  Money laundering. Criminality.  
Intellectual property theft.  It’s a very complex environment”  (de Silva, 2011a). 
 IA is a topic that is becoming integral to US national security. We can no longer rely 
solely on our armed forces to defend the nation. Professionals in the commercial and 
government sectors must do their part to defend our critical information infrastructures 
from cyberattacks (de Silva, 2011b). 
 …it's about assurance that you have done what you said you would do, to achieve a 
risk posture that suits the needs of the organisation. Donn Parker, 30 Aug 2011, per comms. 
 By 2015, the aspiration is that the measures outlined in this strategy will mean the 
UK is in a position where: law enforcement is tack ling cyber criminals; citizens know 
what to do to protect themselves; effective cyber security is seen as a positive for 
UK business; a thriving cyber security sector has been established; public services 
online are secure and resilient; and the threats to our national infrastructure and 
national security have been confronted (UK Cabinet Office, 2011e). 
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by suppliers of key business services to HMG.  The aim of the tool is 
to provide assurance that HMG’s requirements for effective IRM are 
managed by ICT suppliers and within their own supply chains.  This 
is one of a range of government produced documents that uses a 
number of different terms that could leave the reader confused.  In 
particular, in the question set, there is reference, in one section alone 
to data assurance (security), IRM and IA.  There is a reference to 
definitions to be used in “Annex A, AS6” but no routing through to this 
so the reader is left, if reading in the abstract, none the wiser as to 
the intended meaning of the multitude of terms used. 
12.5.380 January 2011 – UK Census Security: Report of the Independent 
Review Team This report is a measured and helpful account of the 
state of security and measurement against the IA Maturity Model 
(IAMM) of the UK Census 2011. This report also provides a helpful 
statement of the alignment between assurance and security as 
referenced in paragraph 3.1.22 (Dowdall, Mattinson and Fagan, 
2011). 
12.5.381 February 2011 – IAAC Work Programme 2012 – agreed by the IAAC 
Board, to include the Three year Business Plan for 2011 to 2013, 
with a focus on Consumerisation and IA issues in shared services in 
the Cloud.  More specifically, this led to a study of IA and 
Consumers: Understanding the Sea Change in the Use of 
Information (The Relevance of IA in the context of Consumerisation).  
The programme included close liaison with academia. 
12.5.382 February 2011 – Data Centre Strategy, G-cloud and Government 
Applications Store, Programme Phase 2, Scope Report.  Whilst 
referencing IA a number of times, the outcome is not clear.  “Given 
that significant value comes from up front, sharable work on 
commercials, service management and IA, frameworks will be 
developed in each of these areas to enable certification/validation on 
a component level, so that work does not have to be repeated when 
components are assembled into new combinations”.  This implies yet 
more IA frameworks will be developed in spite of this Research 
showing the volume of available material and that there is little 
justification for spending yet more tax payers money on building 
more wheels that will be neither referred to nor used in any 
meaningful way (UK Cabinet Office, 2011a). 
12.5.383 February 2011 – PSN Technical Transition Guidance, Version No. 
0.8, prepared February 2011 (UK Cabinet Office, 2011b) – this was a 
draft document that needed tidying up but given that it was designed 
to assist those in the public sector seeking to transition systems 
containing large volumes of public personal data across from one 
secure network to another, the lack of explicitly reference to IA 
requirements in a meaningful way, together with an absence of a 
workable checklist, made it quite a wordy document that was not 
necessarily likely to be of active use to any reader. 
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12.5.384 March 2011 – UK Government ICT Strategy (UK Cabinet Office, 
2011c and Glyck, 2011) – the Strategy contains only one mention of 
IA and no specific pick up on the action for how to follow through on 
this, so it is not clear how this is as joined up as the rhetoric around 
its launch would have one believe. Francis Maude said of the 
strategy that it is “lapidary” – that is a polishing of something to make 
it new, to you and me.” (Hall, 2011b)  This strategy has been 
described as including a “commitment to accountability”, but this 
should not be something new to be lauded as it should have been 
embedded as a “must” from the outset.  There is a claim of “a 
definition of mandated standards” that has not been seen before 
which is welcome news in raising the importance level. 
12.5.385 March 2011 – CESG Certification for IA Professionals – first version 
of the intended certification scheme documentation identifying roles 
and skill levels issued.  Revised in September 2012 and again in 
February 2015.  The scheme is operated by IISP, BCS and APMG. 
12.5.386 June 2011 – Preparing the local public sector for risk governance: 
First steps towards an ISO31000 framework – this was a report 
output from a roundtable conducted by Marsh on public risk 
governance and it sets the “tone at the top” with regard to embedding 
a risk culture across all organisations.  It provides a helpful list of 
strategic risks to be considered and a good visual representation of 
risk control mechanisms and should be seen as a useful addition to 
the learning portfolio for anyone charged with risk management in 
their organisation. 
12.5.387 November 2011 – US Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future – 
detailing Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security 
Enterprise, highlighting the scale of the cyberspace threat and 
confirming that addressing cybersecurity is a shared responsibility. 
12.5.388 November 2011 – UK Cyber Security Strategy (UK Cabinet Office, 
2011d) – set out how the government planned to deliver the National 
Cyber Security Programme through to 2015, with funding of £650 
million. 
12.5.389 December 2011 – HMG launched Information Principles detailing 
7 key information principles which have significant implications:  
1) Information is a valued asset  
2) Information is Managed 
3) Information is Fit for Purpose 
4) Information is Standardised and Linkable 
5) Information is Re-used 
6) Public Information is Published  
7) Citizens and Businesses can access information about themselves  
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12.5.390 31 January 2012 – UK Cyber Security Strategy, Record of a Joint 
Cabinet Office/IAAC Seminar – identified four key outcomes that 
required collective support and effort between the public sector, the 
private sector and academia: 
1) To define the educational training needs from pre-school to post graduate 
level 
2) To develop an effective approach to communicating the issues of cyber 
security across the domains of large organisations, SMEs and to the public 
at large 
3) To define and implement an effective career development approach for 
government and industry in order to promote the engagement with new 
talent and achieve a high level of professionalism  
4) To develop an imaginative approach to incentivise young people to engage 
and contribute to the OCSIA/IAAC programme 
12.5.391 March 2012 – InfoSec Assurance Capability Maturity Model (ISA-
CMM), issued by Carnegie Mellon (Carnegie Mellon, 2012) to 
support the US National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (US DHS, 
2003).  A System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model had 
been in existence in one form or another since 1995.  There was also 
an international standard built in this area - ISO/IEC 21827:2008.  
This latest iteration saw a combination of both terms to create a new 
definition:   
InfoSec Assurance is the assurance level that can be associated with the 
security that the system (e.g., technical, procedural, etc) uses to protect the 
information. Since it is impractical for security to guarantee that information 
is totally protected from exploitation, there is a level of assurance that is  
associated with the ability of the system to protect the information. InfoSec  
Assurance services analyse this level of InfoSec Assurance through analysis 
of information criticality, vulnerability, threat, impact, risk, and 
countermeasures. Although InfoSec Assurance services can be performed 
on developmental as well as operational systems, the focus of this current  
version of the ISA-CMM is the analysis of operational systems. 
12.5.392 6 September 2012 – CESG, Cabinet Office and CPNI jointly 
launched Cyber Security Guidance for Business (UK CESG, 2012a)– 
consisting of three products: 
12.5.392.1 Aimed at senior executives, this offered some high level 
questions which we believe will assist and support them to 
determine their critical information assets, support them in their 
strategic level risk discussions and help them ensure that they 
have the right safeguards and cultures in place. 
  
2012 Highlights / Lowlights 
 Australian parliament passed a Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Bill  
 Wikileaks biggest media impact - https://wikileaks.org/ 
 The rise of 3D printing 
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12.5.392.2 An Executive Companion which discussed how Cyber Security is 
one of the biggest challenges that business and the wider UK 
economy face today. It offered guidance for business on how 
together we can make the UK's networks more resilient and 
protect key information assets against cyber threats. The 
document focused around key points of risk management and 
corporate governance and includes some anonymous case 
studies based in real events. 
12.5.392.3 The third product supports the Executive Companion and 
provides more detailed cyber security information and advice for 
10 critical areas (covering both technical and process/cultural 
areas). If implemented as a set it can substantially reduce the 
cyber risk by helping to prevent or deter the majority of types of 
attacks. 
The material integrates the "Top 20 Critical Controls for Effective 
Cyber Defence" as endorsed by CPNI (2012).  These controls 
provide further detailed guidance. 
12.5.393 September 2012 – HMG launched ’10 Steps to Cyber Security’ .  
(UK GCHQ, 2015) – guidance to encourage organisations to 
consider whether they were managing their cyber risks: 
1) IRM Regime 
2) Secure configuration 
3) Network protection 
4) Managing user privileges 
5) User education and awareness 
6) Incident management 
7) Malware protection 
8) Monitoring 
9) Removable media controls  
10) Home and mobile working 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.394 February 2013 – The UK Cyber Security Strategy: landscape 
review – carried out by the National Audit Office (NAO), identified six 
key challenges facing the government in succeeding on delivering 
the strategy as described:  
 the need to influence industry to protect and promote itself and UK plc;  
 to address the UK’s current and future ICT and cyber security sk ills gap;  
 to increase awareness so that people are not the weakest link ; 
 to tack le cybercrime and enforce the law;  
 to get government to be more agile and joined-up; and  
 to demonstrate value for money. 
2013 Highlights / Lowlights 
 Early June 2013 saw the release (leaking) of classified NSA documents from to 
journalists worldwide by Edward Snowden – a former government contractor.  This set 
a change of direction as the progress that was being made up to that point, embedding 
IA into the culture and thinking, was taken off course, as a result of this distraction.  
 The rise of Big Data. 
 December 2013 – 110 million people affected by a breach at Target. 
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12.5.395 February 2013 – The Global Cyber Game  – an extensive report 
produced by the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
(Tibbs et al., 2013).  This report, prepared for the UK Government, 
presented a synthesis of the findings of the idea of the Global Cyber 
Game and Cyber Game board as a framework that could be used for 
practical thinking about cyber strategy. 
12.5.396 February 2013 – Network InfoSec (NIS) Directive initially proposed 
by the European commission to raise cybersecurity capabilities 
across the EU’s 28 member states. 
12.5.397 July 2013 – NIST launches a Preliminary Framework to Reduce 
Cyber Risks to Critical Infrastructure.  It was hailed as a way for 
executives, managers, and staff to:  understand and assess the 
cybersecurity capabilities, readiness, and risks of their organisation 
and identify areas of strength and weakness and aspects of 
cybersecurity on which they should productively focus, and learn 
what informative standards, guidelines, and practices are available 
and applicable to their organisation.  However, given the ongoing 
cyber breaches, there is an implied lack of adoption of these 
available frameworks. 
12.5.398 October 2013 – Government Security Classifications (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2013a) - updated, came into force on 2 April 2014. 
12.5.399 September 2013 - ISF Standard of Good Practice Executive 
Summary (ISF, 2013).  The definitive guide to enable InfoSec 
compliance.  This is a practical source of InfoSec and information 
risk-related guidance available.  It covers the complete spectrum of 
InfoSec arrangements that need to be made to keep the business 
risks associated with IS within acceptable limits, and presents good 
practice in practical, clear statements.  Updates to the 2011 Standard 
of Good Practice included reference to the following: 
 Cyber Resilience 
 Data Analytics 
 Securing the Supply Chain 
 BYOD Management Risk 
 Data Privacy in the Cloud 
 SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls 
 Australian Government Defence Signals Directorate Strategies to Mitigate 
Targeted Cyber Intrusions 
 UK Government's (CESG) 10 Steps to Cyber Security 
 PAS 555 
12.5.400 November 2013 – Cyber governance health check: 2013 (UK 
Cabinet Office, 2013b).  This review identified that 58 per cent of 
companies have assessed themselves using an online tracker tool 
against the 10 Steps guidance since it was first launched.  This was 
up from 40 per cent in 2012.  An Executive Companion publication 
was also produced. 
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12.5.401 December 2013 – Cyber Primer (UK MoD, 2013) – introduces 
“cyber” in the defence context.  Cyber and cyberspace are articulated 
fully.  This publication was shared widely across UK Government 
departments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.402 April 2014 – HMG Security Policy Framework (UK Cabinet Office, 
2009f)– re-released and addressed  
 Good Governance 
 Culture and Awareness  
 Risk Management  
 Information 
 Technology and Services  
 Personnel Security 
 Physical Security 
 Incident Management 
12.5.403 June 2014 – Cyber Essentials launched (UK HMG, 2014) as a 
result of a call for evidence during 2013 – to coalesce the views of 
multiple players – and narrowed the landscape still further to five (5) 
areas of focus: 
1) secure configuration basics; 
2) boundary firewalls and internet gateways;  
3) access control and administrative privileges; 
4) patch management; and 
5) malware protection basics. 
There are two levels – Cyber Essentials, which is a self-assessment 
online questionnaire for internal completion and signature by a board 
member and Cyber Essentials Plus – where tests are carried out by 
an external body for validation and certification purposes.  
12.5.404 Late 2014 – Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing Initiative was 
closed and staff were redistributed. 
2014 Highlights / Lowlights 
A year of breach / loss – a full report is available here: 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports_2014.pdf  
This website provides a chronology of the numbers of people affected by breaches: 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.co.uk/infographic-2014s-top-breaches-so-far-a-7408# 
Amongst the biggest numbers that stand out are the following:  
 76 million household customers and 7 million business customers affected by a lack of 
protection of two-factor authentication leading to a breach at JPMorgan Chase.  
 53 million customers email addresses compromised with the theft of a third party 
vendor’s user credentials from the Home Depot . 
 4.5 million patients affected by a breach at The Community Health Systems in the US 
when attackers exploited the infamous Heartbleed vulnerability . 
 Mid-2014 – “security experts reported that a gang called CyberVor (‘vor’ is Russian for 
‘thief’) had stolen 1.2 billion unique credentials” – i f validated, this would be the biggest 
(known) single crime in terms of people affected (Lucas, 2015, p.11).  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
537 | P a g e  
12.5.405 December 2014 – The Internet of Things: making the most of the 
Second Digital Revolution (UK Government Office for Science, 2014. 
p.8) – a paper commissioned by the UK Prime Minister into the 
Internet of Things and its likely impact, written by the UK’s Chief 
Scientific Advisor, Mark Walport.  Walport highlighted that for the 
system connectivity to work safely and effectively, all data and 
devices must have proportionate “security by default”.  “Standards 
must protect against cybercrime and national security threats, and 
help to ensure that the system is trustworthy and trusted” .  Walport 
acknowledged that as the UK is part of a global economy it would be 
impossible to set a global standard.  However, he recommended that 
the Government “should take a proactive role in driving 
harmonisation of standards internationally”.  CPNI and CESG were 
recommended to work with industry and international partners to 
agree best practice security and privacy principles based on “security 
by default”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.5.406 January 2015 – 10 Steps to Cyber Security re-launched (UK 
GCHQ, 2015) - updated to ensure continuing relevance.  Covering 
ten areas of known best practice not dissimilar to the 20 SANS 
Critical Controls / Cyber Controls: 
1) IRM Regime 
2) Secure configuration 
3) Network Security  
4) Managing user privileges 
5) User education and awareness 
6) Incident management 
7) Malware prevention 
8) Monitoring 
9) Removable media controls  
10) Home and mobile working 
12.5.407 January 2015 – CESG IA Assurance Landscape Survey – headlined 
as such, however, immediately goes on to query cyber security 
measures in place: 
  
2015 Highlights / Lowlights 
 21 million records taken from the US Office of Personnel Management, possibly by 
China.  
 4,000 records, some with “sensitive” information, stolen from the Joint Chiefs civilian 
email system, possibly by Russia. 
 32 million records taken from the “cheating” site, Ashley Maddison.  
 Schrems wins Privacy case against Facebook (Cordery, 2015).  
 487,731,758 leaked records, including TalkTalk. 80% of companies had a security 
incident in 2015 (ISM, 2015).  
 Over 200 billion emails sent every day; 2.5 billion people sending them (Lucas, 2015, 
p.xviii).  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
538 | P a g e  
CESG are undertaking a study to ensure you have access to the right  
‘assurance activities’ - things which give you confidence that you have the 
right level of cyber security in-place. We would welcome your support in this  
by indicating in the grid below how you manage cyber risk in your own 
organisation. For ease we have based the grid on the "10 Steps" with which 
you should be familiar. Your answers will be treated in complete confidence 
and only used to help us understand the effectiveness of our existing 
approaches and any gaps. 
12.5.408 29 May 2015 – NHS Information Governance Toolkit (UK NHS, 
2015) – the 13th version was launched, with requirements addressing 
significant changes, responding to the Caldicott 2 report as well as 
changes in the NHS England Standard contract.  The updates also 
include the removal of references to deprecated standards, 
guidance, knowledge base, publications etc.  The Toolkit includes an 
Incident Reporting Tool for Reporting, Managing and Investigating IG 
and Cyber Security Serious Incidents Requiring Investigation. 
12.5.409 June 2015 – A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review (Anderson, 2015) – a well-received report by David 
Anderson, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.  This 
extensive paper influenced the planned changes to the Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) 2014, and 
examined: 
 The threats to the United Kingdom 
 The capabilities required to combat those threats 
 The safeguards to protect privacy 
 The challenges of changing technologies, and 
 Issues relating to transparency and oversight. 
12.5.410 July 2015 – Cybersecurity Principles and Learning Outcomes for 
Computer Science and IT-Related Degrees: A resource for course 
designers and accreditors, Version 1.1, July 2015 – updating the 
2013 first edition.  The Principles seek to ensure that content will be 
integral to computing course and not just a module added on.  
However, equally the concerns are beyond that of the computing 
sector specifically – they are business issues. ((ISC)², 2015g) 
12.5.411 September 2015 –G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
(OECD, 2015) OECD Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, September 2015 – six principles core to financial 
markets management.  The report identifies that there is no single 
model for corporate governance – although most models have 
common elements. 
12.5.412 6 October 2015 – European Court of Justice (EUCJ) declared 
previous acceptance of US Safe Harbor Privacy Principles invalid.  
This reversed a fifteen-year policy of allowing data governed by 
Directive 95/46/ES to be stored in the US despite the lack of national 
data protection law. 
  
Tackling the barriers to achieving IA 2017 
 
 
539 | P a g e  
12.5.413 December 2015 – General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) put 
forth by the European Commission in 2012, finally agreed upon by 
the European Parliament and Council, set to replace the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/ec.  Approved 14 April 2016. 
12.5.414 December 2015 - Network InfoSec (NIS) Directive – the European 
Council reach an informal agreement with the Parliament on 7 
December and the agreed text was approved by the Member States 
on 18 December.  Awaiting “technical finalisation” at the time of 
thesis completion; expected Spring 2016.  Member States will then 
have 21 months to implement the Directive into law. 
12.5.415 October 2016 – National Cyber Security Centre – NCSC – opened in 
London, with 700 staff tasked with bolstering security against the 
growing online threats from around the globe. The NCSC, believed to 
be a world first with its links to the intelligence service, will have four 
key objectives (UK HMG, 2016a): 
 Understand the cyber security environment, share knowledge and use that 
expertise to identify and address systemic vulnerabilities 
 Reduce risks to the UK by working with public and private sector 
organisations to improve their cyber security – including the provision of 
bespoke advice and guidance, help to design and test networks, and 
exercise response arrangements. 
 Respond to cyber security incidents to reduce the harm they cause to the UK 
- to minimise their damage, help with recovery and learn lessons to reduce 
the chance of recurrence and minimise future impact. For very serious 
incidents, messages may have to be issued on how the public can protect 
themselves. 
 To nurture and grow Britain’s cyber security capability and provide leadership 
on critical national cyber security issues, by identifying threats and 
technology trends. 
12.5.416 3 November 2016 – the next five year National Cyber Security 
Strategy 2016 - 2021 was launched, reflecting a £1.9bn package of 
defence funding designed to improve the UK’s cyber security, 
repeating many of the existing objectives, including the intention to 
ensure that the UK is the most secure place to do business (UK 
HMG, 2016b). 
12.5.417 February 2017 – IAAC Cyber Profession paper (IAAC, 2017) 
produced as a result of starting with the Professionalism findings 
from this research and building upon the work to identify some future 
recommendations for the profession.  This paper introduced the term 
GRADE A to cover the breadth of possible actors across Governors; 
Risk Managers; Auditors/Assessors; Defenders (incorporating 
testers, analysis and operators); Engineers and Architects. 
12.5.418 May 2017 – The UK Government funded an initiative to create a 
“Cyber security Body of Knowledge (CyBoK).  
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12.6 Where is IA Going? 
12.6.1 The move towards digital storage and extensive dissemination of 
information created both opportunity and risk: 
 Opportunity because it has never been easier, given the right management 
systems, to share information across an organisation and with partners on a 
distributed, global basis 
 Risk because, without adequate technical and procedural controls,  
unauthorised and inappropriate usage of information has been made much 
easier.  
12.6.2 The central issue for most organisations is to balance the need to 
generate the maximum return from the value of the information they 
possess which, in practice, can only be achieved by providing 
unfettered access to information to those who have a legitimate need 
with the risk of the damage that unauthorised use can entail.  “IA is 
essential for the delivery of those Government outcomes that are 
dependent on realising the benefits of Information and 
Communications Technology” (UK Cabinet Office, 2007a). 
12.6.3 In the early 2000s, the approach to InfoSec was based on 
conventional network and InfoSec paradigms: 
 Network  security: protection from inbound penetrative attacks by 
unauthorized intruders and viruses by the use of firewalls and virus  
protection software 
 Information security: control of access by the use of passwords and other 
means, providing a simple on/off switch to information (access is either 
granted or not granted).  
12.6.4 These approaches were proven to have the following limitations: 
 Relatively blunt tools, in that they do not specify different circumstances 
which might dictate different access rights 
 They usually say little or nothing about what the individual is permitted to do 
with the information once accessed 
 They depend crucially on the ability of an organisation to accurately identify 
individuals and manage passwords (often a vulnerable area of corporate 
security) 
 Critically, they place no technical controls on the information once it has left 
the secure environment. 
12.6.5 The move to deliver government applications using cloud technology 
services changed information access, management and security 
needs, adding to the need to improve IA but also changing the 
culture to accept these new ways of working. 
12.6.6 In 2010, it was anticipated that mobile access to the web would 
overtake desktop in 2014, data and processing would move to the 
cloud, web would move towards v3.0, the Semantic Web and by then 
payments via mobile technology would be well embedded.  These 
expectations have been largely borne out and the pace of change 
continues unabated. 
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12.6.7 IA was supposed to be moving more towards the ideas of the content 
industry – solving the conundrum of maximising consumer access 
while minimising unauthorised usage (Barlas, 2003). Digital rights 
elements were to be addressed across two categories: 
 Permissions systems which control the use to which a digital file can be put 
and 
 Forensic systems running outside the controlled corporate environment,  
which detect misuse. 
12.6.8 With the continued movement towards “Raw Data Now” (Berners-
Lee, 2010) as part of the UK Government’s Open Data (and thus 
transparency) initiatives to make as much information generated in 
the public sector as available as possible, the pressure was on public 
sector organisations to be able to evidence their datasets and further 
scrutiny will ensue if these prove to be inaccurate.  The Audit 
Commission had already highlighted inadequacies and concerns with 
regard to Data Quality, a subject they have been publishing and 
reporting on for some time, producing standards in 2007.  The 
advice, guidance and best practice is already available and needs to 
be being implemented (Audit Commission, 2010).  As a result of the 
trend towards consumerisation, economically it will not be possible to 
keep building stronger castles (Cole, 2002).  The aim, in line with 
defence in depth strategies, depicted in Figure 94 below, is to limit 
the damage and reduce the threat.  So the IA strategy for the future 
needs to be focused on reducing impacts on the basis of solid risk 
assessment understanding. 
 
Figure 94:  Defence in Depth, Source: Nige the Security Guy (2013) 
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12.6.9 In 2011, the UK Government pledged to spend £650m during the 
subsequent four years on a National Cyber Security Programme to 
protect individuals and the national infrastructure from cyber-attacks 
(ISM, 2010).  However, in March 2016, GCHQ provided commentary 
advising that despite spending nearly £1 billion on cybersecurity, the 
expected benefits had not been realised (Gothard, 2016). 
12.6.10 The public declaration of data loss incidents will be embraced by the 
EU GDPR – General Data Protection Regulation.  In the main, 
breaches are already reported to the Information Commissioner at 
the earliest possible opportunity as, in doing so, the potential 
penalties are reduced by virtue of early communication and co-
operation. 
12.6.11 IA is being lost as a term and cybersecurity appears to be winning 
the day – but in so doing, depth of knowledge is also being lost.  This 
is emblematic of the anti-intellectualism rife in the 21st century and 
will have future consequences, much of which can be foretold. 
 
 
12.7 A Footnote About Risk 
12.7.1 The concept of risk is entirely embedded within the thinking of IA 
practitioners and the available BoK bears this out.  A wider review of 
some key risk papers, as referenced in the Bibliography, attests to 
issues relating to the difficulty and subjectivity of risk thinking.  
People do not get “safer” the more they understand and appreciate 
risk issues – they simply reapportion the risk elsewhere (Shostack 
and Stewart, 2008, p.97). 
12.7.2 Adams’ writing on risk management should be compulsory reading 
as it sets out perspectives of risk assessment in an understandable 
way that help to better design and assess internal and external risks 
within a framework of human factors and impacts (Adams, 1999).  
Recent events provide perspective.  For example, “BP had strict 
guidelines barring employees from carrying a cup of coffee without 
lid-but no standard procedure for how to conduct a ‘negative -
pressure test’, a critical last step in avoiding a well blow out. If do ne 
properly, that test might have saved the Deepwater Horizon” 
(Fortune, 2011).  Unfortunately, there is “no good evidence that 
training users causes them to behave differently weeks or months 
after the training” they may have received (Shostack and Stewart, 
2008, p.141).  Schou and Trimmer (2004) identified, similarly, that 
“Awareness is at the lowest level of the solution to IA.  It is designed 
Information Assurance is actually what is required by us all – in these Internet of 
Things times, in these interconnected times, mobile payments etc.  The need to 
design in security rather than to leave it as an afterthought is well known amongst the 
information security community and has been confirmed in recent research from 
Georgetown University. (Vaidya, 2015) 
Improving IA is a multifaceted endeavour. (Ackerman, 2013) 
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to affect short-term memory.  ...One fundamental goal of training 
programs is motivation of learners to move knowledge and skills from 
short-term memory into long-term memory.  Often, these knowledge 
and skills are chained sequences of behaviour that require higher 
level mental processing” (Ibid. p.iv). 
12.7.3 There are many ways to view risk.  The COSO ERM model provides 
a different categorisation, shown in the example risk model in Table 
31 below: 
 
Environmental 
Risks 
Capital Availability 
Regulatory, Political and Legal 
Financial Markets and Shareholder Relations  
Process Risks 
Process Risks Operations Risk 
Empowerment Risk 
Information Processing / Technology Risk 
Integrity Risk 
Financial Risk 
Information for 
Decision Making 
Operational Risk 
Financial Risk 
Strategic Risk 
Table 31:  Example Risk Model, Source: cited in Bediako (2014), p.30 
12.7.4 Fitzgerald (2012) represented the US Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS 199) System Categorisation showing Potential 
Impact Definitions for Security Objectives below in Table 32, in such 
a way as to show the links between the CIA attributes of security and 
their corresponding risk related impacts. 
FIPS 199 Low Moderate High 
Confidentiality 
Preserving authorized 
restrictions on information 
access and disclosure, 
including means for 
protecting personal 
privacy and proprietary 
information.   
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542] 
The unauthorized 
disclosure - loss - of 
confidentiality could be 
expected to have a 
limited adverse effect on 
organisational operations, 
organisational assets or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized disclosure 
- loss - of confidentiality 
could be expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on 
organisational operations, 
organisational assets or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized 
disclosure - loss - of 
confidentiality could be 
expected to have a severe 
or catastrophic adverse 
effect on organisational 
operations, organisational 
assets or individuals. 
Integrity 
Guarding against 
improper information 
modification or 
destruction, and includes 
ensuring information non-
repudiation and 
authenticity. 
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542] 
The unauthorized 
modif ication or destruction 
- loss - of integrity could 
be expected to have a 
limited adverse effect on 
organisational operations, 
organisational assets or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized 
modif ication or destruction - 
loss - of integrity could be 
expected to have a serious 
adverse effect on 
organisational operations, 
organisational assets or 
individuals. 
The unauthorized 
modif ication or destruction 
- loss - of integrity could 
be expected to have a 
severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect on 
organisational operations, 
organisational assets or 
individuals. 
Availability 
Ensuring timely and 
reliable access to and use 
of information 
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542] 
The disruption of access 
to or use of information or 
an information system – 
i.e. loss of availability 
could be expected to have 
a limited adverse effect 
on organisational 
operations, organisational 
assets or individuals. 
The disruption of access to 
or use of information or an 
information system – i.e. 
loss of availability could be 
expected to have a serious 
adverse effect on 
organisational operations, 
organisational assets or 
individuals. 
The disruption of access 
to or use of information or 
an information system – 
i.e. loss of availability 
could be expected to have 
a severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect on 
organisational operations, 
organisational assets or 
individuals. 
Table 32:  Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and IS, Source: NIST 
(2004a), cited in Fitzgerald (2012), p.126 
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12.7.5 Whilst acknowledging that “Good risk governance processes can 
help us avoid very costly or even deadly fates”, it appears there is a 
gap in understanding how vital this information view is in avoiding 
costly risks being realised (Koenig, 2012, p.185).  Table 33 below 
provides a different set of risk descriptions, than the list in Table 31. 
Type Definition 
Market Risk Changes in exchange rates, interest rates, stock prices, carbon prices 
and other market-priced variables  
Credit Risk Exposure to the failure of a counterparty to a transaction or loan  
Operational 
Risk 
The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems 
Technology 
Risk 
Failure of a technological agent in a system or inadequacy of 
technology  
Reputation 
Risk 
The loss of the value of a brand or ability of an organisation to 
persuade. 
Legal Risk Changes in regulation, failure to comply with existing regulations, 
errors in legal agreements, or litigious actions against an organisation  
Security Risk Employee safety, executive protection services, barriers to access of 
company infrastructure  
Liquidity Risk Loss of short-term financing to facilitate the daily transactions of the 
organisation, or unexpected demands for funds that cannot be met in a 
timely fashion 
Project Risk Delays or dis ruption to the scheduled implementation of key projects. 
Supply Chain 
Risk 
Exposure to other agents in our network upon which we rely to supply 
goods or services that are part of our organisation process or the 
delivery of our goods or services.  
Insurance Risk The management of risk transfer contracts with various insurance and 
re-insurance companies, or the failure to obtain appropriate coverage  
Environmental 
Risk 
The potential impact of our organisation’s activities on its environment 
or changes in the environment in which we operate that affect our 
ability to pursue corporate values  
Business 
Continuity Risk 
Disruption of our organisation’s ability to operate at its normal place or 
using its normal technologies due to natural or other factors.  
Strategic Risk Misalignment of corporate goals with network member needs or 
innovation external to the system that replaces or acts as a substitute 
for an organisation’s goods or services. 
Enterprise Risk Integration of all moving parts in the organisation for maximisation of 
value based on risk-taking capacity. 
Table 33:  Risk Definitions, Source: Koenig (2012), p.160 
 
12.7.6 Whilst positively, there is mention of “security risk”, there is no 
mention of Information Risk, nothing relating to information loss nor 
corruption and yet in the subsequent two years, data breaches 
increased exponentially.  Perhaps it is intended implicitly.  There is 
mention in the book of the Professional Risk Managers’ International 
Association (PRMIA) (Koenig, 2012, p.113) and the fact that 
professional risk managers have only come to occupy important roles 
in their organisations since the mid-1990s and the science of risk 
management has advanced greatly over that period (Ibid. p.159). 
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12.7.7 There is much work to be done between the IA professionals and the 
Internal Audit professionals to ensure that the two directions of 
business risk consideration meet in the middle and adequately 
address the needs of the business(es) being served.  IA 
professionals need to be able to share identified business risks with 
Internal Audit colleagues in advance of them being realised and in 
advance of them being raised to the Board. 
12.7.8 By 2013, the Institute of Internal Auditors had introduced the concept 
of the “Three Lines of Defense” (3LoD), as a mechanism for 
providing effective risk management, shown in Figure 95 below. 
 
 
Figure 95: Three Lines of Defense in Effective Risk Management and Control, Source: IIA Position 
Paper (2013) 
 
12.7.9 Leech (2016) proposed an approach – the Five Lines of Assurance - 
5LoA – which more appropriately addresses this maturity, ensuring 
leadership are positioned as being actively engaged, rather than 
bystanders, as represented in the flow below in Figure 96. 
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Figure 96:  Five Lines of Assurance, Source: Leech (2016) 
 
12.7.10 However, ensuring evidence of the maturity roadmap, the three lines 
of defence were updated to reflect nine lines, as shown in Figure 97 
below, in the context of a robust enterprise risk management 
framework. 
 
Figure 97:  Stakeholders Lines of Defense, Alleyne et al (2016) 
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12.7.11 There is still a journey to be undertaken to understand the overlay of 
the importance of the information lens in the dialogue.  As articulated 
by McKinsey (2009) “Companies are susceptible to interconnected 
cascades of risk”.  Therefore, IA Professionals need a broader 
perspective to address these cascades. 
12.7.12 Information Risk, Reputation Risk, Brand Risk – and the 
management thereof – are integral parts of corporate governance as 
much as they are part of IG.  Training and education, above and 
beyond awareness raising, needs to be tailored to address risk 
perspectives.  The resultant trained professionals then need to be 
empowered to act responsibility in the IA domain and beyond, 
incorporating all aspects of the “corporate defence umbrella”, 
illustrated in Figure 98 below. 
 
 
Figure 98:  Corporate Defence Umbrella, Source: Lyons (2016) 
 
December 2017 
